A Critique of Plato's Just Society using the Notion of Fairness from John Rawls - Essay Example

? Both Plato and John Rawls had a view of a just society grounded on the relationship of the individual to society. Plato maintained that justice in society ought to reflect justice in the soul. Just as the soul was governed by reason, so should society. However, Plato viewed that some had a better capacity for reason than others, and thus, the more rational individuals ought to be at the top of the social hierarchy because they were 'best suited' for it. By contrast, Rawls viewed inequality not as a biologically determined variable, but as one that was the product of unequal distribution. He viewed that there could be a harmony or just society, only when these inequalities were either factored in or eliminated, and this notion of 'fairness' will be presented as a fundamental critique of Plato. The most explicit discussion of the tripartite part of the soul, and the primacy of reason therein, occurs in the fourth book of the Republic (435b). One of the first preliminary aspects of the soul, is that although the parts of the soul are distinct in their virtues, Socrates also stresses that in the functioning of these parts, the soul must be considered as a “whole” [Plato, 1992, p. 436a]. What is implied by this, is as follows. If for example, one desired food, and this desire originated in the appetites, it would still require reason both to discern the means of satisfying this desire, but also it would require reason to know when one has had enough for the sake of health in which case, reason would act upon the ‘will’ to suppress desire, so to speak. This is a ‘chain of command’, so to speak, which will be explored both as it is outlined in this section of the Republic, but also in terms of how this is established in the three classes of the state [Haworth, 2004, p. 13]. Further, it is important to similarly stress that the appetites are as necessary for reason for the sake of surviving. In other words, someone who had no appetite would starve, just as someone who had no ‘will’ or ‘spirit’ would have no discipline to stop eating or drinking. Thus, Socrates stresses that although reason is given privilege within the scheme of the soul, he also stresses that all three aspects constitute the ‘whole’, and this ‘whole’ is necessary for surviving. In some ways, his position on the soul can be said to be a refutation of Thrasymachus' position from the beginning of the dialogue where he argues that the just society is the one ruled by the “stronger” [Adams and Dyson, 2003, p. 4]. Socrates defines this relation, using, for example, the compulsion to “drink” extending from the appetites or the “irrational” [Plato, 1992, p. 439d] part of the soul: “Doesn’t that which forbids in such cases come into play – if it comes into play at all – as a result of rational calculation, while what drives and drags them to drink is a result of feelings and diseases? Apparently” [Plato, 1992, p. 439c-d]. Although the surface appearance, suggests that there is a complete opposition between the appetites on the one hand, or, desire, impulse, etc.., and on the other hand, the rational component of the soul, it is as though there is a harmony of opposites which Socrates is arguing here. What is implied by this, is as follows. Even though reason and irrationality are opposed, they are united in the very functioning of the soul. While the appetites are controlled through the “spirit” or the will [Plato, 1992, p. 440a], it is reason which makes the decision concerning how much control, or when to control the appetites. Again, it is important that we have appetites, and that they are necessary for survival, which reason is aware of, for the same reasoning, that is, for the sake of surviving or health, they must also be controlled. In keeping with Socrates example of drinking, it is often the case that an alcoholic, who is overcome by their appetites, may end up dying or being sick at the very least. Thus, the relationship between the parts of the soul, can be described as created a harmony between opposites, but for the sake of the ‘whole’, and for the sake of maintaining health through moderating the components of the soul. In this regard, he argues that “physical training”, and the study of “music” and “poetry” [Plato, 1992, p. 441e] are all necessary for cultivating or educating the soul into condition of balance or harmony – that is, a harmony where reason regulates the other two components. Having outlined both why reason is superior to the appetites, through an examination of the parts and relation between the parts of the soul (book iv.), it is now possible to examine how the state becomes a reflection of the soul, which will be followed by an argument which essentially agrees that reason should rule over the other two parts of the soul. Socrates argues that in the ‘ideal’ state, the appetites correspond to the merchant or business class, while the will or spirit corresponds to the military class, and at the top of this hierarchy, reason corresponds to the guardians who rule above the spirit/military and the appetites/business class. And, just as it is necessary to have appetites in the soul for the sake of survival, so too with the business or merchant class. In this regard, the appetitive class of people are to be allowed to consume and build to the extent that they create a ‘surplus’ which is necessary for the survival of the state. In other words, the fruits of their labour, must also feed the military and the guardians who have other rules in the state – however, they must not be allowed to gain so much power so as to usurp the other two components of the ‘ideal’ state. Thus, there is a strong parallel between the hierarchy of the state on the one hand, and the hierarchy of the soul on the other. Further, it is important to stress that just as all three parts of the soul are necessary for the ‘whole’ or for maintaining the very existence of the soul, so too with the hierarchy of the state. In the context of this essay, the fact that although there is a hierarchy in the state and in the soul, but that nevertheless all of the parts of the state and soul are essential is stressed for a number of reasons. First, it is tempting to read Plato as an elitist, given that, for example, he argues that philosophers are the most fit individuals in a society to become rulers [Haworth, 2004, p. 15]. And, second, that he is critical of egalitarian states in general, and very specifically, critical of democracy as outlined in Book Eight of the Republic [Plato, 1992, p. see: 561a-b], is further evidence to suggest that he was an elitist. Thus, when one examines the ‘elitism’ or non-egalitarianism of Plato on the one hand, and the fact that he nevertheless advocates the necessity of this structure, it is difficult to pass a dismissive judgement upon Plato with considering this contradiction. By ‘contradiction’, it is not implied in the formal sense, but in the sense that his viewing the necessity of all classes over and against the non-egalitarian structure of his society (and soul). And, this contradiction itself entails that a further clarification of his view of the soul and state is needed in order discern whether or not it is palatable or philosophically desirable to advocate the primacy of reason over the other two components on the soul, which would further involve, advocating also the hierarchy (non-democratic) in the state which is a precise extension of this view of the soul. What needs to be qualified in this sense, is what is implied by reason in the soul. Toward this end, what will be examined, is the notion of education in the ideal state. And, as a preliminary remark, it is important to stress that education in the ‘ideal’ state proceeds with the aim of cultivating a rational guardian [Jayapalan, 2002, p. 106]. Therefore, to better understand what Plato means by reason, and hence, why reason is superior to both the appetites and to the will or spirited component of the soul, this paper will now examine how reason is developed, and moreover, what specifically Plato means by ‘reason’ as a direct result from the education which the guardian receives. One of the more obvious, but also most important observations concerning the cultivation of ‘reason’ within the guardians of the ‘ideal state’, is that it is a form of education which departs from the type of education we might assume as the best means of education. And, by departure, it is implied that there is included in the cultivation of the soul, many traditional or familiar subjects and skills which the philosopher-guardian acquires along the way, but that these skills and forms of knowledge are ultimately abandoned for a “mystical” ascent [Schindler, 2008, p. 235]. The reason why the term ‘mystical’ is used to describe this education ‘above the divided line’, so to speak, is because Plato can only express the experience through the form of an allegory. In other words, while he can articulate in plain terms, what is involved in the forms of education along most of the divided line, he cannot do so with the experiences which supposedly occur above the line. Thus, the following will examine the cultivation of reason in the soul with this idea in mind – that is, the idea that although he privileges reason above the other parts of the soul, his notion of reason is one which is inseparable from a certain mystical reason, or the experiences which can only be expressed through the literary form of an allegory. And, in this regard, his notion of reason, is in many respects different than a more conventional sense of reason, which is more akin to the lower areas of study – on the line, so to speak. As mentioned, the ‘divided line’ is one of the non-allegorical means of expressing how the soul is cultivated to the pinnacle of reason in the Republic. It emerges at the end of Book Six where the discussion concerns the education of the ‘philosopher guardians’ or ‘philosopher kings’, and it is a line which Plato divides into four sections. At the bottom of the line, is what is termed as “imagination” [Plato, 1992, p. 510a]. At this level, what is described are the images which are reflected in water, or the shadows which are reflection of the body as well and this is the level of “distorted opinion” [Miller, 2003, p. 13]. At the next level of the line, he claims that education moves up to a notion of belief [Plato, 1992, p. 510a]. And, what belief concerns, is the apprehension that the images of what was perceived, are the images of real and not merely imaginary or shadowy phenomenon. Concerning the relationship between images and the phenomenon, he argues that education occurs because in discerning the difference between these two, one has to use “hypotheses” and further, one has to engage in an “investigation” along with drawing a “conclusion” [Plato, 1992, p. 510b]. Although it may seem obvious that images are not the phenomenon which they represent, and this is not the point of this phase of education. What is important, is that the ‘difference’ and the means of acquiring a knowledge of the difference between the belief and the imagination, involves some form of reasoning [Mitchell and Lucas, 2003, p. 55]. He argues that the difference between images and what they represent, is a difference which will lead to understanding more complex forms of relationships. That is, understanding aspects of “geometry” such as the notion of “ratio” [Plato, 1992, p. 510c]. And, for example, when one has a representation of an object beside an object (e.g. a portrait of a person and the person), one is not merely discerning the difference between the original and the copy, but also discerning the difference in proportional terms. So, to be capable of discerning a disproportionate portrait of a person, involves the use of calculation, and if calculation is involved, then so too is “thought” which is the next stage above the divided line [Plato, 1992, p. 511a]. What is important to stress, is that this form of thought, is abstracted from sensible nature, and the following will serve as an example to demonstrate this. It has been claimed that below the line, education remains at the level of the senses. What is implied by this, is that both the image or reflection, and the tangible or physical object which serves as the image or reflection, are all known through the senses. Yet, when we begin to think about this difference (images and reality), we are beginning to think in abstract terms, and by abstract, it is implied in terms of utilising concepts which are known through reason and not the senses. For example, if a portrait or image of a person is half the size of the living person, we are employing an abstract concept, such as a ratio (e.g. 2:1). And, while one can remain considering the difference between images and reality, one could also progress further up and above the divided line toward thinking about more complex, but also more abstract ideas such as those utilised in abstract “geometry” [Plato, 1992, p. 510c]. And, with respect to the realm of abstraction, and that which is known through “thought” rather than the senses, Plato terms as the world of “intelligible” [Plato, 1992, p. 511d] and beyond that, is the level of the “forms” [Plato, 1992, p. 511b]. So, for example, at the highest level of “dialectic” [Plato, 1992, p. 511b] one is considering the difference or dialectical relationship between mathematical and geometrical concepts, and the forms themselves. And, this is further expanded on in Book Seven where he views education as moving through music, poetry, and physical training [Plato, 1992, p. 535a-537b] to military service [Plato, 1992, p. 537b-c] to ten years of mathematics [Plato, 1992, p. 537d] to finally, five years of training in ‘dialectic’ [Plato, 1992, p. 537d-540a]. So, for example, and in using the divided line, one is contemplating ‘where’ these forms come from at the level of ‘dialectic’? In other words, where do they come from given that we can mathematical construct complex geometrical figures, but without any prior sense experience of such figures. This, however, begins to enter the realm of what was described earlier as mystical. And, for example, it was asserted as mystical because Plato does not develop this, except through allegory. While the cultivation of reason both in the state (Book iii. And iv.) and on the divided line [Plato, 1992, p. 509ff.] can be articulated in straight forward terms, the ‘sun’ and ‘cave’ serve as allegories or non-literal descriptions of a type of ‘wisdom’ which is connected with reason. Plato makes two very strong and compelling defences for the argument which states that reason should be given priority over the other two components of the soul and it is a priority based on “meritocracy” [Haworth, 2004, p. 14]. First, he argues that if reason employs the will to regulate the appetites, then, the whole of the soul will be both just and harmonious. In other words, the appetites will be satisfied enough to remain healthy, but not overindulged to the point of making the soul unbalanced. The second argument, and outlined in this paper, is that the exhaustion of reason as articulated by Plato, is a mystical form of wisdom – that is, a soul which has had a rigorous training in mathematics and many other practical arts and sciences, but a soul which can also go beyond this education [Kraut, 1997, p. 151]. In other words, a soul which has contemplated ‘abstraction’ to such a degree, that an experience is had which cannot even be spoken of in literal terms, but only through allegory. This paper agrees that these two components of reason are sufficient to defend the argument that reason should be granted a superior status in the hierarchy of the soul, as compared with the appetites or with ‘will’, and further, it defends the idea that philosophers should be rulers. But, nevertheless, a very specific type of philosopher. This paper began with an outline of the central arguments concerning the primacy of reason, as articulated in the first book of the Republic. It has so far been argued, that it is reason and not the appetites which can stand to best serve the interests of the ‘whole’ of the soul, and both for creating harmony, balance, and moderation in the individual, but similarly within the state itself. In this regard, it is difficult to refute the primacy of reason over the other components of the soul. In this sense, it is reason which is given privilege by Plato/Socrates, not for the sake of self-interest, but for the sake of the whole soul which must necessarily conform to reason for the sake of survival – and, both for the survival of the individual but also the just society. Haworth argues that there are some interesting parallels between the notion of justice in relation to society between Plato and the philosopher, John Rawls [Haworth, 2004, p. 16]. The following will examine Rawls theory of justice, and contrast this with Plato's. It will be argued that while there are some similarities, the differences also point to a strong critique of Plato's just society. Rawls contrasts his theory of justice, which he calls "justice as fairness," with the utilitarian theory of justice, as follows: “Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override... therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests." [Rawls, 1971, p. 3-4] Rawls is primarily concerned with the justice of "the basic structure of society.", and it is important in terms of a principle of democracy given that there is a pronounced or focused sense of the ‘whole’ of society taken into consideration. Rawls defines this latter term as "the way in which the major social institutions that is, the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements in society distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" [Rawls, 1971, p. 7]. Rawls is especially concerned with the justification for those distributive inequalities (of income, wealth, and opportunity) that exist because these institutions favor certain starting places over others [Freeman, 2007, p. 92]. Such distributive inequalities (for instance, those that people experience because of their race, intelligence, sex, class, or the socioeconomic group into which they are born) strongly influence people's prospects in life, "yet cannot possibly be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or desert" [Rawls, 1971, p. 7]. Rawls gives his initial statement of the two principles of justice he will defend in the work in question in the following passages: First Principle: "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others." Second Principle: "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all." [Rawls, 1971, p. 60]. Rawls says that the first principle has priority over the second. This implies that even inequalities that benefit all are not allowed if they violate anyone's basic liberties. Note that these principles are egalitarian in nature. The second principle, for example, assumes that equality is the preferred state, and that any social and economic inequalities that exist require a justification that would be acceptable to all [Martin and Reidy, 2006, p. 212]. Rawls argues that these principles define a conception of justice that anyone should accept. Rawls' aim is to "present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant"[Rawls, 1971, p. 11], and this is central to the relationship between the principles of democracy and rights. Traditional social contract theories try to determine what political and social institutions would arise spontaneously if people were in a primitive state of nature (that is, living without any government or social organization) [Morris, 1999, p. 97]. Social contract theorists do not generally attempt to give a history of how societies and governments actually arose. Instead, they take it that the political and social arrangements that would arise from such a "state of nature" decide the legitimacy of specific political and social arrangements that currently exist (e.g., democracies over monarchies) [Freeman, Ed., 2003, p. 7]. Rawls, by contrast, is not interested in defending any particular type of government or economic system (e.g., democracies over monarchies); rather, he is interested in determining which principles would have to operate in any just society "to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits." [Rawls, 1971, p. 60]. Thus, the people in Rawls' original position are not choosing particular forms of government or distributive economic schemes. Rather, they are choosing the principles that they agree should limit the ways in which people form governments and economies, which invariably has important implications on the notion of rights. Another contrast between Rawls and traditional social contract theories is that Rawls does not imagine that the people agreeing to these principles are in a primitive "state of nature," but instead imagines that they are in an initial position of equality (called the original position) where their identities (e.g., their particular interests and place in society) are unknown to them. The people choosing the principles of justice are imagined to be rational and mutually disinterested, knowledgeable about human societies in general, and to possess ‘a sense of justice’, so to speak. However, they are placed behind a "veil of ignorance” [Hinman, 2007, p. 238]. He argues that they do not know anything about their own society in particular, or about the various contingent and undeserved qualities they possess (class, race, intelligence, health, wealth, profession, socioeconomic status, and so on), or how those qualities affect people's rights and social advantages in their society. The purpose of describing the original position this way is that it captures a certain notion of fairness. Rawls puts the point as follows: “Since all are similarly situated in the original position and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain ... it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.” [Rawls, 1971, p. 12]. After people in the original position agree to a particular conception of justice, the veil of ignorance is lifted and they can go about forming particular political and social arrangements in accordance with the principles of justice they agreed to behind the veil of ignorance. The relevance of this set-up to real life is that is helps us decide whether our current social situation (or some hypothetical social situation that does not exist) is just. As Rawls explains it, "our social situation is just if it is such that by this sequence of hypothetical agreements we would have contracted into the general system of rules which defines it" [Rawls, 1971, p. 13]. The following will close with a summary analysis of the main points about ‘fairness’. As was mentioned earlier, Rawls will argue that people in the original position would choose his two principles of justice. The first requires equality in the assignment of “basic rights and duties” and the second, it maintains that social and economic inequalities “are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society" [Rawls, 1971, p. 14-15]. How are we to decide what people in the original position would be like, and what principles of rationality they should conform to in reaching their decision? Rawls argues that we should proceed by the method of "reflective equilibrium." [Maffetone, 2011, p. 147]. In this regard, he argues that before we start theorizing about what conception of justice is best, we already have firm judgements about many particular cases of justice and injustice [Simon, 1995, p. 10]. Any general conception of justice (such as justice as fairness) ought to be consistent with the vast majority of these judgements. Overriding any of these judgements is permissible only if is necessary to develop a conception of justice that is simple, coherent, and morally attractive. At the same time, we also aim at justifying those particular judgements by showing that they conform to an attractive, general conception of justice – as is being stressed, this represents a means of balancing the notion of individual rights with the general principles or tenets of democracy. By contrast, Plato viewed justice as the harmony of a hierarchical soul. Thus, we work simultaneously from both ends: the conception of justice we arrive at must match our particular judgements, but the conception itself is judged plausible or not depending on how well it matches our most strongly held and certain judgements. This means that our description of the original position must be "morally loaded" from the start: in other words, substantive assumptions about justice and injustice are already built into that description, and are used to justify that description (which is not to say that we cannot revise our characterization of the original position if we find that it leads to a morally unattractive conception of justice). The original position is thus a fairly flexible device that helps us reach "reflective equilibrium" about which conception of justice is best. Thus, we start with basic conditions (such as fairness and equality) that we recognize as reasonable. This represents a general framework that incorporates the rights of the individual with a consideration of the whole of society, or the ‘greater good’. In sum, Rawls views the ideal and just state as one that has equality as its aim. Plato, as we saw, viewed a just state as one that reflected the harmony of the three parts of the soul working together. Where both viewed 'reason' or a capacity for rationality as universal, Plato maintained that some had a greater capacity. Rawls, by contrast, views reason universally and in the sense that there is an equal capacity to act as just and moral agents. Inequality was based on material wealth, and this and not the nature of the soul is what determined the inequality of perspectives along with social inequality. Moreover, justice is a matter of 'reflective equilibrium' whereby we compare and contrast actual instances of it rather than ideal ones as Plato maintained. The main point of criticism is the principle of equality. Plato maintained that inequality in society was a reflection of inherent or biological differences. By contrast, Rawls viewed inequality as created by the distribution of wealth, and while Plato's ideal was a harmonious soul, Rawls ideal was equality itself. Both have a view of a just society based on the nature of the individual, but Rawls notion of a just society has equality as its fundamental aim and goal, and arguably, this represents the strongest criticism against Plato. Bibliography: Adams, I and Dyson, R W 2003, Fifty Major Political Thinkers, Routledge, London. Freeman, S R 2007, Rawls. Routledge, New York. Freeman, S R (Ed.) 2005, The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Haworth, A 2004, Understanding the political philosophers: from ancient to modern times, Routlege, London. Hinman, L 2007, Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory, Wadsworth, Belmont. Jayapalan, N 2002, Comprehensive Study of Plato, Atlantic Publishers, Darya. Kraut, R (Ed.) 1997, Plato's Republic: Critical Essays, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham. Maffettone, S 2010, Rawls: An Introduction, Polity Press, Cambridge. Martin, D and Reidy, M 2006, Rawl's Laws of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? Blackwell, Oxford. Miller, D 2003, Political Philosophy. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Mitchell, B and Lucas, J R 2003, An engagement with Plato's Republic: a companion to the Republic, Ashgate, London. Morris, C W (Ed.) 1999, The Social Contract Theorists, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham. Plato, 1992, Republic. Translated by C.M.A. Grube and Revised by C.D.C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis. Rawls, J 1971, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Schindler, D C 2008, Plato's Critique of Impure Reason: On Goodness and Truth in the Republic, Catholic University of America Press, Washington. Simon, S 1995, Democracy and Social Injustice: Law, Politics, and Philosophy, Rowman and Littlefield, London. 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