Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion, Windsor Castle Fire, and Other Great Fires - Case Study Example

FIRE CASE STUDIES The BLEVE: LPG filling station, Korea 1998 The BLEVE (Boiling liquid Expanding vapor Explosion) incident occurred in Korea on 11th of September 1998.The fire incident occurred as a result of rapture of the LPG vessel following corrosion of the vessel that had resulted into gas leaks. The cause of the fire was initiated by electrical spark due to welding that was taking place. The welder who was a smoker had just lit a cigarette using a gas lighter. The fire was therefore triggered by either the electrical sparks that ignited the gaseous vapors or the cigarette gas fire lighter that was lit by the smoker. The fire spread through vapor cloud explosion following change of physical state of LPG into gas. The gas molecules spread through diffusion; thus movement of molecules from their point of high concentration to their point of low concentration through concentration gradient. There was failure of fire and safety regulation at the time of incident since all fire causing measures like a lit matchstick and burning metals especially welding when LPG is offloading or loading were not taken into consideration. The management failed to follow fire and safety regulation by allowing fire to occur within proximity of the LPG vessel. The management of the vessel was not carrying out risk assessment of the vessel via routine check ups to ensure the vessel complied with standards of pressure for the vessel. Evidence of corrosion was a clear sign of negligence in maintenance of the LPG vessel (Dae-Won lee et al., 2004; Sliwinski-korell et al, A. 1988). HISTORIC: Windsor castle fire, 1992 The Windsor castle fire incident occurred on Friday 20th November 1992 in the queen’s private chapel at 11.33 A.M. The fire was caused by a 1000 watt hydrogen lamp that was being used by a paint restorer (Wikipedia, 1992; bbc correspondent, 1992). Hydrogen gas is the lightest gas with a relative molecular mass of two grams. Hydrogen reacts with oxygen exothermically and explosively in an open system to produce water vapor and therefore recommendation for use of hydrogen lamp was an overlook with respect to fire safety. It is the explosive nature of the reaction of hydrogen and oxygen that initiated the spread of fire and then the spread of the fire was propagated after it ignited a curtain. As a result of fire darts and presence of combustible materials, the risk of spread of fire increased. The risk of spread of fire was augmented by congestion of combustible artwork that included a varied collection of art, armour, furniture and sculptures. There were no measures in place to ensure the building conformed to fire risk spread assessment with regard to the minimum distance between buildings as a measure to combat spread of fire. The paint restorer did not take precautions to ensure the 1000 watt hydrogen lamp was cautiously used according to its fire safety precautions. The management did not ensure the use of the hydrogen lamp conformed to fire risks and safety for use. Other non-reactive gases should have been used like neon, helium or Argon that are inert and safe to use. The castle did not have automatic water sprinkler systems to help in timely control of the fire. Historic: The great fire of London, 1666 The great fire of London of the year 1666 occurred on Sunday 2nd September (Bell, 1971). The fire was caused by a small fire that broke out in the residence of a Baker’s shop known as Thomas Farriner along the then pudding lane (Clout, 1999). The maid had failed to put off the fire in the ovens. The mechanism of spread of the fire was subject to three main factors. First, the weather was hot and dry (Ellis, 1986) and the easterly winds that swept across London were strong. Second, buildings in London at that time were made up of wood that is a highly combustible material (Lang, 1956: (Weiis, 1968)). In the presence of strong winds the distances between the houses was very small such that darting flames in one building or structure ignited fire in the neighboring structures (Schofield, 1954). Third, presence of hay and feed of animals provided more fuel for the fire (Porter, 1996). This was increased by other combustible materials like oil, hemp, coal and spirits. Failure of fire safety precautions were evident with the maid who failed to put off the fire in the oven. The London city planning department had also failed to ensure the London city conformed to fire safety and regulations standards and to ensure the buildings adhered to minimum building to building distance. The inter-distance between buildings was not enough to stop spread of fire via fire darts. The London fire brigade was using methods for extinguishing fire that were not competent enough to handle the great inferno. Use of water buckets to extinguish the fire was not likely to have any effect on the fire. There were no wind breakers that could have at least made extinguishing of the fire easier by reducing the force of wind. The London city planning department did not learn from4 a previous fire tragedy of 1633 that had similar economic and life losses. Tunnel fires: King cross Underground fire 1987 The King’s cross underground fire occurred on November 1987.The fire incident occurred as a result of fire that had broken out in one of the escalators whose underlying cause was a burning cigarette butt or a burning matchstick dropped by a cigarette smoker. The spread of fire was catalyzed by presence of litter and wood that had been used to make the escalator. Other combustible substances that fueled spread of the fire were grease and hydrocarbons that support oxidative combustion. Failure of measures on fire and safety was evident in permitting smoking to take place in the underground station and failure of the management to maintain high standards of cleanliness to remove any grease and hydrocarbon fuels. The British Transport police did little to stop the spread of the fire. There were no trained personnel to handle fires in tunnels and there was failure to carry out routine fire risk assessment. The railway station did not have a fire brigade to respond immediately to fire incidents (Derek J, 1999: 362-369). Entertainment complex: The Bradford city football stadium fire, 1985 The Bradford city stadium fire incident occurred on Saturday, 11th may 1985 (bbc Corespondent, 1985). The Flash fire was caused by a burning cigarette butt or a dropped match stick by a cigarette smoker. The football match was between Bradford city and Lincoln city and more than 11,000 football fans were in attendance During the fire incident 52 people are on record to have lost their lives. 256 football fans were admitted in hospital with 30-60%burns.The higher number of deaths was elderly persons and children who were stumbled upon as the mass of fans escaped from being trapped in the inferno. Others died of carbon monoxide poisoning, respiratory problems or death of brain cells due to carbon monoxide poisoning and respiratory problems. The spread of the fire was fueled by litter beneath the seats and dry grass and presence of perspiration that increased temperature of air also contributed into spread of the fire. The Bradford city stadium management failed to carry out fire assessment and the stadium was littered with many papers, litter grass and other combustible materials. The management should also have banned smoking in the stadium as a matter of health concern to fans and to reduce risk of choking. The wooden stands also played a great role in the spread of the fire. The management did not have measures in place to contain fans within 30 meters of a manned exit. The requirement of a possible 150 second evacuation of the stadium was not implemented. Tunnel fires: Channel, Tunnel 1996 The first English Channel turned fire incident (NFPA, 1996) occurred on November, 18th 1996 and involved a heavy goods vehicle shuttle. The fire occurred in a carrier wagon at the rear of the train. It is this fire that the French fire Brigade witnessed as the train entered the UK- France tunnel. The spread of the fire was increased by increased airflow in the France-UK tunnel. Failure of fire safety measures occurred when a decision (National fire Protection Association; Quincy, MA, 1996) was made by the Railway control centre for the train to continue with the train schedule to UK. The decision to have the fire extinguished in UK after the train emerged (in UK) was against fire safety rules and regulations. The distance of 50.45 kilometers from France to UK was long and exposed the 33 passengers to carbon monoxide poisoning. The captain of the train also failed to fully adhere to fire safety rules and regulations (National fire Protection Association; Quincy, MA, 1996). After he received a warning of abnormality and successfully bringing the train to the chef de Train (CdT) the captain opened the door and smoke entered into the train and exposed passengers to risks of respiratory difficulties. Another breach to fire safety and regulation was over-pressurization of the tunnel through increased airflow. This increased intensity of fire that destroyed 16 inches of the concrete (National fire Protection Association; Quincy, MA, 1996). The management of the UK- France channel tunnel had poor alert procedures. This was evident by the fact that five of the six in-tunnel fire detectors were not functioning to standards and gave unconfirmed alarms. There was no fire risk assessment on the train with regard to fire response alarm. The train’s on board fire detectors failed to give an early warning on the fire. The Eurotunnel management training was not competent enough to handle the fire incident. There was also delay in Activation of tunnel ventilation system which occurred 15 minutes after the train had stopped at marker 4131.The UK-France incident was characterized by issue of commands that were not appropriate or were late. At the same time, the cross-over doors in the Eurotunnel were open (Channel tunnel fire recalls 1996 incident, 2008). Entertainment complex: Summerland, Isle of Man, 1973 The Summerland, Isle of man, fire incident occurred on the night of August 2nd 1973. 51 people died and eight others were admitted following spread of fire through Summerland leisure centre in Douglas on the Isle of Man. The fire was caused by boys who set a dismantled Kiosk at the summer land leisure complex on 1940 hours (Summerland fire disaster, 1973). As the kiosk continued to burn, it fell against the exterior of the building. The fire spread was propagated when the flammable Acrylic material got ignited and then the fire spread fast across the acrylic sheeting on the walls and the roofs and vents that were not fire resistant. As the Acrylic material melted, it fell on persons who were making attempt to either escape or put it off. There was failure to comply with fire incident management because there was no person in the building who made any attempt to notify the fire brigade. It took 30 minutes after the fire had begun for a ship captain to inform the fire brigade of possibility of fire in the Isle of Man. Fire safety rules were also not followed because evacuation was not implemented until it was evident the worst was in the offing. The fire exit door was locked and this prompted people to rush for the main gate. This was the main cause of the death as people stumbled on each other while trying to get out (summerland disaster, 1973). Entertainment complex: Dublin stardust disco, 1981 The Dublin standout disco fire incident occurred in the early moving of February 14th (Valentine day) 1981. Out of 841 people in attendance, 48 died and 214 were injured (McCullagh, 2001). The fire was caused by a burning cigarette butt or a burning matchstick although possibility of an arson attack was not fully ruled out. The fire ignited form that is a very flammable polymer. The fire spread through the paper decoration, the foam coated seats, papers and litter on the floor and eventually the whole building went on fire. There was laxity in fire safety rules as evident by closure of doors that disco fans could have used as exit though this was a measure to minimize fans from free access as well as reduce costs of door guards. The management did not provide fire extinguishers. The fire exit points were all closed. The building did not have automatic water sprinkler system to help in controlling spread of fire. Explosion: The New York TWA Flight 800 fuel tank vapor-Air explosion 1996 The TWA flight 800 fuel Tank Vapor-Air explosion occurred on 17th July 1996 when the plane was headed for Paris from John F. Kennedy airport in New York. The flight exploded off long Island killing 212 passengers and 18 crew members. The cause of TWA flight explosion was not established but three theories have been proposed namely a possibility of a bomb, mechanical failure of TWA flight 800 or a missile strike. Nevertheless National transportation safety Board (NTSB) suggested the probable cause was explosion of center wing fuel tanks following ignition of flammable fuel-air mixture in the tank. This conclusion was arrived at after the aircraft was rebuild and shown evidence of center tank explosion. The TWA flight 800 suffered electrical arcing and auto-ignition according to NTSB (1999b) and McKenna (1999) meaning the management had failed to institute maintenance of the aging electrical systems of the flight (Mckenna, 1999) THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, 2001 The fire incident (Halberstam, 2001) that was experienced on the world trade centre occurred on September 11th 2001.The incident was caused by intentional crash (Halberstam, 2001) of two airplanes that had been hijacked by terrorists namely American Airlines flight 11 that had been hijacked from Boston’s Logan Airport with 92 messengers on board and was crushed into the upper floors of world Trade center North Tower, New York, Manhattan and 17 minutes later United Airlines Flight 175 with 65 passengers on board, crushed into the south Tower. The Terrorist incident claimed likes of more than 3000 lives, The fire spread into neighboring buildings like Marriott Hotel, The commodities exchange, Dean Witter, The U.S. Customs house and 7 world Trade center as a result of hot burning ash and hot dust for the inter building spread of fire (Halberstam, 2001). The spread of the fire within the world trade center was as a result of heated fuel and ignited vapors that melted the building steel support structures to the tune of 800°C forcing them to collapse downwards. The impacts of the jet planes weakened the building interior support structures and the first crush of the north tower disabled wet-pipe water sprinkler systems. The spread of fire was also increased by papers and other office combustible materials. INDUSTRIAL: The browns Ferry nuclear power plant, march 1975 The Browns Ferry Nuclear power plant fire incident occurred at noon of March 22, 1975 (Comey, 1976).The fire was caused by a lit candle that was being used by two electricians, an electrical inspector and a Browns plants electrician (Hanauer, 1976: Ford, 1976; (Bajwa, 1996)). The candle ignited polythene form. The fire spread through the penetration that had four cables going through it. The spread of fire was propagated and catalyzed by pieces of polyurethane and rags that had been used as temporary sealing. The Browns ferry nuclear power plant incident was characterized by laxity of fire safety rules and regulations. There was no dynamic assessment of the fire. The two electricians did not follow recommended procedures for combating the fire. The personnel who reported the fire incident did not follow emergency reporting procedures. The construction workers breached the rules of fighting fire by starting to extinguish the fire instead of raising a sound alarm to create awareness of a possible risk of fire incident. The guard who reported the fire incident did not use the recommended telephone numbers for emergency or procedure but instead called shift engineers office. The Technician use of candles without knowing if temporary sealant was flammable was against fire safety and regulation and failure to comply with fire risk assessment procedures. At the same time, the plant design did not meet fire hazards guidelines for grouped electrical cables in trays. The electrical critical safe shut down functions and control of production units were in an area that was exposed to risks of localized fire accident. The electricians had also disabled the electrical systems that could have initiated cardox systems that could have increased partial pressure of carbon dioxide to 95-98% HOTELS: ONE MERIDIAN PLAZA, PHILADEPHIA USA, FEB, 1991 The fire incident of one meridian plaza in Pennsylvania in Philadelphia occurred on February 23 1991 (Gumpertz, 2002).The fire killed 3 fire fighters and destroyed 8 floors of the 38 storey. The fire injured 24 firefighters (Routley, 1991). The fire started on the 22nd floor that had been littered with linseed oil soaked rags. The linseed oil was left by the contractor. The spread of the fire was catalyzed by loss of a backup emergency generator and problems related to standpipes systems. Fire ambers dropped from the 22nd floor downwards to 21st floor. The fire incident was characterized by untimely detection of fire smoke because the fire detectors were far apart and not adequate to cover the entire high rise building. This implies that by the time the fire detectors were activated, the fire had developed into a huge inferno and had taken hold. There was laxity of fire safety rules resulting from failure of the building employees to call fire department after fire alarm went on. The alarm monitoring service that was responsible for the 24 hour surveillance and monitoring did not make an attempt to contact fire department but instead called the one plaza building to verify and confirm presence of fire. There were no dynamic risk assessment and fire risk assessment procedures that were followed. There were no fire safety precautions that were followed prior to the fire incident to ensure all fire detection and prevention devices were functioning optimally. The installed electrical system both primary and secondary power risers led into total power failure following destruction of conductors. The natural gas powered emergency back up generator also failed to initiate. There had been no measures to determine possible spread of fire in the building prior to the fire incident. This was evident with both vertical and horizontal spread of smoke and fire via the unprotected penetrations in the fire resistant assembly. Fire fighting was also made difficult by ventilation in the staircases that made it possible for the smoke to spread into the stairway and this had an impact of reducing visibility. The one building plaza had improperly installed standpipes valves (thus pressure reducing valves) that resulted into decreased pressure for the fire department hopes streams. The fire incident response from the fire department shown there were limited pre-fire plan information and details of the building were being given pout as the fire progressed. The building owner ought to have furnished the fire department with the building plan before the fire incident in order for the fire department to have a ready fire fighting plan for the building. The stair ways doors were also locked and the fire fighters had to use forcible entry tactics to gain access from stairways to the floor areas. Chester field little woods store fire The fire incident occurred as a result electrical short circuit although possibility of an arson attack was not ruled out at Cinecitta. The fire incident occurred in a multi-storey office block at Churchill Plaza, Basingstoke and led into death of three fire fighters (Public Protection commitee, 1994). The superstore was completely destroyed by fire in less than three hours despite efforts of over 200 firefighters who used modern fire fighting techniques and equipments to combat the fire. The spread of the fire was catalyzed by wind and presence of many combustible synthetic materials. Efforts to extinguish the fire were hampered by synthetic vapors that were being produced as products and by products of the oxidative combustion. There were no wet standpipes and automatic water sprinkler systems though the Hampshire Act 1983 provided that all storey buildings be fitted with automatic water sprinklers. The storey didn’t have entry for fire brigade that could have assisted in quenching the fire. The windows were open and this increased ventilation of the storey and created an opportunity for wind to fan the spread of the fire. The management had failed to install automatic water sprinklers and automatic smoke detectors that could have provided an early warning of the onset of the fire and eventual extinguishing of the fire. There was also congestion of the synthetic combustibles in the shopping center that produced flame darts of 30-40 meters high. Benthnal Green road fire 20th July 2004 The Benthnal green road East London fire incident occurred on 20th July 2004 and led into death of the two fire fighters and rescue of 2 members of public who had climbed to the roof of the building. The fire began in the lower floors of the building that had many shops. The spread of the fire was fueled by presence of combustible synthetic products that were stocked in the shops (BBC News, 2004) The building did not have automatic water sprinklers that could have helped in timely extinguishing of the fire. The building did not have wet standpipes or dry standpipes that fire brigade department could have used to deliver water to the floor where fire was burning. The management had not installed fire extinguishers that could have been used to put off the fire immediately it had begun. House: Monica Wills House, Bristol 2007 The fire incident of Monica Wills house in Bristol led into evacuation of 64 residents (Lee and Bernay 2007). There were no casualties that were reported. The fire was caused by a car’s electrical faulty system that was characterized by electrical arcing. The electrical arcing led into auto-ignition and triggered fuel-air explosion. The fuel-air explosion led into ignition of fire into 22 other cars that were parked in the ground floor. The owner of the car failed to maintain the electrical system of his or her car. The car had old loose wires (firestop sprinklers, 2007) and the engine area was dirty that predisposed electric arcing. The management of the Monica Wills house did not have automatic smoke detectors and automatic wet water standpipes and sprinkler systems that could have helped in extinguishing the fire. House: Malborough road, New port, 2007 The Marlborough road fire incident occurred on 7th August 2007 at 1445 BST and was caused by failure to adhere to fire safety and regulation at Limelight Joinery Workshop. The spread of the fire was fanned by presence of organic vapors that arose from glue and turpentine and was propagated by presence of abundant dry wood. The fire spread along Marlborough road building leading into destruction of 10 houses, displacement of residents and loss of electric power and cooking gas (water gas) to over 260 households that were within the vicinity of limelight. The management of Limelight Joinery Workshop did not have any installed automatic smoke detectors and alarms or automatic water sprinkler systems for extinguishing fire. There were no fire extinguishers and the employees did not have any training on fire fighting. Hotel: Dupont Plaza Hotel, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1986 The fire incident of Dupont Plaza hotel in 1309 Ashford Avenue, in Condado, in Puerto Rico, occurred at 1530 hours on 31st December 1986. The fire was started by three employees that had a labor dispute with their employer. The three employees lit rags and synthetic combustible materials in a room that was filled with combustible flammable liquids in the ground floor.97 people were reported dead and 140 people had severe burns of magnitude 40-75%.The employees set up the fire in order to scare tourists who had rent rooms at Dupont plaza hotel. The fire spread through the store that was filled with unused furniture. The fire darts fanned by wind and wooden combustible dry wood, cloths, Bed sheets and other synthetic materials and spread of fire into rooms via synthetic carpet and the fact that the doors were open that also increased ventilation. The management of Dupont plaza had not installed automatic smoke detectors and alarms and automatic water sprinklers. The Dupont plaza did not have fire exit channels and this contributed into deaths of the tourists because there was no other escape route out of the building. The management did not instill good management practices to its employees. The management ought to have sought better avenues for managing and addressing labor disputes (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 1986). Hospital Falklands hospital fire 1984 The Falklands Hospital fire incident led into injuries of more than 70 persons and over 20 were admitted with 70-90% burns that complicated medical treatment. 5 persons were reported dead following the fire incident including a nurse who opted to stay with the patients.The fire incident was caused by explosion of a gas tank. it was not immediately established if the gas tank was shot or bombed (James R., Mahoney, P.F., Greaves, . and Bowler, G. 1984;Leonard, R.B. and Teitelman, U. 1991; Dougherty,W and Waxman, K. 1996). The spread of the fire was brought about by strong winds and highly oxidative combustible materials like timber, plasterboards and corrugated iron sheets that were used for roofing. Bibliography Bajwa, C. S. (1996). Fire barrier penetration seals in nuclear power plants NUREG -1552. 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