History of Europe in the 20th century. Were conservatives responsible for the rise of Hitler - Research Paper Example

of the of the concerned History and Political Science 5 September History of Europe in the 20th Century. Were Conservatives Responsible for the Rise of Hitler? Introduction After the end of the World War I, the United States of America wanted the allies to pursue a benign attitude towards Germany (Greene, 1967, p. 104). Sadly, the other allies did not think so. The French and the British proceeded with a spirit of vengeance towards the Germans, an approach that eventually culminated into the Treaty of Versailles (Greene, 1967, p. 14). This treaty deprived the Germans of many overseas colonies and large tracts of land rich in natural resources. Besides, as per the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was also bound to compensate France and the UK for the damages caused in the War. The German masses had little say in this arrangement as Germany was simply not in a position to question the terms set by the allies. There is no denying the fact that the life for the ordinary Germans got quite difficult and worrisome after the culmination of this treaty. Germany was pushed to borrow considerably from the United States of America, to compensate the UK and France (Gibbons, 1982, p. 72). The Great Depression in the late 20s made it almost utterly difficult for the Americans to lend more money to Germany. The fall of the imperial Germany gave way to the rise of parliamentary parties interested in running the political affairs in the defeated nation. It goes without saying that a fair number of political parties and mainstream leaders in the war ravaged Germany were affiliated to a conservative frame of mind and political thought. The nation was already suffering from the guilt of defeat and national humiliation. Above it, it was required to pay heavily in terms of compensation. The political parties and groups supporting the infant Weimar Republic were they Democrats, Socialists or Catholics, were strongly denounced by the Conservative Nationalists (Frye, 1985, p. 169). Hence, it was in the background of a nationwide social and political crisis, that the German Conservatives resorted to political machinations, which led to the rise of Hitler. Economic Situation in the Post War Germany In the period 1924-1928, the economic situation in Germany was somewhat stable. However, this stability was deceptive and stood on hollow economic foundations. The German investments and economic recovery in a post war scenario relied heavily on the loans extended by the US. With the crash of the Wall Street in 1929, the Americans were simply left unable to support the German recovery and economic growth. As the impact of the US economic depression was felt universally, so Germans were utterly not in a position to check its fallout on the German society and economy. The industrial production in Germany plummeted threateningly, the wages crashed and the workers were left jobless (Goemans, 2000, p. 173). Such circumstances left the German masses weary, anxious and scared. The Germans resorted to the crisis by opting for a reckless printing of currency, resulting in a devaluation of currency and rampant and unchecked inflation (Braun, 1990, p. 39; Eubank, 2004, p. 9)). Political Situation in the Post War Germany Just when the Weimar Republic was in its nascent stages, Germany witnessed the rise of radical political thoughts in the form of communists, throughout the length and breadth of the Republic (Bessel, 1993, p. 57). The communists gained hold in many German towns and villages. The political atmosphere in Berlin was strongly in favor of a USSR style of governance. Still the Weimar Republic accrued immense support in the form of democrats, Catholics and socialists (Mueller, 2000, p. 46). The Weimer Republic managed to restrain the communists with a strong hand. The post war Germany faced a twin pronged problem. Both the communists and hardcore nationalists were in the favor of a radical solution to the German problems and issues (Kolb, 2005, p. 39). It was such a political environment marred by economic crisis and a loss of faith in the conventional political thoughts that the conservatives saw a chance to place a government that though on the surface seemed radical, but in spirit stood subservient to their interests (Lee, 1998, p. 101). Not to mention that Hitler stood to be a prime candidate thought to be capable of furthering the conservative agenda, while for all intents and purposes seeming radical. The German conservatives were confident that once in power; they will be able to use Hitler to further their agenda. Social Atmosphere in the Post War Germany A festering feeling of guilt and national humiliation loaded with the burden of paying a gargantuan compensation to the victorious allies saw the emergence of a sentiment of fear and anxiety amongst common Germans. With the irreparable loss in the value of currency, the German middle class and the working class had to bear the pain of watching their hard earned money and savings go down the drain in a matter of days (Davis, 2000, p. 38). Small businesses and retailers had to witness the ruin of their enterprises, courtesy the economic instability and uncertainty gripping the post war Germany. A deeply hurt and insecure working class along with a soaring number of unemployed people gave way to a feeling of disgust towards the political class in favor of liberal solutions and restraint (Cavendish, 2002, p. 782). The economic, political and social environment was marked by a lack of certainty, necessitated for some sort of change, even if it happened to be a radical solution (Turk, 1999, p. 103). The German conservatives were very much aware of the public sentiment and knew well that if they managed to place a radical like Hitler in the scheme of things who promised stability, order and safety; the masses will vouch for him (Turk, 1999, 109). After all, the masses needed certainty and Hitler seemed just the right kind of radical who was capable of ushering in stability. After a perusal of the general economic, political and social atmosphere in the post war Germany, any attempt to understand the rise of Hitler would be utterly incomplete, without delving on the role played by conservatives like Kurt Von Schleicher, Franz Von Papen and Alfred Hugenberg in this context. To have valid insight into the rise of Hitler and the conservative role in it, it is imperative to analyze the role played by the salient conservative politicians of those times. Kurt Von Schleicher Without understanding the politics and plans of Kurt Von Schleicher, it is next to impossible to have a meaningful insight into the rise of Hitler. Schleicher was an army general. Though he was gifted in the art of politics, being a nationalist conservative, it was his firm belief that the German army was the primary institution binding the German society and it was only the army that could effectively maintain some sort of political tranquility in Germany (Hiden, 1996, p. 219). Kurt Von Schleicher also happened to be the last chancellor of the Weimer Republic. It was but obvious to Kurt Von Schleicher that the Treaty of Versailles placed severe economic and political restrictions on Germany. In that context Schleicher had made himself the most ardent supporter of the role of army in achieving stability in Germany. He dealt with his political opponents posing as the voice of the German army and do believed that the army stood to be the ultimate representative of the national interests and traditions. In that context, Kurt Von Schleicher had certainly succeeded in adding to his personal stake in the German polity by 1930. It needs to be mentioned that Schleicher was extremely impressed by the ability of Nazis to garner mass support. However, Kurt Von Schleicher failed to estimate the political acumen and mass support for Hitler in the times marred by unrest and economic turmoil. The general was simply happy with the hope that one could use the Nazis as a viable opposition to democrats of all hues and shades (MacCormick, 1999, p. 1097). He actually looked forward to use Hitler as a prop for the contemporary government and as counterweight to the contrary political movements. Though Kurt Von Schleicher was much aware of the danger that came as Hitler, the general was definitely impressed by Hitler’s ability to project himself as a mass leader. The whole idea of Kurt Von Schleicher was to use Hitler’s superiority in terms of numbers and mass support to bolster the presidential form of government (Darby, 2010, p. 47). Regarding that Schleicher had several meetings with Hitler. Schleicher strongly believed that he could successfully balance the need for a strong and democratic government against the rapacious Nazi yearning for dictatorial powers (Wheeler-Bennett, 1954, p. 209). Schleicher used both deception and intrigue, hoping to dilute the influence of Nazis. Schleicher carried on with his political machinations, believing that somehow he would be able to divest the Nazis of their revolutionary zeal. He believed he could tame Hitler by offering him a cabinet post or by creating dissensions in the Nazi party (Wheeler-Bennett, 1954, p. 226). However, as is but evident, Schleicher utterly failed to restrain the Nazis, courtesy his inability to underestimate Hitler’s drive for absolute power. By destabilizing the Weimer Republic and giving a political space to Nazis, the conservative Schleicher gave a firm footing to the Nazi hold on the German polity. Franz Von Papen Franz Von Papen belonged to an aristocratic, conservative family. Papen joined the German army and served as a general staff officer during the outbreak of the World War I. After the end of the First World War, Franz Von Papen served as a functionary in the Catholic Centre Party. It was during this time that Papen got elected to the Reichstag. Papen also gained a decisive stake in the leading newspaper of those times, Germania. Papen left no stone unturned to use Germania as a mouthpiece for his ultra conservative, right wing views. However, not only Papen did not succeed in this ploy, but his zeal as an upholder of conservative ideas made him considered being an outsider in the Catholic Centre Party. It ought to be mentioned that Papen commanded a meager political following, therefore when he was appointed the chancellor by Paul Von Hindenburg; it came as a great surprise to the German masses and political circles (Bithell, 1955, p. 160). Once Papen gained a stake in the German polity, the risky idea of using the Nazis to strengthen his hold over Germany gained a ground in his mind (Bithell, 1955, p. 160). He initiated the steps to forge a league with Hitler by lifting the ban on SA. In that context Papen also resorted to dissolving the Social Democratic Party led government in Prussia. When forced to resign from the post of Chancellor, courtesy the success of Schleicher in turning many ministers against his government, Papen resorted to plotting with Hitler to oust Schleicher, who at that time rose to be the chancellor (Redlich, 1999, p. 54). It was Papen who rallied around himself the support of varied conservative industrial and corporate leaders, to be able to suggest President Paul Von Hindenburg to make Hitler the chancellor of Germany (Stackelberg, 1999, p. 94). While doing so, all the time Papen believed that he will be able to use Hitler to support the conservative cause, while restraining his panache for absolute power (Stackelberg, 1999, p. 94). Hitler well succeeded in pretending to the self righteous and conceited conservative leaders like Kurt Von Schleicher and Franz Von Papen that he was serving them in achieving their aims, till he afforded to ditch them, when placed soundly in power. It goes without saying that Franz Van Papen guided by his egotistic lack of conscience, was never able to grasp the possible risks involved in placing Hitler in the saddle. No wonder, Hitler did succeed in exploiting the conservative ladder in times marked by uncertainty and economic depression, to rise to be the one and only power centre in Germany. Conservative Mindset and the Rise of Hitler There is no denying the fact that the conservatives played a pivotal role in the rise of Hitler. This happened because the conservatives lacked a quintessential grip over the realities of those times. As, it is a known fact that in Germany, the times before the rise of Hitler were defined by many political, social and economic turmoil, it was the inability of the conservatives to have a grip over these pressing and immediate realities, which led to the rise of Hitler. They simply failed to understand the masses’ need for order and stability. It was a great misconception of the conservatives that all conservative political movements, including the rise of the Nazi Party were directed towards a common movement that was affiliated to common aims. They simply failed to grasp the verve of the Nazis for absolute power. All the times conservatives kept on believing that they will eventually succeed in winning over the Nazis to their cause. Besides they also believed that they will be able to placate the Nazis by offering to Hitler a place in the overall power sharing arrangement or by creating dissensions in the Nazi party. The other blunder on the part of conservatives was their able to estimate the role and stake of the working and middle class in the German polity. There existed a prominent illusion amongst the conservatives that their vision and values were of paramount importance in the shaping of the future Germany. The simply failed to realize the alienation of the masses and their yearning for sort of the semblance of an economic and political order in Germany. To the average Germans anything, even a dictatorship was acceptable, considering their disillusionment with the political handling of the economic and social unrest in Germany. Being unaware of this mass predilection towards opting for stability in whatever guise it may come; the conservatives committed the blunder of courting Hitler and his Nazi party. They underestimated the Hitler’s ability to continue to play along with them, till he got a chance for the absolute dictatorship. Conclusion There is no denying the fact that conservatives had a major role in the rise of Hitler. The irony was that the conservative politicians were as much self conceited in their aim to grasp power as Hitler. In that perspective they admired the ability of Hitler to garner the mass support around him. The conservatives were deluded enough to believe that Hitler was not much of a threat and they could easily solicit the support of Hitler for their cause, while at the same time diluting the sway of Hitler by appealing to his greed for power or by creating dissensions in the Nazi Party. Over and above it, it was a grave mistake on the part of the conservatives to underestimate the extent and sway of the working class need for economic and political stability in Germany. It was the conservative hankering for power that led to the rise of the uncontrollable and implacable demon called Hitler. Reference List Bessel, Richard 1993, Germany after the First World War, Oxford University Press, London. Bithell, Jethro 1955, Germany, a Companion to German Studies, Methuen, London. Braun, Hans-Joachim, 1990, The German Economy in the 20th Century, Routledge, London. Cavendish, Marshall 2002, History of the World War I Volume III, Marshall Cavendish, New York. Darby, Graham 2010, ‘Hitler’s Rise and Weimar’s Demise: Graham Darby Points to Common Errors and Omissions that should be Avoided’, History Review, Vol. 67, 42-49. Davis, Belinda J 2000, Home Fires Burning, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC. Eubank, Keith 2004, The Origins of World War II, Harlum Davidson, Wheeling, IL. Frye, Bruce B 1985, Liberal Democrats in Weimar Republic, Illinois University Press, Carbondale. Gibbons, Herbert Adams 1982, Europe Since 1918, The Century Co., New York. Goemans, HE 2000, War and Punishment, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Greene, Theodre P 1957, Wilson at Versailles, DC Heath, Boston. Hiden, John 1996, Republican and Fascist Germany, Longman, London. Kolb, Eberhard 2005, The Weimar Republic, Routledge, London. Lee, Stephen J 1998, The Weimar Republic, Routledge, London. MacCormick, Neil 1999, ‘The Jurisprudence, Democracy and the Death of Weimer Republic’, Texas Law Review, Vol. 77, no. 4, 1095-1100. 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