Buncefield Incident - Effects on the Environment and Human Health - Case Study Example

BUNCEFIELD INCIDENT Introduction This is an inferno that was caused by a series of explosion on the Sunday morning on December 11th 2005 at the Hertfordshire oil storage facility within the vicinity of the M1 motor highway in England. The terminal which is independently owned by Total U.K & Texaco on a 60% & 40% shareholding respectively has a capacity of 60,000,000 imperial gallons and approximately holds 8% of the U.K oil storage capacity which makes it the sixth largest fuel storage depot in United Kingdom. Approximately 200 people were evacuated on an emergency fire advice, whereas the fire burned for several days continuously while destroying most of the site, large clouds of smoke were witnessed and emitted into the atmosphere which ended up dispersing people within the Home Counties, Southern England and beyond. Approximately 800,000 liters of foam concentrate and 40 million liters of water were used to fight off the fire (Cabinet Office). 16000 employees who worked within the Maylands industrial area were unable to access their duty stations, 82 businesses were displaced for almost an entire week, 17 businesses were forced to permanently relocate their premises and more than 70 million sterling pounds were lost from the local businesses either in lost stocks, revenue or relocation expenses (Cabinet Office). The fire scene is a major hub on the UK’s oil pipeline network that serves the Humberside and Merseyside and it’s a critical fuel source to the UK’s aviation industry with approximately half of its capacity being dedicated to aviation fuel supplying the Luton, Gatwick and Heathrow airports. The first and largest explosion occurred at around 06:01 UTC in which some further explosions overwhelmed 20 giant storage tanks and it is believed that due to the inversion layer, explosions could be heard almost 200 Kilometers away and there were even some reports suggesting that the explosions themselves were audible as far as in France, Netherlands and Belgium. According to the British Geological Survey the event measured 2.4 on the Richter scale and there were reports people who were as far as South London and Wokingham which is approximately 28 miles from the incidence were woken up. The flames were hundreds of feet’s high and were visible from as far as Lincolnshire which is approximately 70 miles away. Nearby office blocks were hard hit and nearly every window within the buildings were blown off, cars in the nearby streets caught fire, there were 43 injuries and two people were critically injured and admitted in the hospital. Effects on the Environment Despite the event producing one of the largest explosions in recent times since the end of the Second World War and releasing thick & dirty smokes which were visible hundred of miles away, the inferno is unlikely to cause a lasting environmental harm (Sam Bond, 2005). There is a likelihood that there is a toxic fallout since rain will aid the particulate matter from the smoke back to earth but this will eventually be dispersed over a wider area and despite the magnitude of the fire, this process has not been predicted to cause any long lasting problem. The smoke within fire’s vicinity and the airborne particulate matter may aggravate existing respiratory problems such as asthma but since a large portion of the population within had been evacuated and the ones that had been left behind strictly adhered to the precautionary advice issued. The burning fuel released a lot of greenhouse carbon dioxide and despite the disaster being so huge it would not register on a global scale. The real threats came from pollutants reaching the aquifer and contaminating the water supply system as well as the likelihood of damaging the air quality. This was not possible because there was no evidence suggesting that the petrochemicals escaped from the site. The fire-water with a combination of oil and water would have resulted into a very serious disaster for the aquatic life and measure were taken to avoid the situation from worsening and run offs were collected and eventually pumped into safer storage areas. When the first major risk assessment was undertaken when there was the fire outbreak, it was concluded there was negligible environmental risk present, environmental data from soil and grass samples were analyzed and reviewed and likewise there was also search of plume grounding to determine the need for any further sampling. There was a further review on the air pollution data which was collected and analyzed by various organizations across the country together with an evaluation into how they were being perceived to be a potential health hazard resulting from the exposure to the plume, the main conclusion was that there was no significant health or environmental impact risk resulting from the exposure of the explosion nor the fire neither the thick smoke resulting as a result of the Buncefield oil depot. The dispersion of pollutants from the fire can also be simulated using a regional Eulerian transportation model, here the transport and mixing of the fire plum are analyzed and it was shown that the hot plume never touched the ground, contrary, it systematically pierced the thin layer of the wintertime boundary and was subsequently injected into the free troposphere within the high altitudes. This injection is very fortunate due to the fine aerosol particles (PM10) which are generated by the smoke from the fire exceeds those from a normal pollution by a very high magnitude. Should have the incident occurred during summer when the boundary layers are very deep and convective, there could have been a severe degradation of the air quality due to the PM10. The European air quality levels mainly depends on the altitude from the plume and in all cases present it was found that the fire only affected the surface aerosol concentrations without necessarily increasing the photochemical pollution (R. Vautard et al, 2007) According to an environmental impact assessment report, there were no significant exposure to hazardous chemicals to the public within the vicinity of the scene or under the smoke plume, the present air quality data showed that there was an unlikely impact at ground level to the plume and to support this, seventy two samples from thirty three different locations were taken from the soil and grass downwind of the fire and compared, with control locations and available background information on level of pollutants, samples of dust and soot were also collected & analyzed and this was done before any substantial amount of rainfall within the area in order to avoid any possibility of rain washing away the pollution which had been attached to the vegetation, soil or property (Prof. Pat Troop). The samples were then analyzed at two laboratories for a combination of chemicals including heavy metals such as the vanadium and nickel which are considered the most appropriate markers for oil combustion. Fluorides, furans and dioxides were also used. When these samples were compared with the available data on the background level of some of these pollutants from similar soils and grasses from the United Kingdom, a huge majority of the samples were exceptional and did not pose any risk to human health and had virtually no evidence of fire contamination. Even though there were no clear associations with the fire distance or a probable dispersion of the plume, several results required further explanation and on extensive investigation it was further on revealed that on the balance of evidence that the results were not as a result of the fire but rather the historical contamination, and even one of the sites was a plausible source of contaminated land, a power station had existed there before (Prof. Pat Troop). However, the visible air pollution may contain catastrophic effects on crops in the farms, the carbon and kerosene residue present from the blast off may render agricultural produce unusable and this is likely to have a negative effect on the dairy produce (Sam Bond, 2005). Effects on Human Health Exposure to combustive pollutants as a result of a fire outbreak from petroleum sources has the potential of causing short- long term adverse health effects on the victims exposed. A surveillance system was installed during the incidence to ascertain the number & types of casualties involved during the outbreak and there was a similar investigation examining the health impact of the casualties. Epidemiological data was collected and analyzed. Following was a retrospective description study of attendees within the Accident & Emergency departments of the Watford and Hemel Hempstead hospitals. Records that met the case definition were identified, and information on exposure date and time were recorded including complaints, past medical history and diagnosis and this particular data were fed on a standard questionnaire in which they were eventually entered into a computer database and analyzed by using spreadsheet software. According to the findings, it was revealed that 244 people had sought some emergency healthcare within the emergency departments of the two hospitals due to the fire outbreak in which 76% of them came during the very day of the explosion. The patients fell into three groups, depot workers during explosion, members of public and emergency services at the scene such as the firefighters and police officers. I20 people had symptoms attributed to the fire in which the most common was respiratory irritation i.e. increased asthma, cough & sore throat. The second most common was injury accounting for 32% of the symptoms followed by headache at 16% and anxiety at 12%. It is interesting to note that patients suffering from anxiety at only 12% were quite similar to the percentage of the nearby residents who are suffering from psychological distress, this is according to a survey of 4920 residents within the vicinity of the oil depot that had a psychological distress of 9 % (M. R. Hoek et al, 2005). Fig 1.0 a graph depicting Accident & Emergency attendees at the two hospitals The highest percentage of injuries and anxiety was noticed from workers of the depot, in comparison, the emergency workers, headache and respiratory complains was most common. Among the patients presented to the Accident & Emergency departments, 25 out of 120 patients were referred for further medical follow up, fifteen to their GP, three to orthopaedic surgeons, one to a cardiologist and three more were advised to make a follow up appointment at the Accident & Emergency section. People with a history of cardiac or respiratory problems were six times more likely to require medical follow ups (M. R. Hoek et al, 2005). Fig 1.0 showing medical complaints as a percentage of each group Despite the thick smoke and huge flames, the health impact according to patients visiting the Accident & Emergency section was very minimal and the main impacts were the respiratory symptoms, injuries, headaches and anxieties. Despite the incidence being the largest in terms of a fire outbreak since the Second World War, its health impacts were absolutely minimal and the burden laid on the Accident & Emergency units of the two hospitals was due to the emergency personnel in which a huge majority of them are asymptomatic (M. R. Hoek et al, 2005). Redeveloping the Buncefield site Most of the parts of the depot have largely been destroyed by the fire outbreak and cannot be re-built, in order to re-build parts of these sites, and organization or an individual will hate to get a consent from the Dacorum Borough Council. They will also require a pre-construction safety report to be submitted to the Health and Safety Executive (H.S.E) and the Environment Agency (E.A) for consideration (MIIB, 2007). The British Petroleum (B.P) part did suffer minimal damages but they are not operating it, however, they have announced that they are seriously considering the viability of using their site, in which they are also prioritizing opening up their pipeline to Heathrow and using some of the storage tanks in storing aviation fuel and as a distribution point of motor vehicle fuel but on a much reduced scale. B.P has already submitted their risk assessment to the H.S.E and the E.A in ensuring that all the safety and environmental protection are up to the standard for a renewed and successful operation. On the other hand the Total Company has submitted a proposal that will seek to (Total U.K): Locate all storage tanks in accordance with the relevant legislation procedures. Provide storage of different types of fuel in tanks of varying sizes and the extra tanks will be used to manage the flow of fuel within the underground pipeline network. They will include a road tanker loading bay. They will build a new control and administration area. Key findings The Major Incidence Investigation Board (MIIB) which has been conducting a series of comprehensive investigation towards the incidence has managed to come up with some of the major key findings which an important aspect pertaining to the incidence was that there was one huge explosion. Among its progress reports, are findings that the incident occurred due to a spillage of unleaded petroleum from one of its storage tanks which should have well been anticipated before the incident (E.M.A.G, 2007) After the advisory group carried out a preliminary assessment of the forensic evidence from the incident and the results from experiments which were conducted by Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) with the objectives of: Determining whether sequence of events could be easily identified that would lead to an answer why such severe explosion pressures were witnessed. Incase this was not a possibility, then what actions should they recommend to explain the magnitude of the explosion. In conducting the assessment the advisory group referenced laboratory scale and other large scale experimental work and some of the technical issues considered were: Explosion Mechanism: Explosion may be realized when a gas cloud is ignited within a confined enclosure such as a building, however, this was not very convincing because there are not confinement of gas clouds that caused severe pressure which resulted into explosion. Detonation: It occurs due to a coalesce of a strong shock wave and a combination of a fast moving chemical reacting front, it may also arise due to the high temperatures and pressure generated by shockwaves within a confined high speed flame deflagration or from strong shockwaves in a reactive mixture. The group went further on and explained the possible causes of the explosion using the above two mechanism but their scenario to explain all the other aspects were limited since There was uncertainty on the composition of the vapor cloud. Ambiguity in the forensic evidence involved. Uncertainty on the magnitude of the explosion required to initiate such an explosion. There was a lot of difficulty in distinguishing the unburned gas flow which is ahead of the flame and the burned gas in the opposite direction. The group concluded that there is a very strong likelihood that the cause of the explanation could be explained but required considerable detailed work which they recommended that a joint industry project be initiated, the first phase was scheduled to be completed in 2008 and the experimental theoretical work would take a period of another 18-24 months. In the course of the work the group presented results of computational fluid dynamics which elaborated on the way vapor from the spilled fuel dispersed across the scene, this proved to be difficult because in most computational fluid dynamics vapor flaw and wind dynamics are minimal (E.M.A.G, 2007) Some other factors that were considered were overpressure in the combustion generated by a number of mechanisms, there was also ignition which could have occurred due to the emergency generator cabin present on the emergency pump house. There were also the options of high concentration of fuels within the emergency pump house, due to the creation of an intense fireball occurring as a result of fuel mixing with air (E.M.A.G, 2007) However, the group realized that it was very difficult in establishing the cause of the explosion due to the time available and they recommended that certain areas needed extensive research which involved large scale tests. These researches were to be done in two different phases. Phase one with the initial assessments would involve reviewing similar incidents, identification of crucial gaps in order to understand information, forming an interim guidance committee if possible, critically reviewing and analyzing data from the incident associated with the vapor cloud, ignition & explosive behavior finally establishing the second phase of the program (E.M.A.G, 2007) In the second phase all the gaps in information misunderstandings were to be identified and a proposal was to be prepared. This phase will extensively be involved in experimental research combined with a series of modeling studies which may involve both the lab and large scale experiments because physics type explosion are always scale dependent. This phase would finally provide a definitive recommendation on measure to be followed to prevent a resurgence of such a type a disaster in future (E.M.A.G, 2007) This project will be overseen and managed by a steering committee comprising of stakeholders such as the sponsors, regulators and the academia. All the main activities will be carried out by the technical committee and it shall be the responsibility of the project manager in facilitating all the technical discussions arising, compiling the input from the different members into one convincing report and each of the two phases are scheduled to take a period of nine months on the assumption that everything goes on schedule as planned (E.M.A.G, 2007) References 1. Cabinet Office UK Resilience. Emergency Planning Team, Hertfordshire County Council. Retrieved January 2009. From http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/response/recovery_guidance/case_studies/b5_buncefield.aspx 2. Sam Bond. 2005. Buncefield Blast: Environmental Impact likely to be Limited. Faversham House Group. Retrieved January 2009. From http://www.edie.net/news/news_story.asp?id=10894 3. R. Vautard, P. Ciais, R. Fisher, D. Lowry, F.M. Bréon, F. Vogel, I. Levin, F. Miglietta and E. Nisbe. 2007. Dispersion of Buncefield oil fire Plume: An extreme accident without air quality consequences. Elsevier Limited. Retrieved January 2009. From http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VH3-4PNFVCJ-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=1166315459&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=24ad147f371f12ea9a77743c10ec3f32 4. Professor Pat Troop. The Public Health Impact of The Buncefield Oil Depot Fire. Retrieved January 2009. From http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache%3AW739WmkiMycJ%3Awww.hpa.org.uk%2Fweb%2FHPAwebFile%2FHPAweb_C%2F1194947321467+buncefield+environment+impact&hl=en&gl=ke 5. M.R Hoek, S. Bracebridge, I. Oliver. 2005. Health impact of Buncefield Oild depot fire. Study of Accident and Emergency case record. Advance Access Publication. Retrieved January 2009. From http://jpubhealth.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/29/3/298.pdf 6. Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB). 2007. Retrieved January 2009. From http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/faqs.htm 7. Total UK. 2009. Buncefield Public Exhibition Brochure. Retrieved January 2009. From http://www.total.gb.com/set/docs/South%20East%20Terminal%20brochure.pdf 8. Explosion Mechanism Advisory Group. (E.MA.A.G). 2007. Retrieved January 2009. From. http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/buncefieldagr.pdf Read More