A comparative study between Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 - Research Paper Example

?A comparative study between Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Compare the differences in intelligence. Where did the intelligence failthat allowed the attacks to take place. What are the similarities between the two attacks. 1. Introduction The use of intelligence in the military has been often negatively criticized as of its effectiveness. The attack in Pearl Harbor proved that intelligence should not be exclusively related to the military forces. Rather it should be managed in common by civilians and militants. It is the above fact that led to the establishment of CIA in USA in 1947. The above initiative was considered as a solution, which could guarantee the effective prevention of any such attacks in the future. However, the attacks of 9/11 proved that intelligence failures cannot be fully avoided. This paper focuses on the intelligence failures in Pearl Harbor and in the attacks of 9/11. The characteristics of these failures are critically evaluated taking into consideration the conditions – political and technological – of each particular era. Moreover, the similarities and the differences of these failures are identified and explained, as possible, aiming to show the causes that led to the particular events. It is concluded that the attacks in Pearl Harbor would not be easily prevented – because of the lack of effective intelligence mechanisms at that period of time; however, the intelligence failures in the attacks of 9/11 should be characterized as not justifiable taking into consideration the support offered – in terms of human resources, technology and funding – to the relevant initiatives. 2. Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 - intelligence failures Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 proved that the development of effective measures for preventing such events could be a difficult task even if technology and funding available are significant – as in the case of the attacks of 9/11. The feedback on the investigation regarding the causes of Pearl Harbor has been used by the commissioners of 9/11 as the basis of their research on the causes of the attacks of 9/11 – due to the similarities of these attacks with Pearl Harbor. It should be noted that in both cases, in Pearl Harbor and in the attacks of 9/11, the ability of researchers to seek for information on the various aspects of these events has been increased – in opposition with other countries where the access to such information is not permitted (Johnson 2007, p.30). In order to understand the intelligence failure in Pearl Harbor and the attacks of 9/11 and to identify the similarities and differences of the above events, it would be necessary to refer primarily to the issue of intelligence, as used in describing the measures taken by countries for their protection against enemies. At the next level, the exact failures of intelligence in each of the above cases should be identified, as possible, and evaluated aiming to retrieve their similarities and differences. The term military intelligence is used in order to describe a series of activities; at a first level, the term is related to intelligence, as a condition showing the awareness on issues, like: ‘a) the military capabilities of foreign countries, b) the potentials of US regarding the country’s armed forces, its military strategy and tactics and the level of knowledge on the use of regions (in the country and outside) for military purposes’ (Keating 2011, GL 15) In Pearl Harbor, the failures of military intelligence could be identified in the following events: despite the fact that a war was in progress, no measures were taken for facing an enemy’s surprise attack (Treventon 2003). Of course, it could be supported that in that period, in 1941, when the attack against Pearl Harbor occurred, the level of intelligence involved in the military was rather limited. The military services engaged in such activities were proved totally incapable of capturing in advance information related to the attack. In other words, a failure in identifying signs for the enemy’s preparation for the attack took place (Treventon 2003). In the context of the above failure, president Truman decided to establish CIA (through the National Security Act 1947), in order to ensure that information related to the safety of the nation will be captured on time in the future (Treventon 2003). The conflict between CIA and the military services working on such projects was unavoidable (Treventon, 2003). Moreover, it seems that ‘the rivalry that was developed between CIA and the military’ (Treventon 2003, p.73) led to the limitation of the effectiveness of intelligence, as a tool for ensuring the nation’s safety, a fact which was proved through the attacks of 9/11 which were developed as planned by the enemy - without being identifiable up to their completion. On the other hand, Kreis et al. (1996) noted that the use of military intelligence in 1940s cannot be doubted; however, the level and the quality of intelligence used in the military in the particular period can be characterized as quite low – the failure of intelligence in Pearl Harbor verifies the above assumption. In accordance with Kreis et al. (1996) the failure of intelligence in Pearl Harbor can be mostly identified in the ‘failure of interpreting content of the Japanese diplomatic messages’ (Kreis et al. 1996, p.113). It was specifically at this point that the intelligence used by US military failed to achieve its targets – referring to the capturing of valuable information in advance so that time of preparation before an enemy’s attack exists. Another potential area where the intelligence used in Pearl Harbor failed was the terrain management: the geographical characteristics of the specific region should have been taken into consideration when using the place for keeping a massive volume of armed forces; the place was totally open to the enemy – in terms of its accessibility and visibility by the enemy, a fact which was not appropriately evaluated. However, it should be noted that in Pearl Harbor, intelligence was not quite developed – in fact the above service/ network was just in its initial phases of existence, not being able to respond to the targets set by its planners (Kreis 1996, p.113). Regarding the intelligence failure related to the attacks of 9/11, Copeland (2007) gave the following explanation: the above attacks were not prevented because the main intelligence services in US have the trend to focus ‘on prosecution rather on gathering information’ (Copeland 2007, p.245); reference is made specifically to FBI and CIA as the main intelligence agencies in USA. In accordance with the above view, the attacks of 9/11 could have been prevented if emphasis was given on gathering information, an activity that mostly reflects the intelligence failure in the case of the specific attacks. From a similar point of view, George et al. (2008) noted that intelligence failures in the attacks of 9/11 could be related to a series of facts: a) the lack of sufficient material on terrorism, meaning the information related to the key initiators of terrorism activities worldwide, b) the lack of skilled staff for managing the information gathered – reference is made to the lack of language skills for interpreting and evaluating information related to terrorism activities worldwide (George et al. 2008). In other words, in the case of the attacks of 9/11 the intelligence failures are mostly related to the lack of preparation in regard to terrorism, an activity which had already developed worldwide and which could be expected to occur, at a significant level, in USA. 3. Similarities and differences between the two attacks The two attacks have a series of similarities; both of them were followed by losses in humans and by damages on infrastructure; moreover, both the events were surprise attacks, i.e. took place in ways (the events of 9/11) and in time (the attack in Pearl Harbor) that could not be, normally, related to such threat (Diamond 2008). At the next level, both these events were against US, a country which has been traditionally related to military interventions for the protection of piece in the international community. From another point of view, the above events, have another common point: taking into consideration the conditions in which the events developed, it could be noted that both of them should be expected; the attack in Pearl Harbor took place during the war against Japanese; in terms of geography, the above place was near Japan, so such attack should be considered as possible – compared to an attack against US directly, which was not possible at that time because of the distance involved (Kellner 2003). The attacks of 9/11 should be considered as expected, having in mind the extensive participation of US in military activities worldwide and the existence of such threats by terrorists; these threats should be handled as warnings; the over-estimation of these threats has led to the complete lack of effective measures for preventing the attacks of 9/11; in case of Pearl Harbor, the over-estimation of the enemy’s ability to proceed to such attack was also a key reason for the failure of intelligence in regard to the specific attack. The key difference between the Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 is the level of preparation of the country regarding the management of such threats. This issue is highlighted in the study of Wark (2004); in that study emphasis is given on the following fact: by 2001, the amount invested on intelligence has been estimated to $30bn – an amount extremely high. It was believed that by fully supporting the relevant projects – meaning the projects focusing on the prevention of potential attacks – the chances for such events would be minimized. Moreover, the participation of 13 intelligence agencies in the above initiatives would further increase the effectiveness of the measures taken (Wark 2004, p.59). In accordance with the above, in the case of 9/11 the country was appropriately prepared, as possible, for the case of an enemy attack; for this reason, normally the events of the 9/11 should have been prevented. In this context, the occurrence of the attacks of 9/11 set many questions regarding the management of the whole project – meaning the increase of the country’s safety towards such threats; in Pearl Harbor, there was no particular preparation – at least not at such level – but, still, the effects of the enemy attacks were similar to those of 9/11. From another point of view, the attack in Pearl Harbor took place during wartime; in 9/11 the attacks were not developed in the context of an existed war – at least, not a war in the traditional meaning of the term. From this point of view, the attack in Pearl Harbor should be easier identifiable – and expected; the attacks of 9/11 could not be expected, taking into consideration the level of safety measures in airports but also the intelligence practices used by CIA, the US’s key intelligence organization. The fact that in the first case, in Pearl Harbor, only military intelligence was involved while in the second case, in the attacks of 9/11, a complex intelligence network existed (referring to the existence of both civilian and military intelligence) did not have any effect on the above events. Another important difference between the Pearl Harbor and the attacks of 9/11 has been the response of the US president regarding the identification of the events’ causes. In Pearl Harbor, the president, Franklin Roosevelt, ‘appointed a high level military and civilian commission to determine the causes of the intelligence failure’ (Wark 2004, p.59). On the contrary, in the case of the attacks of 9/11, ‘the US president, George Bush, as well the chairmen of the Senate and House’ (Wark 2004, p.59) avoided ordering the identification of the events’ causes; in other words, in the case of 9/11 a trend for keeping the causes of the attack unknown was followed – a fact that was negatively perceived by people across US. It is clear that the attacks of 9/11 did not reveal just a failure of intelligence; they also revealed a trend for the development of secret diplomacy, which, even if it was for the interest of the country, could set the credibility of the country’s politicians in risk. 4. Conclusion The effects of both Pearl Harbor and the attacks of 9/11 in terms of human lives and damages in infrastructure were severe. Of course, a series of differences have been identified between the above events; however, similarities also have been proved to exist. The review of the failures in intelligence, as occurred in both the above events, has led to the assumption that the effectiveness of any intelligence – related plans cannot be guaranteed. Rather, it could be noted that the preparation of a country against such events is a challenging task. After the attacks of 9/11 ‘Condoleeza Rice (as the National Security Adviser) told the press that: This isn’t Pearl Harbor’ (Wark 2004, p.59). After examining the terms of each of the above events, it could be stated that the attacks of 9/11 were more severe than Pearl Harbor, an event which can be possibly related to false estimations on the level of the risk; in the case of the attacks of 9/11 the country was believed to be fully protected against such threats, a belief that was proved totally wrong; in fact, in 9/11 the level of the failure of intelligence was extremely high – all attacks of the enemy were developed successfully whereas in Pearl Harbor there was a response to the attack – even with delay – meaning that the enemy didn’t manage to escape with only minor damages – as in the case of the attack of 9/11. References Betts, R. (2009) Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. New York: Columbia University Press Copeland, T. (2007) Fool me twice: intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Diamond, J. (2008) The CIA and the culture of failure: U.S. intelligence from the end of the Cold War to the invasion of Iraq. California: Stanford University Press George, R. & Bruce, J. (2008) Analyzing intelligence: origins, obstacles, and innovations. Washington: Georgetown University Press Johnson, L. (2007) Handbook of intelligence studies. Oxon: Taylor & Francis Kellner, D. (2003) From 9/11 to terror war: the dangers of the Bush legacy. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Kreis, J., Ehrhart, R., Cochran, A., Futrell, R., Fabyanic, T. & Kreis, J. (1996) Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War II. Washington: DIANE Publishing Linnan, D. (2008) Enemy combatants, terrorism, and armed conflict law: a guide to the issues. Westport: ABC-CLIO Shulsky, A. & Schmitt, G. (2002) Silent warfare: understanding the world of intelligence. Virginia: Brassey's Smith, P. (2008) The terrorism ahead: confronting transnational violence in the twenty-first century. New York: M.E. Sharpe Treventon, G. (2003) Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Wark, W. (2004) Twenty-first century intelligence. London: Routledge Read More