The Approaches to Environmental Ethics - Essay Example

Essay Question Outline and evaluate the deep ecological critique of anthropocentric theories of environmental value. The Approaches to Environmental Ethics Part I: Outline 1. What are the deep ecology approaches of environmental ethics? The rise of deep ecology gave rise to the philosophical and religious principles that completely undermined traditional ways of understanding the human environment relationship, or what deep ecologists frequently referred to as the “dominant paradigm” of Western thought in regard to nature. According to Bill Devall and George Sessions (1995), “deep ecology goes beyond a limited piecemeal shallow approach to environmental problems and attempts to articulate a comprehensive religious and philosophical worldview" (p66). As it tackles the natural environment, deep ecology concerns itself with all organisms – both plants and animals – within the biosphere and promotes equality, particularly in regard to the right to live of all organisms as a fundamental value. The deep ecology approaches to environmental ethics include “self realization,” “biocentrism” or “anti-anthropocentrism” as these ecologists espouse democracy in the biosphere among all organisms within (Devall etc 1995, p67). Self-realization beyond the concept of the modern Western self or for a narrow sense of individual salvation and that it supposedly has further maturity as it goes further than the egocentric cultural assumptions, values and conventional wisdom in its treatment of the environment (Devall etc 1995, p67). The main argument of the biocentric approach, meanwhile, is that “all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realization within the larger Self-realization” (Devall etc 1995, p67). 2. What are the anthropocentric approaches of environmental ethics? The anthropocentric approach to environmental ethics is mainly dominated by the Western paradigm of the primacy of the human species over other animals and organisms. Religion, heavily influenced by the Aristotelian principles, and scientific and utilitarian approaches are the prevailing philosophies in environmental ethics. The Bible is the main source of Christian attitude towards environmental ethics. The biblical account in the Genesis wherein God created man in his own image and grant him dominion over other species, is a cornerstone of the Christian philosophy that have influenced our attitudes in environment ethics throughout these past millennia. This philosophy is, in turn, influenced by the Greek attitude of the natural world, particularly the Aristotelian school of thought, wherein nature is considered a “hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more.” (Singer 1993, p. 267) Most of the approaches based on these philosophies maintain that the nonhuman natural world is best considered ethically in terms of its instrumental values to human beings. In the realm of environmental philosophy, several important thinkers have crafted broad anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics. The most notable of these is John Passmore, who has argued that “ecological problems can be solved only by the joint efforts of scientists, technologists, economists, statesmen, administrators” (p173). He has maintained that the diversity of open societies, allows for more options in environmental ethics, giving it “the capacity to grow , to change; it nurtures within itself the seeds of innumerable revolutions” brought about by numerous traditions, politics and morality. (p. 195) Aldo Leopold (1949), for his part, presented what he called as the ethical sequence. He wrote: “There is no ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. Land… is still property. The land relation is still strictly economic, entailing privileges and not obligations"(p2). In addition, he put forward the Community Concept approach, wherein “instincts prompt man to compete for his place in the community while ethics prompt him also to cooperate.” (p. 3) With this concept, it is underscored that with the concept of community, man becomes a citizen – a principle that implies respect for his fellow citizens and respect for the community as well. 3. Outline the deep ecological critique of anthropocentric theories of environmental value. Arne Naess (1973) provided us with the fundamental critique of the anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics. He called the approach as the “Shallow Ecology movement,” wherein the fight against pollution and resources depletion revolves around the central objective of ensuring the health and affluence of people in developed countries. (p. 95) The shallowness of this approach is found wanting in terms of addressing environmental problems because it has been the general view that environmental protection in general hurts human interests. This perspective was further expanded by Devall and Sessions with their concept of deep ecology. They attacked how science brush aside the role that religion and the ancient spiritual practice and enlightenment in environmental ethics, stressing that these are the only ones that can provide “the search for a more objective consciousness and state of being through an active deep questioning and meditative process and way of life.” (p. 66) In her, commentary on the concept of ecofeminism, Plumwood (1993) assailed the anthropocentric model as the masculine’s distance from nature. According to her, the anthropocentric approach overvalues rationality and that it becomes a tool for exclusion and oppression. (p. 24) She labelled anthropocentrism as a mental sphere associated with “the elite masculinism of the masters who leave to slaves and women the business of providing for the necessities of life.” (p. 25) It is important to highlight that these critiques to anthropocentric approach is fundamental in the environmental practices and attitudes, in general, even in the context of a human-centred solution to environmental problems. The demise of these critiques not only threatens the loss of the major revolutionary insights of environmental thought but also appears to threaten the claim to autonomy of the many environmental movements and the independence of their intellectual critique. Part II: Evaluate How deep ecological criticisms evaluate the deep ecological critique of anthropocentric theories of environmental value. You must examine those theories through at least ONE specific example and analysis it in details. While deep ecology cannot tell us specifically what position to adopt, it guides us to understand the issue. It allows us to make intelligent choices as well as to engage in reasoned debate on the issues. What is being required by the present situation is an environmental ethics that is characterized by those found in process ethics in general; the development of reorganizing and ordering functions of creative intelligence; the imaginative grasp of authentic possibilities, the vitality of motivation, as well as an in-depth understanding of the sense of concrete human existence and its relationship with those around him. By harmonizing these factors, one can expect a change in moral consciousness that is fundamental in the implementation of environmental ethic. A very important source of concern particularly in regard to the deep ecological critique of anthropocentrism is that the appeal to the everyday human scale of values will not suffice to protect biodiversity. Its protection requires an appeal to some particular biocentric perspective that could address the vagaries of human concerns in terms of biodiversity conservation. It is even safe to say that in consideration of all the factors and areas in environmental ethics and solutions to environmental problems, an account of this kind would allow us to escape the dilemmas and conflicts that the diversity of human beings bring. Even Leopold found that ethic derived from utilitarianism, as most scientific and economic approaches based their arguments from, does not go far enough. Indeed, a proper ethic, a distinctly environmental ethic – founded on fundamental concepts such as love and respect, upon an expanded moral sentiment – may be the only effective way to achieve harmony between people and all other organisms in the biosphere. Essay Question 2: Explain the distinction between voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Is there an important moral difference between these? Why? The Ways of Permissible Killings Part I: Definition 1. What is voluntary euthanasia? On what Feinberg regards as a “coherent and reasonably plausible” interpretation of the right to life (and the interpretation that he attributes to the Founding Fathers of the United States), “the right to die is simply the other side of the coin of the right to live.” (p. 249, 251) According to Feinberg “I waive my right to live in exercising my right to die.” (p. 251) One of the arguments against euthanasia, in general, that Feinberg faults is that the right to life is an inalienable right that cannot be waived or properly given away. Euthanasia is supposedly a gentle and easier death and the bringing about of this, especially in cases of incurable and painful disease. (Campbell and Collinson 1988, p. 121) Voluntary euthanasia is one of the three ways in which consent in euthanasia can figure, along with involuntary and non-voluntary. Voluntary euthanasia is simply the case when a person requests euthanasia at the time such request was made or in advance. It is supposedly the typical euthanasia. 2. What is non-voluntary euthanasia? Non-voluntary euthanasia, meanwhile, is the category that is neither voluntary nor involuntary. According to Campbell and Collinson, “this suggests that consent is not the fundamental issue for no one believes that whether severely damaged and disabled adults and newborn babies are killed simply does not matter.” (p. 123) This means that there are humans who do not possess the capacity to consent or refuse to be killed because they do not have the faculty to do so. Babies and adults in coma are specifically the examples of this type of euthanasia. 3. What is involuntary euthanasia? Involuntary euthanasia, on the other hand, is the kind of mercy killing wherein the subject does not explicitly request for it. (Campbell and Coolinson, p. 123) In this situation, the immediate family may be the ones providing the consent for the suffering family member in order to end his ordeal. Usually, there is the possibility that the said individual does not want it and had “clearly expressed a wish to live as long as possible, whatever circumstances.” (Campbell and Coolinson, p. 123) Part II: Compare and Contrast 1. The similarities between voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia constitute what Helga Kuhse (1987) calls as direct or permissible killing, whose intention is the immediate death of a human being. (p. 104) From here, another fundamental similarity between voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia arises – that of the intentional termination of the life one human - in both of what Rachels calls us passive and active euthanasia or killing and letting die –in order to end the suffering of an individual. (p. 123-124) The intention here is the same for all these three and they all rest on the poor quality of an individual’s life for justification. In relation to this concept, there is also the principle particularly for those advocating euthanasia, that voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia are all morally distinguishable from killing brought about by other motivations. 2. The differentiations between voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. As has been cited previously, the main difference between voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia resides in the way consent was obtained or given. The person requesting the termination of his or her life gives his consent in voluntary euthanasia; in non-voluntary euthanasia, consent is not important; and, finally, in involuntary euthanasia, the person to be deprived of life did not give his or her consent. 3. Is there an important moral difference between these? Why? According to James Rachels, there are no important moral differences between the various kinds of euthanasia, particularly when it comes to passive and active euthanasia, although he cited some significant one in regard to their consequences. (p. 35) However, Tom Beauchamp (1989), argued that it does not follow that the differences are always morally irrelevant. (p. 108) This line of thinking is supported by Kuhse, in her work entitled, Intentional Termination of Life and the Principle of Double Effect. Here, she stressed that the distinctions as per between ‘ends’ and ‘means’ or ‘side effects’ to the extent that it can be drawn – involves a confusion between the nature of actions and the goodness or badness of agents.” (p. 89-90) The moral distinctions to the various types of mercy killings is the cornerstone of the arguments of those supporting the passive form of euthanasia. In their commentary on the Extraordinary Means and Double Effects, Campbell and Collinson (1988) cited the Double Effect principle in arguing how passive euthanasia can be considered as morally sound in administering whether voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary euthanasia. Indeed, active euthanasia is currently prohibited by the law, whereas passive euthanasia is permitted. (p. 163) Going back to the important differences between voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia in the context of morality, we can identify one fundamental distinction. And this is in giving the consent to terminate an individual’s life. If we follow Feinberg’s arguments on voluntary euthanasia, it seemed that it is not only the most typical, but the most morally acceptable type of mercy killing. The consent in voluntary euthanasia has the highest degree of “waiver” wherein the claimant for the right is expressing his willingness to surrender it. We cannot find this in either non-voluntary or involuntary euthanasia. It is morally difficult to grant the power or the right to terminate an individual’s life to a person besides himself or herself. If there is one solid moral standard in regard to life, in general, it is the sanctity of life principle. Here, life is an inalienable right that is not discretionary or something for anyone to throw away. The moral perspective is dominated by the thought that “life is an extremely important benefit to a person” a gift that can never be waived, declined or given away. From this parameters, it is easy to understand how morality differentiates voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. The arguments outlined in the previous paragraphs are the usual prima facie case for euthanasia, and whatever weight it has rests on beliefs about the role of compassion and sovereignty in life. As it is, both of the arguments – the pros and cons – arrive at the public policy debate with opposed beliefs about what morality requires firmly in hand so that morality alone seems to guide the public policy in a case wherein no public policy can be stated in any area where a unanimous support is missing. However, it is helpful to remember that out of the entire moral and values dissection, the case of euthanasia is rooted from one glaring moral fact: there are people out there who are dying and that they are anguished and suffering. What they seek is deliverance with the help of medicine. The arguments for euthanasia are also found in the dogma or the scriptural interpretation on what is humane. When we make the step to evaluate the law and the social policy, we are brought back to a line of argument based on a moral stance. In this perspective, consideration of justice is enough to move us from our current protection of a patient’s right to refuse life sustaining therapy all the way through to legalizing voluntary euthanasia. References Devall, Bill and Sessions, George, Excerpts from Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith, Peregrine Smith Books, 1995), pp. 65-73. Leopold, Aldo, Excerpts from A Sand County Almanac, with other Essays on Conservation from Round River (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949). Passmore, John, Removing the Rubbish, Man’s responsibility for nature: ecological problems and western traditions (London: Duckworth, 1980), Ch 7, pp. 173-195. Naess, Arne, ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement’, Inquiry, vol. 16 (1973), pp. 95-100. Plumwood, V. ‘Feminism and Ecofeminism’ in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (Routledge, London & New York, 1993), ch 1, pp.19-40. Singer, Peter, ‘The Environment’, Practical Ethics, Second Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ch. 10. Beauchamp, Tom ‘A Reply to Rachels on Active and Passive Euthanasia’ in Beauchamp and Walters, Contemporary Issues in Bioethics, Second Ed. (Wadsworth, 1989), pp. 107-115. Campbell and Collinson, ‘Killing and Letting Die’ in Ending Lives, (Blackwell, 1988), ch. 6. Campbell and Collinson, ‘Extraordinary means and double effects’ in Ending Lives, (Blackwell, 1988), ch. 7, pp. 153-162. Feinberg, Joel, ‘Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 7, 1978. Reprinted in Cohen et al (eds.) Medicine and Moral Philsophy. Kuhse, Helga The Intentional Termination of Life and the Principle of Double Effect, The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine (Oxford U.P.1987), pp. 83-93. Kuhse, Helga, Direct and Indirect Killings, The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine (Oxford U.P.1987), pp. 103-123. Kuhse, Helga Killing Intentionally and Refraining from, The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine (Oxford U.P.1987), pp. 123-145. Kuhse, Helga The Principle of Double Effect, Absolutism, and Responsibility, The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine (Oxford U.P.1987), pp. 146-165. Rachels, James, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’, New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 292, no. 2 (Jan. 1975). Reprinted in Rachels, Moral Problems, Third Ed., (Harper & Row, 1979), pp. 490-197. Read More