Effects of the Buncefield Incident on the Surrounding Area during and after the Event - Case Study Example

Running Head: The Buncefield Incident The Buncefield Incident: Effects of the incident on the surrounding area during and after the event [Client’s Name] [Affiliation] At 6:00 am in December 11, 2005, the Buncefield Oil Storage Depot vaporized and formed a flammable mixture that ignited the depot and its surrounding environment. The result was devastating as the explosion that occurred engulfed more than 20 oil storages and caused massive damage to its immediate environment and at the same time revealing, as data gathered from various investigations shed light to the complexities of the problems involved in storage depots. Evidence shows that the root cause of the disaster is not only due to engineering failure but more of a multilayered failure of various stakeholders involved in the operations. his incident provides helpful insights on a lot of areas like fire prevention and control, risk management, and structural engineering. This also provides insights on why certain policies, controls, and regulations concerning the construction and the operation of fuel storage tanks failed in various levels and what could have been done to avoid such events in the future. Summary of Events Buncefield Depot is occupied by three oil companies namely the Hertfordshire Storage Oil Limited (HSOL), United Kingdom Oil Pipelines Limited, and British Petroleum Oil UK Limited. The depot is a part of the national petroleum, refinery, and storage system that is supplied by three pipeline systems. About 19:00 on December 10, 2005 Tank 912 in bund A at the HOSL West started receiving motor fuel from T/K South Pipeline with a flow rate of 550 m3 hour. By midnight, all pipelines leading to the HSOL oil tanks were closed and stock check of products were performed by maintenance engineers. The routine check was finished by 01:00 and no anomalies were noted. By 03:00, there was no noted change in the content level of Tank 912 but it continues to receive motor fuel at a rate of 5:50 m3 per hour. Evidences gathered in the blast site suggests that the protection system that should have prevent any more filling of the tanks when the valves are closed failed to operate. After more than an hour of filling, Tank 912 overflowed and the motor fuel cascaded down the side of the tank, exposed in the air. Petrol on its own does not easily explode but an exposure to air at this level leads to the formation of rich fuel/air mixture in bund A which eventually reached its saturation point. By 05:38, CCTV footages showed that the vapour from escaped fuel started flowing from the North-West corner of bund A going west and was flowing to different directions by 05:46. At around 06:00, the pumping rate of from T/K South Pipeline towards tank 912 gradually increased to about 890 m3 per hour. About the same hour, the vapour clouds were visible in various areas of the Depot, blanketing the contour of the topology, particularly in the Fuji and Northgate buildings. At 06:01, the first explosion occurred followed by successive explosions, engulfing more than 20 storage tanks. The first explosion was centred on the car parks between the HOSL West site, the Fuji building, and the Nothgate building. Ignition Mechanism But what could have caused such massive explosion? It is very difficult to identify the main source of ignition of the vapour cloud coming from Tank 912 as the vapour cloud started to occupy a larger area to up to 80, 000 square meters. Based on the evidences gathered, there are potential sources of explosion: First, there was a noted internal explosion in the fire pump hose located on the East side of HSOL. This is evident by what has remained of the cladding – left hand door was blown open, upper right part of the door folded outwards indicating an explosion from the inside. Second, the spark that ignited the explosion could have been created in the emergency generator cabin whose heaters were controlled by a thermostat. Spreading vapour may have entered the cabin and any electrical contacts with the vapour may have caused the explosion. Lastly, vapour contact with the car engine may have caused the explosion. Witness account indicates that their cars move erratically and is racing even after the driver turned the ignition and left their cars. Effects of the Explosion during the Event With more than 20 fuel tanks that have exploded almost simultaneously, the explosion could have been enormous, if not gigantic. Eyewitness accounts indicate that there was a very large explosion followed by smaller ones (DOWP, 2008). Media reports concerning the eyewitness account is consistent with the statements provided by the eyewitnesses. This is independently verified by British Geological Survey (BGS) which estimated the main explosion to be around 06:01:32. It was estimated that the main explosion and the larger explosions that followed took about 30 minutes to finish. The smaller explosions were then starting to be noted. This suggests that the smaller explosions could have been due to the explosions within tanks or release of fuels (which triggered the explosion) from damaged pipes and tanks. The fire burned for five straight days. The explosion produced black soot in the 80,000 square meter radius with an inverted cloud of smoke present for days on the area directly above the depot. Chemical pollutants, particularly those emitted by the fiery area are spreading all over. Residents are evacuated for the fear of inhaling poisonous gases and for the fear that the fire would spread to include their houses. Houses that are close to the depot are destroyed completely while the Eastside of the HSOL depot suffered major structural damage. The damage is observable with a 5 km radius but has considerably lessened as the area becomes further from the blast site. Some parts of the depot receive much damage and contamination that it is impossible to access it for months. Intense heat and fire caused significant loss and damages to the secondary containment of HSOL and British Pipeline Agency Limited storages. There were also tertiary damages on the storages on other locations resulting to the spill off contaminated fluids and to the ground, water reserves, and the sewers. The explosion occurred under a clear morning sky. The absence of rain clouds mean that the presence of dust particles and chemical components in air has a high chance of staying in the local, or spreading to nearby areas depending on the direction of the wind. Solid particles and debris contaminated with motor fuels and other hazardous contaminants remain localized which is both dangerous and thankfully merciful. The whole operation involved more than a thousand ground and support personnel from Hertfordshire and across UK. Emergency response units were deployed minutes after the explosion took place. The fire plume can be seen over twenty miles away from the site. The team took more than 32 hours to extinguish the main flame. Minor fires were still burning on the morning of Tuesday and ignition of fuel to flame which caused another fire took place the following day. Forty three individuals were injured during the explosion and no one was reported dead or missing. Almost 2000 individuals were evacuated from their homes to safety, including the suspension of classes and the closing of some sections of the highway. Overall, more than 55 million (more than 50 million ‘clean’ water and the rest is recycled water) litres of water and about 750,000 litres of foam concentrates were used to extinguish the flame. Effects of the Explosion after the Event Although the fire has been completely extinguished in the HSOL and in the BPAL sites within the next five pages after the explosion, access to the site have been restricted for various safety reasons. Contamination of the ground, water, air and soil are the primary concerns of the risk management teams. Several tests have been performed to check contamination issues on the ground, water, air and soil. Water Quality Monitoring Essential to the water quality monitoring of the site is the presence of contaminants coming from the fire and from the fire-fighting equipments. Solid and liquid samples taken from lagoons, lake, tanks, and bunds were gathered to check for the presence of compounds from fire-fighting foams and fuels. Chemical compounds containing fuels are indicators for fuel contamination while perflourooctane sulfunate (PFOS) and zinc were the main indicators for fire-fighting foams. Elevated PFOS levels were detected in River Ver and River Colne but the level decreased significantly after only a few days. Six month monitoring reports indicate that fuel residues, fuel-related compounds, and residues of fire-fighting foams are noted to be at significant levels but are located close to and directly underneath the blast site. Groundwater Monitoring There have been various monitoring facilities that were set up to record the contamination reading on the ground water directly beneath ground zero and nearby areas. The third progress report of the Buncefield investigation indicates that abstraction boreholes were dug within the 9-km radius from the blast site to monitor toxin levels in groundwater as well as on the six water pumping stations operated by Three Valleys Water Company located nearby. There were also private boreholes that were distributed in the area which are not a part of the typical risk management process. As a precaution to new contaminations, three boreholes were drilled near Buncefield (in Butler’s farm, in Breakspear House, and Hogg End Lane) to monitor any seepage of groundwater pollution to uncontaminated areas. Two more boreholes were dug up near Tank 12 to monitor the level of the groundwater and to detect any presence of toxic contaminants in the area. Monitoring of Air Quality and Surveillance The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) published a report in May 2006 that concludes that the presence of wide-area contamination of air is not established in their findings. The report further indicates that there were no significant increases in the pollution level at ground zero as well as with the nearby areas. Moreover, the pollution level noted in the area is typical to the pollution level found in any urban zones. The weather condition during and after the explosion, which is fair and bright, allows highly buoyant smoke and fume particles to disperse high in the atmosphere, making them less likely to settle on the ground as pollutants considering that its area of spread is wider. DEFRA affirms this by saying that the soil and grasses around the vicinity received significantly less amount of soot, dust, and fume particles. Land Investigations Barely two months after the explosion land excavation started to monitor the effects of the explosion on the soil and on the ground. There were many trial pits that were excavated to check the ability of the soil in the area to be able to bear vegetation. Moreover, soil tests were done to check if the contaminants present on the soil are going to affect habitation in the long run. Up to this writing, there is no available information on the comprehensiveness of the results. Summary of the Key Findings Overall, the Buncefield incident did not cause much damage to the lives and properties of the people residing within the 10-km radius of the area. The damage is contained around the vicinity of the blast site and hence did not affect much of the surrounding environment. The series of investigations that followed after the incident shows that: (a) The Buncefield incident has no significant negative impact to public health. The ability of the fire fighters and the emergency rescue units to stage an elaborate and effective rescue and control plan averted the negative impact of the explosion on public health. This highlights the need to have an extensive, exhaustive, and appropriate risk management plan to counter or deflect the negative effects of disasters of that scale. (b) Operators of oil depots must have consistent and comprehensive plans for on-site and off-site emergency measures. These operators must satisfy state regulations and requirements set forth by competent authorities before getting the “go” signal to operate. Moreover, operators must integrate an automated system that detects any abnormalities in any of its equipments or machines to avoid large-scale disasters such as the Buncefield incident. (c) It is required that the use of land be consistent with state policies and the policies defined by the competent authority before any projects be carried on. This is to ensure that the land developer is aware of the potential threats and hazards that are integrated with the land he is going to develop. A stringent land use requirement must be passed into law to ensure that all land developers must go through the rigor of the legal requirements set for land development. Recommendations to Land Developers Apparently, land developers need to go through a stringent process in order to obtain an approval from the authorities on the use or development of the blast site. Based on the evidences gathered by the Department for Work and Pension of Great Britain, Health and Safety Executives (HSE), and the Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB), there are at least four major things that land developers has to consider before utilizing the closed HSOL depot area. These are: (a) Independent validation of the test results obtained by HSE and MIIB concerning the level of chemical and physical hazards contained in the soil, air, and water of the area. If they have high-end equipments available to investigate data and samples, it would be best to use these materials to increase the validity and the reliability of the results. (b) If there are traces (of significant levels) of the contaminants within land, soil, air or water, decisions regarding the delay of any project must be made and implemented before actual projects are initiated. (c) if results indicate that there are no more traces of contaminants in the immediate vicinity of the blast site, or that the amount of contaminants present are not significant or could not cause serious injuries to the inhabitants of the area, land developers must need to work closely with the capable authority for the approval of the engineering, structural, and environmental design requirements set forth by the state policies and regulations. Similarly, there has to be an open line communication in the development process between the land developers and the fire and emergency authorities, the UK police force, and other stakeholders to ensure an effective and systematic flow of command and of response strategies. (d) Finally, land developers must take full responsibility of all the necessary precautions and safety requirements required by state laws and regulations to oversee the safety of the development of the land area around the blast site. This means that land developers must constantly monitor any changes of the level of high risk contaminants present directly in the blast area to ensure the safety of the people living in the area. References Great Britain. Department for Work and Pension. (2008). The Buncefield Investigation: The Government and Competent Authority's Response. Stationery Office Books. Health and Safety Executive. (2008). The Buncefield Incident. Retrieved online http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/volume1.pdf on January 21, 2010 Appendix A: Explosion site in the HSOL depot Appendix B: Vapour Mists as captured in the CCTV camera Appendix C: Burning Trees and posts near ground zero. Read More