Domestic and Regional Factors - Research Paper Example

?Evaluate how domestic and regional factors limited Japan’s ability to play definitive security roles in East Asia. Assess whether these are legitimate factors or whether Japan is using them as a ‘free ride’, depending on the U.S. for its national security. Due to its history of imperialist aggression in the first half of the 20th century, and the regional and domestic reaction against this after 1945, Japan adopted a position regarding the international world which has tied it up, constitutionally and politically, into a policy of military non-intervention. There are some signs that this is now changing, but the Japan-US military alliance will continue to be the defining feature of Japan’s foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Article 9 Following the Second World War, Japan officially renounced its right to declare war, which has left the country in a unique situation, somewhat removed from the life of a ‘normal’ nation state. The Japanese military is restricted by Article 9 of its constitution, which states that Japan has forfeited its right as a nation to declare war, and will not recognize force as a valid means of settling disputes between nations. As a result, Japan does not officially keep its armed forces for any purpose except self-defense. Article 9 ends: ‘The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized’. Japan does maintain a large military force, and has one of the world’s largest military budgets, but this is justified as being purely in a defensive capacity, and until the past two decades, Japan did not even contribute personnel to peacekeeping missions sanctioned by the United Nations (UN). The defense budget is nearly $50 billion, approximately 1% of Japanese GDP, and it spends a further $2 billion annually on supporting American forces based in Japan1. Japanese forces are controlled tightly by civilian politicians, and the first time they were allowed to operate outside of the country was in a peacekeeping capacity in Cambodia in 1992-3. Article 9 effectively prevents Japan from taking a particularly active military role in international affairs, and for many Japanese, who are broadly pacifist, the horrors of the Second World War remain a powerful reason not to abolish Article 9 from the constitution2. As Kingston put it, ‘The US actually insisted on the insertion of Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution [as part of postwar peace negotiations], but has regretted it ever since’3. The United States would prefer Japan to take a more active role in attaining their shared security goals, so that it would not have to shoulder the absolute burden of operations in East Asia, including making considerable provision for Japan’s own defense. Kingston argues that, despite strong popular support for Article 9 – ‘For many Japanese, it is a point of pride that Japan’s Constitution embraces pacifism, a powerful symbolic break with the wartime past and an ongoing guarantee’, it has ‘diminished sway over government security policy’4. As we shall see, Japan has indeed circumvented the provisions of its constitution to deploy its forces abroad in recent years. The Japan-US Alliance Following the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan’s foreign policy has essentially been guided by its close relationship with the United States. Japan has been able to leave international issues to the United States, and concentrated mainly on economic recovery and development, ‘with relatively little concern (and cost) for its own defense’5. The Alliance has had benefits for the US also. Keen to expand its practical influence right across the Pacific in the aftermath of the Second World War, Japan, as an archipelago right off the Asian mainland, offered an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ from which to pursue this policy. Bases in Japan have helped with deployments against Communist forces in Korea and Vietnam, as well as other conflicts in the region. This alliance is boosted by the large volume and value of trade between the US and Japan. In 1990, the combined gross domestic products (GDP) of the two nations amounted to around a third of the world’s total, with Japan receiving around 11% of US exports, and the US receiving an astonishing 34% of Japanese exports. US-Japan Tensions With the ending of the Cold War, many international commentators felt that naked military force would be less important in a world without two clear blocs competing for power through an arms race. Therefore, much attention was focused on Japan as an economic powerhouse, and the role it was expected to play in a world where economic factors would be of primary importance. However, the end of the Cold War also led to more strained relations between the US and Japan. Many Americans, protective of their domestic industries, came to consider Japan as an economic threat, and there was a growing perception that Japan was not ‘playing fair’, given the huge imbalance in the trade between the two countries. The presence of American personnel and naval bases on some Japanese territory, and particularly the large base on Okinawa, has been a considerable cause of friction on the ground. The Japanese communities have resented this presence for some time, but the central government does its best to placate their concerns while maintaining good relations with the US. At the same time, Japan was showing a great willingness to handle more of its own affairs, and to defer to the United States for guidance with decreasing frequency. Nevertheless, Japan still considered the United States to be is closest friend and ally, and the primary keeper of its national security. Relations have arguable strengthened since the late 1990s. Most Americans who look to Asia to identify an economic threat have their eyes fixed firmly on rising China, with its double-digit growth figures, rather than Japan, which has been plagued by economic stagnation since the early 1990s. At the same time, the escalation of tensions in the Korea peninsula, as North Korea reinforced its position as a rogue state by performing provocative missile tests and developing nuclear technologies, gave Japan and the United States another common concern in the East Asian arena. Since 2009, with the election of the Democratic Party of Japan, there have been renewed concerns in the US that Japan might be moving towards a more independent and assertive foreign policy, but this has yet to be substantiated by reality. A basic tension between Washington and Tokyo in recent years has been the US’ desire that Japan do more in terms of providing for its own national security, and take on a greater role in global security. In this respect, opines Kingston, ‘Japan remains a reluctant partner, doing the minimum necessary to placate the US’6. Economic Factors From the 1960s and 1970s, having experienced remarkably rapid economic development, Japan again came to be recognized as one of the world’s great powers, but in an economic rather than military capacity. As Pyle states, ‘Japan’s role as a merchant nation brought astonishing results’7.It stood out of the main fray for the duration of the Cold War, and worked for economic success. While other developed countries were spending big on military technologies and deployments, Japan remained largely unencumbered by this, and the United States performed many of its national security functions. There was a general expectation, shared by commentators around the world, that Japan would use this powerful economic position from which to intervene more forcefully in diplomatic and international affairs. Waltz felt this expectation keenly, writing that ‘Now Japan is ready to receive the mantle [of a great power] if only it will reach for it’8 (55). However, this did not really occur. Pyle summed it up well when he wrote that after about 1990, Japan entered ‘a puzzling period of paralysis’9.There was economic and political stagnation, while China was beginning a remarkable economic growth. Nevertheless, since this time, Japan has taken on a more active role in global security. First Gulf War Since the First Gulf War of 1990-1991, there have been increasing signs that the Japanese might reduce some of the restrictions on their armed forces, and move into a new phase of their postwar history. This war was sparked by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq under Saddam Hussein. In response, the UN mandated a US-led coalition to remove the Iraqi army by force from Kuwait. Japan was called upon by the international community to contribute to this coalition, which led to fierce debates in the country about what it could do. Restricted as it is by Article 9 and the widespread pacifism of the Japanese population, Japan was unable to send troops to the region. Instead, it contributed a large amount of the funding – around $13 billion of the total $60 billion spent by the coalition. However, Japan was widely criticized by the international community for not taking a more active role in the struggle – ‘in times of military crisis, the banker does not get nearly as much respect as the solider’10. Japan learned, from this conflict, that there would still be armed conflict in the world after the ending of the Cold War, and that it was expected to take its place in UN peacekeeping missions. For Fukuyama and Oh, the aftermath of this episode, together with the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a security threat, led to Japan reassessing its security requirements and provisions. The Gulf War had, as these authors put it, ‘highlighted for many Japanese the extraordinary abnormality of its international position’11. Pyle sums up the general consensus when he states that after this embarrassing experience, a new generation of leaders in Tokyo, impatient with being regarded just as a commercial nation, moved towards ‘a more orthodox international role in which it [Japan] will be deeply engaged in political-military affairs’, ‘a major player in the strategic struggles of the twenty-first century’12. Increased International Role Since then, the Japanese government has contributed defense personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, and not just in its immediate region. It has sent troops to Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Mozambique and East Timor. In these situations, Japan has also taken a greater role in diplomacy, with Japanese negotiators taking much of the responsibility for the peace plan which led to elections in Cambodia in 1998. Japan has also sought a greater role within the UN framework in UN. It has been a non-permanent member of the Security Council for 19 years, and is now looking to gain permanent membership of the Council. The deployment of Japanese troops into Iraq with the American-led coalition in 2003 was the first time they had been deployed overseas since 1945. This deployment, predictably, was hugely unpopular among the Japanese public. Koizumi’s government was perceived as being very close to the Bush administration, and this deployment was useful in keeping American support for putting pressure on North Korea. However, given the provisions of Japan’s constitution, many people failed to see how intervening in Iraq was a matter of self-defense. Furthermore, given the tight restrictions on the rules of engagement for Japanese troops, they had to be protected by troops of other countries on the ground. Ozawa, Secretary General of the Democratic Party of Japan from 2009, argues that if Japan wants to become a ‘normal nation’ and seek permanent membership on the UN Security Council, it will have to deploy troops with UN peacekeeping missions in support of resolutions passed by the UN. Japan has certainly begun to do this. Japanese troops may not engage with the UN mission in Afghanistan as combatants, but the Japanese perform a vital refueling mission for coalition ships in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, Japan has contributed warships to the international force confronting Somali pirates off the Horn of Africa. Relations with Regional Powers Japan closely aligns itself with the United States in their joint efforts to seek a solution in the Korean peninsula. It has supported the US’ efforts to persuade North Korea to meet the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Japan is included in the six-nation talks periodically resumed in order to make progress in the peninsula. Japan and South Korea have had some disputes, partly a throwback to memories of brutal Japanese imperialism in Korea in the 1930s and 1940s, but have moved towards closer and more amicable relations in recent years. There have been long-running tensions with China also, partly fuelled by Japan’s history as an imperialist aggressor, and the memory of atrocities such as the Rape of Nanking. During the 1960s, trade between the People’s Republic of China and Japan was established for the first time, and in 1972, they signed a landmark treaty establishing diplomatic relations. Tensions remain, especially over controversial visits by Japanese prime ministers to war shrines which contain the remains of war criminals. However, a thaw has been noticed, with Japanese trade contributing heavily to Chinese economic growth in recent decades, and Emperor Akihito of Japan visiting China in 1992. More recently, the Chinese military buildup has caused concern. The budget of the People’s Liberation Army grows by double digits each year, while that of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces remains essentially static13. Conclusion Japan seems to have begun its transition to a ‘normal’ nation, in terms of taking a more active responsibility for its own national security, and taking a greater role in the international community – something that is expected of this great economic power. We must agree with Pyle that it is strange that the Japanese, with their strong cultural sense of self, should ‘continue to live under a foreign-imposed constitution’14. Some Japanese leaders have led this trend, approving the deployment of Japanese troops in theaters around the world, largely under the auspices of UN peacekeeping missions. However, the memories and legacies of the Second World War are still fresh to many in Japan, and have left a legacy of pacifism which runs strong in that country. Japanese governments will therefore need to meet the concerns of pacifists, and in the long term, consider an alteration to their constitution, in order to take their place in the community of nations. References Beasley, W. G. The Modern History of Japan. New York: St Martin’s Press, 2003. Print. Bush, F. C. The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations. Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2010. Print. Fukuyama, F. & Oh, K. The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War. Santa Monica: National Defense Research Institute, 1993. Print. Kingston, J. Contemporary Japan. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. Print. Pyle, K. B. Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose. New York: Public Affairs, 2007. Print. Waltz, K. ‘The Emerging Structure of International Relations’. International Security, 18.2, 1993. Print. Read More