Armed Services Combination in the Falklands Campaign - Essay Example

?Running Head: ARMED SERVICES COMBINATION IN THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN         Armed Services Combination in the Falklands Campaign [Institution Name] Armed Services Combination in the Falklands Campaign Introduction Margaret Thatcher legitimately astounded everyone when she opted to launch an all out invasion force to the Falklands. Thatcher defied all military advice and decided to send a huge force, probably escalating the war into something it never had to become. In fact, the Prime Minister of the third strongest country in the world, was sending a force of 20,000 soldiers to occupy what amounts to a string of barren rocks in the middle of the South Atlantic Ocean, inhabited by about 1800 people who at one time or another had ancestors in England. Despite being over 8,000 miles away and at a tremendous logistical disadvantage, Prime Minister Thatcher sent an invasion force consisting of ships of all varieties, airplanes, helicopters, soldiers and one British Prince. Mrs. Thatcher wanted to prove to the USSR and communist governments throughout the world that western powers were not going to back down from a conflict, especially a colony or territory that contained a large number of western inhabitants. Thatcher was informed that Soviet intelligence reports stated that even if Thatcher were to go ahead with a military invasion, the English would lose if they went at it alone. Again, The Iron Lady took offence and set out to prove them wrong. The British Prime Minister realized the implications of this crisis. She knew that what ever she chose to do would be setting one precedent or another. It was in Thatcher's hands to decide which precedent she would set. For her, there was no question, she could not let it seem that the Soviets could freely choose a Western territory or colony and simply invade it without fearing the consequence of military action. In most of the renowned strategists’ opinion, the Falklands War has been referred to as like two bald men fighting over a comb. Neither country particularly needed the Falklands, and the Falklands had very little that either country coveted, but it was the symbol that was important. (Gordon 2006) Argentina lost the war in part because the comb wanted to go to England but more importantly because they simply were not prepared to fight a war against the whole world. How did British Royal Forces Show Leadership Styles The British royal armed forces used dramatically different leadership styles portrayed by British Officers at the battle of Goose Green. As regards to these two characters are the most prominent: the Battlegroup Commander Colonel H Jones who was famous for assaulting a trench single handedly and was subsequently killed. The second character is that of the B Company commander Major John Crosland who successfully lead an assault on Burntside Hill and demonstrated a markedly different style of leadership than that of Colonel Jones. These two characters have been chosen because of their almost polar opposite approaches to initially the orders process and then their own leadership style. They demonstrate just how subjective the orders process can be and the affect that a differing approach can have on the battle itself. Jones demonstrated how an autocratic style of leadership coupled with a positionalist approach to war fighting lead to near disaster, whereas Crosland showed how a slightly more Laisser Faire attitude and an understanding of mission command could prove successful. How could two such different approaches be present in what was to all intents and purposes was the same organization? The first - the orders delivered by Jones for the Assault on Goose Green and secondly his individual leadership style. These will then be contrasted with that of Major Crosland and his assault onto Burntside Hill. Colonel H Jones was a renowned figurehead of the 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment. He was known for his fiery temper, his embrace of the Parachute Regiment ethos and his dogged tenacity (Middlebrook, 1985). His actions at Goose Green demonstrate these attributes of his character. The initial orders group given by Jones is something of almost folk law within the Parachute Regiment of the time. This does show that his intentions for launching an attack were possibly a little too much for personal gratification rather than success of the mission (Middlebrook, 1985). Jones was employing an almost outdated concept on the battlefields of Goose Green. The German term for this tactical approach was Befehlstaktik, denoting a very inflexible system of tight control. The newer approach that was been considered by the Army at the time was that of Auftragstaktik, a tactical approach that encompasses all the facets of what we now know as mission command - flexibility at lower levels enabling any form of initiative to be capitalized on. It was noted that at the time many of the officers of 2 Para embraced the Auftragstaktik system, unfortunately this number did not include Jones. Jones was relying on the accuracy of information received by his information officer and also on the fact that the enemy would not move position. With this in mind, he detailed off numerous grids and report lines to ensure that he could keep overall control of the situation. This, as demonstrated, produced a rather staccato affect to the battle with many lulls (Smith, 1989). Junior commanders were trapped by the very system that was laid down to ensure that they had every chance of success. It was this controlling nature that led to his demise. Eye witness account detail how Jones charged an enemy trench without any support as he believed that this single act could kick start the assault during one of its many lulls. On the very same battlefield however, there was someone who embraced the Auftragstaktik tactical approach. This was the B Company Commander Major Crosland. From the much offset contrasts can be made with Jones. Crosland viewed the operation as an advance to contact rather than a deliberate assault, presumably due to the fact that he was not so short sighted to believe that the Argentineans would hold their present positions. Issuing orders as an advance to contact already was providing his platoon commanders with flexibility to maneuver if required as opposed to the set piece battle that Jones had foreseen. Crosland wanted to give his junior commanders the information they needed with flexibility they required. Crosland demonstrated the use of mission command many years before the army as a whole embraced it. Another example of this within Crosland's orders group was the fact that he omitted individual platoon missions - he recognized that any information received on the enemy would be subject to change, so planning tasks were given to the entire company instead. In direct relation to Jones' dictatorial, autocratic style of leadership, Crosland portrayed a much more laisser faire approach. That is to say that he involved his subordinates in the whole decision process. His orders provided them with enough scope to think for themselves - he demonstrated to them that he valued and trusted their opinions. (Gibbon, 2001) This did not mean however that the platoon commanders were left completely to their own devices as this would have definitely led to disaster as well. Crosland managed to strike a balance between control and allowing free thinking. As with Jones, not so far forward that he was leading assaults, but far enough forward to have a marked influence over events as they unfolded before him. The most direct action that Crosland took was firing a burst of tracer into an enemy position to identify it for an attacking platoon. At no point did Crosland belittle his Platoon Commanders and lead a direct action himself. It is fair to say that Goose Green provides us with an excellent example of why British Military Doctrine was updated after the Falklands Campaign. The advantages of the principle of Mission Command are clearly demonstrated, it is unfortunate however that not all commanders were as forward thinking as Major John Crosland. The overall military scenario that comprised the Falklands crisis of spring 1982 is varied and complex, a mass of detailed, nuanced proceedings and acts spread from pole to pole on three continents. The negotiations can be best understood as a diplomatic process by laying out their elements or components as they developed through the many proposals for solution of the crisis. The solution to the Falklands crisis was in the end the military campaign of May 21 and the month following. Statecraft failed: It neither produced a "win" nor a negotiated compromise. War produced a "win" but did not solve the dispute. . (Gordon 2006) The politics leading up to crisis and war have as many instructive politico-military points as the war itself. Diplomacy and the use of force interacted throughout the crisis. With the expenditure of billions of dollars and thousands of casualties, the Falklands War may have been the costliest conflict per square foot of contested territory or per capita of population in history. The implications of the Falklands crisis for crisis management are highly specific and disturbing in their implications for world order. Equally disturbing are the mislearned lessons about politico-military affairs and international relations which many governments drew and some may act upon. There are a few novel instructive points. There are more, equally valuable, reminders about the use, effects, and causes of interstate violence over territory. Understanding the cause does not lead to the cure. However, understanding may at least lead decision-makers to a sparing and effective use of violence and the nation-state system to better shape incentives to keep a just peace. All plans and proposals in the Falklands crisis of Spring 1982 called for military disengagement of some kind. A cease-fire was an obvious precondition. Roughly mutual or parallel withdrawal of forces was a common element throughout, and the time frames were relatively short because neither side had impossible logistics requirements. Most had an explicit or implied commitment not to reintroduce forces into the area. Verification was provided for by a third party in most cases. This element was reinforced in the respective negotiations by the call of UNSC Resolution 502 at the opening of the crisis in its operative paragraphs 1 and 2 for a cessation of hostilities to take effect immediately and the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands. (Paul 1982) When initially approached by a mediator, the British Government's sense in early April of military provisions in any diplomatic agreement was that these should consist solely in possible arrangements for supervising the withdrawal of Argentine forces in line with UNSC Resolution 502. In this sense, military provisions were the only British diplomatic goal at the opening of the crisis: peaceful Argentine withdrawal so as to obviate the use of force. This was the pure trade-off that the dispatch of the Task Force envisioned. Argentina of course saw any military withdrawal as contingent on a cancellation of all initial British military preparations and a firm and permanent recognition of Argentine sovereignty. It was eclipsed by subjects like the Cabinet battle over the size and composition of the Royal Navy. Defense was too costly. Retrenchment was politically impossible. Politicians and foreign affairs professionals opted for deterrence, yet it was really a trip wire, meant, in the appropriate wording of a prewar officer of the landing party in the islands, to invoke the full might, awe, and majesty of the British Government. (Brown, 1987) Such deterrence, however, required regular, clear signals of interest, and early, clear knowledge of the opponent's intent. In the real world, neither politics nor intelligence gathering admit of such precision. Britain was unwilling to liquidate, undisciplined in its "signals," oblivious to open-source intelligence on "intentions," and unable to get into place the backup force of submarines and frigates that had been used previously. (Cockbum 1982) Two aspects of the decision making need to be looked at separately: strategy (deterrence while negotiating and unwillingness to either defend or surrender territory), and tactics (intelligence readings in the final months before the invasion). The Cabinet system, which should give the chief executive a wider command of issues, instead became a filter of information that kept important decisions and later important developments from Cabinet-level attention. (Braybrook, 1982) Forces Strategy in the Battlefield British military catch-up options were few and extreme: Strike strategically at the landing forces by air and hope to land and surrender, refuel for the return in the face of the fresh air resources of the Veinticinco de Mayo, or fly in for the token defender's sufficient smart rocketry to make the invasion a costly one. Indeed, several truck-mounted antiaircraft and antiship cruise missile batteries might well have been the best investment the British Ministry of Defense had ever made. There was indeed some doubt as to whether Britain's reduced; distant naval power was available and applicable in this situation. British forces were not viewed with awe by the Argentine military. British combat efficiency was matched by some elite Argentine units like the 601 Commando Company. Argentine forces on the ground had first-rate equipment such as U.S. armored personnel carriers. A serious air force was spearheaded by the Israeli Dagger, Douglas A-4, and the French Super-Etendard armed with the Exocet cruise missile. The end of the opening round would lead most observers to agree that a British counterattack would be what the ground commander of U.K. forces General Jeremy Moore would later, quoting Wellington, call a “near-run thing.” (Bramley, 1991) However, within three days of the invasion, the Royal Navy left Portsmouth, the skeleton of a carrier battle group taking a salute from Lord Nelson's flagship Victory and pointing out, if it were needed, the serious underestimation of the Thatcher government's political will and the strength of the British military tradition. III-equipped and hastily assembled, under strength units and ships notwithstanding, the United Kingdom in short order assembled a carrier battle group embarking the Royal Marine commando units, Two and Three Para, the Scots and Welsh Guards, Gurkha units, the Special Air Service, and the Special Boat Service. (Sandy & Patrick 1997) If a winter war at the end of a long supply line with poor air cover and difficult amphibious landing conditions were a daunting prospect, this was precisely the United Kingdom's job in its reinforcement of NATO's northern flank in Norway. The possible scope of this political will should have been assessed by the Argentine government. It should have been decoupled from military capability and certainly distinguished from the negative cultural and economic assessments many Argentines would make of the United Kingdom in the 1980s. No Argentine government should have assumed that it would face in the Falklands seizure only the initial British presence in the area of a platoon of Royal Marines at Stanley and the patrol vessel Endurance, yet that seems to have been the working assumption since no serious planning for holding as opposed to seizing the islands was prepared. The doubling of the Marine contingent by holding over the outgoing rotational platoon was not a deterrent late in the invasion planning. Britain moved to strengthen naval and air forces. This included not only the 24-hour ship Royal Fleet Auxiliary recommissioning and chartering tankers and extra cargo and passenger ships, one of which would carry over 20 Harrier jump jets to the area in addition to the approximately 20 already enroute. (Hastings and Jenkins, 1983) The Navy requisitioned four trawlers to be used as mine sweepers. The Air Force announced that its Nimrod reconnaisance aircraft were flying scouting missions from Ascension Island (3,500 miles from the Falklands). C--130 aircraft were sent to Ascension. The task force now outnumbered the 17-ship Argentine Navy. There was public discussion of the task group reaching the Falklands by April 20. The threat of force was now fully credible. The air bridge was an encouragement. C-130 transports were able to continue supply and personnel changes through early May to the main airport at Stanley. (Brown, 1987) Thereafter, however, the British air attacks at Stanley and Goose Green which began on May 1 made the runways ever less useful, and the trend must have been clear. The de facto withdrawal of the Argentine surface Navy reflects the realistic assessment that the U.K. Royal Navy was superior in numbers of combatants and the level of their electronic sophistication. This was clearly balanced, however, by the ability of the Argentine Air Force in mass attacks to inflict serious damage on British vessels with conventional bombs. Quality Over Quantity The British Task Force attempted to have a qualitative as well as quantitative edge on Argentine forces and weaponry in the South Atlantic conflict. British doctrine emphasized quality where a trade-off was needed as both were not possible. This seems to pay off far from home where only limited amounts of equipment can be sent. Each side had four submarines in the Falklands battle area, but the Argentine subs were diesel-powered and the British subs were nuclear-propelled. The two British aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible were "pocket" carriers with VTOL aircraft but together were more than a match by class for the 25 de Mayo and the cruiser General Belgrano, the capital ships of the Argentine navy. Argentina fielded 3 corvettes as well as 8 destroyers, 2 type-42, 2 Fletcher class, 1 Gearing class, and 3 Summer class. The United Kingdom matched these with 4 type-42 destroyers, 6 type-21 frigates, 2 County class destroyers, and 2 type-12 frigates. Argentine aircraft by mission pitted 74 Skyhawk and 9 Canberra bombers with 43 Mirage fighters against a total of 32 Sea Harriers and 3 Nimrod AEW aircraft. (Denys 1992) The British qualitative/quantitative disadvantage in aircraft was partially made up for by the unique characteristics of the Harrier aircraft, and the qualitative superiority of 32 Sea King helicopters (with radar and missilery) over 14 light-and 25 heavy-armed helicopters on the Argentine side. Furthermore, of course, instead of having an extended coast-line and several major naval bases, 300 to 400 miles away, Britain had to rely on a vulnerable, slow-moving Task Force of Royal Fleet auxiliaries: tankers, fleet replenishment ships, a stores support ship, 5 landing and logistic ships, 2 troop and hospital ships, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and a scattering of smaller utility craft. In the modern missilery category, Argentina possessed Sea Cat point-defense SAM, Sidewinder or other AAM, Sea Dart SAM, the Gabriel antiship missile and both surface and antiship Exocet, which were all but the last two antiship missiles also in the British inventory. . (Gordon 2006) In addition, some British vessels or aircraft had Sea Skua, Sea Wolf and Sea Slug, but in this field where quality is so costly not all British vessels were "state of the art," and the price in ships and lives was heavy. Combat Effectiveness Quality of leadership is essential, and one of its leading elements is the willingness to share hardship and risk with the combat soldier. Distasteful as that may be to some civilians, combat deaths are a unifying and inspiring factor in the collective identity and cohesion of military units. Casualties among officers have an even more exemplary value than those from the enlisted ranks. To the extent that the enlisted ranks are drawn from the population at large and the officer corps is also expanded from nonprofessionals in war-time, broader social values than even unit cohesion are appealed to. Thirty-three percent of the German aristocracy was killed in action during World War II. The aristocracy was less than 4 percent of the Officer Corps, yet took 7 percent of the casualties. The combat readiness and combat efficiency of Argentine forces was clearly not up to that of British forces. Good organization, however, and the time to entrench and prepare active defenses ought to have been able to overcome this problem. This is where leadership both before and during combat made the crucial difference. The performance of Argentine submarines cost the Argentine cause dearly. The captain of the A.R.A. Salta is sure that he fired torpedos at H.M.S. Hermes on May 5. Royal Navy experts feel that this may have been a completely aborted firing; that the only sonar "tracks" on May 5 seemed to be the screws of Broadsword in her screening role for H.M.S. (Hall 1982) Invincible, the other carrier. Since sonar records are kept and would normally show the propellers of an attacking torpedo, it would appear that Salta's torpedos, if launched, never got far from the submarine itself. The cost to flexibility and operational options of bad intelligence was clear. Brilliant Argentine flying could not compensate for the waste of Argentina expending her penultimate Exocet on the Atlantic conveyor rather than the carrier Invincible, which had been her target. It may be that the loss of the Atlantic conveyor was tactically more crucial to the ground forces. For Argentina to then, however, expend her final Exocet on the already crippled merchantman was a lost opportunity of tremendous proportions. It might have been saved for one of the carriers. Good offensive equipment well employed is largely lost unless it is properly directed and coordinated according to a good assessment of targets and priority among them. British bombing of the Argentine forces was less effective. The first bombings by refueled planes from Ascension were telling psychologically on Argentine forces at first, but eventually began to produce the counterproductive results seen in World War II by uniting those bombed in a feeling of camaraderie against an unseen and apparently unfeeling enemy. Cratering of airfields might have been the most effective use of bombing by the attacking British forces, but the Argentines seemed to be able to both fake and repair damage to the field, which operated right through British recapture of the Islands. British troops displayed a remarkable combat efficiency, more than countering the fact that they may have numbered half the number of Argentine troops on the Islands. . (Gordon 2006) The British Task Force included units counted among the best assault infantry in the world: the second and third battalions of the Parachute Regiment; the Special Air and Special Boat Services; and 40, 42, and 45 Commandos, Royal Marines. Battle Management--Restraint Restraint and moderation consist not only in initial strategic decisions such as avoiding main-force combat and attacks on the Argentine mainland, both of which confer tremendous advantages in limiting the conflict, but also in tactical flexibility and good political judgment in handling political affairs in the field. Accounts of the conduct of the campaign are notable in the regular calls for surrender, pauses for talks under white flags, actions designed to save life rather than taking it with cold efficiency. First-hand accounts and interviews indicate a constant preoccupation with the contradiction that this dangerous, well dug-in defender was often an unwilling draftee and might, on a small unit basis, be talked out of giving up his life for these islands. If there is a key line in the instrument of surrender signed by Argentine General Mario Menendez and British Major General Jeremy Moore, it is the initialed cross-out in the second line of the document before the word "suffender." It very likely read "unconditionally." The surrender was a full one. The word "unconditionally" would only have served to humble the Argentine Field Commander further. No aspects of a conditional or limited surrender, even the ceremonial provision for officers to retain swords, are contained in the document's stipulations. From the conception of the campaign through surrender, restraint paid diplomatic as well as military dividends. The longer-run dividend is that there are some 10,000 Argentine veterans who have met the enemy and found him fierce and unforgiving only in combat. Conclusion The integrated command of ship and shore units was crucial to the success of the British Task Force and landing operations. Conversely, while Argentina did a credible job militarily in its initial takeover, it was in a situation of unopposed landings. Thus, a power that had little if any capability for amphibious landings beyond its crack marine units could handle a lightly guarded disputed territory. The country with what were supposed to be first-rate NATO-level capabilities was forced to improvise: While the British landing counted a lot on the Royal Marines, the British army had not for years conducted amphibious operations. The northern flank reinforcement mission for Great Britain is handled by the Marines. The British Army is stationed well inland along the Rhine, and does not on a regular basis practice coastal invasion with the Royal Navy, making all the more creditable the skill with which staffs were merged, the operation mounted, and a successful landing conducted. The command and control implications of both joint forces operations and decentralization would thus seem parallel for both the power seeking to retain control of territory and that country seeking to wrest control: beyond the diplomatic stage, in which force is exercised mainly to intimidate or deter, war is too complex and fast-changing to be left to multiple central service commands, or to civilians. Within broad guidelines, the local commander must in the end make the tradeoffs between political restraint and prosecution of a military solution. This is so not only as regards preserving the means to fight if so ordered (force preservation), but because the other side--where they meet--will signal its true intentions on the scene, not at the negotiating table. The reiteration of the will to peaceful settlement can be camouflage or can simply change in the calculus of the parties. That both sides have forces on the scene of a crisis means they may have to use them. In the final analysis, only the commander's judgment can keep those forces disengaged but ready, threatening but not attacking. Only he can determine the actions as opposed to the stated intentions of the opposing side. Thus he must be kept informed of the wide diplomatic and political context, and also given the freedom to defend his force not only from attack but even from being put in a position of disadvantage in event of hostilities, which is itself a temptation to the other party to opt for force. Should armed conflict come, by design in opposing capital cities, or by error on the scene of confrontation, his orders must be to secure superiority as fast as possible. Holders of territory in dispute must clearly retain the means to defend it. Clearly is the key word. Ironically, when Francis Pym was Defense Minister from 1979 to 1982, he had questioned the decision to trade conventional naval units for an augmented seagoing nuclear deterrent. The Argentine perception of diminished British naval and amphibious capabilities was a major factor in the Argentine decision to invade. A credible level of defensive forces must also be matched by their deployment within striking distance of disputed territory. British decisions to bring Endurance home and not to rebuild the Marine barracks at Stanley were overread in Buenos Aires. If distances must be great, then the investment must be made in aircraft and holding-time at site to overcome them. Finally, such a credible deterrent must be known to the potential opposition, and should be multifaceted and flexible. Cross-training among services and specialized forces is indicated. One's ability to handle the recherche task or the specialized mission should be advertised, along with general skills and training for difficult jobs. Cold-weather Sea and amphibious operations, as well as refueling at sea, were key skills of the Royal Navy and Marines, but Argentine attaches let Argentina forget the analogy of NATO's northern flank to the Falklands. References Bramley, V. (1991) Excursion to Hell - Death in the Falklands, Pen & Sword Books Ltd Braybrook Roy. (1982) Battle for the Falklands (3)--Air Forces. London: Osprey Publishing. Brown, David (1987) The Royal Navy and the Falklands war, Naval Institute Press; First edition Cockbum A. (1982) War in the Falklands. New York: Riverrun. Denys Blakeway: (1992) Channel Four: Falklands War, Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd. Gibbon, Spencer Fitz- Not Mentioned in Despatches: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green (Cities of the Biblical World) Lutterworth Press; New edition (18 July 2001) Gordon Smith, Battle (2006) Atlas of the Falklands War 1982 by Land, Sea, and Air, Penarth: Naval–History.Net Hall Ron, ed. (1982) War in the Falklands. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Hastings M., and S. Jenkins. (1983) Battle for the Falklands. London: Michael Joseph. Middlebrook, M. (1985) Operation Corporate - The Story of The Falklands War, Viking, London. Paul Eddy: (1982) The Falklands War, Andre Deutsch; First Edition. Sandy Woodward, & Patrick Robinson: (1997) One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander (Bluejacket Books Series) Naval Institute Press. Read More