Iranian Revolution of 1978-9 - Essay Example

Iranian Revolution of 1978/9 [The Writer’s Name] [The Name of the Institution] Iranian Revolution of 1978/9 Introduction In this critical and analytical essay, I would discuss and evaluate modern revolution theories in connection with the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 brought by the masses in the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iranian revolution may be termed as the most successful, long term and lastingly effective and brought a real change in the whole socio-economic and political spheres of Iran. The entire Middle East experienced a revival of Islamic militancy in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.The increasing tensions in the Persian Gulf brought Iran and the United States to the brink of war in the summer of 1988. The killing of hundreds of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca by Saudi security forces in the summer of 1987 severely damaged the fragile relationship existing between the two countries. Lebanon is torn by religious and factional strife in which the revival of Islam plays a significant role. Kuwait—a relatively prosperous and stable country in the Gulf region—has been the target of occasional bombing since 1983, and in 1985 there was an assassination attempt against its leader, the Emir Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah. Bahrain barely escaped an attempted coup d'état that threatened to create an Iranian type of Islamic republic in December of 1981. For the analysis of the topic and evaluate the theory of revolutions with its illustrations, it is necessary to discuss and examine revolutions occurred in various parts of the world. I think the most influential of the current era revolutions is that of Iran that happened in 1978. That same year President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated by a Muslim fundamentalist group. Saudi Arabia, which was purported to be "monotonously stable," has experienced occasional demonstrations by the Shi'ite population in its eastern province. The highlight of the growing opposition to the Saudi regime culminated in an armed rebellion and the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca by a group of Sunni Muslim fundamentalists in the autumn of 1979. The late General Zia Al-Haq of Pakistan deemed it necessary to implement Islamic law, the Shari'a, and to revive the Islamic code of justice in the face of the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism. Afghan Muslim rebels are continuously challenging the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. I affirm at this very initial stage and declare that the new Islamic challenge has not been confined to the Middle East alone. From the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand to Morocco and Tunisia to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the Muslim minorities are becoming more assertive in opposition to their respective secular regimes. Although significant in themselves, these events are only a partial manifestation of a broader Islamic Revival for which the Iranian Revolution was a major catalyst. The emergence of this Islamic Revival has been the source of much theoretical debate and has induced numerous political conclusions. Demythification of the ideological composition of the Islamic movement in Iran is the key to the comprehension of this revival. This is especially true when seen in light of the fact that the two major sects of Islam, Sunnism and Shi'ism, have converged in recent times. 1 I consider that before the key question of why the Iranian Revolution in 1978-1979 took an Islamic form can be answered, a host of other questions must be investigated: What is the historical role of religion in Iranian political culture? What are the origins of Shi'ite populism? What significance does Shi'ite populism have today? What is the historical relationship between Shi'ism and dissent? Why do the majority of the devoted followers of populist Islam come from the ranks of the lower classes? What were the social and political reasons behind the emergence of neo-Islamic populism in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s? Who were the major populist intellectual leaders of this period and what was their impact? What are the social dynamics of neo-Islamic populism? Finally, what is the link between the populist culture of the 1960s and the character of the 1979 revolution? To offer viable answers to these questions and delineate the contribution of this study, we must first critically appraise the various theoretical approaches to the study of the Iranian Revolution. I argue that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 not only changed the prevalent perceptions of Islam, but also challenged many existing theories that have been used to study revolutions. To understand the revolution, many observers resorted to old theories, but those theories lagged behind the new, unfolding political reality and could not capture its essence. It is instructive to review some of those theories and discuss their weaknesses. I have gone through various studies and agree that the prevailing approaches to the study of the Iranian Revolution can be classified into the modernization, conspiratorial, reductionist, and doctrinal theories. The conventional wisdom of modernization theory, by assuming that modernization engenders increasing secularization, led even some of the better scholars of the Middle East in the 1960s to conclude that the power of the ulama and religious institutions was declining and that Islam would probably not play a crucial role in the future of Iranian politics. The methodological weakness of this approach stems from a linear concept of history that leaves no room for the possibility of twists, turns, and regressions in the process of historical development. Without such an understanding of historical change and an appreciation for the interrelationships between external stimuli and internal dynamics, the question of why the Iranian Revolution took on an Islamic character cannot be accurately answered. In fact, according to my analysis, many modernization theorists have downplayed the impact of Western encroachment on developing countries. 2 By studying the domestic scene in isolation rather than in relation to external stimuli, these theorists have fallen short of capturing the total picture of political development. Moreover, the pervasive Islamic character of the Iranian Revolution and the breadth of the power of the ulama in the society raises serious questions regarding the accuracy and the viability of the term "modernization." To describe the contradictory process of industrialization and urbanization in the Third World that puts the "old" and the "new" social forces in motion, and to explain the implementation of reforms on the decrepit social infrastructure as "modernization" has proved to be inadequate in depicting the uneven process of development. I believe that the conspiratorial view of the Iranian Revolution that is common on both ends of the political spectrum is, to say the least, superfluous and naive. 3 If, as the proponents of this view would have us believe, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was the work of a few grand conspirators, then why should one bother with the study of history and political events and take on the task of social analysis at all? What this view implies is that the course of history is determined by discreet intrigues of omnipotent individuals capable of defying political and social forces and imposing their will on history, rather than by open clashes of contending social forces in which human consciousness and activity play a decisive role. Of course, I notice that this attitude has been nurtured by the legacy of a long history of direct and indirect foreign domination in which the significant decisions that determined the faith of the nation often originated behind closed doors and beyond the seas. At times, conspiracies and coups d'état did indeed became necessary to implement these decisions. To paraphrase the renowned historian Hofstadter, it is naive to think that conspiracies do not occur in history, but it is insane to think that history itself is a conspiracy. The conspiratorial view is unscientific, ahistorical, and ultimately stems from an attitude that is accustomed to seeking answers to social problems in supernatural forces rather than in society. To look for a conspirator behind each social event predisposes the individual to look for scapegoats when faced with the arduous task of social analysis. As regards to this, I feel that the reductionist theory that abounds in the many versions of orthodox Marxism reduces all social phenomena to their socioeconomic base. By overlooking the roles of culture in general, and religion in particular, this approach fails to explain why two countries with the same socioeconomic base produce different political cultures. For example, the general conditions of economic dependency, underdevelopment, and poverty have led to a relatively democratic tradition in India or Costa Rica, whereas the same conditions have given rise to authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world. In the existing theoretical literature, I found that the doctrinal explanation of the revolution, which interprets social change in primarily cultural terms and, more specifically, in terms of innate religious doctrine, at best provides a timeless analysis that does not explain why the Iranian Revolution of 1979 did not occur in 1969 or 1989. Such an approach disregards the entire spectrum of interaction and conflict between the social groups in state and civil society that were responsible for change in a given historical juncture. 4Social forces once in motion follow their own course and logic. Thus, the seemingly innate doctrines that are supposed to be the source of change are reinterpreted and modified in the process. For example, throughout much of the Middle Ages, the doctrine of occultation of the twelfth imam inspired quietism. In the twentieth century, Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati deduced an activist conclusion from this occultation. Similarly, at the turn of the century, the pro-constitutionalist cleric Nai'ni rationalized the need for a constitutional government in Islamic terms by referring to the example of the Caliphate of Ali; seven decades later, Ayatollah Khomeini, using the same example, derived the necessity for a theocracy. 5 As I observed, the common underlying methodological weakness of these approaches lies in the manner in which they treat the relationship between culture and social structure. The modernization approach is ambivalent in its treatment of culture—some modernization theorists adapt a "political culture" approach and seem to view culture as an autonomous factor, whereas others opt for a "functionalist" analysis and downplay the impact of culture. 6The conspiratorial approach discards a relationship between culture and social structure altogether and seems to suggest that the power of the conspirator is above social and historical forces. The reductionist approach minimizes the significance of culture altogether, and the doctrinal explanation regards culture as an autonomous force. If we cross examine the world history from theoretical revolutionary perspective, it is assessed that political events do not occur in a vacuum; they take place in a cultural context by which they are sanctioned, and in turn these political events modify cultural norms and sacred symbols. Without a proper understanding of these dialectics and the nature of cultural context, a thorough comprehension of symbolic and substantial politics is impossible. I would like to point out that although Iran is not alone among ancient civilizations that possessed a rich religious tradition, the pervasiveness of religion in Iranian social life is definitely a peculiarity of that culture. The study of Iranian history demonstrates that Iranian culture originates, evolves, and changes within a primarily religious framework. 7The facts that no independent Islamic political theory developed in Iran until the twentieth century and that throughout the Middle Ages politics was studied within "the confines of the unassailable walls of the Shari'a" are indications of this primordial role of religious traditions. 8 This explains the continued existence of religious groups that were politicized as well as political groups that were highly religious. The history of this religious predisposition goes back to the pre-Islamic teachings of Zarathustra and Mani, the two major prophets of the ancient Persian Empire. After the Arab conquest and Islamization of Iranian culture, the all-encompassing nature of Islamic faith strengthened the religious character of Iranian society. It has been confirmed to me historically, revolutions have occurred because an old social order no longer is perceived to be tolerable, either materially or morally. Most revolutions in human societies have called for an end to the "decadence" and "corruption" of the old regimes. Hence, revolutionaries often set out to lead a moral regeneration of the society. Insofar as revolutions call for moral revival of the society, they are ultimately millenarian in character. Thomas Paine, for example, perceived the American Revolution as an attempt to break away from the decadence and corruption that plagued Europe and to restructure American society on a new moral foundation. 9 The Puritans who played a prominent role in the English Revolution also called for the moral regeneration of the society and sought to rebuild England on the basis of "the righteous path." Walzer's description of Puritanism as "the earliest form of political radicalism" 10 captures the essence of the inseparable link between religion and politics even in revolutions that ushered in the dawn of the modern age. Viewed in this light, a deep underlying religious element can be discerned in all social revolutions. I affirm and argue that even the French Revolution, which marked the beginning of the secular era in human history, is perceived by some scholars as a primarily religious revolution. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, argued that beneath the laity's attack on the church as representative of the rich aristocracy lay a profound religious instinct. The French Revolution provided the common people with a faith that the old order no longer represented. Thus, it initiated a religious revival and embarked on the crusade of creating a new man. 11 It is for this reason that de Tocqueville seems to be justified in his contention that the French Revolution can be properly understood if it is compared with other great religious movements. When I viewed historically, I find that the very secularization of human societies and the emergence of secular political movements even in the most developed Western cultures is a very new phenomenon. In our "secular age" it is often easy to lose sight of the fact that prior to the Enlightenment and the "scientific revolution" in Europe, separation of church and state, religion and philosophy did not exist as such. In the absence of popular secular ideologies, the kings needed the church to legitimize their rule and philosophers pursued divine spirit and absolute truth. Therefore, I agree that it is not surprising that prior to the eighteenth century, social movements in human history took primarily a millenarian form. Insofar as human history has had a long tradition of millenarian movements, the Islamic Revolution in Iran is nothing new. Seen in the context of our secular age, however, the revival of Islamic fundamentalism and the establishment of the first theocracy in the twentieth century make the Iranian Revolution certainly novel. To trace the roots of this anomaly, we must study the activist inclination of Shi'ite precepts and analyze its origins, development, and legends. We must evaluate the role of Shi'ism as a banner of political dissent in history. We should also propound the metamorphosis of Shi'ism in modern times and delineate the facets of the post-World War II politicization of the Iranian society. Theoretical Perspective After an extensive and thorough study, I reached this point that the complex interactions between human beings and their social environments lead to the emergence of certain ideological formations at different historical junctures. Scholars of politics have developed various methodologies to study these phenomena, and from these methodologies two distinct approaches have emerged. The first studies a given ideology in its own terms—its self-image, definitions, proclamations, and official interpretations. The second approach studies such exogenous factors as the sociological environment responsible for evolving content and form of the ideology. This approach studies the ideological formations in terms of properties and characteristics that are not immediately recognizable as a component part of the ideology but, in essence, form the broader content within which the ideology itself evolves. This becomes apparent only by proper abstractions, deductions, and the juxtaposition of different relevant social entities. It is only with the second approach that I can go beyond the state of self-consciousness of Muslims and bring the different facets of the subconscious process of political socialization to consciousness. Such a methodological approach, which views Islamic history as a part of Muslims' collective consciousness, can reveal the evolution of complex issues that lie behind their present political behaviour. As Edward Mortimer has noted, "Islam is a political culture: it often provides the form and the vocabulary of political action. It can greatly strengthen personal commitment to the cause. But it is not itself a sufficient explanation for the commitment, or a sufficient content for the cause." 12 But, on the other hand, I suggest that the disadvantage of such an approach is that it may neglect the actor's definitions of self and reality. The way in which the individual defines oneself as a Muslim determines what one will do and refrain from doing. We cannot, as some positivists do, ignore the actor's subjective concept of reality by arbitrarily imposing our own interpretation on social reality. Although confined by objective social conditions, it is human subjectivity that determines the way in which the actor changes the world. A methodology that presents the relationship between the subjectivity of the political actor and the objectivity of the world as a dynamic interaction averts the error of reductive determinism, in which the political actor is reduced to a mere stimulus-response system (for example, economic determinism), or a purely subjective explanation, which divorces the individual from the social environment and sees that person as a mere agent of divine will (for example, metaphysical explanation). Acknowledging the actor's concept of reality does not imply acceptance of the actor's definition of truth. Only through such a distinction can the biases of the normative approach and the one-sidedness of reductionism be avoided. Therefore, the phenomenological approach, which intends "to accept that which appears, that which the religious tradition presents, on its own terms," 13 seems the most appropriate for the purpose of this study. In order to be able to go from appearance to essence, one must be concerned with the broad sociological factors and social relations that determine human consciousness, as well as religion as a particular form of that consciousness. Thus our phenomenological approach must be synthesized with the Weberian idea of "elective affinity"—the way in which certain ideas and certain social processes "seek each other out in history." 14 Such an approach not only goes beyond reductive "materialism" and monocausal "spiritualism," but also has the practical benefit of eliminating dubious political conclusions that may arise from these methodological weaknesses. I view that the legitimate criticism may arise in this respect, however, that a phenomenological approach, which deals with evolution of religious ideas on their own terms, leaves no room for discussion of discrepancies between appearance and essence, myth and fact. Our answer to such criticism is to repeat Hegel's contention that it is not the history that is significant: it is myth. Popular belief is often the public's internalization of "the myth," and it is through the myth that people are socialized. Therefore, to explain human behaviour, the myth must be properly understood. Examining through historical phenomenon, I can go with this opinion that the popular perception of history is to a large extent dependent on the methodology and the ideology of the historian, and often the victors rather than the vanquished write history. Historical facts are therefore dependent on the social environment that helps determine them. Facts are not absolute entities, as many subjectivists hold; neither are they the locomotive of history, as some determinists propose. Facts are what hold to be true at a certain juncture under specific social constraint, and this truth is relative. As Pascal has observed, what may be truth today in a certain part of the world may turn out to be falsehood at another juncture. The study of history is pursued here to examine continuity as well as discontinuity in political movements. Although the Hegelian temptation to deal with totality is difficult to resist, especially given the broad perspective such a total picture provides, there has been a conscious effort to avoid such temptation. This work is limited by the scope of its methodological and theoretical framework. In the light of revolution factors and considerations, I can trace that this is not a history of clergy and state confrontation in Iran's Islamic period—such an ambitious project must be left to historians. Neither is this a study of Shi'ism in Iran nor an account of state and clergy confrontation in the twentieth century. 15 The present research expounds on the historical roots and development of Iranian populism as it culminated in the post-1950 populist metamorphosis of Iranian society and the rise of ulama to political power. Iranian populism is deeply ingrained in Shi'i-inspired millenarian and messianic movements of the past. Therefore, we shall take issue with the problematic of Shi'i doctrine and political thought only to the extent that it is relevant to the subject of the present study. The study of Irano-Islamic populism also requires emphasizing certain movements while disregarding others. Historians might find me guilty of leaping over many historical periods—I do so only when they are not crucial to my theoretical propositions. Such an important period as Mossadeq's era and the movement for the nationalization of Iranian oil, for example, will not be discussed here as it does not fit the category of populist movements. 16 Modern Revolutionary Theories Implications This historical fact has also been traced by me that prior to the Iranian Revolution; however, this populist streak in Islam was either ignored or misunderstood. Such classical thinkers as Weber came to believe that Islam accepts a purely hedonistic spirit, especially toward women, luxuries, and property. 17 To be sure, as Turner has noted, the harsh life of the desert predisposed Arabs to a compensating hedonistic morality that was influential in the further development of Muslim values and character. But it is also true that Islam is a religion of suffering, sorrow, and stoicism. In fact, purposeful suffering is conceived to be man's struggle on the path of God. 18 The cult of martyrdom in the Shi'ite sect of Islam is the most dramatic expression of this intrinsic ascetic character of Islam. But Islam is by no means the originator of this stoic culture; the ancient religion of Manichaeanism had a rich tradition of noble suffering that had a profound impact on Islam and other religions. While exploring various avenues of revolution theory, I have come across the view to suggest that the underlying egalitarian and communal spirit of Islamic precepts has been the focus of many controversies and debates among Muslim theoreticians and scholars of late. 19 In the Quran are verses that discourage accumulation of wealth, emphasize social solidarity, and call on Muslims to help the deprived and the oppressed. .20 Similarly, the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali, the first Shi'ite imam, have been portrayed by Muslims as compassionate and just rulers who lived ascetic lives, purified themselves through noble suffering, and proved their sincerity and devotion to the faith by a willingness to die for it. Bibliography Akhavi, S. ( 1980). Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period. State University of New York, Albany. Algar, H. ( 1969). Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1905. University of California Press, Berkeley. Algar, H. ( 1979). 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