Can the Queensland Community Become More Resilient to Floods - Term Paper Example

Can the Queensland Community Become More Resilient to Floods? The Natural Hazard Cast Study Report Name Institution: Executive Summary Resilience is important because it influences the degree to which societies and ecosystems regenerate themselves so that resources needed for human livelihood and development are delivered after a disaster event. This case study report examines the resilience of the Queensland community after the 2011 floods. It will analyze the impact of the floods and the community’s response, and proposes strategies for enhancing the community’s resilience. An analysis of the floods reveals the following vulnerabilities: poor disaster planning, poor information dissemination, uncoordinated evacuation, and ineffective dam management. A theoretical review shows that communities can build resilience through their adaptability, resistance to change, incremental change, resource transfer, network-centric organizations, and institutional resilience. A network-centric focus seems most appropriate for building Queensland’s resilience. The report proposes three strategies to make Queensland more resilient to floods: develop the state’s economic resources and reduce social vulnerabilities; engage local residents in the mitigation process to improve social capital; and utilize pre-existing community networks to mobilize ongoing and emergency support services for the affected families and communities. These strategies will help the community, environment, and the economy become more responsive, adaptive and resilient to future natural hazards. Introduction Natural hazards are a part of human history (Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter & Rockstrom, 2005). Coping with these hazards is difficult especially for populations that have been exposed to hazards such as tsunamis, coastal flooding, disease epidemics and hurricanes. Studies show that more than 10 million people have experienced coastal flooding from landfall typhoons and storm surges while 50 million more are at risk of flooding by 2080 (Adger et al., 2005). These hazards are quite prevalent along the coastal ecosystems where human populations are mostly concentrated. The concentration of human population in areas sensitive to natural hazards makes them vulnerable and creates the need for a resilient community. Resilience aims at linking human societies and the ecosystems in a manner that enables societies to absorb recurrent hazards, adapt and self-organize. Resilience is important because it influences the degree to which societies and ecosystems regenerate themselves so that resources needed for human livelihood and development continue to be delivered (Cutter et al., 2008). This report examines the resilience of the Queensland community after the 2011 floods. It will analyze the impact of the floods, the community’s response, and the steps taken to mitigate the community’s vulnerability to future floods through social-ecological resilience. The Queensland Floods Natural hazards are a common phenomenon in Australia. These hazards result from natural disaster such as cyclones, floods, tsunamis and earthquakes. The wet season in Queensland is often characterized by floods and cyclones. During the 2010/2011 season, the Australian Bureau of Meteorology (ABM) warned about the occurrence of the La Nina event (Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry [QFCI], 2011). They observed that the La Nina increased the risk of tropical cyclones and flooding along the eastern parts of Australia. Between 2010 and 2011, Australia had experienced the second strongest oscillation pressures coupled with persistent monsoon rainfall. Water catchments became soaked and river systems could no longer absorb the rain. This resulted in flooding across the state including Queensland where the effects of the floods were more long lasting and widespread (QFCI, 2011). The Queensland floods had a significant effect on the environment, the community, and the economy. There was massive overflow of river systems such as the Bremer, Condamine, Moonie, Warrego, Brisbane, Mary River, Cooper Creek, Balonne, and Dawson River. Roads were closed and families self-evaluated from danger zones. Residents were also requested to relocate to schools and community centers. Warwick residents, for instance, were forced to evacuate their homes after the Condamine River peaked (QFCI, 2011). Flash flooding in areas such as Toowoomba resulted in mass casualties and missing persons. Hundreds of thousands o homes and businesses were destroyed in the floods leading to loss of property and economic livelihood for Queensland’s residents. Impact of the Floods The Queensland floods had long-term effects both ecologically and socially. The floods also had a significant effect on the economy of the state (Smith & Petley, 2013). From an ecological perspective, the floods caused a lot of environmental degradation. The overflowing of river systems caused great havoc to the wildlife in the region. The effects of the floods also limited access to water and farmland. Concerning social implications, many residents lost their lives, reported missing relatives, or loved ones. They also had to relocate leaving behind their sources of livelihood. The devastation of the floods also resulted in psychological problems such as trauma in the victims. From an economic perspective, the floods destroyed properties, business assets, and infrastructure (such as roads and telecommunication networks). This destruction caused a lot of economic strain because the Queensland government had to set aside funds for repairing public infrastructure (Q FCI, 2011). The effects of the floods depict the vulnerability of Queensland to threats arising from natural disasters. The impact of these natural hazards is greater in cities, which have interdependent and complex systems (Godschalk, 2003). The interdependency of architectural structures, infrastructure systems, and population concentrations make cities desirable for habitation. However, this interdependency exposes the cities to hazards such as hurricanes, earthquakes and even terrorist attacks. A review of the impact of natural hazards in 2001 shows losses amounting to $36 billion, insurance loss of $11.5 billion and 25,000 deaths (Godschalk, 2003, p.136). The losses occurred in locations known to be vulnerable to natural hazards such as coast lines, floodplains and fault zones for earthquakes. Action on hazard mitigation is needed to reduce the risk, cost and effect of natural hazards on people and the environment. To implement hazard mitigation policies, it is important that one examines and understands the vulnerability of a society. Queensland’s Vulnerability and Response The floods revealed a lot about the vulnerability of Queensland. The actions preceding the floods and the disaster response reveal weaknesses in the following areas: disaster planning, dissemination of information, evacuation, and dam management. On disaster planning, the QFCI (2011) established that there was need to develop a strategic framework for managing disasters in Queensland. The Commission observed that the state did not have an effective disaster management framework that shared responsibility among government agencies, families and communities. This is despite the fact that Queensland had enacted a Disaster Management Act in 2003 outlining the arrangements for disaster management in three hierarchies: the State Disaster Management Group, local disaster management groups, and the district disaster management group. From the Commission’s findings, it was observed that Queensland government needs to collaborate and share responsibility for disaster management with families and communities (QFCI, 2011). The findings revealed that Queenslanders expected efficient services resulting from shared responsibility and effective communication on disaster response from the government. Queensland Government (2011) acknowledged the weakness in sharing responsibility and coordinating disaster plans across the state. The government acknowledged that the floods put the disaster planning system under pressure resulting in procedural limitations. These limitations hindered the government from developing long-term solutions (such as mapping and floodplain management) aimed at making the floodplains more resilient for Queenslanders. Consequently, the government promised to streamline the disaster management processes through provide delineated roles and responsibilities and through resilient long-term floodplain management solutions. On dissemination of information, it is important that communities are aware of impending disasters and are in a position to react by seeking shelter or relocating to non-threatening areas. In addition, governments must ensure that communities are prepared adequately through diverse information programs so that people can prepare for and mitigate the risks of natural hazards (Queensland Government, 2011). QFCI (2011) reported that the Queensland government needed to do more to ensure communities were well-prepared and well-informed in good time. The Commission established that the government should have disseminated more information on flooding through community awareness initiatives and education programs. In addition, it reported that the government had failed in preparing residents for isolation at least three days prior to the disaster and mitigated the risks to personal property. The Commission believes that early isolation would have helped the residents prepare for and respond better to the floods. Furthermore, education on the construction of houses and buildings with habitable floors, which were above the flood height, would have possibly reduced the losses associated with property damage (Queensland Government, 2011). The reaction to the floods reveal that the Queensland government had not taken sufficient steps in disseminating disaster information to help residents prepare for the floods, relocate, and control the damage to their property. The evacuation of residents revealed weaknesses in the state’s disaster management. It is inevitable that the state will experience natural disasters in the future. Therefore, it is imperative that the Queensland government takes steps to mitigate the effects and severity of future disaster events. The 2011 floods revealed a weakness in the government’s response capacity and capability. Although the state has one of the best emergency service personnel in the world (Queensland Government, 2011), it has not taken adequate measures to support and build the resilience of these personnel and the community to natural hazards. The lack of support affects the coordination and interoperability of the government’s integrated response system. QFCI (2011) concurs that the Queensland government needs to enhance its capacity to respond to natural hazards. This would improve the coordination of response efforts, improve the interoperability of evacuation systems, and strengthen the community’s resilience to extreme natural events. Lastly, the QFCI (2011) observed a number of discrepancies in the management of dams. These discrepancies or failures include: 1. The Water Supply Act does not place any statutory obligation on a dam owner to comply with a flood mitigation manual. Moreover, the Act does not give any criteria for reviewing the content or form of a flood mitigation manual neither does it provide any guidance on the composition of an advisory council for assessing flood mitigation manuals. As a result, the Queensland Government has not convened an advisory council or assessed flood mitigation manuals for Wivenhoe, Somerset and North Pine Dams (QFCI, 2011) 2. Dam operators find it difficult to manage a flood when the volume of rainfall exceeds the volume of flood storage available within the dam (QFCI, 2011). This means that during peak flooding season, the dams can only absorb only part of the flood that they can store and end up discharging the rest. The operators have to release the water during the flood until the water level in the dam reduces to full supply level. 3. Flood engineers used ineffective tools to monitor the floods. Initially, the flood monitoring system used a hydrodynamic model to establish the flow velocity and the level of the river system in real time. When the monitoring system changed, the engineers did not replace or retain the hydrodynamic model. They used hydrologic models instead. When the 2011 floods occurred, the flood engineers could not access real-time, accurate flood levels in different downstream locations such as in Ipswich and Lockyer Creek (QFCI, 2011). The engineers could not anticipate the flood levels and flow velocities which meant that they could not provide accurate information on the impact of the floods on the river system. 4. Seqwater was not adequately prepared for floods. Although Seqwater was tasked with the responsibility of implementing dam safety management programs, emergency action plans and flood mitigation manuals, it did not pay attention to the flood operations center. Seqwater did not check that all of the flood engineers were registered with a professional board. In addition, Seqwater exposed the flood operations staff to long working hours and did not provide training exercises as mandated by the Department of Environment and Resource Management (DERM) (QFCI, 2011). 5. The release of water from dams such as the Wivenhoe Dam during the wet season was not effective. According to QFCI (2011), the release of water from dams was not controlled and caused a lot of ecological damage including soil erosion, loss of vegetation, damage to irrigation systems, and riverbank slumping. The Commission observed that dam operators and relevant authorities could have prevented this damage by reducing the water level of the dam during the wet season to about 80 percent (p.45). This would improve the dam’s storage capacity during heavy rainfall. The weaknesses highlighted above reveal lapses in management decision-making and regulations. First, the alteration of the supply level of main dams is the responsibility of the Queensland government. However, the responsible minister in the government did not perceive the floods to be serious enough to warrant significant reduction in supply levels. QFCI (2011) observed that the minister was solely accountable for making decisions on the full supply levels. The minister could not abdicate this duty to other agencies such as the Water Grid Manager or Seqwater. However, he/she could receive advice from these agencies to support his decisions on supply levels. Second, the regulatory framework on dam management needs to be simplified (QFCI, 2011). It does not address crucial issues such as compliance to flood mitigation manuals, the assessment of these manuals or the establishment of an advisory council on dam management. The weaknesses also reveal the need for a resilient Queensland community. The next section will introduce the concept of resilience and discuss how the Queensland community can become more resilient to floods. Resilience The term ‘resilience’ can be applied as a metaphor, a theory, capacities, or a strategy. As a metaphor, resilience refers to the capacity of a system or object to return to its equilibrium after it has been displaced (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008). A resilient object has the capacity to bounce back no matter the degree of initial displacement. Individuals and societies can also be described in similar terms when they demonstrate the ability to return to equilibrium after displacement by a natural hazard. As a theory, Norris et al. (2008) posit that ecological resilience as the capacity of a system to adapt during adversity or stressful situations. It reflects the degree of adversity that the system can absorb without changing and the degree to which the system can perform self-organization. Social resilience is premised on the ability of the community (or social units) to withstand external shocks and mitigate natural hazards so that social disruption is minimized (Adger, 2000). The theory of community resilience is similar in that it refers to the capacity and capability of the community’s resources (physical, socio-cultural, and socio-political) to mitigate hazards and promote safety (Norris et al., 2008, p. 129). These definitions present resilience as a process that links the adaptive capacities of a system or community in a positive trajectory after a disaster. It is different from vulnerability, which represents the persistent dysfunction of a community’s adaptive behavior. Resilience can also be described as a set of capacities, which rest on community resources, and the attributes of the resources such as redundancy and robustness. These capacities define the community strength in mobilizing its needs and cultivating the skills, resources and systems needed to offset a hazard (Norris et al., 2008). This definition focuses on elements of capacity building such as community action, problem-solving skills, flexibility, empowerment, and political partnerships. These elements are integrated with economic development, information and social capital strategies to mitigate the risks and effects of natural hazards. Lastly, resilience can be perceived as a disaster readiness strategy. This approach looks at various factors affecting resilience including economic capabilities, social vulnerability, social capital, organizational networks, inter-relationships, communication, and flexibility (Norris et al., 2008; Tompkins & Adger, 2003). How Communities Build Resilience Scholars present different approaches to building resilient societies. Gaillard (2007) argues that a community can build societal resilience through adaptability, resistance to change, and incremental change. The community can achieve adaptability by planning and preparing for the natural hazards. This involves designing disaster preparation and mitigation plans in such a way that they not only mitigate the risks of a hazard but also focus on restoring the community’s economic and social systems. Alternatively, the community can resist the damage from the hazard as its way of coping with the disaster. On the other hand, the community can support incremental change by absorbing the effect of the natural hazard and taking steps to recover from the hazard (Gaillard, 2007). A traditional approach to building resistance is transferring experience, technology, and knowledge from the industrialized nations to developing countries with poor capacity to respond to environmental hazards. Gaillard (2007) asserts that this approach is largely top-down and driven by Western logic. The main argument is that developing countries lack the resources to prevent, prepare for and recover from natural hazards. As a result, these countries depend greatly on industrialized nations for external resources. The developed nations transfer their resources and encourage short-term socio-cultural adjustments to promote cultural change and continuity. The developing countries or societies use this external aid to support lifestyle changes such as reducing food consumption to cope with shortage. These social-cultural changes may take months or years depending on the country’s initial vulnerability. As the dependent countries make these changes, they become more resilient and able to overcome the effects of future natural hazards. Allenby and Fink (2005) recommend the establishment of network-centric organizations to build resilience. They describe cities as nodes where networks (such as financial, corporate and transportation) intersect. As these networks enhance, they disperse critical systems such as the workforce. A dispersed workforce is more resilient since employees working from home have a lower risk of contracting and spreading infectious diseases. Similarly, the dispersion of data and information in backup facilities creates resilient communities by protecting corporate and government agencies from information loss in the occurrence of a natural hazard. In addition, the shift towards virtual offices and offshore outsourcing make communities more resilient to hazards since social infrastructure and corporate assets are not limited to one location (Allenby & Fink, 2005). Godschalk (2003) concurs with the network-centric approach. The author observes that human communities represent the social components while physical systems represent the infrastructural and the ecological components of a city. In the event of a disaster, community networks (neighborhoods, organizations, and taskforces) need to self-organize and work cohesively to mitigate physical systems from further stress. A resilient community network would therefore help cities mitigate the risks of natural hazards and reduce vulnerability to disasters. Adger (2000) proposes that communities can achieve social and ecological resilience by focusing on the resilience of their institutions. This is because institutions can comprise both socialized behavior and formal governance structures. The author posits that institutions can be made more resilient and sustainable depending on their legitimacy, environmental risks and social capital. Once resilient, the institutions would be able to integrate different social networks through norms, trust and inclusivity. An application of institutional resilience is in the management of coastal resources such as agriculture and fisheries, which are usually degraded through inappropriate privatization and property rights. A property management scheme would help coastal communities deal with external pressures and natural hazards on the coastal resources. This scheme represents institutional resilience since it integrates both social capital and the need for ecological resilience. The theoretical approaches to building resilience help us understand the dynamics of resilient communities as well as how Queensland can adapt to become more resilient to floods. Queensland should build its resilience for two reasons. It should build resilience because social and technological systems are vulnerable to the unpredictability of natural hazards (Berkes, 2007; Tompkins & Adger, 2003). The uncertainty of these hazards means that hazard managers cannot effectively predict how, when and where a hazard would occur in order to create systems that resists it. Second, natural hazards cause stress on people and damage property. Resilience would lower the risk of collapsing buildings, power outages, deaths, injuries, communication breakdown, and infrastructural damage (Godschalk, 2003). Building the Resilience of the Queensland Community Prior to the 2011 floods, Queensland had been confident of its disaster resilience initiatives and programs. The initiatives focused on evacuation, emergency response, and communication. However, the floods revealed the need to demonstrate resilience in the entire disaster management, recovery and rebuilding process (Queensland Government, 2011). Since Queensland is likely to experience future natural hazards, it is vital that the communities, the environment and the economy be responsive and adaptable to endure, recover from the hazards, and come out stronger. The report proposes three strategies to build the resilience of Queensland. The strategies are: 1. Develop the state’s economic resources and reduce social vulnerabilities According to Norris et al. (2008), the first step to building resilience to a natural hazard is to develop the community’s economic resources and reduce areas of social vulnerability. This strategy recognizes that hazard risk is not evenly distributed in all areas. Therefore, it is important that communities mitigate the social vulnerabilities by making poorer neighborhoods much safer, meeting the economic needs of each neighborhood and developing specific and appropriate mitigation plans. It is also important that communities support economic diversity by encouraging entrepreneurship and self-employment as well as ensuring that economic resources are equally distributed to all neighborhoods (Tompkins & Adger, 2003). Members of the community including residents, grass-root leaders and government agencies would need to collaborate in developing the economic resources and reducing social inequalities to reduce the vulnerabilities to hazards. The first step for the Queensland government would be to build its economic resources using federal funds, public funds, and the support of the private sector. It would need to work with the private sector to identify the needs of each neighborhood, develop individualized mitigation plans, ensure equal resource distribution, and to encourage economic development in each neighborhood by supporting entrepreneurs and businesses. The Queensland Government (2011) agrees that resilience can only be achieved by getting businesses and communities involved in the disaster management, reconstruction, and recovery process. Second, the government should support economic initiatives that promote community resilience such as capacity building and business continuity planning. Examples of continuity planning include helping small and medium-sized enterprises to create businesses, supporting the local industry, setting aside funds for employment, providing apprentice support, training communities on priority skills, and providing community and industry grants for climate risk management and preparedness. 2. Engage local residents in the mitigation process to improve social capital Residents work with professional practitioners (such as flood engineers and hazard planners) to identify vulnerabilities, invest in community networks and improve their problem-solving capacities. This engagement is important because it emphasizes the empowerment of the local residents versus the powerlessness they experience when they are unprepared for disasters (Norris et al., 2008). Furthermore, engaging with the local residents helps the members mobilize their resources, integrate the resources into a response plan, and become self-sufficient. The Queensland Government can also improve social capital by building the capacity and resilience of local residents and communities. It needs to provide mental health programs to help individuals affected by the effects of the floods. This includes providing mental health information, supporting bereavement services, relocating mental specialist staff to Queensland and funding mental health services for affected families and individuals. A financial program would also improve the community’s social capital. This program target families facing financial difficulties after the floods and could include financial counseling and funding initiatives at the local government level. These programs would restore community networks, develop community leadership, and promote resilience-building activities so that families are more self-reliant and better prepared to deal with future natural disasters. 3. Utilize pre-existing community networks to mobilize ongoing and emergency support services for the affected families and communities It is important that Queensland develops loosely-coupled and cooperative community networks which provide the most effective combination of flexibility and linkages (Norris et al., 2008). The community networks could be developed through cooperative networks and coalitions which indicate how each constituency will be involved in disaster management and recovery efforts. Constituencies need to trust each other and coordinate their activities to ensure that their combined effort contributes to the resilience of the local residents (Berkes, 2007). The Queensland government could utilize existing community network at local council level to provide support services to the residents. The Ipswich City Council has developed such a program to provide support services to community groups in Gailes, Goodna, Moores Pocket, Karalee and small neighborhoods in Ipswich (Queensland Government, 2011). The council provides services such as resilience training (through the Red Cross), first aid training, information referral, resilience leadership, and community recovery centers. A similar model can be adopted for other local councils in Queensland. Conclusion This report has examined the resilience of the Queensland community after the 2011 floods. It has observed that the effects of the floods could have been mitigated if the community had developed resilient disaster plans, disseminated information in a timely manner, coordinated evacuation efforts and monitored the management of the dams. To resolve the weaknesses and achieve community resilience, the report proposes that the Queensland community should develop economic resources and reduce social vulnerabilities; engage local residents in the mitigation process; and utilize pre-existing community networks for resource mobilization. References Adger, W. N. (2000). Social and ecological resilience: Are they related? Progress in Human Geography, 24(3), 347-364. Adger, W.N., Hughes, T.P., Folke, C., Carpenter, S. R., & Rockstrom, J. (2005). Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters. Science, 309, 1036-1039. Allenby, B., & Fink, J. (2005). Toward inherently secure and resilient societies. Science, 309, 1034-1036. Berkes, F. (2007). Understanding uncertainty and reducing vulnerability: Lessons from resilience thinking. Natural Hazards, 41, 283-295. Cannon, T. (2008). Reducing people’s vulnerability to natural hazards communities and resilience. UNU-WIDER Research Paper, 2008(34), 1-17. Cutter, S., Barnes, L., Berry, M., Burton, C., Evans, E., Tate, E., & Webb, J. (2008). A place-based model for understanding community resilience to natural disasters. Global Environmental Change, 18, 598-606. Gaillard, J. (2007). Resilience of traditional societies in facing natural hazards. Disaster Prevention and Management, 16(4), 522-544. Godschalk, D.R. (2003). Urban hazard mitigation: Creating resilient cities. Natural Hazards Review, (August), 136-143. Norris, F., Stevens, S., Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, K., & Pfefferbaum, R. (2008). Community resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capabilities and strategy for disaster readiness. American Journal of Community Psychology, 41, 127-150. Smith, K. & Petley, D. (2013). Environmental hazards: Assessing risk and reducing disaster (6th edn.). London: Routledge. Tompkins, E., & Adger, W. N. (2003). Building resilience to climate change through adaptive management of natural resources. Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Working Paper, 27, 1-19. Queensland Government. (2011, August). Queensland government response to the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry final report. Retrieved from http://www.emergency.qld. gov.au/documents/qld%20gov%20response-to-flood-inquiry.pdf Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry. (2011). Interim report. Retrieved from http://www.emergency.qld.gov.au/ Read More