The Fukushima Nuclear Plant Disaster - Research Paper Example

?RUNNING HEAD: Fukushima Nuclear Plant Disaster The Fukushima Nuclear Plant Disaster This study is an examination of the anomaly that occurred at Fukushima I Power Plant in March. The said incident happened as a direct result of the massive earthquake and tsunami that occurred just recently. As with the calamities it succeeded, the nuclear disaster resulted in widespread loss of life, and has had numerous consequences that persist to this day. However, unlike the earthquake and tsunami whose long-term consequences revolve mostly around structural damage and psychological scars and trauma – especially where the survivors are concerned – the consequences of this nuclear disaster are much more disquieting. If left unchecked, these can result in casualties equaling or even exceeding the body count of the previous natural disasters. This being the case, this study intends to take a look at the specifics of the incident – what occurred, as well as how and why. Concluding the study shall be a brief reflection on the incident and its immediate and distant aftermath. Table of Contents Abstract 2 Introduction 4 The Disaster 5 Radiation – The Deadly Consequences 8 Reflection 14 Conclusion 15 References 16 Introduction The disaster that occurred at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant last March came right on the heels of the then-recent earthquake and tsunami that rocked the nation. The said occurrence was a consequence of these natural calamities, and was in fact joined by other nuclear accidents all over Japan. However, the one in Fukushima stands out as the largest. In fact, the magnitude of the disaster is said to be comparable to the tragedy at Chernobyl decades ago (Thomson-Reuters, 2011). The comparison to Chernobyl came courtesy of experts on the subject, which should say something on how catastrophic the Fukushima incident was. On the International Nuclear Event Scale, its rating was a 7, exactly the same as that of Chernobyl, whereas the Mile Island Disaster trailed behind at 5. As shall be explained below, the Japanese government tried to dismiss and downplay the incident to extent, but was eventually forced to concede to its magnitude. Fortunately, casualties resulting from the immediate disaster were relatively few. For sure, the natural calamities that preceded the disaster claimed over 9,000 more lives than the accident at Fukushima. Even then, the latter was still hardly equivalent to a slap on the wrist. The death toll immediately following the disaster numbered at 47. Two of these were Fukushima plant workers unlucky enough to get caught in it, and who sustained multiple external injuries before ultimately dying of blood loss. The other 45 who perished had been patients at an evacuated hospital in Futaba, and who had mostly been suffering from dehydration and starvation. Unfortunately, though, the relatively low immediate body count might be balanced out by an even bigger death toll if things are left the way they are now. As with the disaster at Chernobyl – and, more to the point, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki – the area remains irradiated, and cleanup efforts continue up till today. The threat of radiation is arguably the most terrifying thing to have come out of the disaster. The other consequences which have resulted from the accident cannot be seen by human eyes. However, these are unmistakably there, and can in fact result in a much higher body count if left unchecked. Even as it is now, the constant threat of being irradiated has rendered numerous surrounding villages and neighborhoods uninhabitable, which by itself is already a monumental setback for the unlucky ones living there (Maeda, 2011). The Disaster As already noted, the Fukushima disaster ranks among the biggest nuclear catastrophes in recent history, easily at par with or even exceeding what happened at Chernobyl (Thomson-Reuters, 2011) though still on a somewhat lower scale compared to the Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombs. Considering that multiple reactors were involved at Fukushima, in contrast with the single one that went critical at Chernobyl, it could be inferred that the latter is the case. As noted by Black (2011), Reactors 5 and 6 were shutdown at the time of the disaster, as they were due for maintenance, while Reactor 4 was then currently defueled. Precautions were also taken so that the remaining reactors would shut down in the event of disaster, which came to pass in the form of the earthquake, while emergency power would take over with regard to control systems and other safety measures. This way, in theory, the worst case scenario could be averted; yet the plant would not become completely inoperable even then. Despite these precautions though, things still went wrong as the 19-ft seawall fell short of the 46-ft wave that immediately succeeded the earthquake and ended up flooding the place. The result was that the electrical grid was cut off, which in turn cut power to the reactor cooling systems, and caused them to overheat (Daily Yomiuri Online, 2011). The worst of the disaster was concentrated in Reactors 1-3, which all suffered a full meltdown (CNN, 2011). The plant’s owners, Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) admitted that the control rods in 2-3 may have melted during the first week of the crisis, while #1’s rods melted within 16 hours of the disaster’s onset. A follow-up report from TEPCO on May 24th added that the plant had further been crippled possibly due to the failure of a major part of #2’s control rods. Reactors 2 and 3 were expected to melt down completely, though this scenario has yet to come to pass – and hopefully never will. What can be observed, however, is that temperature within the plant has been rising even after 2 months since the incident started. Alas, not even Reactors 5-6, which had supposedly been shut down, were spared from the disaster, and began to overheat as the water levels dropped. Workers were being exposed to radiation left and right, and thus an evacuation order was given in order to avert the biggest catastrophe in the form of massive loss of life. Enough power had been restored to cool Unit 6 down and restore electricity to other parts of the plant, but Reactors 1-4 remained inoperable due to extensive damage (Narioka, 2011). Additionally, it did not help that the basement areas remained inaccessible, because the whole place was flooded with radioactive water. This has happened due in part to how emergency crews have been blasting the damaged reactors with water in an attempt to prevent a full meltdown, an endeavor in which they were at least partly successful. In the process though, the same water that had been used to cool down the reactor became radioactive as it washed out the plant, eventually making its way to the lowest levels as a toxic soup which cannot be safely disposed of immediately (Makinen and Vartabedian, 2011). The official estimate courtesy of the Japanese government pegs the total at 57 million liters of water, which only served to aggravate the already-exhaustive effort needed to clean it all up. Specifically, it is said that the radioactive substances first need to be solidified, and that this task alone requires a specialized facility. Even then, a task such as this could take up to decades to complete and cost billions of dollars. From this alone, it can already be seen that the Fukushima disaster was a major catastrophe that requires equally drastic measures for resolution. More to the point, it differs from the early earthquake and tsunami in that relatively few died at the immediate occurrence of the disaster, but that the ramifications of the disaster can themselves multiply the body count exponentially if left unaddressed. Thus, the next section aims to look specifically at the radiation effects resulting from the disaster. Radiation – The Deadly Consequences To reiterate, the biggest and most important difference setting apart the man-made (to an extent) Fukushima nuclear disaster from the preceding earthquake/tsunami tandem is not the death toll. If nothing else though, the fact that the former claimed a lot less lives than the latter is something to take comfort in. Though it would have been infinitely preferable that the casualty rate from the Fukushima disaster was zero, it is still worth noting that there were a lot less immediate casualties than one would expect – especially considering the circumstances in question. While the rest of the world may have criticized Japan for its questionable safety measures that allowed the crisis to occur at all, as shall be explained later, it should also be noted that these safety measures at least succeeded in keeping the mortality rate low. In other words, it was not that they failed to plan for every contingency; rather, even the worst-case scenario they had in mind paled in comparison to what actually noted. All the same, it should be noted that the 47 people who died as a result of the disaster only pertains to the immediate death toll. As already mentioned above, the most important thing about the Fukushima catastrophe is that it also let loose dangerous levels of radiation in the surrounding area, which could inflict even more casualties just by being left as it is. Moreover, unlike the danger zones left behind by the earthquake and the tsunami, which can be seen a mile away, irradiated areas cannot be judged as such just by looking at them. Thus, an unlucky and unsuspecting soul could wander into the area and end up paying for his curiosity with his life. In fact, it is said by Grier (2011) that the total amount of iodine-131 and caesium-137 released into the atmosphere following the disaster exceeded 10% that of Chernobyl, which should help justify the comparisons to that earlier incident. However, scarier still is the fact that the Pacific Ocean ended up receiving large quantities of radioactive isotopes as well. This is highly ironic, considering that at the immediate wake of the disaster, it had been reported that none of the facilities had released any radiation (IAEA, 2011). Just a day later, Japanese authorities were forced to change their tune and admit that levels of these substances had been elevated all over the surrounding area. It was Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano who first reported the alarming levels of radiation in the surrounding area (ABC News, 2011), while Prime Minister Naoto Kan warned the public to stay indoors so as to avert being exposed to it (Kyodo News Agency, 2011). Luckily, the radiation at the time had yet to spread as far as Tokyo City, although vegetables such as spinach were found to have become somewhat irradiated instead (Kyodo News Agency, 2011). Things became rather hairier as trace amounts of radiation were found in Tokyo’s tap water, as well as those of other prefectures (The Japan Times, 2011). Luckily, Secretary Edano clarified that it there would not be any immediate harm in ingesting either the irradiated vegetables or tap water – that is, one eating or drinking either would not have to worry about dropping dead sooner or later. However, he added, it would still be dangerous for people to become complacent and continue eating such contaminated goods. While ingesting these once would not be harmful in the least, doing so on a regular basis would definitely be dangerous to one’s health. A month later, even the fish caught in the surrounding area were found to have become irradiated as well (Chittim, 2011). This recent development forced the government to enforce stricter safety standards in public fish markets, but even this is rather limited considering that some of those fish may move on to other waters which they can contaminate. A fisherman living in the area lamented that the recent disaster may have put a stop to the already small fishing industry that had been thriving in Fukushima. With things the way they were, it was more or less inevitable that sooner or later, the people of Fukushima would be asked to evacuate the area. Finally, on April 22nd, a little over a month after the catastrophe, an evacuation order was given for the village of Iitate (Talmadge, 2011). Unfortunately but not surprisingly, a sizable chunk of the villagers could not bear the thought of leaving their homes – not least since, as far as one could see, nothing was wrong. Another possible explanation would be that since the village somehow managed to escape the tsunami altogether, the villagers were confident that neither would the radiation affect them. Regardless of their reasoning though, most of them were reluctant to leave, and the local government too was far from quick about evacuation. In one man’s case – the oldest resident in the village decided to kill himself rather than leave home. Truly, then, it cannot be disputed that the radiation levels brought on by the disaster have been extremely detrimental. Not only has it rendered much of the surrounding area dangerous and even uninhabitable in some cases, it has also taken its toll on the lives of people there – if not on their health, then on their livelihood, their finances, etc. For one thing, the fishermen that had been making a living in the area now need to get another job or take their business elsewhere. Of course, the events themselves have no doubt traumatized the citizens of Fukushima – even driving one man to suicide. Aftermath Incidents and calamities have a way of changing the lives not only of those caught in them, but also of those who happened to witness everything. The Fukushima disaster was obviously no exception to this rule, either. The entire world watched how the TEPCO and the Japanese government fought to keep things under control, and naturally, there are varying opinions as to how well – or how badly – these important personnel handled the situation. For one thing, it was certain that at some point, heads would roll. This was exactly what happened as TEPCO president Masataka Shimizu was forced to resign (Kageyama, 2011). Shimizu had been criticized and come under fire for having kept a low profile all throughout the disaster while his ground personnel endured the situation. This has happened even as he vowed that he and his company would do everything in its power to keep things under control. As a result, it was called into question whether Japan should rely so heavily on nuclear power. To be sure, the notion that the catastrophe at Fukushima was the worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl is widespread. And the fact that the reactors may well take a long time to contain does nothing to help the situation. It is customary for the heads of Japanese corporations to step down in case of major problems. In Shimizu’s own words, his resignation came about as he could not help but feel that it was his fault that the public lost its trust in nuclear power, and that the people became burdened with all those fears and anxieties. In fact, the disaster at Fukushima also led the government to shut down another nuclear plant at Hamaoka. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency had attempted to downplay the severity of the disaster, but eventually even it was forced to admit that yes, the nuclear disaster really was that bad (Maeda, 2011). In particular, the occurrences at Units 1-3 were raised to Level 5, which was reserved for incidents with potentially widespread consequences (Black, 2011). Another news report by Cru (2011) tells us how this level was or should have been raised to 6. However, in spite of all these, it was still said on the Wall Street Journal that Japan alone had the authority to rate the incident. This was subverted later on when Japan itself revised its earlier rating, and admitted that the incident warranted Level 6. The incident has also given rise to a few findings. For instance, some have surmised that perhaps the nuclear industry’s sense of foresight leaves something to be desired if such a disaster could happen in spite of their precautions, which would in turn mean that the IAEA needs to refine its policies somewhat (Kurczy, 2011). This was attested to by Brumfiel (2011), who added that the IAEA’s response to the crisis came off as sluggish and confusing at times, and that the agency needed to be more proactive when it came to nuclear safety. The rating scale would also need to be revised, taking into account the confusion that pervaded when Japan attempted to properly rate the magnitude of the catastrophe at Fukushima. Another article by Shields (2011) quotes Russian nuclear accident specialist Iouli Andreev, who lambasts the IAEA for its response to the disaster. According to him, the agency had failed to learn from the earlier tragedy at Chernobyl; not only that, he also accused it as well as the entire nuclear power industry of practicing willful ignorance just to ensure that the industry continued to expand. This is ironic, considering the IAEA’s role of ensuring safe yet efficient nuclear power. In reality, what seems to have happened is that it advocates the use of nuclear power without paying more attention to the hazards involved. Reflection It can thus be seen from the various reactions involved that the entire world watched the disaster at Fukushima, and, while it was indeed a major, major disaster, were still somehow able to glean some learning from it. While some things could have been worse, it cannot be denied that the entire catastrophe should never have happened in the first place, and might never have come to pass had certain precautions been taken. Thus, the last section shall focus on the learning and reflection that can be had from the incident. First of all, it can easily be noted that Murphy’s law was correct: ‘if anything can go wrong, it will. And if any single chain of events can go wrong, it will go wrong in the worst possible way’. Again, let it be said, in the partial defense of the Japanese government, that they did see fit to place some precautions where their nuclear plants were concerned. Among these precautions was the seawall surrounding the Fukushima plant that was meant to ward off a tsunami, as well as automatic shutdown systems for the reactors involved. However, while it was admittedly the result of foresight that the seawall was erected in the first place, that foresight unfortunately did not extend to making the seawall high enough to block an especially large wave. In this light, it can be noted that while it would still have been difficult to prevent a disaster from taking place, it would have been much more manageable. As it was, though, that particular oversight caused a most catastrophic chain of events to follow, one that resulted in 47 dead, and even more to follow should the radiation be left alone. From here, it can also be said that safety measures are never truly appreciated until they are needed – and especially when they fail. Finally, the importance of learning from past mistakes can also be seen. As had been repeatedly mentioned in the preceding pages, the Fukushima disaster was easily on par with Chernobyl – a separate event that took place 25 years ago. Despite the IAEA supposedly knowing perfectly well the hazards of nuclear power, they still failed to implement the necessary policies meant to avert such a catastrophe as this. It had been said by Winston Churchill that one who fails to learn from history would be doomed to repeat it – which is exactly what happened at Fukushima. Needless to say, this should serve as a wake-up call for the IAEA, which should do all in its power to ensure that such an incident never happens again. Conclusion In order, the previous pages served to examine the events at Fukushima, take a look at the lingering radiation threat, observe the international reaction to the incident and then come up with reflections based on what happened. The Fukushima nuclear plant disaster was indeed that – a disaster which, while not as bloody as most, was still not without a death toll. If anything, the lingering radiation may indirectly claim even more lives in the years to come. An important question remains, one that the Japanese government needs to answer right away: is nuclear power worth it? On one hand, Japan knows perfectly well how convenient nuclear power can make their lives; at the same time, though, the incident at Fukushima should serve as a painful lesson that using such power is not without its drawbacks. Whatever it decides, the government needs to make sure that this horrific tragedy never repeats itself. References "Radiation leak feared at nuke plant, people urged to stay indoors" (2011) Kyodo News Agency. 15 March 2011. Retrieved on June 19, 2011 from http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/03/78123.html "Spinach with radiation 27 times higher than limit found in Japan" (2011) Kyodo News. 21 March 2011. Retrieved on June 19, 2011from http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/03/79856.html 3 nuclear reactors melted down after quake, Japan confirms (2011) CNN. 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