Direct and Representative Democracy Issues - Coursework Example

?Running Head: Direct and Representative Democracy Direct and Representative Democracy [The [The of the Direct and Representative Democracy Democracy, in Greek, is derived from demokratia, the root meanings of which are demos (people) and kratos (rule). Generally, it means a form of government in which, in contradistinction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule. There is no clear-cut, universal definition of democracy and most definitions of democracy focus on qualities, procedures and institutions. It is perhaps better conceived as two aspects of the same thing that can not be separated with clear lines. First, it is a practice or method of government, a set of forms and procedures. Second, it relates to ends rather than means, to an ideal or set of ideals. A direct democracy is a political system in which all citizens are allowed to influence policy by means of a direct vote on any particular issue. However it is impracticable except in a very small polity. Even though it was practiced in Athens, it didn't involve all the people, only adult male citizens. Representative democracy can simply be defined as an indirect democracy in which the people do not themselves govern but elect representatives who govern them. As for the relation between electoral and representative democracy, it will suffice to note that the former is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition of the latter. This is also to say that the concept of representative democracy comprehends electoral democracy; but the reverse is not true. While modern democracies are jointly electoral and representative, an electoral democracy that does not elect representatives is a distinct possibility. The other two notions--direct democracy and referendum democracy--require a somewhat more detailed explication. Although a direct democracy can be simply defined a contrario, that is, as a democracy without representatives and without representational transmission belts, yet this specimen displays subspecies that command separate recognition. Any direct democracy is, in some sense, a self-governing democracy. But we know that the meaning of self-government crucially hinges on the size factor; (Banducci, 1998, 116) so does the meaning and reality of direct democracy. A literal, authentically self-governing direct democracy can be said to exist only with reference to relatively small groups--say, up to assembly-size groups. Beyond the assembly size, the most meaningful distinction is between observable direct democracy, and a direct democracy whose size escapes direct observability, that is, a greater than observable one. The democracy of the ancients qualifies as observable, for it resolved itself not only in the gathering of the citizens in a single place but in an observable behaviour of the participants. But the magnitude that allows for such observability is in the order of a few thousands. And that order of magnitude already brings about a great deal of indirectness in a direct democracy. Only in part was Greek democracy truly and authentically "direct." And when we come to a greater-than-observable direct democracy, what makes it direct is only, or basically, the inference that it is not a representative kind of democracy. The notion of referendum democracy will help to qualify this last assertion. The original idea of a representative was of a person elected to express or reflect the views of his constituents. (Raphael, 1990, 91) However, this does not seem possible, the representative needs to gather his constituents and get the view of them on every issue. Therefore the representative chosen is not obliged to mirror the ideas of his constituents rather he is elected as a man of good judgement. This is a doctrine often known as Edmund Burke's Principle, which states that representatives should act upon their own conscience in the affairs of a representative democracy. Nevertheless in practice, the inevitable rise of the well disciplined party system has caused representatives to decide under the boundaries of party policies. Therefore, Burke's representative behaviour becomes also nonsense on the majority of issues. Democracy operates under the majority of votes, where those in the numerical majority are powerful and they tend to ride over the concerns of the minority. However one of the most important principles for today's democracy is the principle that it may not take measures to secure its position in power. By criticizing and showing the possibility of an alternative policy, the minority functions as a balance system for the government and prevents it from becoming "majority tyranny". In practice, as Raphael stated: "The government need not take much notice of the views of other parties in its day-to-day business. Criticism of government policy by a party in opposition is not made with any expectation of persuading the government to mend its ways, but rather in the hope of persuading the public to make a different choice at the next election. The opposition takes the opportunity at every important debate of showing where it stands and what it would try to do if it were in power." (Raphael, 1990:91) Representative democracy is that it is very practical and quick. Some people think that other kinds of democracy are more efficient like direct democracy because the whole country would vote on every issue and it would be very democratic. This is not always the case e.g. in Switzerland they have direct democracy and in every referendum held in the past year, less than 50% of those eligible to vote did so. Also the government does not have to go with what the majority of the people decide so some people may say that it is pointless. Some people may say that representative democracy is not very democratic because of many reasons e.g. the whip system. Representative democracy allows Member of Parliament’s (MP) to look at all of the factors and elements that would be affected if a new policy was introduced and make an informed decision on which way to vote. This means it is reliable and there are lots of people trying to find a problem with the policy and either amend it, or vote against it. (Smith, 1998, 72) A major flaw with this is that even though the MP is supposed to represent the views of his/her constituents not all of the peoples views may not get back to the MP so they do not have all of the factors to consider. This system where the people elect MP’s to vote in matters for them seems like a very fair system. However some people say that when examined closely the system demonstrates a range of flaws which can make it unfair and undemocratic. One of these is the fact that when a party is running for election, they bring out a manifesto. This is a small booklet of the main policies that that party wishes to bring in, and the main issues they wish to tackle. This sounds excellent, but the party does not have to feature policies they don’t want to on the manifesto. This means that a party could have policies that the public may not agree with and only bring them in after they have been elected. Another problem with this system is how representative parliament actually is. The term “representative” means the people who are represented. (Fishkin, 1991, 85) This includes all people such as men, women, homosexuals and ethnic minorities. Today's populists can be roughly divided between those on the left, who tend to believe that increasing citizens' engagement with the political system is a good thing in and of itself and will usually lead to more progressive policy if structured properly, and those on the right and in the centre, who tend to want to use direct democracy to rein in big government and the influence of special interests. (Stark, 1995, 106) All populists come to a meeting of the minds on one thing: representative democracy as practiced in the United States is not working. Populists of the centre and right, far more than their counterparts on the left, have their finger on the pulse of Americans' discontent with politics as usual. Their agenda for citizen lawmaking, with its emphasis on building on existing and flourishing institutions of direct democracy such as initiatives and referenda, is much more likely to influence the future direction of American politics than the constitutionalists'. (Cronin, 1989, 54) Advocates on both sides can draw on a wealth of recent research, as well as on experience, to bolster their positions; even so, some of the questions are difficult to answer definitively, given the current state of the evidence. Others depend a great deal on subjective judgments; for example, concerning the issue of just how well informed voters need to be to vote on policy, or what exactly constitutes responsible governance. (Rosenthal, 1998, 280) The best arguments on each side come to some reasonable conclusions as to which way the evidence points. Even though the bulk of the evidence seems not to support the populists' position, the weight of popular opinion in this debate is clearly with them. Their argument is simple and persuasive. They believe that the majoritarian principle is at the heart of democracy. They argue that ordinary people are best able to judge what is in the public interest (especially when one considers the corruption rampant in representative institutions); polling the people is thus the only way to determine the popular will and something approximating the public interest. Further, they contend that the claim made by constitutionalists that representative institutions are better able to determine the public interest is elitist and fundamentally undemocratic. (Cronin, 1989, 56) A great deal hinges on the method populists wish to use to identify what the people want in public policy—the vote. Representative democracy is a "thin democracy," as Barber puts it. Actually, his criticisms are far more devastating than what is implied by that term; Barber suggests that representative government is really more akin to monarchy than to democracy. It destroys participation and citizenship and encourages a passivity among voters who cede their sovereignty to experts who proceed to bureaucratize, overorganise, and shunt over to the court system much of the policy-making on issues of importance. The core reason that representative systems are not democratic, according to Barber, is that ordinary people are not permitted to make collective public judgments. Their participation is limited to a vote that they make in private, that is expected to be based on private interests, and that is influenced by manipulative ad campaigns largely paid for by corporate entities. The elected representatives, in turn, proceed to govern by self interested bargain and exchange, not by a search for the public good. (Baker, 1991, 707) In our system, writes Barber, this private-interest ethic is so pervasive that it even seeps into plebiscitary decision-making, where such measures are permitted. During initiative and referendum campaigns conducted in the states the public has no reasonable opportunity to learn about the issues that are foisted on them to decide; instead, they are subjected to an endless barrage of ads funded by private interests. Voters then proceed to vote on the basis of their private judgments, not after a healthy public debate involving interaction and democratic participation. (Fishkin, 1995, 131) In Barber's view, "public opinion" in a representative system is really a misnomer; public opinion is really the tallying of private opinions influenced by elites in government and in the media and by slick corporate-sponsored marketing campaigns. (Barber, 1998, 239) Barber thinks, further, that the theory of representative democracy assumes the worst of men and women: deemed unfit to make decisions for themselves, they need to be protected from themselves. People are never allowed to be inventive, or to participate in producing a communitarian political decision. Representatives, bureaucrats, and judges determine what is "just" in society, not the people. (Baker, 1991, 707) The people are assumed to be interested only in private gain, not in public ends. At its best, Barber says, representative government is a search for great leadership. But this search turns the people into passive watchdogs. In Barber's words, representative government aims for "prudent rulership not participation, private rights not public purpose, limited government not active citizenship." (Barber, 1984, 90) According to Barber, a representative democracy is essentially "incompatible with freedom," because people willingly give their freedom over to elected representatives and the bureaucracies they create; it is "incompatible with equality," because those with the most resources invariably win the day in the give and take of legislative politics; and it is "incompatible with social justice," because real justice can take root only in a participatory environment in which people make informed decisions as equals in a deliberative context. (Barber, 1984, 90) Representative democracy is about control, keeping citizens apart and limiting their participation to the voting booth. Such a system is deadening to people's souls, because there is none of the interaction that is consonant with the truly interdependent nature of people's lives and their yearnings for fraternity. (Dahl, 1989, 72) Barber advocates a strong democracy that focuses on participation, citizenship, and civic competence. (Barber, 1984, 90) Strong democracy connotes a system in which people govern themselves at all levels at least part of the time, and certainly on the major hot-button issues and on matters involving the use of a great deal of power by the government. Barber believes that our "freedom is not the precondition for political activity rather our freedom is the product of vigorous and active citizenship" (Barber, 1984, 90) —a vigorous and active citizenship that is not a part of a representative system. Americans are bored and without purpose in antiseptic modern life; meaning can be found in self-government within the framework of participatory institutions that reflect and celebrate equality. Public judgment after deliberation and as a precursor to more discussion will elevate politics above the private interests and market forces that dominate representative democracy. Barber prescribes the creation of deliberative institutions that would fully engage people in self-government, enabling them carefully to consider policies that would be good for the whole community. Barber is fully aware of what a radical break this would be from what people are used to. He acknowledges that initially there would be a need for civic education and transitional leadership to facilitate the move from undemocratic hierarchical decision-making structures (so familiar and essential a part of representative democracy) to structures in which citizens can participate on an equal basis. People would need to be indoctrinated in civic communitarian values as an antidote to the existing private-interest ethic. References Baker, Lynn. "Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective." Chicago-Kent Law Review 67 (1991): 707. Banducci, Susan. "Direct Legislation: When Is It Used and When Does It Pass?" In Citizens as Legislators, ed. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Caroline Tolbert. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998. 116 Banducci, Susan. "Searching for Ideological Consistency in Direct Legislation Voting." In Citizens as Legislators, ed. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J. Tolbert. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998. 78 Barber, Benjamin. Passion for Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. 239 Barber, Benjamin. Strong Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 90 Cronin, Thomas. Direct Democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 54-56 Dahl, Robert. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. 71-73 Fishkin, James. Democracy and Deliberation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. 85 Fishkin, James. Voice of the People. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. 131 Raphael D. D. Problems of Political Philosophy, London: MacMillan Press, 1990, 91 Rosenthal, Alan. The Decline of Representative Democracy. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1998. 280-82 Smith, Daniel. Tax Crusaders and the Politics of Direct Democracy. New York: Routledge, 1998. 72 Stark, Steven. "Too Representative Government." Atlantic, May 1995, 106. Read More