Organizational Background and Justification for Participation - Research Paper Example

? Number and of the Amicus Brief for: Howes v. Fields No. 10-680 Organizational Background and Justification for Participation In this Amicus Brief, I represent Human Rights Watch. This is a multinational organization whose mission is to protect the rights of people globally, United States of America (US) included. Among aspects of human rights that Human Rights Watch area committed to helping protect against their abuse include inhumane treatment, discrimination, denial of access to justice and ensuring that offenders arte brought to book while at the same time the state respects and upholds the rights of the defendants and prisoners. Human Rights Watch also has a role of investigating and exposing incidences of human rights abuse abuses and violation, with an aim of putting the abuses to the task of being accountable. The organization also seeks to challenge the government and other bodies or people who hold powers to observe human rights and to end human rights abuses, particularly with reference to international human rights standards as well as that of the municipal laws. As a leading human rights body, with the aforesaid specific roles, which are highly tangential to the issues of justice , the organization has a legitimate interest to participate in the case and to present an Amicus brief for the same. The organization has a lot of interest in ensuring that justice is done to the defendant. It is the Human Rights Watch that this honorable court safeguards future systematic human rights abuses by the state, and in particular the police, against the citizens. It is the interest of the organization that the police and all government organs concerned are held accountable for human rights abuses that they perpetrate. Given that this case contests the previous court ruling in favor of the state, where an abuse of human rights against a citizen was alleged, the organization has intense interest in ensuring that the rulings of the lower courts were right in law so that greater justice and legal security may be realized. Brief Restatement of Facts (Prior Ruling: Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals [617 F.3d 813]) Randall Lee Fields was already in jail when Lenawee County deputies Batterson and Sharp began to question him on December 23, 2001. Incarcerated on a disorderly conduct charge, the deputies were hoping to learn more about Fields' relationship with an underage male. Fields was not given his Miranda warnings, but was told he could leave the conference room where the questioning took place at any time. During the 7 hour questioning, Fields repeatedly told the deputies that he did not want to talk about the allegations of sexual misconduct that they had leveled against him. Eventually, however, he did admit to some of the behavior that had been alleged. On the basis of that information, and over the strenuous objection of his counsel, Fields was later convicted of two counts of third-degree criminal conduct and sentenced to a term of 10-15 years.  Fields appealed claiming that when he was first removed from his cell to go to the conference room, he was given no notice of what the deputies wanted. Further, because they had not Mirandized him and continued to question him even after he told them he did not want to speak to them, the incriminating statements should be thrown out. Throughout his appeals in the state judicial system, his arguments were denied.  Upon making a habeus corpus motion to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, however, Fields' contention that his rights had been violated was upheld. The Sixth Circuit Court affirmed that lower court ruling which contrasted with decisions made in similar cases in other federal courts. The split in the circuits virtually guaranteed that the Supreme Court would take the case. On January 24, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  The present case presents a question as to what amounts to being in custody and in particular whether or not a prisoner is always “in custody” in order that a Miranda warning be given, whenever a prisoner is secluded from the general prison population and then questioned concerning conduct that is occurring outside the prison, not withstanding the circumstances of the surrounding. Following Miranda v. Arizona , the supreme court emphatically pointed out that the Fifth Amendment privilege that protects a persons from self-discrimination have to be safeguarded by first informing the suspects of their “Miranda rights” going a head to make the interrogations. The case therefore presented Constitutional issues relating to the right to due process, and specifically protection from self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Does Mathis V. U.S. (391 U.S. 1[1968]) Control This Case? In Mathis V. U.S. (391 U.S. 1[1968]), while the petitioner was in a state prison, an Internal Revenue Service investigator had come to investigate him concerning the tax returns. This investigation was conducted as a “routine tax investigation," and the petitioner was not given many Miranda warning. Incriminating evidence was obtained which was used against him in the lower courts, leading to his conviction for filing false claim. His appeal was dismissed by the court of appeal. Upon further appeal at the Supreme Court, his conviction was quashed on grounds that he was not warned as to his right to counsel and to remain silent. In this case, there was evidently an attempt to swindle and trick the petitioner, by the officer appearing as though he was undertaking the routine investigation. As such, it was not easy to objectively decipher his intention. This aspect of trickery misses in the Howes vs. Field; hence Mathi will not apply for the case. What Does "In Custody" Refer to With Regard to Police Interrogation? Under the rule developed on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), all the statements that are taken while the prisoner is in cudtody together with all the custodial interrogations have to be preceded with a warning . Only then will the case be admissible in the government’s examination in chief. More particularly, the court pointed out in this case that the suspect in question has to “be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” ( at 444). Since Miranda, the issue with regards to Miranda awarding has been of key interest to this honorable court. The court further explained that: If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease ... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. This aspect of Miranda warning has been reiterated in further in the ruling by the court in Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) among other cases. Miranda placed the burden on the state side to ensure that it adheres to the warnings thereby stated. Thus Miranda placed to the effect that whenever custodial interrogations are issued, then, the government would have a duty to show as a “prerequisite to the admissibility of statement,” and that it was only made and that the particular “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently “waived his rights” (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,475-476). In partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Tom Clarke preferred to use the term the “totality of circumstances” to evaluate whether the Fifth Amendment Right to have a suspect warned before incorporating their confession. Justice Clarke had the following to say: consider in each case whether the police officer prior to custodial interrogation added the warning that the suspect might have counsel present at the interrogation and, further, that a court would appoint one at his request if he was too poor to employ counsel. In the absence of warnings, the burden would be on the State to prove that counsel was knowingly and intelligently waived or that in the totality of the circumstances, including the failure to give the necessary warnings, the confession was clearly voluntary. Miranda warnings are therefore vital to any case involving the accused as it defines the procedures that have fundamental influence on the admissibility of evidence. Whereas Miranda versus Arizona laid this fundamental legal principle and issue, the court did not directly and unequivocally define what it means to be “in custody” and whether the term custody refers to whenever one was in any kind of incarceration or imprisonment with the other people. In Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994), the court was evidently of the opinion not all forms of movement restriction amounted to being “in custody” and thus warranting the issuance of Miranda warning, rather, ‘only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” Similar proposition was made by the court in earlier case of Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). Defining Custody and in Custody In defining what amounts to being “in custody: so that the Miranda warning and the consequences failing to issue the warning to apply, there are two fundamental questions or consideration that the analysis should take into account. First, considerations should be given to the surrounding circumstances, under which the statement in question or the interrogation by the police officer or any other officer was made. Once the circumstances under which the statements were made are established, one should then ask if in view of the circumstances a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was actually at liberty and had freedom to leave and terminate the interrogation (Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667 , 2004). As such, defining the term “in custody” calls upon clearly digging out the circumstances of the particular case ands setting the scene clear before making judgments as to whether or not the person was in custody. In light of various precedents by the court, the subjective perception of lack of freedom or the suspect’s psychological state may not be taken into account to determine whether or not one was in custody. Neither does it include the psychological affects that that a particular suspect may evaluate and find himself or herself into. It has been suggested in Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) that the feeling of lack of freedom should be that which is equivalent to the circumstances to a greater degree, as those close to formal arrest. It has been argued that taking into account subjective factors in defining this aspect of fundamental significance would definitely makes the Miranda warning and related issued, and therefore justice very difficult to administer. Very much valuable evidence would be dispensed with owing to the technicalities relating to the Miranda rights, thus miscarriage of justice. Such a miserable result must therefore be avoided by adopting interpretations that serves the ends of justice, and not ones that offer legal loopholes. Objective Restraints In order to determine whether or not a suspect is “in custody” for purposes of applying the principles set by the court under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), courts should examine the surrounding’s restraint from the view point of a reasonable man. Relying on the subjective limitations of an individual will be tantamount to tailoring justice to fit the vantage point of every individual. As such, not only will law have uncertainty and unpredictability, but there may be lots of chaos in administration of justice. Any individual who seeks to discredit a cogent evidence that the government have against him or her will only need to coin an argument to the effect that by the time he or she was questioned, he or she felt that he was not at liberty to remain silent or to answer. The essence of having Miranda Rule in the advancement of the fundamental right stemming from the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution is to offer a clear guidance for both the police and the court on how to go about obtaining confessions and statements, and how to treat statements that are not got through voluntary confessions. As such, any interpretation of rights emanating from Miranda must be consistent with the ends of maintaining this clarity. Opening rooms for subjective definition of being in custody will be going against the spirit of the Miranda principle. The argument here is merely a restatement of the memorable words from this court in the case of Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) and which were again reiterated in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667 , 2004 where this honorable court offered a comprehensive definition of “custody” to mean “a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest” and instructed police and courts that they can identify such a situation by (1) examining “the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” and (2) assessing whether a “reasonable person” in those circumstances would have feltable “to terminate the interrogation and leave.” This court has therefore consistently and exclusively focused on the observable features such as the location of the place where the police do the questioning as well as the length of police questioning, as the elements of the objective tests. This honorable court has always rejected to offer consideration of the suspect’s subjective factors such as the suspect’s emotional and psychological status, including distress, intoxication or a prior experience with the police. Whereas we submit that once in a while there could be a point and legitimacy in taking into account these subjective interests, the court should not, for the very first time in the history of this nation’s constitutional law, set a precedence that is going to form a panacea of ambiguity and lack of clarity. As the court did point out in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 432 (1984) “the simplicity and clarity of the holding of Miranda” are not to be compromised “[a]bsent a compelling justification.” The rule of clarity is best captured by the memorable case by this court: Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979), where this court pointed out that : Miranda's holding has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible. This gain in specificity, which benefits the accused and the State alike, has been thought to outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miranda imposes on law enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring the suppression of trust-worthy and highly probative evidence even though the confession might be voluntary under traditional Fifth Amendment analysis. A circumstance under which the confession was made is equally of value in defining being in custody. This court has in the past held in Berkemer V. Mccarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) among other cases that what matters in determining whether or not the circumstances essentially one “in custody” is to assess whether the questioning sought to trick the suspect or deliberately exert pressure against the suspect so that the suspect may act. With this regards, this court had this to say in refusing a claim by the appellant that his conviction be set aside on grounds that he was not mirandarised by the police before being questioned: We do not suggest that there is any reason to think improper efforts were made in this case to induce respondent to make damaging admissions. More generally, we have no doubt that, in conducting most custodial interrogations of persons arrested for misdemeanor traffic offenses, the police behave responsibly and do not deliberately exert pressures upon the suspect to confess against his will. But the same might be said of custodial interrogations of persons arrested for felonies. The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "`inherently compelling pressures'" generated by the custodial setting itself, "`which work to undermine the individual's will to resist,'" and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of isdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies (Berkemer V. Mccarty, 468 U.S. 420 [1984]). These statements present additional protections that are central to answering the question: what is “in custody”; protection against coerced ands manipulated confessions. In the present case, the appellant had indicated that he gave out the information, but his only ground for applying for the judgment against him to be set aside is that he was not given Miranda warning . However, he fails to cite evidence of coercion, manipulation and trickery or use of threat or force against him to make the confessions. There is hardly any evidence of involuntariness in the responses that he gave to the police. In voluntariness and coercion must not be seen from the belief of the appellant, but from the objective circumstances that are prevailing. Those beliefs are relevant only to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her" 'freedom of action….Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest. The weight and pertinence of any communications regarding the officer's degree of suspicion will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case…. an officer's views concerning the nature of an interrogation, or beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the individual being questioned, may be one among many factors that bear upon the assessment whether that individual was in custody, but only if the officer's views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave(Berkemer V. Mccarty, 468 U.S. 420 [1984]). Even though the appellant may seem to argue that the long duration of questioning translates into a kind of harassment or coercion, this is not clear. Putting this honorable court into the difficult task of weighing options on whether or not the appellant was coerces, when the appellant himself does not bring this out clearly, or to let the court proceed from a point of suspicion of what might have happened to the suspect, the court will be setting up a standard that will be very difficult to monitor. Conclusion May the judgment of the lower court be reversed. Respectfully submitted. Works Cited Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 432 (1984) Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) Mathis V. U.S. (391 U.S. 1[1968]), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994), Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667 , 2004). Read More