Mobilization and Political Tensions in Bahrain - Dissertation Example

?Table of Contents Table of Contents LITERATURE REVIEW MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL TENSIONS 3 POLITICAL DEADLOCK 6 SECTARIAN DISCRIMINATION 9 THE ROLE & PARTICIPATION OF SAUDI ARABIA IN THE BAHRAIN REVOLT 10 REFERENCES 11 LITERATURE REVIEW The Bahrain is the smallest nation, with its population of 1.25 million as of 2010, in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) where as it has the most stratified and conglomerated society from the Gulf region. Almost 50 percent of its population comprise of Bahraini nationals while the remaining half constitutes non-Bahraini residents, among which a mass number is of Asian migrant workers those are mostly male (Central Informatics Organization, 2010). The population of Bahrain grew rapidly during the last decade, more specifically due to its foreign work force – in fact, its population in the year 2001 was about 650, 000 (Central Informatics Organization, 2001). The massive growth in population applies enormous strain on the local workforce and population on an island that has limited natural resources and space. As stated further, mostly Shiites in Bahrain believe that this population growth is basically to a greater extent as a result of the naturalization of Sunni outlanders, which is certainly at their cost. Since a breakdown by religious camps is unavailable officially, it is usually considered that 70% of the Bahrain’s population consists of Shiites where as the remaining Bahraini population includes Sunnis. Nevertheless, this proportionality might have changed due to the naturalization policy of the regime. Bahrain holds a relatively exceptional position among the GCC countries due to its mass Shiite population, long history of political opposition, liberal social norms and natural resources earning relatively small income. The leadership in Bahrain attained authority or power with tribal affiliations and acquisitions just like the Al Saud family in Saudi Arabia but unlikely to the majority of the ruling families in the Gulf region. In the 18th century Al-Khalifa invaded Bahrain with the help of the tribal alliances from the central Arabia. They conquered Bahrain by defeating the Persian administration and have been governing the state since then. Under the socio-political ladder, the other Sunni Arab tribal families include the Sunni tribal allies in Bahrain just below the Al-Khalifa. After the Sunnis the hawala families, who re-located themselves in Bahrain during the last century from the coast of Iran, declared themselves as of Sunni and Arab origins. The fifth and the biggest tire of the socio-political hierarchy constitutes the indigenous Shiite Arabs known as the Al-Baharina where as bottom most tier include the Persians, both Shiite and Sunni. No to mention that all the Shiites are in favor of the protesters or there is no Shiite elite. However some Shiite families such like the Al-Arrayed and Al-Jishi have turned very rich and are regarded as the allies of the ruling families. MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL TENSIONS Contemporary education commenced quite early as per regional standards, which is inclined towards a large educated middle class and supports the first liberal organizations, trade unions as well as labor movements. This further stimulated the population during the 1950s as well as prompted a re-known uprising in 1965 against the presence of the British. As a result of this, an extremely engaged associational life was created. Perhaps Bahrain possesses the dynamic and obtrusive civil society amongst the Arab Gulf states (Fuccaro, 2009). The successors of these groups are yet in function today. Al-Kahlifa endeavored to strengthen their legitimacy, during the late 1960s and early 1970s while they were experiencing an opposition that illustrated sharp class and ideological characteristics, by asking for the development of an assembly assigned to draw up a constitution consensus at which the semi-elected national assembly possessing limited legislative powers would agree upon. In June 1973, the constitution was promulgated where as in the early December 1973, the national elections were carried out. This was a short lived experiment. Under a wide front, both conservative and progressive political activism continued. Many industrial strikes were held by the leaders of the labor union. Moreover, the situation got more critical with the economic discrimination based on sectarianism and the restricting security structure being extensively employed with foreigners. In 1975, a wide range of State Security Measures Law were issued by the Bahrain’s ruling family, which provided summary powers to the government for arresting and capturing suspects with out trial. The elected members of the assembly having differences on various issues grouped in to a single unit so as to oppose these steps, persuading that they should have been submitted for their approval. The Al Khalifa - Emir Isa bin Salman officially dissolved the assembly in August 1975 when it was unable to approve the lease extension for the units of US navy, which indeed ended the ephemeral parliamentary system (Lawson, 1989). The elections for a new assembly, in accordance to the Article 65 of the constitution, should have been conducted with in the period of 2 months. However, this did not occur which resulted in the suspension of the constitution with the emergency legislation. Consequently, numerous opposition activists, specifically those refusing to contribute to the political process, still consider the operations of the subsequent governments as illegal and thus, have demanded to for the restoration of the 1973 Constitution (Crisis Group Report, 2010). Unrest and clashed often continued, which were mostly reported during the end of the year 1994 in the villages of Shiites outside the Bahrain’s capital. There are various reasons behind this, which include the lack of basic political and civil rights; authoritarianism; pervasive discrimination against Shiites; a stagnant economy; favoritism and corruption within the ruling family as well as among those who are closely linked to these rulers; a repressive and mostly foreign employed security infrastructure. Shiites conglomerated in to the bulk of protesters, even though the Sunni population embraced the target of restoring the constitution of 1973 and thereby, conducting the elections of the national assembly as well as aided to formulate pro-reform petitions endorsed by a mass majority. During the so called period of 1994-1999 intifada, large demonstrations, street politics and skirmishes were sighted commonly. The reaction of the government was brutal as it detained huge number of demonstrators and also, banished the leaders of its opposition. An extending cycle of violence and repression was observed for the next few years in which protesters stoned police, burnt tyres and used makeshift bombs created from cooking gas canisters. Even when the violence abated eventually, it was still observed at a small level till 1999. In the beginning of March 1997, the most deadly assault took place when 5 Bangladeshi laborers died in a restaurant bombing. Bahrain’s security forces extensively included men from Pakistan’s Balochi area while the officers belonged to Jordan and other Arab states. These forces employed blockades in villages and searched the homes of reputed protesters. Thus, numerous Bahrainis were captured, afflicted and tortured. The two Shiite Islamist groups constituted the main opposition, participating in petitions and street protests during the 1990s, namely Bahrain Islamic Freedom Movement and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain. Where as the 2 left-wing groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and the Bahraini National Liberation Front were also very alert. Numerous activists were sent to prison due to hash repression where as the many others were either banished or left the country on their own (Bahry, 1997). Since then the negotiations between the regime and the opposition have been fruitless most of the times. This is largely because of the government’s action of detaining important opposition dialogists, namely Abd-al-Wahab Husein and Sheikh Abdal-Amir al-Jamri, with out any trial or charge and confined them in isolation. Furthermore, those people who endorsed reform petitions, including both Shiites and Sunnis, experienced official vengeance that involved blacklisting from employment, harassment, detention and various other such harsh treatments. The significantly created the bitter feeling among various communities that persists till date, specifically with in Shiite populations who frequently faced harassments, arrests and torture. King Hamad endeavored to abate these tensions as he dissolved the State Security Courts, promulgated a general amnesty, abrogated the State Security Law and promised democratic reforms. The latter undertaking was integrated in to the Bahrain National Action Charter that is considerably ambiguous in its wording, embodying revised parts of the suspended constitution of 1973. This program introduces a 2 chamber system that includes an elected lower council and a designated upper council. The Bahrain National Action Charter was almost collectively accepted or authorized by means of a referendum conducted on 14th February in the year 2001. However, the latest revolution was observed on the day of the10th anniversary of that referendum. In contradiction to the King’s apparent promises to involve the opposition and other players in the amendment process of the previous constitution, he instead declared a revised constitution unilaterally in February 2002 that, according to the opposition’s views, a way long backward. Thus, tensions blew up once again in 2004 when the repressed aggravation and agony appeared to the surface and the peaceful demonstrations were converted in to violent protests which to a greater extent adopted a sectarian dimension. The militant constituency challenged the large moderate leadership of the Shiite opposition, which was previous refrained due to the lack of the movement on the part of the regime (Crisis Group report, 2010). It would not be accurate to limit the scenarios purely to a sectarian divide since history shows that numerous Sunnis have been participating in the opposition to the government in Bahrain. However, the Shiites have been surely greatly affected through social dislocation and endure as they suffered from various levels and sorts of discrimination sine the late 1970s. Due to this a decidedly sectarian hue has been added to the issues of the island, albeit the fact that the grievances are largely shared. POLITICAL DEADLOCK As mentioned previously, the unfulfilled promise of Hama Al Khalifa for the political reform in 2000, to a great extent, led to the current dissatisfaction. In the initial two years of this experiment, numerous measures had brought the state at the cutting edge of regional liberalization. Going back to 25 years of authoritarianism, Emir Hamad terminated some of the most abusive practices of his regime and also introduced institutional changes for a better political engagement between the government and the society. Bahraini people voted in the referendum of February 2001 with over 98 % support for the National Action Charter. Emir Hamad sought to disassociate the conservative regime elements from himself through his project involving but not refrained to the prime minister. The Emir also abrogated the State Security law along with dissolving the State Security Courts which fulfilled a core demand of the political activists as it abolished the major component of the regime’s repressive system. This could be described as his most forward leaning reform. The Emir, the Crown Prince and some high officials ascertained the Bahrainis, after their overwhelming support in the referendum, that a constitutional commission would revise the 1973 constitution instead of replacing it where as the new elected chamber of the parliament would practice sole legislative powers, However, on the the anniversary of the referendum in February 2001, the then Emir and now’s King proclaimed a re-written constitution with out taking the public in to confidence. The politically active community of Bahrain was shocked due to the elusive decision of not consulting the opposition while the constitution was being re-written. This action reinforced the distrust to the intentions of the state with in the opposition. The fault lines separating the royals from their critics were widened through this unilateral decree, leading to the conclusion that the power and the resources would firmly remain with in the royal family. Fueling cynicism towards the intent of the regime is the most significant issue with the 1973 constitution. The major points of contention include: The new legal and institutional framework ascertained that the king and his advisers are unaccountable, The designated Consultative Council (that is the Majlis al-Shura or the parliament’s upper house) along with the elected Council of Deputies (that is the Majlis al-Nawwab or the lower house of parliament) can bestow their vote as a tie-breaking element in a deadlock, and The king reserves the right to appoint all ministers (Crisis Group Report, 2010; Peterson, 2009). Further more, in line to the royal decree, the members of shura are to be selected from the ruling family, senior clergy, senior retired officers, professionals, business community, ministers, former ambassadors and judges. Albeit the voters primarily accepted a bicameral legislature in the referendum -2001but the community leaders argued that had the conception that the appointed chamber would be not only smaller but also consultative. On contrary, its framework virtually assured that the ultimate decisive power remained with in the royal palace. A majority of two-third of the combine houses is require for any constitutional amendment thus, rendering change becomes almost impossible. Although the authority to approve laws lies in the hands of both chambers however the cabinet alone also reserves the right to introduce and draft them where as the designated Shura chamber enjoys the power of veto on the initiative and the decisions of the elected chamber. The power to rule by decree is reserved for the King (marsoum bi qanoun) with the condition that such decrees do not contradict the constitution. Subsequently, it has to be passed by both houses to remain in action however this approval process is not confined through any stipulated time period. Statutory decrees such like the ones issued in 2002 before the National Assembly’s first session can not be revised and stay in action until both the chambers vote for their abolishment. The power of the elected chamber was also limited in the other amendments of the 1973 version of the constitution. For example, according to the previous constitution, the government had the power to suspend the parliament for 2 months, after which it should conduct new elections. Where as according to the new constitution, the parliament could be suspended for 4 months with out the requirement of the elections and the King could postpone the elections regardless of any time restriction provided that the cabinet advises so, which is led by Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa who is in fact Kings’ uncle. Similarly, the previous version of the constitution endorsed the formation of an audit bureau that is submissive to the National Assembly where as the 2002 constitution dismissed this requirement of the bureau reporting to the national assembly. The King formed a Financial Control Bureau through the Legislative Decree no. 16 (July, 2002), which directly reports to him and thus, eradicates the ability of the legislature to govern the financial affairs of the state. The constitution crisis does not directly led to the sectarian issue since both Shiites and Sunnis had their own reasons for aversions. SECTARIAN DISCRIMINATION According to the Shiites in Bahrain, discrimination is the harsh reality of life that is produced by the government’s political will. The poor handling of the issues by the state further fuelled this conviction. The high ranking officials constant endeavor to abate the unity of the opposition through manipulating sectarian anxieties and creating differences between the Shiites and the Sunnis. THE ROLE & PARTICIPATION OF SAUDI ARABIA IN THE BAHRAIN REVOLT Being a small state in the Gulf region without having much of the resources available, Bahrain extensively relies upon its neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia. Thus, it has been under tremendous pressure from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states for not to allow the democratic current reach too far and in particular, to stop the Shiites from tuning in to a dominant political force (Ulrichsen, 2011). Being the most significant force in the GCC federation, the Saudi Arabia is the most vital supporter of Bahrain apart from the U.S. In the past, Bahrain has opted not to be a playing-field in the conflict between the Saudi Arabia and Iran with the help of a triangular foreign policy that balances both through augmenting relations with the U.S. (Gulf States Newsletter, 2011). As a result, Saudi Arabia apprehends any Shiite struggle as a quasi-existential threat that not only serves the Iranian interests as being Iranian inspired but also disturbs its own internal situation. Therefore, Saudi Arabia perceives that genuine democracy over its border will invigorate its local activists and quite promptly, the empowerment of Shiites in Bahrain could possibly inspire the Saudi-Shiites of the Eastern Province who constitute almost the 50% of its population. Many Shiites of the Saudi Eastern Province are closely related to Bahraini Shiites and thus, in the past, there political movements were collaborated with the Bahraini networks (Matthiesen, 2009). On February 7, demonstrations in the Eastern province began in inspiration from the Bahraini events however only hundreds of the protestors participated in these demonstrations, which later reached to several thousand, after the Saudi troops were deployed in Bahrain , in favor of the Bahraini activists and to persuade the Saudi regime to withdraw. Although it is quite difficult to describe the uprising in Bahrain and the supporting demonstrations in the Saudi Eastern Province as an external threat however the media in Saudi Arabia has been persistently emphasizing that Iran is behind these events. REFERENCES Bahry, L. (1997). “The Opposition in Bahrain: A Bellwether for the Gulf?”, Middle East Policy, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 42-57. Bahry, L. (2000). “The Socioeconomic Foundations of the Shiite Opposition in Bahrain”, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 129. Central Informatics Organization, 2010. Population by Age Groups, Nationality and Sex - 2010 Census. Available at www.cio.gov.bh/CIO_ARA/English/Publications/Census/General%20%20%202011%2002%2006%20-%203.pdf. Central Informatics Organization, 2010. Population by Age Groups, Nationality and Sex - 2001 Census. Available at www.cio.gov.bh/cio_ara/English/Publications/Statistical%20Abstract/2001/2001-CH02%20Population.pdf. Crisis Group Report (2010). Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge, op. cit., p. 2. Dabrowska, K. (1997). Bahrain Briefing: The Struggle for Democracy, December 1994-December 1996 (London). Fakhro, M. (1997). “The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment”, in Gary Sick and Lawrence Potter (eds.), The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion (Basingstoke), pp. 167-188; Fuccaro, N. (2009). Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf: Cambridge. Gulf States Newsletter (2011), vol. 35, no. 895 (25 February 2011), p. 6. Lawson, L. (1989). Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy. Boulder, pp. 87-91. Matthiesen, T. (2009). “The Shi’a of Saudi Arabia at a Crossroads”, Middle East Report Online (6 May 2009) Peterson, J. (2009). “Bahrain: Reform, Promise and Reality”, in Joshua Teitelbaum (ed.), Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf (New York). Ulrichsen, C.K. (2011) “Security Policy of the Gulf States: Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar”, Orient, vol. 1, pp. 23-28. Read More