Ethical Dissonance and Ethical Divide on Enhancers - Essay Example

Ethical Dissonance and Ethical Divide on Enhancers My quick search in the academic journals and internet literature failed to provide a good definition of ethical dissonance that has been adopted or shared by several academic professions. However, a dictionary definition of dissonance is “lack of agreement” and, in music, dissonance means a “combination of musical notes that sound harsh together” (Hornby 424). Thus, this writer believes that it is viable to assert that within context of the article by Gary Stix, the ethical dissonance discussed in the article refers to the divergence or variety of views on whether it is alright or ethical for medical professionals to prescribe drugs claiming to have the ability to enhance mental or physical capacities. Of course, in psychology, we have Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance that says, “If a person holds two cognitions that are psychologically inconsistent, he experiences dissonance: a negative state (not unlike hunger or thirst)” (Aronson 128). Elliot Aronson elaborated that Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance hold that the experience of dissonance is “unpleasant” and, thus, “the person will strive to reduce it----usually by struggling to find a way to change one or both cognitions to make them more consistent with one another” (128). According to Aronson, Festinger integrated the dynamic marriage between the cognitive and the motivational (128). Thus, given the Aronson review, it is just as viable to define ethical dissonance as the unpleasant experience of having two divergent ethical perspectives on the use of drugs that enhance or that claim to enhance physical and mental capacities. Following Aronson’s interpretation on Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance, the ethical dissonance described to modify one or both ethical perspectives to make them consistent with one another because of discomfort. However, Gary Stix’s article appeared in a neuroscience and not in a psychology topic of a journal and we need not expect Gary Stix’s notion of ethical dissonance to be compliant with the Aronson and Festinger notion. It remains viable though to define ethical dissonance as the unpleasant experience of having two ethical perspectives to live by where the individual has to struggle to modify one or both ethical perspectives within himself or herself to make his or her perspective consistent. Smith and others defined cognitive dissonance theory as a theory that “assumes that there is a drive toward cognitive consistency, meaning that two cognitions---or thoughts---that are inconsistent will produce discomfort, which will in turn motivate the person to remove the inconsistency and bring the cognitions into harmony” (Appendix G-3). Ethical perspectives, after all, are also types of cognition. My interpretation of the Gary Stix assertions on ethical dissonance is that there are three ethical perspectives on the use of drugs or medical treatments or procedures for boosting physical or mental capacities or enhancers (the focus of the Stix article was on the cognitive). The first ethical perspective holds that physical and cognitive enhancers are unnecessary, unfair, and that it is improper to use enhancers or employ medical procedures that would boost one’s physical or cognitive capacities except for such conditions like dementia, Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s patients. The premise for the first ethical perspective is not evidence but perspective. The ethical perspective assumes that enhancers do work. The assertion that the use of enhancers is unfair or that it is improper involves perception and not evidence. The second ethical perspective hold that enhancers or medical procedures that boost physical or cognitive capacities are similar to wearing eyeglasses and that we must dispense with the notion that drugs or medical procedures are only for illnesses. Related to this, Stix noted that an article from an influential journal in 2008 raised “the prospect of a shift away from the notion of drugs as a treatment primarily for illness” (48). The article even suggested that there are bright prospects that psychostimulants will be widely-available “to the able-minded to improve performance in the classroom or the boardroom, provided the drugs are judged to be safe and effective enough for healthy people” (Stix 48). The second perspective emphasizes that there is nothing wrong in using drugs or employing medical procedures that enhance physical or mental capacities. The perspective is consistent with the H+ notion of humanity wherein man can overcome his or her mental or physical limitations through advanced technologies like stem cells, robotics, cognition-enhancing drugs, medical procedures, and drugs (Stix 46). The drug or medical procedures can range from those that simply enhance wakefulness to those that can improve memory or boost intelligence or physical prowess (Stix 47, 49-50). Cognitive enhancers like those that claim to improve concentration constitute one type of mental capacity enhancing or boosting drugs (Stix 48). Like the first perspective, the second perspective is a perception of what is proper and does not require evidence. Finally, the third ethical perspective dismisses that the ethical issue does not exist at all because cognitive enhancers do not work anyway. It is this perspective that requires evidence. As mentioned, although the Stix article covered physical enhancers, the focus and emphasis of the Stix article was on cognitive enhancers. Thus, for instance, some scientists argue that amphetamines only tend to make us feel we are performing well when in fact we are not (Stix 52). According to Stix, the US and British studies of the 1940s provide evidence for this assertion on amphetamines (52). Methylphenidate has been argued to improve performance on several measures but not on others (Stix 52). Further, Methylphenidate can also lead to drug abuse and implies more harm than benefits for cognitive abilities. The evidence for some of the claims on the inefficacy of methylphenidate can be found in the studies conducted by University of Cambridge researchers (Stix 52). Modafinil can improve one’s performance in recalling numerical sequences but not on many other cognitive abilities but not on many others and the drug affect different individuals differently thereby preventing us to anticipate the effect of the drug. The 2003 study of Sahakian and Robbins provides evidence for this assertion on the efficacy of modafinil (Stix 53). In sum, the third ethical perspective holds that there are no cognitive enhancers to worry about in the first place and, therefore, the debate between the first and second perspective revolves on a false issue (Stix 49). In addition, both the first and the third perspective can point out or highlight that to the extent that the enhancers are addictive, some people can have declining cognitive performance with the use of enhancers, at least in the long term if not in the immediate term (Stix 49). The first two ethical perspectives presume that the drugs that are claimed to improve capacities, including cognitive capacities, are better than placebos be they in “attention, memory or ‘executive function’ (planning and abstract reasoning, for instance)” (Stix 48). A discourse on which of the first two ethical perspective is appropriate provided the basis for neuroethics or the discipline “meant in part to address the moral and social questions raised by cognition-enhancing drugs and devices (brain implants and the like)” (Stix 48). My personal position on the ethical divide is to treat the enhancers as regulated drugs when science is able to prove adequately that they can provide cognitive or physical benefits and when it can be shown that the drugs are not habit or vice-forming nor addictive. However, when the drug is habit or vice-forming then the drug could either be banned or regulated after debates based on scientific studies have been conducted. If there are real benefits on the use of drugs, let the ethical issue on the use of enhancers be resolved by the individuals. However, regulation or even banning the use of the drug should be maintained as options for the policy makers when it is clear that risks or harms exceed the benefits from using the enhancers or that the enhancers promote vice or are addictive. Work Cited Aronson, Elliot. “Back to the Future: Retrospective Review of Leon Festinger’s ‘Theory of Cognitive Dissonance’”. The American Journal of Psychology 110.1 (Spring, 1997): 127-137. Hornby, Albert. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Smith, Edward, Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Barbara Fredrickson, and Geoffrey Loftus. Atkinson & Hilgard’s Introduction to Psychology. 14th ed. Thomson Wadsworth: 2003. Stix, Gary. “Turbocharging the Brain.” Scientific American October 2009: 46- 55. Read More