Why Did Britain Invade Egypt - Essay Example

?………………… ………………… Building an Empire: Why Did Britain Invade Egypt in 1881 Introduction Having presumably started with the first voyages of exploration in the North Atlantic around 1550 – whether inspired by the hope of finding a shortcut to the Indian Ocean, or by the fish-rich waters near Newfoundland – the idea of exploring, and consequently planting a settlement in new lands occupied the English monarchs and ruling elites for centuries (Lloyd 3-25). Levine considers the three Acts of Union that “cemented the legal, political and economic relationships” between England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century to be some the earliest forays of England into colonial rule (1). Being often dubbed “internal colonialism”, those relationships, according to Levine, did little, if anything, to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor, but exploited the divide for colonial ends (11). Insofar as the poor had found a solution, although not always an easy one, to their problems, migrating in large numbers from their impoverished regions into distant lands, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British Empire is largely considered “a significantly Scottish enterprise” (Levine 11). On the other hand, as Judd points out, the primary motive and most powerful drive behind the establishment of the Empire and its global growth was the “desire for profitable trade, plunder and enrichment” (3). Thus, having served many useful purposes, besides bringing wealth to a substantial part of the British population, the Empire was seen as both “a mainstay” of the restored Stuart monarchy after the period of republican rule known as “the Commonwealth and Protectorate” and the stabilising factor in “the post-revolutionary Britain of the late seventeenth century” (Judd 3-4). In regard to the latter, the Empire not only provided employment for a substantial number of young men, which originated in the middle and upper classes, as officers in the colonial services, but it also helped to maintain Britain’s status as “a military power on an equal footing” with the great Continental powers, like France, Germany and Russia (Judd 4). All in all, the British Empire had been perceived as “underwriting the nation’s future in a variety of ways”, including as “a means of uniting the British people in a common cause, a means of “inspiring a sense of international mission”, as well as a “device to blunt the edge of class warfare and egalitarian philosophies”; most notably, however, the Empire helped boost both the confidence of the individual and the nation, stifling fears of degeneration and decline. (Judd 4-5). This essay is intended to review the reasons for the British invasion in Egypt in 1882, including such as the situation in Europe, imperial geopolitics, commercial and strategic interests, as well as domestic economic concerns due to the pressure of increased international competition. The essay argues that the invasion was necessitated by a cocktail of factors, whose relative weigh varied with each stage of the British involvement. 2. Historical Background Porter point out that the British Empire significantly changed over the nineteenth century; thus, the West Indian islands rapidly lost their relative importance in the British trade after 1815, whereas the westward extension of Canada to the Pacific, along with the emergence of six colonies in Australia, transformed not only altered the pattern of investment distribution within the Empire, but also created a number of “self-governing, self-confident ‘settler capitalist societies’”, which generated nearly “16.5 per cent of Britain’s overseas trade” (Porter 5). Despite the changes, India, which underwent a consolidation of the British control over its territories between 1819 and 1870 – remained of “paramount importance in any assessment of Imperial assets” (Porter 5-6). This expansion, in turn, brought about other significant developments, like private investment that benefited some “sections of British society” via finance, employment, shipping and other services, the Imperial use of India’s army, etc.; which, as stated by Sir Charles Dilke, had created a situation where a possible loss of this Imperial asset would represent “a crushing blow” to the British trade (Porter 7). Additionally, the British Empire took control of other Asian holdings, including Hong Kong, Singapore, the Malayan mainland, and parts of Borneo, which however never matched India’s importance; nevertheless, they added to the emerging eastern Empire and became “incorporated into the Empire’s political and economic networks” (Porter 7). During the course of the nineteenth century, Britain had also acquired a few “economically important” strategic coastal outposts in Africa and apparently showed little interest, if any, in conquering another part of the black continent (Parsons 69). In Egypt, the rule of Khedive Ismail is believed to have greatly expanded both revenues and exports, increasing agricultural productivity via expensive irrigation projects, including construction of canals and dams; additionally, 480 kilometres of railroad lines had been laid and over 400 bridges were built, towns were modernised by the expansion of public services, and thousands kilometres of telegraph lines were erected (Fay n.p.). The Egyptian army and bureaucracy were also expanded and modernised, which, along with the reorganised public education and the newly established postal service, marked the beginning of Egypt’s transformation into a modern state (Fay n.p.). The state-building exercise – as represented by the modernisation, diversification and industrial growth during the reign of Khedive Ismail – more or less turned Egypt into an important supplier of raw materials, most notably cotton, and consumer of manufactured goods (Al-Sayyid-Marsot 652). Insofar as Egypt’s development and prosperity were closely tied to the export of cotton, the fluctuations in prices on the world market inevitably made this income rather uncertain; on the other hand, Ismail’s projects entailed more expenditure than the country’s income could provide, so the alternative was found in the form of foreign loans, which amounted to the staggering 100 million pounds by 1875 (Fay n.p.). The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which was financed and build by France under the leadership of Ferdinand de Lesseps, not only seriously challenged British commercial and imperial interests, and especially the British rule in India, but also considerably increased Egypt’s indebtedness (Judd 46; Fay n.p.). Having sold his shares in the Suez Canal Company to the British government in 1875, Khedive Ismail failed to solve the financial problems that were plunging Egypt into bankruptcy, although he succeeded to stave off the crisis for another year (Fay n.p.). Besides, the British government became the largest shareholder in the Suez Canal Company, hence a major player in the Egyptian affairs (Fay n.p.; Judd 47). All this inter alia may have produced the heated controversy in the West in regard to the rule of Ismail and accounted for the bulk of the British attitudes towards the Khedive – mainly held by British administrators, like Lord Cromer and Lord Alfred Milner – who was depicted as a despot “squeezing the peasants” by oppressive taxation and the whip, and ruining the country by his lavish spending (Fay, n.p.). Not surprisingly therefore, on the eve of Britain’s invasion, Egypt was seen as a country, which “during the last half-century had been becoming ever more and more an appanage of Europe, in which thousands of European lives and millions of European capital were at stake”, and which had just been dragged “from the verge of bankruptcy” (Sir Alfred Milner, cited in Al-Sayyid-Marsot 651). In 1879, the forced departure of Khedive Ismail from the country paved the way for intense negotiations between London and Paris about “how best to restart the process of Egyptian financial reform” (Owen 117). The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, took decisive steps to define and guarantee Britain’s interest in the matter; which included the appointment of Baring by the British government “to exercise powers of inspection and advice, not those of direct administration” (Owen 118). Eventually, the negotiations between Salisbury and Waddington – his counterpart in Paris – had led to a period of indirect Anglo-French dual control over the Egyptian affairs, with Baring and de Blignieres as appointed Controllers (Owen 122; Judd 47). The establishment of the Commission of Liquidation on 31 March 1880 brought about growing tensions between the Egyptian government, advised by the Controllers, and the Commission, which were shifted to sections of Egypt’s population, most notably army officers who were either forcibly retired or remained resentful at their continued subordination to Turco-Circassian commanders (Owen 137). As of 1881, the power struggle between the Commission and the Controllers, along with the popular anti-European feeling and the strong sense of injustice amongst the Egyptian army officers, eventually led to a mutiny and the consequent removal of the war minister; later on that year, Urabi used once again the threat of the military’s bayonets to apply pressure on the Khedive, demanding an increase in military strength and expenditures, and the Khedive yielded to his demands again (Raugh xviii). Thus, Colonel Urabi gained a reputation and prestige as a “fearless nationalist leader”, which rapidly spread throughout the country (Raugh xviii). The “Joint Anglo-French Note”, published on January 8, 1882, which was aimed at reinforcing the Khedive’s authority, actually aggravated the situation and a new government came in power with Urabi as war minister (Fay n.p.; Raugh xix). The anti-European mood and tension among the Egyptian army threatened not only stability of the country but also the public safety, as well as the safety of the nearly 90 000 Europeans who lived in Egypt (Raugh xix). In order to support the Khedive and protect the Europeans, Britain and France dispatched naval squadrons to Alexandria in May 1882; five days later, both great powers demanded the dismissal of the nationalist leader and the entire government resigned in protest (Raugh xix). Urabi, in turn, threatened the Khedive with being deposed and the Khedive consented, just as he did to the earlier Anglo-French demand for Urabi’s dismissal; being fed by Urabi’s victory, the nationalist sentiments, along with anti-Christian emotions, grew stronger and soon exploded into a riot in Alexandria on June 11, 1882 (Raugh xix). The serious anti-European riot in Alexandria signalled the British to anticipate a risk to their control over the Suez Canal, hence a threat to their lifeline to India (Judd 47; Fay n.p.). Therefore, the Gladstone Government considered the military intervention as a device to solve the ongoing Egyptian crisis and began to draw contingency plans to send expeditionary force to the region (Raugh xix). Although the expeditionary unit was initially intended only to protect the Suez Canal, two infantry battalions and an engineer company, under the command of Major General Sir Archibald Alison, were despatched from Malta to Cyprus in order to assist the Royal Navy (Raugh xix). While the Egyptians continued fortifying Alexandria, the British naval commander, Admiral Sir Seymour, issued an ultimatum on July 10, 1882, demanding the surrender of the forts within twenty-four hours (Raugh xix). Since France refused to cooperate with Britain in this action and withdrew its naval squadron from Alexandria that very night; following the expiry of the ultimatum, the British fleet began bombarding Alexandria and the Egyptian forts had been silenced by nightfall (Judd 47; Fay n.p.; Raugh xix). The nationalist leader, Urabi, who headed the Egyptian forces, withdrew his troops while British landing parties, later reinforced by Sir Alison’s troops, were sent into Alexandria to occupy the city and restore the order (Raugh xix; Fay n.p.). 3. The British Invasion of 1882 Subsequently, over 16 000 soldiers were sent to Egypt from Britain, another 7 600 from Mediterranean garrisons, and nearly 7 000 from India; this formidable force, under the command of General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, began to disembark at Alexandria on August 12, 1882, with the objectives to “seize the Suez Canal to ensure the maintenance of free passage, destroy Arabi’s army, and capture the Egyptian capital of Cairo” (Raugh xx). In result, two centres of political power temporarily emerged in Egypt, namely Alexandria where the British–backed Khedive exercised his authority, though limited in territorial terms, and Cairo, along with the provinces, which was under the control of Urabi (Fay n.p.). General Wolseley decided to shift his base of operations on the western side of the Suez Canal, in order to avoid fighting in the flooded irrigation ditches of the Delta and the treacherous desert west of Cairo; instead he intended to attack westward to the Egyptian capital, parallel to a railway and the Sweetwater Canal, which was the shortest land route to Cairo and to the main camp of the Egyptian troops at Tel el-Kebir (Raugh xx). Additionally, Wolseley devised a diversionary operation intended to deceive Urabi about the British intentions, which included a coordinated ground and naval attack on the Egyptian forts at Abukir Bay, situated some thirty miles to the east of Alexandria (Raugh xx). Thus, by 20 August, the British naval forces had secured the key points and entire length of the Suez Canal, and on 13 September 1882, the British troops defeated the Egyptian army at Tel el-Kebir; the battle had been won at “a relatively low cost of nearly 500 British casualties in total, of which 57 dead, 382 wounded and 30 men missing, as against about 2000 Egyptian deaths (Raugh xx). Following the defeat of the Egyptian forces at Tel el-Kebir, Urabi surrendered two days later, namely on 14 September 1882, and Wolseley entered the Egyptian capital on September 15; thus, the war was over (Raugh xx). 4. The motives behind the 1882 British Invasion in Egypt Insofar as the British appeared not that tempted to enlarge their possessions in Africa until the second half of the nineteenth century, the invasion of Egypt in 1882 is considered, more often than not, an imperial enterprise aimed at securing Britain’s commercial interests and the British rule in India. The building of the Suez Canal in mid-nineteenth century actually denoted a likely threat to what was considered the most valuable possession of the British crown, to the degree that the Canal allowed a short and easy access to the emerging eastern British Empire. Additionally, the British involvement in the Suez Canal Company, through the acquisition of Egypt’s shares, necessitated the defence of considerable British investments in the region, along with the lives of numerous British citizens living and working in Egypt by then, hence the 1882 intervention could be also regarded as a response to immediate pressures from the ongoing crisis. Nevertheless, there are deeper and broader reasons, besides the aforementioned ones, that brought almost 30 000 British soldiers, under General Sir Wolseley, to the shores of Egypt in 1882. First and foremost, it was the globally increased competition with foreign rivals, as against the prospect of a global depression, which provoked worries amongst British manufactures and merchants, and made them lobby the government to protect their interests and expand the overseas markets (Parsons 69). Thus, the economic and political competition in Europe produced quite an impact on British imperial affairs, which, by the way, had been always the case ever since the outset of the Empire, forcing the British political leaders to consider the economic potential of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, and Egypt in particular (Parsons 70); moreover, Egypt was already a significant supplier of raw materials, most notably cotton, to the European markets. Additionally, the British manufacturing sector had been in decline, as compared to Britain’s continental and North American rivals, so the British economy was predominantly driven by the banking sector and the imports of food and raw materials. Thus, the outburst of a “new’ wave of imperialism in Africa could be interpreted as “a speculative effort” by Britain, along with France and the other imperial powers, to make the African societies more receptive to European commercial contracts and investments (Parsons 70). On the other hand, British strategic considerations played a significant role in substantiating the 1882 invasion, insofar as there were growing pressures from the German and French imperialism; which necessitated the defence of Britain’s African interests (Parsons 70). All these, as combined with the strategic proximity of Egypt to important routes to India and the emerging eastern Empire – the Suez Canal – along with the substantial levels of British investment in the country, inevitably led to the arrival of the British fleet to the shore of Alexandria and, consequently, the British expeditionary troops’ march towards the Egyptian capital Cairo. 5. Conclusion All in all, the reasons for the British invasion in Egypt in 1882 included a cocktail of imperial geopolitics and strategic considerations, commercial and financial interests of the British elite, as well as domestic economic concerns due to the pressure of increased international competition, whose relative weigh varied with each stage of the British involvement. Thus, while the commercial and financial interests brought Britain into the region, the defence of those interests during the crisis and, more importantly, the strategic considerations brought about the military intervention. However, as Judd points out, the Empire so successfully served to camouflage “the increasing nakedness of Britain’s claim to be a truly great power” that by the end of the nineteenth century Germany, Italy and France rushed into a competition to acquire colonial possessions in Africa, being based on the assumption that imperial possessions “somehow guaranteed” the great-power status (4). In that regard, the latter could be also considered among the main reasons behind Britain’s decision to invade Egypt in 1882. Works Cited Al-Sayyid-Marsot, Afaf L. “The British Occupation of Egypt from 1882”. The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century. Ed. Andrew Porter. Vol. III. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1999. Print. Fay, Mary Ann. “Historical Setting – From Intervention to Occupation, 1876-1882”. Egypt: A Country Study. Ed. Metz, Helen C. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, December 1990. Web. 26 November 2013. ---. “Historical Setting – Khedive Ismail, 1863-79”. Egypt: A Country Study. Ed. Metz, Helen C. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, December 1990. Web. 26 November 2013. < http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+eg0034)> Judd, Denis. Empire: The British Imperial Experience, from 1765 to the Present. New York: Basic Books, 1996. Print. ---. “The World’s First Superpower: The Rise of the British Empire from 1497 to 1901”. The Modern Scholar. Recorded Books, LLC, 2004. Course Guide. < http://www.oneclickaudio.com/courses_pdf/UT048.pdf> Levine, Philippa. The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007. Print. Lloyd, Trevor O. Empire: The History of the British Empire. London: Hambledon and London, 2001. Print. Owen, Roger. Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2004. Print. Parsons, Timothy. British Imperial Century, 1815 – 1914: A World History Perspective. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999. Print. Porter, Andrew. Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century. The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century. Ed. Andrew Porter. Vol. III. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1999. 1 – 30. Print. Raugh, Jr., Harold E. The Victorians at War, 1815 – 1914: An Encyclopedia of British Military History. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC – CLIO, Inc., 2004, Print. Read More