Euthanasia and the Right to Choose - Essay Example

Section Number, Euthanasia and the Right to Choose, Final Paper The word “euthanasia” is derived from the Greek prefix “eu-” (or, good) and the Greek suffix “-thanatos” (or, death), which means the term that has come to mean “assisted suicide” in our common language denotes a “good death” (Rosenstand 2008, 641). But the question of whether this death is really a “good” death is one that occupies the attention of legal philosophers. The debate over whether one has the right to die when that wish is expressly given is still hotly contested by many with varying political affiliations. Conservative people, although they use individual rights as part of their principles, do not believe in the right to die, seeing life as too valuable. On the contrary, liberal people typically see the right to die as a matter of personal choice and a good option for those who do not desire to continue living. Of course, to talk about these applied ethical issues, one needs a grasp of underlying normative ethical theories (asking “what is good?” in general), instead of relying solely on an intuitive grasp of what is good in this particular situation. There are a number of perspectives to consider in the issue of assisted suicide; from each of these viewpoints, assisted suicide is a moral practice that ought to be upheld. The discussion of assisted suicide is divided between those in favor, those opposed, and those with some position in between. For the purposes of this essay, the only answers to the question of assisted suicide’s ethical foundation are “ethical” and “unethical”. Those who believe assisted suicide is ethical tend to believe that the practice, if put into law, is not morally problematic and that it should be allowed to occur. Likewise, those who believe the opposite tend to believe that if any case of assisted suicide is allowed, dire circumstances will result. Those who oppose assisted suicide in any circumstance tend to support an ethical theory called deontology: the thought that ethics is based on rights. According to Craig Paterson, “Deontologists hold that there are rigid duties that are always in force, no matter what the consequences may be” (19). An example of one duty under this framework is the duty every human being has to not kill another human being; this means that no matter what the circumstances are, or the consequences, it is immoral to kill another person. Because this duty is universal and non-conditional, it is quite clear in its application to the issue of assisted suicide. A different moral theory, which is quite different from deontology, is utilitarianism. “Utilitarians take a rather different perspective… their rules are based on some calculation of the consequences of decisions or actions” (Feinberg and Feinberg 185). In other words, it is only the consequences of the action that matter, not the duty one has to another person. Under this theory, if a suffering person requests assistance in their suicide, then the moral action is to help him kill himself, since that action would ease that person’s suffering and thus lead to the greatest good. If one accepts the utilitarian view of ethics as the truth, the argument for assisted suicide is quite clear. Since assisted suicide is a very situational, or circumstantial, issue (that is, the conditions and diagnoses of doctors are often unclear), it does not make sense for a deontologist to cite a moral rule that applies in all situations, when that theories has no knowledge of the variety of different situations other people have to live with. Because the utilitarian can evaluate cases of assisted suicide on a case-by-case basis, without calling the practice immoral in itself, he or she has more freedom to address the issue fairly. The applied ethics debate over euthanasia is typically framed around the normative claim of its permissibility, which is then followed by objections and responses launched from those who find it to be a morally reprehensible act. Nevertheless, we are faced with misunderstandings (whether deliberate or unintentional) about what the term actually refers to. Many opponents try to equate it with other immoral acts categorically recognized as immoral, such as the judicial execution of the innocent by Nazi Germans. At this point, the debate seems won or lost by emotivist standards (or, in other words, by whoever can yell the loudest). It ought to be clear that the debate over euthanasia is not centered on non-voluntary euthanasia, in which the person is not capable of expressing his or her own desires (Otlowski). Rather, it deals with situations such that the person is lucid and able to give lasting consent to being killed: this is called voluntary euthanasia (Rosenstand 2008, 641). The literature dealing with the bioethics of euthanasia is indeed extensive, and is structured according to the configuration mentioned before. However, like most applied ethical issues, there seems to be a lack of consensus except between adherents to particular normative theories. Given this fact, it seems like the best course is to avoid adjudicating the dispute; rather, one should only hope to dispassionately and critically analyze the conflicting propositions. The Definitions of words and concepts become stretched and bent such that they can fit into certain contexts that they might not be particularly well-suited for. As a result, their meanings become changed, and they are used more frequently in these new contexts. One example of such a concept is that of euthanasia, which has negative connotations that follow the term unjustly, when even today as the practice the word refers to becomes more accepted in throughout the world. The word’s definitions often depend upon the political and ethical assumptions underlying them. Less politically- or ethically-centric views of euthanasia direct us toward more neutral definitions of the practice. It might be better, for instance, if we move away from standard dictionary denotations of the word (“a quiet and easy death”) and, instead involve the death itself—not just the manner of that death. To use it to describe the death, without any mention of the death itself, allows the term to be misused. Another useful definition has been given by numerous writers, the clearest of which is Craig Paterson who presents the distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia. The second term refers to euthanasia performed at the request of the patient and the first term refers to “euthanasia performed on those who do not have the mental ability to request euthanasia or those who, though competent, are not given the opportunity to consent to it” (Paterson 21). This distinction is useful insofar as it strikes away the emotionally-charged, humanitarian objections commonly heard against euthanasia by separating out what is voluntary from what is no different from murder. A revised definition that is being offered here agrees partially with the revised definition, and disagrees wholly with political definitions. We must not ignore the context of euthanasia or the fact that the issue of euthanasia is not one related to “an easy death” but the deprivation of a natural right to life. Our definition does not shift interest to the consequences of action or inaction, but to the natural right to life and its rejection. Death, it seems, is a corollary of life, and the destruction of a life is the destruction of a natural right (Paterson). We must take into account this fact of rights and society in our definition, and therefore, according to a new view, the fact of the death itself. Therefore, based on these considerations, one might define euthanasia as the ending of a life preceded by the suspension of a right to life. Notice that this definition contains the conjunction of two events: the death itself and the suspension of a right. The argument over voluntary euthanasia has intensified in the context of technological innovations that make a longer life possible, and pushing mortality rates back further and further. At some point, a life becomes too burdensome to continue, and death seems like the preferred option. It is ultimately the patient, given that he or she is competent to make the decision, which makes the final decision, as it is his or her autonomy which is being considered. However, the moral case for euthanasia outlined previously presupposes that the number of cases with competent patients is large enough for the issue to be of any practical significance. Clearly, in the event that a patient is unable to follow through on a suicide except by employing help from another human being, it is difficult to evaluate whether that individual is (1) enduring in his or her request, (2) competent to make the request, and thus (3) legitimately voluntary. Knowing that it is difficult to evaluate these things from a third-person perspective, it is perhaps much too complicated to determine. We cannot know what forms a competent consent to an assisted suicide from an outside perspective, and although we are respecting that person’s autonomy, it is not immediately clear from what that person is saying what he or she really has in mind (Foley and Hendin). A frequently used argument against the position in favor of voluntary euthanasia relies on the slippery slope: that allowing one kind of euthanasia will open the door to more invasive types of practices (such as non-voluntary euthanasia) because there is not enough of a distinction between them. These claimants say the slippery slope between the two types is logical, psychological, or arbitrary in nature, and the distinction is not substantive enough to prevent the slippery slope from occurring in real life. The allowance of voluntary euthanasia, some claim, is impossible without providing for the legality of non-voluntary kinds as well (Sgreccia). Therefore, those in favor of physician-assisted suicide claim to gain ammunition from concrete results. However, the slippery slope argument against the case for voluntary euthanasia deserves its fair share of criticism too. Contrary to the claim that the distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary forms is not substantive, there is reason to believe the opposite. There is nothing logically inconsistent about rejecting non-voluntary forms while accepting the voluntary form. The difference is a matter of values, not logic. Secondly, there is no reason to believe that because of support for voluntary euthanasia that someone will be more likely or willing to support its non-voluntary correlate. Thirdly, the difference between voluntary and non-voluntary forms is not at all arbitrary and is based in clear principles (Young). The difference in positions on voluntary euthanasia boils down to a difference in one’s conception of ethics: what ethical standards are designed to accomplish and whether they reduce to rules or outcomes. The moral case for euthanasia depends strongly on one’s respect for autonomy, as well as on the belief that physically incapable people are mentally competent enough to make an appropriate decision relating to the outcome of his or her life. The arguments presented by both sides are simply not compelling enough either way; typically, the only consensus that arises in issues like this fall on deeper, normative levels. Nevertheless, the arguments we hear in this debate need to be reframed to reflect more clearly the concepts being discussed. Even if it is decided, by consensus, that voluntary euthanasia is a moral practice, a conflict still remains in figuring out how just to make it a legal practice, workable in real life. Lastly, with the debate intensifying in the United States, a new concept or definition of “euthanasia” is necessary: one that moves away from the past and toward something which can be used in a neutral debate. Given that the right to life is one of the first conditions of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, making the definition of euthanasia contingent upon it should hardly be controversial. Euthanasia must, in addition to acknowledging the context of its practice, refer to the death itself and not to the manner of it (whether it is “easy” or “good”). This definition is significant insofar as it provides the potential for a bioethical consensus on the issue of euthanasia by erasing the distinction between “voluntary” and “non-voluntary” forms. It also takes us away from the often emotionally- or theistically-driven opposition given to the practice or to its moral justifications. Euthanasia, in order for it to be distinguished from murder, must be followed by the suspension of a right to life. It is, of course, an entirely different discussion on what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for “suspending” such a natural right are. Nevertheless, this contingency in the definition allows us in principle to differentiate Hitler’s euthanasia program and a physician-assisted suicide. The right to life belongs to the individual intrinsically: to give up or retain on one’s own free will. Although this definition will not solve the issue for many groups adhering to ideological ties, no definition should put an end to debate. This definition will not change the public image of euthanasia, but it will provide a stronger basis for substantial discussion of the question. Works Cited Feinberg, John S., and Paul D. Feinberg. Ethics for a Brave New World. New York: Crossway Books, 2010. Foley, K., and H. Hendin. The Case Against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. Otlowski, Margaret. Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Peterson, Craig. Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. New York: Ashgate, 2008. Rosenstand, Nina. The Moral of the Story: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: McGraw Hill Publishers, 2008. Sgreccia, Elio. "Legalizing euthanasia for children in the Netherlands." Statement by H.E. MSGR Elio Sgreccia. Rome: Pontifical Academy for Life, n.d. Young, Robert. Voluntary Euthanasia. April 18, 1996. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/euthanasia-voluntary/ (accessed April 6, 2009). Read More