Ethical Systems of the Impulse to Act - Essay Example

?Part 2, Question Parfit is a reductionist. His claim is that people do not exist, except as a d collection of parts. Individual identity doesnot exist--it is “a collection of separate facts combined with giving the combination a single name” (Stairs: Notes on Parfit: Bundles Without Selves). I agree with Stairs’ analysis that Parfit does not prove his argument, and will try to justify this. Parfit looks at instances where the corpus callosum, which joins the left and right brain hemispheres, has been severed. He examines the verbal responses of such patients, and their written responses to a screen that shows red on one side, blue on the other. One hand writes “red.” The other writes “blue”. The left brain is able to enunciate “I see red.” The verbal component is important, because Parfit’s definition of identity is that identity exists because we talk about it, we name it. So the split-brain, Parfit says, represents two streams of consciousness. Both hemispheres are conscious as long as they are intact. Parfit then says this dual consciousness equals two people in the same body. Then he says that in the sense that identity is a named collection of objects (memories, thoughts, emotions) there are no identities here, because the original person has been split in two. I believe that consciousness equals identity, but more on that later. Stairs posits the Ego Theory, where the existence of the ego explains the existence of the person. Parfit’s shallow definition of personal identity as a named collection of parts is put to the test. Stairs wants Parfit to look at the complexity of the collection: “we do make a distinction…between mere assemblages and things that have a coherence or unity…From the mere fact that a thing is compound, it simply does not follow that its existence as a thing is merely nominal” (Stairs). Using increasing complexity, Stairs illustrates his point, going from a collection of items on his desk that he names “modemness” to his computer, a more complex entity, to Bubba the dog, an organism whose “principle of organization or activating force is internal to it.” This is true as well on the atomic level, where an atom is an assemblage of electrons, protons and neutrons, but is more than that: “it is a highly coherent unity” (Stairs). Parfit says that a person is a long series of experiences, thoughts and feelings. Memory is “a causal relation that ties together the items in the series” (Stairs). In Bundle Theory, this group or series of feelings has certain facts that can describe them, as well as describe the causal relationships between them (Stairs). Parfit does an “either or” or false dilemma argument between Ego Theory and Bundle Theory, stating: “Either P or Q Not--P Therefore, Q Either the Ego Theory or the Bundle Theory is correct The Ego Theory is not correct Therefore, the Bundle Theory is correct.” (Stairs). Is the premise true? No. It is a false dilemma: Either A or B. No alternate explanations are provided, even though they may exist. The form of the argument is correct, but the initial premise is false. The argument is invalid. Stairs disagrees with Parfit in the example of identity as memory: “The process that led from your experience to my memory [of you telling me about your experience] is not the right sort to bring two events into the series that composes a life” (Stairs). My memory of your story of your experience is not the same as your experience, or your memory of your experience. I can’t get past the idea that the identity does not survive, yet something survives. Here are some arguments. On page 5: In hoping for both to survive, I would be preferring death (for one half--my addition) to survival. Definition of terms: survival=one half survives. I=ego presupposing my existence=me. If survival is possible for me if one half survives and If survival is impossible for me if both halves survive Then I would hope for one half to survive. Wishing for both to survive implies a death wish until survival is defined for me as one half surviving. Then I would hope for that, based on a new definition of survival. P.6 would be true under continuity: A is continuous w/B is continuous w/C Therefore, A implies C. A,B, & C are me. P.7 With the corpus collosum temporarily disconnected, one experiences a division of perception, but not a division of identity. When reunited, identity (the “I”) takes in both divided perceptual streams and integrates them into a single consciousness. The sticking point for me is the complexity of the entity that survives. Even atoms have a complexity of organization. An human organism is a supreme organization of individual atoms, which in and of themselves have an innate complexity. This cannot be compared in the same sense as a collection of objects on a table. Consciousness is present in humans. Consciousness is not present in a collection of objects on a table. P.10 I will define: A=my original brain=consciousness=my identity=B(? of A that functions as A) =C (? of A that functions as A). If B=A and C=A then there is psychological continuity from A to B to C. It is a direct continuity, because in essence, B and C are A. Therefore, identity would be preserved. This depends on the initial premise that B and C are the same as A in terms of consciousness. P. 15 Connectedness implies survival Connectedness is a direct relationship So an entity that survives possesses connectedness: Between a q-memory and the experience remembered, between a q-intention and the intended action The word “I” can be used to imply the greatest degree of psychological connectedness. Let us say that B&C both possess the q-memory and the experience remembered, and the q-intention and the intended action. “A” no longer exists as “A” but as B & C. Therefore, the “I” of A is dead. But B & C as descendents of A survive. The original identity A is lost. But a new identity: B & C remains. B & C would have the same ancestral self. Together, they would form a new “I” based on psychological connectedness, and on the continuity of A’s DNA. P. 17 Some Consequences I would need a definition of “we”. Is “we” some sort of collective without personal identity? The Borg? (see Star Trek the Next Generation). If the “we” is assumed to be a collection of individual entities under the sway of a single will, then “what we want” would be defined by the monarch, as would be “the best interests of all concerned.” We would want what the ruling will wants, and the best interests of all concerned would mirror the interests of the monarch. Without self, or identity except for that of a ruling will, there would be no conflict between principles a & b. If individuals possess identity, then the “I” will do what best achieves what the “I” wants. If an individual possesses ethics and altruism, then he might be inclined to sacrifice what he wants to the best interests of the many. Without individual identity, the Borg hive mentality is the only scenario that fulfills these principles. I see the existence of consciousness as a key part of individual identity. Human and other organisms are too complex to relegate them to the same descriptive category as a collection of objects. This collection of objects does not possess consciousness, therefore has no identity. Part 1, Question 3: Libet’s experiment measured the brain activity of subjects to see the internal processes involved in motor actions done under conditions of free will. The conditions of the experiment were as follows: there were “no external cues to affect the occurrence or emergence of the voluntary act…the subject should feel: she wanted to do it, and she could control what is being done, when to do it or not to do it” (Libet, 47).There were 40 trials of hand motion each for four subjects. The subject flicked his hand or wrist whenever he wanted to do so during the trial. After “the flick”, the subject reported the clock-time associated with the first awareness of the wish to move. The clock went extremely fast and measured time in milliseconds. Brain activity was recorded using a DC system to measure output of active electrodes placed on the scalp in the middle of the head or on the left side of the head (control side of the performing right hand) S=skin stimulus applied to each subject in each trial at random times. This was the control, in which no motor act was performed, but subjects were to report when they became aware of the stimulus in “the same way he reported the time and awareness of wanting to move…in self-initiated motor acts” (48). This measured: actual stimulus time and time lapse between the actual stimulus and awareness of the stimulus. This contrasted with measurement of : actual motor action, and time lapse between RP and reported awareness of intention to act. Findings: The Readiness Potential (RP), a “specific electrical charge in the brain” (47) started at 550ms before the act. Clock-time of reported awareness: 350-400ms after RP starts, 200ms before the motor act. The RP develops unconsciously, at 550 ms before the motor act. But the conscious will appears at 200 ms before the motor act. Free will takes place here, and consists of a veto function: The RP starts. Then conscious awareness of the impulse kicks in. At this point, before the motor action is under way, the subject can decide not to do the action. Awareness of signal content: desire to act From the onset of the unconscious signal (the RP), it takes 400 milliseconds for the brain to become aware of the intention to act contained in this unconscious signal. The decision to veto the act is a function of awareness. Free will is a function of the conscious, aware mind and requires 400 milliseconds to process. Even though the impulse starts in the unconscious, this small time lapse needed for consciousness to become aware and to make an executive decision to act or not to act constitutes free will. With the definition of awareness as a necessary prerequisite to a conscious choice, Libet frames the role of free will as a control mechanism that determines “whether the act takes place” (54). Libet’s experiments determine that the initial impulse originates unconsciously, but that in a matter of milliseconds, the conscious awareness takes over. Once one becomes aware of the initial impulse, there is deliberation in the mind about whether to act or not. There is a “conscious wish to act” but that wish does not have to be acted upon. This process constitutes the essence of free will. In cases of neurological dysfunction (I.e. Tourette’s Syndrome), the patient lacks conscious control of his actions. The veto function is lost to the brain pathology, and the signal goes directly from an unconscious RP to a motor action. In such cases, the patient cannot be held responsible for his actions. They are not under his voluntary control. According to Libet, the unconscious signal can “bubble up” and one is aware of it within 400 ms. The person aware of this impulse can deliberate for any length of time about whether to act on it or not. This is a person operating under free will. As far as ethics are concerned, Libet finds fault with religious mores that condemn a person as a sinner who only harbors a sinful impulse: “But any such urges would be initiated and developed in the brain unconsciously, according to our findings. The mere appearance of an intention to act could not be controlled consciously; only its final consummation in a motor act could be consciously controlled” (54). This belief, he maintains, causes unnecessary distress to believers, because it holds a person responsible for brain impulses which arise without conscious control. In terms of ethics as they relate to codes of behavior, where actions upon other persons are regulated, Libet maintains that as long as a person possesses a conscious control function, then he should be held responsible for his actions--not his thoughts. Ethical systems “are presumably dealing with actions, not simply urges or intentions” (55). Only by physically acting upon another person can we affect their well-being. The impulse to act may originate in the unconscious, but if our mind is sound, conscious awareness will order a veto of any action that will harm another and thus be unethical. Libet’s experiments give empirical proof to the saying that “No one in his right mind would do…X, Y or Z.” This, I believe, is true. Read More