Drug Violence in Mexico - Research Paper Example

?Going down a checklist of quick and easy facts, Mexico at first seems like the perfect neighbor for the United s. It shares an extensive borderwith the United States. It also has a warmer climate than some of the states, and miles of beaches, making it a good destination for tourists that wish to leave the country but not go too far away. The country has a rich history of ancient cultures, including the Azetcs, Mayans, and Olmecs, and just like the United States has a democratic government with an elected president. However, lurking under the beautiful cultural history of Mexico and its obvious benefits in being a trade partner for the United States due to the shared borders is a deadly problem: the violence in Mexico due to the drug cartels. Mexican drug trafficking is not a new item in the history of the country; the country has since Prohibition years of 1917-1933 been exporting illegal substances to the United States, and even before that, in Civil War years, was seen as one of the major suppliers of opiates, including morphine and heroin used to treat soldiers (Gonzalez). Though drugs have been commonly used in Mexico during this time, even though they were exported to the United States, they were still only being used for medical purposes, therefore the government saw no need to regulate or otherwise deter their uses. If there were addicts, they were seen as “ill persons”, not criminals, and the government was more concerned about protecting the public from low-quality drugs in its desire to make laws against drug use than they were in sending people to jail for it (Gonzalez). Another reason that the Mexican drug trafficking grew and prospered, coming under the control of what is known today as the drug cartels, is that for a long time the attentions of anti-drug campaigns were focused elsewhere, specifically Columbia. With all of the United States attention focused on bringing down the Columbian cartels, it is only natural that Mexico would be able to “fly under the radar” of the anti-drug missions and grow unchecked to the size that it is today. However, once the Columbian cartels had been dealt with by the American government, the Mexican cartels took what they had learned, and made their own drug pipeline (“Losing Ground Against Drugs: The Erosion of America’s Borders” 1997). Now Mexico is considered a major drug producer, as well as a major supplier, both in United States and the world. It is the main foreign supplier of methamphetamine and to the United States, and although Mexico accounts for only a small share of worldwide heroin production, it supplies a large share of heroin consumed in the United States, with an estimated 90% of cocaine entering the United States through Mexico (Cook 1). Violence in the border region has begun to spill over and affect Americans, with more than 60 Americans kidnapped in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico as of 2008 (Cook 1). Clearly, this is not the relationship that the United States envisioned with Mexico, though Mexico publicly does not support the actions of the drug cartels, as kidnappings and murders are generally seen as bad on both sides of the border. Today in Mexico, seven known drug cartels operate throughout the country: the Arellano Felix Organization, Beltran Leyva Organization, Los Zetas Cartel, Sinaloa Cartel, Carillo Fuentes Organization, Gulf Cartel/New Federation, and La Familia Michoacana, each with its own fluid area and territory of influence (Cook 3). However, that does not mean that each cartel is content with what they have accomplished, and since there are no fences marked with “this cartel’s territory here” or “keep out”, the borders are often fought over. Infighting is common, and an almost immediate result of the rise in the Mexican drug cartels was a spike in violence, not just across the US-Mexican border where the cartels fought the authorities, but within Mexico itself, where the cartels wage turf wars against one another (Cook 13). Drugs are a very dangerous trade in Mexico. One of the biggest reasons for the drug violence is that the boundaries, as stated above, occupied by each drug cartel are not defined by specific border lines or even the states within the country, but, as stated above continue to be “fluid”. For example, initially found mainly along the Mexican border, the Gulf cartel’s enforcer gang the Zetas in 2009 had spread to southern Mexico, and was disputing territory previously controlled by other cartels (Cook 12). Added to the fact that though they were once a simple “enforcer gang”, the Zetas had moved on to becoming a sophisticated, tiered organization, with middlemen and petty criminals to control the work (Cook 12), and the violence and influence of the drug cartel only multiplied. A U.S. Intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity to the Dallas Morning News, stated in 2011 that the Zetas organization was continuing to grow, and estimated that it had at least 13,000 to 15,000 members hard-core nationwide (Solis, and Kocherga 27). Unless something is done, and soon, the drug cartels that have already taken over will completely control the country. Ironically, the efforts that have been made to decrease the drug trafficking and violence through arrests have not helped, but instead increased the violent “turf wars” these cartels go through. The 2002 arrest of Benjamin Arellano Felix, head of the Tijuana cartel, and the 2003 arrest of Gulf cartel head Osiel Cardenas led to a realignment of Mexican cartels and increased turf wars. While in prison, Arellano Felix and Cardenas forged an alliance against the Sinaloa cartel and its ally the Juarez cartel. Cartels in 2008 were largely aligned into two blocks in support of the Gulf and Sinaloa cartel (Cook 15). Instead of helping to decrease the drug trafficking by arrests of two highly powerful members, the arrests actually seemed to cause a truce with even more hurtful consequences. In 2006 a new election took place, and with it came a new president that, though he won by a very narrow margin, had run on the campaign of finally attacking the drug cartels and slowing down some of the violence. However, since taking office, he seems to have succeeded in doing neither, though officials do admit to hope. While there has been a dramatic variation in statistics on drug-related killings in Mexico, the trend has not been slowing down since 2007 (Beittel 9). More than 5,600 were killed in 2008, with an increase of 110% over 2007, and among those murdered were 522 Mexican military and law enforcement officials, while in the first two months of 2009, the violence surged upward, with almost 1,000 drug-related killings in Mexico during that time frame alone, a 146% increase compared to that time frame in 2008 (Beittel 10). Even today, the violence of the drug cartels is felt. Though President Calderon and his aides insist that gains have been made, it does not feel that way to some in Mexico. Of particular concern are the cities in which drug cartels have caused so much violence and fear that some families are afraid to even leave their homes, particularly if they owe the enforcers money. The Juarez cartel and their enforcer gang, the La Lineas, have even gone so far in the city of Cuidad Juarez to set up bank accounts so that businessmen can make direct deposit of their “fees” to the cartel (Solis, and Kocherga 27). The citizens of the town have a choice, though not much of one: pay, leave, or die. Missing a payment to the enforcers narrows their choices to one out of three, but even if they were leave, somehow, what is to say that they won’t find another cartel controlling the town that they ended up in? The cycle is endless, and leaves little hope for the people of Mexico not involved in the drug trade. The efforts of the duly elected government to decrease violence have not been helped by corruption of high-level officials, which is rampant in the country of Mexico. Since the 1940’s drug lords that controlled vast amounts of both drugs and money were known to be powerful influences on both the economy and the government. The relationship with the government was one of “live and let live”, though it was told to the public that it was a “working relationship” in which both sides understood each other (Gonzalez). It is unknown whether or not the public actually knew what was going on, or what they thought about it. The corruption became obvious even to the United States in the mid-1980s, though they probably should have seen earlier that their “war on drugs” was having little to no effect in Mexico. Even though they were still seen as a small-time pipeline for the Columbian drug cartels, corruption was almost being practiced openly. In 1985, things came to a breaking point when an American Drug Enforcement Agency officer was murdered. Enrique Camerena, working undercover in Mexico, exposed large ranches where traffickers cultivated cannabis with the full knowledge of some federal authorities, military officers, and state and local officials (Gonzalez). The traffickers captured and killed Camerena, and the discovery of his tortured, decomposing body without a high-profile arrest in Mexico or an apology to the United States created not only a furor of U.S. public opinion, but convinced the American government that highly placed individuals in highly elected offices were working with the traffickers (Gonzalez). Mexican cartels continue to advance their operations through corruption and intimidation of officials, despite efforts by those that remain honest. It is thought that areas are not the only thing that the cartels fight over. They also fight over who can corrupt the high-level officials and officers of the law. So widespread was the corruption in 2005 that some agents of the Mexican Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) were believed to work a second job: enforcers for the Sinaloa cartel. The Attorney General’s office reported that one-fifth of its officers were under investigation for criminal activity, with 1,500 of the 7,000 AFI agents being suspected of criminal activity and 457 of them facing charges (Cook 13). When President Felipe Calderon won office in December 2006 with a very narrow victory, he made combating the drug cartels a top priority. Soldiers and federal law enforcement officials were tasked with arresting traffickers, establishing check points, burning drug fields, and interdicting drug shipments along the Mexican coasts (Beittel 3). Many have congratulated President Calderon on his determination to make battling the drug cartels and their willingness for corruption a key point of his new administration (Beittel 3). Not all, however, are congratulating the president, as they have yet to see his initiative actually impact their lives, and still live every day in fear of losing someone they love. Incidents across the country have included shootouts in broad daylight in public squares of big cities, and in 2008, a grenade attack on September 15th that left eight dead and more than one hundred injured on the central square of Morelia (Gonzalez). The mayhem has also included mass executions discovered on isolated ranches in remote areas, as well as in homes all the way from Tijuana, on the northern border near the U.S. state of California, to Merida, on the Yucatan Peninsula (Gonzalez). Due to the violence and drug cartels being spread throughout Mexico, unfortunately there is no easy solution to this problem. The drug violence itself is complex, and it will take more than arresting those responsible to combat and possibly solve this problem. Arresting one drug lord, as it has been seen, does nothing. The drug cartel simply reorganizes itself, blends in with another cartel, or takes violent steps to gain even more territory in a show of power. Though more than 34,000 people have died in Mexican drug-related violence since President Felipe Calderon first took office, and the year of 2010 was one of the worst ever with 15, 273 deaths, the law enforcement officials of Mexico have been reported to have hope. The authorities feel it is just a matter of time as federal police officers have also been increasing in numbers since the current president took office. The administration began with less than 6,500 federal police officers, and now has over 35,000, with one-fifth or 7,000 of them having degrees from top universities (Romo). Another reason for hope is that the current strategy is working, even if it is working slowly. It is doubtful if anyone really considered the current administration to have a “quick-fix” solution to the drug violence and trafficking in Mexico, mainly because no one is really sure that one exists. In Tijuana, after a strong presence of federal forces and an increase in intelligence capabilities, the level of violence decreased dramatically in 2010. In March 2009, the Mexican government publicly announced that they were looking for thirty seven of the most dangerous and wanted criminals in Mexico, and as of February 9, 2011, twenty out of the thirty seven criminals that were wanted had been detained or brought down (Romo). Also, other strategies have been carried out besides increasing the number of law enforcement officers. Seventy five new universities have been opened since the president took office. The number of young Mexicans with access to a high school education has increased by one million, in addition to the opening of drug rehabilitation centers. Also came the starting of a widespread drug prevention program in 20,000 schools throughout the country (Romo). Other possible strategies exist that Mexico could possibly put into place. Stronger border patrols, for instance, at the southern end of the country. This effort could be strengthened as well at the northern end, on the border between the United States, with more dogs and electronic fences equipped with motion detectors. Taking border control into the 21st century would help immensely. Two other possible solutions exist in helping the drug violence in Mexico, as well as stopping the power of the drug cartels. However, both of these solutions are almost distasteful to some lawmakers. First, there is a public and medical push to have the United States legalize marijuana. With marijuana legal to have in the United States, there would be no point or profit in smuggling it through the border, and the violence at least at that end would be slowed down. The second possibility is that, perhaps, the U.S. should stop policing the Caribbean for cocaine smuggling so thoroughly. The Mexicans learned from Columbia that the lowest cost route was through the Caribbean; however, with the United States policing it, Mexico chose a more direct route with less risk. By allowing smuggling once again through the Caribbean, Mexico would again lose an advantage in an area of power and slow down, possibly allowing their authorities to establish a solid foothold with their anti-drug campaign. Teenagers might even take advantage of the university programs that have been offered, and smaller children would be able to learn about drug prevention without fear of being gunned down by a cartel. A third possibility to help Mexico in its war on drugs could take place right in the United States. Cracking down on drug criminals and making sentences longer, harsher, with more consequences could help Mexico immensely. Should the United States take a harder, firmer stance on drug abuse inside its own borders, Mexico would be forced to stop pushing drugs through the border between the countries. Not only would the persons controlling the drug trades in the United States would fear the penalties that they would face, but one profitable outlet for the Mexican drug trade would be lost. It remains unclear whether an increase in federal presence and arrest, along with drug prevention programs throughout the country, will be the solution to the drug violence in Mexico. One thing is clear: before the war with the drug cartels is over, there will be more death and destruction. Hopefully, the amount of hope that remains can sustain the people of Mexico until the violence from the drug cartels is stopped for good. Works Cited Beittel, June S. United States . Mexico's Drug Related Violence. Washington, D.C.:, 2009. Print. Cook, Colleen. United States. Mexico's Drug Cartels. Washington, D.C.: , 2008. Print. Gonzalez, Francisco E. "Mexico's Drug Wars Get Brutal." Alleghany College Instructor Articles. Alleghany College, Feb 2009. Web. 30 Apr 2011. . Romo, Rafael. "Mexico Sees Hope Among Drug Violence." CNN Online. CNN, 09 Feb 2011. Web. 1 May 2011. . Solis, Dianne, and Angela Kocherga. "Drug Cartels Govern Cities in Mexico." Dallas Morning News 01 May 2011: 27 World. Print United States. Losing Ground Against Drugs: The Erosion of America's Borders. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. Print. Read More