The Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Disaster - Essay Example

The Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Disaster: An Analysis of the Causes and Effects The massive earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in 2011 led to the disastrous Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster. This disaster revealed many issues inherent in Japan’s nuclear sector and crisis preparedness and emergency management. This essay discusses the possible causes of the nuclear meltdown, such as construction or design problems, how prepared the government is for the crisis, how it responded to the disaster, and its long-term environmental impact on Japan and the rest of the world. The disastrous meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear power plant after the massive earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 frightened numerous people, not only in Japan, but also around the world. The roughly four-decade-old reactors needed electric pumps for reserve energy to expel water to activate the fuel rods in an emergency. Unfortunately, these mechanisms failed during the massive earthquake and tsunami (Cahill 48). The technologically advanced nuclear plants hoard water in the reactor containment basin, in an emergency that water would pour without outside power onto the worked up mechanism to cool it up for several days. They can also spontaneously expel water with heated air. Fukushima nuclear power plant was plagued with operator, mechanical, and construction errors. Several months prior to the earthquake, personnel on one of the six reactors erroneously performed procedures for the wrong reactor. A line regulating the cooling mechanism was taken out mistakenly, an error that was only found out weeks after (Noggerath, Geller, & Gusiakov 39). The tsunami aggravated the situation when electric power stopped working at four reactors. Heat accumulated in the reactors and in basins designed to prevent the overheating of worked up fuel rods. A few weeks after, power had not been brought back to the cooling mechanisms and to the hubs of the two reactors. The plant operators at last revealed in May that there had been a reactor breakdown (Noggerath et al. 39). The Fukushima Dai-ichi was made up of six units, with each of them having its own nuclear reactor. These units were built from 1967 to 1979 and were administered by the Tokyo Power and Electric Company (TEPCO). During the earthquake the three units were running and the remaining three were not functioning and under regular maintenance (Samuels 13). After the earthquake struck the three running units were stopped, in accordance to mandated protocols. Emergency generators were turned on to get rid of the spent heat from the reactors. But the 14-meter tsunami worsened the situation because the power plants were built to resist or hold out only a 6.5-meter tsunami (Perrow 2011, 46). The tsunami brought about extensive flooding in the whole expanse of Fukushima and also impaired the generators that run the emergency cooling mechanisms of the nuclear power plants. The available emergency cooling system was run by batteries, which expired after several hours. Lacking sufficient cooling, the water trapped inside the reactors created more heat, which consequently caused the reactors to overheat. This prompted the opening of the relief valves which then released the radioactive steam. A basic rule of nuclear power plant construction is ‘defense in depth’ (Cooper 10). This rule pushes engineers to build a plant that can survive extreme calamities, even as some mechanisms stopped working. A massive tsunami that incapacitates the diesel generators simultaneously is an example, but the 2011 tsunami was too severe, even unimaginable. To endure such a catastrophe, engineers constructed a backup resistance by placing the entire system into a containment unit that is constructed to protect the system. As soon as the diesel generators stopped working after the tsunami, the operators shifted to emergency battery power. But the batteries only lasted for roughly eight hours (Cooper 10-11). The plant operators then started to carry out the emergency procedures. Eventually, people began mentioning the likelihood of core failure, because if the cooling mechanism does not return, the core will sooner or later liquefy. Because the operators were not able to restore their cooling capacities because of power failure, they were forced to utilize any available cooling mechanism to remove as much steam as possible. The main goal was to sustain the strength of the fuel rods by cooling them up (Noggerath et al. 40). In order to maintain the resilience of the containment and basin, the operators began releasing steam every now and them to regulate the pressure. Hence, when the operators began releasing steam, radioactive fumes were discharged into the environment in very small quantities (Noggerath et al. 40). Even though some of these fumes were emitting radiation, they did not create considerable hazard to the health of the people or even the employees working on the reactors. This process is reasonable as its effects are minor, particularly in comparison to the possible effects of not releasing and endangering the resilience of the containment system. However, there were some reports that the construction of the containment systems used at the Fukushima nuclear power plant was performed in the 1960s, and has been condemned since then as less secure than other kinds of system for containing radiation and stopping liquefied fuel from leaking into the environment (Cooper 9). As stated by these reports, the original construction made use of smaller amounts of concrete and other materials than rival containment construction designs. However, these reports contained several errors and oversight that could overstress the possible problems (Eisler 39). For instance, they did not mention that because the containment system is less costly and more limited in size it will collapse. Moreover, the technique the plant operators used to prevent reactor meltdown was sufficient. Not like Chernobyl, the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster was not due to construction errors. The engineering mechanisms at Fukushima worked in accordance to their design requirements. In other words, the natural catastrophe—the earthquake and the tsunami—that brought about the nuclear power plant disaster was too massive for the structure to withstand (Eisler 84). Furthermore, the environmental impact of this disaster do not seem to be as extreme as those of Chernobyl, mostly due to the availability of the containment structures that contained huge amounts of the discharged radioactive substances. As a result, it is hard to find many people who were contented with how the Japanese government handled the 2011 disasters. The weakness of the government was broadly seen as the biggest barrier to a successful response to the crisis. A month after the disaster, Soga Takeshi, an editorial writer for Asahi Shimbun, stated that “our political leaders have yet to offer a single convincing statement about the disaster that strikes an emotional chord in the hearts of the people” (Samuels 33). Rather, he argued, government officials argue against one another, even though “our nation is waiting to hear the voice of a great orator” (Samuels 33). However, the bigger problems of governance were exposed with specific enormity by the people who relied on it. Numerous local public authorities proclaimed the government to be unresponsive and indifferent to the victims. For instance, Mayor Toba Futoshi of Rikuzentakata fiercely protested in desperation, saying that nothing was done for the victims on the periphery. He declared that local victims were ignored by politicians (Perrow 2013, 59). Prime Minister Kan, who visited Fukushima after the catastrophes, was severely condemned for attempting to meddle with relief and rescue operations, thus impeding a successful response. He does not possess command power, partly because he castrated the system of government on which emergency response and crisis management had to rely (Lyman 48). Hence, it was claimed that “the government’s move was always one step behind… caus[ing] the damage to spread” (Samuels 34). However, the criticisms against the government before, during, and after the 2011 catastrophes were conflicting (Samuels 34): Too much or too little consultation, too much on-site presence versus too much distance, too much or too little elite direction, too much or too little political control of the bureaucrats, too much or too little ‘presidentialism,’ too much micromanagement versus too much detachment, too much speed versus too much lethargy, too many snap decisions versus too much caution. Almost three-quarters of those surveyed viewed the dissemination of information concerning the nuclear disaster to be ‘unsatisfactory’, and roughly seventy percent admitted that they were dissatisfied with the prime minister because “he has no leadership capability” (Hindmarsh xxviii). Response preparation and crisis management during and after the disaster involve the ‘preparedness and response’ side of handling catastrophes. In a statement on the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster in 2011, the government has admitted lapses in preparation and response. The government has written the statement before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) official convention on nuclear security. The statement, it declares, “is a preliminary accident report, and represents a summary of the evaluation of the accident and the lessons learned to date based on the facts gleaned about the situation so far” (World Nuclear News para 2). As stated by the Japanese government, immediately after the massive earthquake and the tsunami, the nuclear disaster “followed at an unprecedented scale and over a lengthy period” (World Nuclear News para 2). It further reports, “For Japan, the situation has become extremely severe since countermeasures to deal with the nuclear accident have had to be carried out along with dealing with the broader disaster caused by the earthquake and tsunami” (Hindmarsh 3). The statement emphasized a number of issues that made emergency response more complicated, such as the short duration of the emergency battery power in comparison to the time needed to bring back an external power source. Moreover, hydrogen outbursts worsened the disaster. Several crisis management steps carried out at the plant in an attempt to prevent greater problems, and to lessen the impact, were found out to be ‘inadequate’ (Sugimoto et al. 631). The statement revealed, “Although some part of the measures functioned, such as alternative water injection from the fire extinguishing water system to the reactor, the rest did not fulfill their roles in various responses, including ensuring the power supplies and the reactor cooling function” (World Nuclear News para 9). In relation to Japan’s existing supervision of its nuclear sector, the statement admitted that there was uncertainty over who bears the main obligation to provide adequate efforts to guarantee the safety of the public in a crisis. Moreover, the government said it cannot disagree with the idea that the current structures and procedures made organization of capacities difficult to quickly act in response to such a massive nuclear disaster (The Science Teacher 2012b, 20). Therefore, the government declared that it would exert considerable efforts in making the nuclear device more self-sufficient by splitting off the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which encourages the utilization of nuclear power (Funabashi & Kitazawa 15). Furthermore, the government said it will “review regulatory and administrative frameworks on nuclear safety and a structure of environment monitoring operation” (World Nuclear News para 11). It further promises, “We will be committed to reviewing and improving the legal structures on nuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness and related criteria and guidelines” (World Nuclear News para 11). The Japanese government has realized that a basic modification of its nuclear safety preparedness and response is inescapable. The government also admitted that it is taking the matter very seriously and with regret that this disaster has exposed issues across the globe regarding the safety of generating nuclear power (Funabashi & Kitazawa 12). And especially, as stated by Birmingham and McNeill (2012), the government is very remorseful for bringing about fear among the people across the globe about the security of nuclear power plants and the discharge of radioactive substances.  The nuclear disaster has become a serious challenge for the Japanese government, and the country is now acting in response to the crisis, with the important local groups working hand in hand, and with assistance from numerous nations across the globe. The government declared, “We are prepared to confront much difficulty towards restoration from the accident, and also confident that we will be able to overcome this accident by uniting the wisdom and efforts of not only Japan, but also the world” (World Nuclear News para 14). In the Japanese case, it is clear that infrastructure breakdown resulted in a disaster, despite the wealth of the nation, and led massively to the obstacles that slowed down the emergency response measures: evacuation of affected populations, delivery of relief goods, delivery of trauma care and first aid services, and organized search and rescue operations (Ramana 72). The major nuclear disasters that have taken place have led to serious environmental damages. Safe utilization of nuclear power hence remains a major concern for the global community. In spite of the attempts of the existing international nuclear safety organization, there have been numerous nuclear disasters, the most severe of which was the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster in 2011. Radioactivity emitted from the nuclear power plant contaminated the environment (The Science Teacher 2012a, 31). It also had larger consequences. After the Fukushima nuclear incident, the government of Germany declared that it is withdrawing from the nuclear community. Germany wants to disable all its nuclear power plants by 2022, abandoning its dependence on nuclear power in support of more secure energy sources, such as hydroelectric, solar, and wind (Eisler 106). The decision of Germany to stop using nuclear power is an encouraging move from an environmental point of view. Even though this decision can barely be followed by other countries, it raises the idea that there are other safer, feasible sources of energy that can be dynamically harnessed elsewhere. Atmospheric discharges took place during the reactor explosions and the overheated fuel ponds, smog from the consequent fires, and the vaporization of large quantities of water utilized for the cooling system. Contamination of groundwater and marine environment was brought about by backflow and purposeful release of radioactive substance from the plant. The Fukushima nuclear disaster caused one of the most severe radioactive pollutions of the oceans in the history of nuclear energy use (The Science Teacher 2012a, 31). The effects of diffusion and dilution may decrease the level of contamination in the area of the plant, but only contributes to the spread of the enduring radioactive isotopes, placing a larger number of people at risk of the impact of radioactive contamination. Furthermore, radioactive contamination has been found in all types of plants or crops cultivated in the affected areas as well as in domesticated animals on affected communities. Radioactive contamination has also been found in groundwater and milk, even in major urban areas (Ramana 71). Fishes in the North Pacific were discovered to have high levels of contamination, with a certain buildup of radioactivity in animals. Radioactive buildup and washout will keep on causing radioactive pollution of marine species for the coming decades (Hindmarsh 53). The waters located at the northeastern part of the Fukushima plant are the most used fishing areas in the world. Most of the fishes and seafood consumed by Japan are caught in these areas. Marine species and fishes in Ibaraki region revealed high amounts of radioactive isotopes and had to be dealt with as radioactive waste (Birmingham & McNeill 91). It is frequently reported that the outcome the dilution of radioactive waste released into major bodies of water reduces the impact on the food chain and the environment. Yet, it has to be emphasized that the radioactive contents are not eliminated via dilution but are merely diffused over a bigger area (Lyman 49). This is hazardous because the diffusion of radioactive pollution in the Pacific Ocean will affect a larger number of people and there is no nontoxic amount for radioactivity. Moreover, changes in the food chain result in a buildup of radioactivity in marine animals, which are then consumed by human beings. According to Samuels (2013), radioactive contents in fishes from the North Pacific continuously increased from March to September, with a concentrated contamination discovered in September. Power to the Fukushima nuclear power plant has been brought back and TEPCO has been trying to cool the fuel rods by putting a combination of salt and fresh water into the reactors. The first stage is to make the power plant stable by sustaining and improving cooling mechanisms, avoiding the diffusion of radioactive substances and carrying out preliminary cleanup of the site (Ramana 73). Before the power plant’s decontamination, hundreds of thousands metric tons of radioactive fluid contained in the underground vault should be eradicated and screened. A currently built infiltration structure has been disabled several times because of mechanical setbacks. TEPCO is also worried that salt water utilized for backup cooling will speed up oxidization in the power plant (Noggerath et al. 44). However, in spite of early guarantees, the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster is still contaminating oceans all over the world, and the Japanese government is at last seeking international assistance. The 2011 power plant disaster was one of the most severe since Chernobyl, and after repeated efforts to stop pollution and environmental damages, such as the utilization of ice rings and the building of another processing facility to sift radioactive substances from contaminated water, the government has requested international assistance to stop radioactive seepages from reaching the Pacific Ocean, which is threatening the ecosystems and food sources of the entire world (Osborne para 1-2). Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared, “We are wide open to receive the most advanced knowledge from overseas to contain the problem. My country needs your knowledge and expertise” (Osborne para 3). However, in spite of Abe’s reports that the seepages were ‘manageable’, untold amounts of radioactive substances have reached oceans across the globe, with TEPCO revealing a new leakage brought about by human mistakes (Hindmarsh 77). The disastrous consequences of the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster will be continuously felt in the near future. Environmental concerns and effects develop from earlier issues of nuclear power plant safety, radioactivity and public health, and international energy utilization and alternatives. Such are situated in perspectives of hazard, risk, and reliance; crisis management and emergency response; environment and competent governance; and climate change alleviation and adjustment, worsening global environmental issue and related sustainable and safe energy alternatives. Conclusions Environmental catastrophes and related incidents are part of human lives and should hence be prepared for and responded to. The Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster was a usual mixture of environmental catastrophe, earthquake and tsunami, and technological failure. However, what is important is that Japan and the rest of the world learn from these incidents, and try to prevent the same mistakes and consequences to happen again in the future. The issues related to the Fukushima nuclear disaster are environmental, construction- or design-related, and technological. Japan has to be prepared for earthquakes, especially because it is located in the active seismic part of the world. The engineers of nuclear power plants must hence take this into account at all times. The major error in the Fukushima nuclear disaster was the low elevation of the containment structures against tsunami. Interior versus coastal building of nuclear power plants must be thoroughly studied and the most appropriate decisions should be made. Without a doubt, the Fukushima nuclear disaster was very disastrous, which inflicted sufferings to a large number of Fukushima residents and nearby communities. The nuclear aspect of the catastrophe was in fact preventable if more rigid and efficient emergency preparedness measures were used in the past when building the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Works Cited Birmingham, Lucy & David McNeill. Strong in the Rain: Surviving Japan’s Earthquake, Tsunami, and Fukushima Nuclear Disaster. New York: Macmillan, 2012. Print. Cahill, Kevin. More with Less: Disasters in an Era of Diminishing Resources. New York: Fordham University Press, 2012. Print. Cooper, Mark. “The implications of Fukushima: The US Perspective”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67.4 (2011): 8-13. Print. Eisler, Ronald. The Fukushima 2011 Disaster. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012. Print. 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