Achieving Personal Autonomy through Education - Essay Example

?Achieving Personal Autonomy through Education: The Liberalist and Feminist View 0 Introduction “For as woman came from man, so also man is born ofwoman.” 1 Corinthians 11 : 12 . History has born witness to the struggles of women in a patriarchal society. As such, one would think that the need for personal autonomy would be an instantaneous cause of the feminist movement. However, research indicates that the concept of personal autonomy has been disowned by many feminists when taken in the context of ethical and social theory ( Friedman, 1997; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000 ). Such reservations against the concept of personal autonomy is rooted in the thought that the idea of personal autonomy is laced by the threats of masculinist implications (Friedman, Autonomy, gender, politics, 2003), thus making them feel uncomfortable with such a notion. Over the years and especially in the past decade, those who felt such apprehensions had to face the overwhelming circumstances that place a needed sense of value to the concept of personal autonomy in terms of its critical and constructive aspects (Benson, 2005). With this, feminists have come to adhere to the concept of personal autonomy although particular aspects of the idea have to be qualified to suit the “tastes” of different groups. While the acceptance of the notion of personal autonomy may remain debatable for certain groups, there is no doubt that the feminist movement, together with much of the members of modern civilization, considers education as among the greatest endowment for women in society that provides them with a sense of equality with men. Along these lines, this paper will provide a discussion based on personal autonomy being a goal of education. Specifically, this discussion will be centered on a feminist view, emphasizing education in terms of a liberalist context. First, the concept of personal autonomy will be discussed, briefly outlining its history and highlighting the views of different theorists and, in particular, of contemporary liberals on the concept. The paper shall then proceed to discussing the concept of autonomy rooted on feminist views. Finally, the paper shall highlight how personal autonomy may be advanced by education, using a feminist context. 2.0 The Concept of Personal Autonomy “A person is autonomous to the degree, and it is very much a matter of degree, that what he thinks and does, at least in important areas of his life, are determined by himself.” Dearden, Autonomy and education, 1975, p. 343. The concept of personal autonomy traces its roots to the ancient Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Both men proposed that the rational part of the soul is its most important part and the ideal for humanity is associated with self-sufficiency and being non-dependent on other people (Backus, 2003). Kant later developed the idea of moral autonomy as having authority over one’s actions and soon thereafter, the idea of autonomy in learning has become a part of a wide range of educational philosophies and has been identified recently in educational policy to be crucial to the development of learning (Honderich, 2005). Autonomy simply resided on morals in its early years, but then views about this began to change in the 21st century. For Dworkin ( 1988 ), the concept of autonomy includes one’s overall point of view towards how one lives one’s life. He points out that each individual, whether the most learned or the most carefree, conforms to his or her own personal view of what makes life valuable (Dworkin, 1988). Thus, Dworkin is actually saying that each person reveals how he or she conceives goodness or the good life through his or her behavior. For Raz (1988), the concept of personal autonomy is much more specific as he emphasizes that the individual is responsible for whatever happens to his or her life. As such, an individual with personal autonomy is identified not only by his actual choices in life but by the presence of choices themselves (Raz, 1988). Therefore, an individual can really just be autonomous if these choices are available and if the outcome of his or her life is based on the choices that he or she has made along the way. He adds that if the individual does not have these choices in the first place, then he or she cannot really be labeled as autonomous (Raz, 1988). According to Dearden (1975), autonomy is possible in all aspects of a person’s life. In addition, he claims that what a person thinks and does are determined by himself and personal autonomy is not just part of morality but an all-encompassing personal ideal (Dearden, Education and the development of reason, 1972). This is in context with his previous writings which identified three criteria for regarding a person as autonomous. First, a person must form his own judgments on what to think and do. Second, a person is disposed critically to reflect on his or her own first-order judgments. Lastly, a person is disposed to integrate his or her actual belief and conduct round these first-order and reflective judgments. He further qualifies autonomy as a highly desirable aim of education (Dearden, 1972). In the same manner, other theorists likewise define personal autonomy within the context of education, and even go as far as identifying personal autonomy as an aim of education. Rob Reich, in his book “Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education,” defines autonomy as “a person’s ability to reflect independently and critically upon basic commitments, desires and beliefs, be they chosen or unchosen, and to enjoy a range of meaningful life options from which to choose, upon which to act, and around which to orientate and pursue one’s life projects” (p. 46). Meira Levinson, in what she labels as a weak perfectionist account of rational autonomy (1999), first identifies the main challenges that pervade comprehensive and political liberal theories by pointing out and providing a distinction among the three elements of liberalism. First, liberalist theories must accept the fact of pluralism in modern society. That is, people may never subscribe to a singular set of values or identities, and moreover, these different values and indentities most likely conflict with each other. It would be futile to expect or even hope for such a day to come when every single individual would conform to the same set of values. Secondly, liberalist theories must make sure that there is an existing public legitimization process, which conforms to legitimation conditions, that is based on principles of justice, that establishes the state. Finally, substantive liberal institutions must come out of the aforementioned legitimization process (Levinson, 1999). With these elements in place, Levinson (1999) defines autonomy as “the capacity to form a conception of the good, to evaluate ones values and ends with the genuine possibility of reviving them should they be found wanting” (p. 15). Both Reich and Levinson are of the contemporary liberalist generation who, like Dearden, qualify personal autonomy as an end goal of education. That is, autonomy is not something that is innate within humans when they were born. Rather, autonomy is something that is learned and, consequently, taught. 3.0 Feminist Notion of Autonomy “The self is the One who is not dominated, who knows that by the service of the other; the other is the one who holds the future, who knows that by the experience of domination, which gives the lie to the autonomy of the self. To be One is to be autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be an illusion, and so to be involved in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other. Yet to be other is to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial. One is too few, but two are too many.” Haraway, 2008, p. 177 For feminist theorists, autonomy is taken in the context of the struggle and negotiation for power (Wallace, 2009), and would thus qualify as freedom from extrinsic control. A number of feminists are thus uncomfortable with the concept of autonomy inasmuch as they brand it as being a Western concept and masculinist in nature (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000), which stresses self-sufficiency and competition rather than inclusion of women experiences and interconnectedness (Lather, 1991). Thus, it may be said that for feminists, the concept of autonomy is pegged within the social context, such that it is achieve through a position of strength, that is achieved by maintaining a sense of personal connection with other people (Friedman, Autonomy and social relationships: Rethinking the feminist critique, 1997). It goes without saying that feminist theorists are not entirely receptive of the subsistent ideas of autonomy. Paradoxically, feminist theorists do not subscribe to the concept of freedom and equality within the context of autonomy (Friedman, Autonomy, gender, politics, 2003). They claim that the notions of freedom and equality benefit the individual person by affirming one’s sense of self only when competing with other individuals who likewise aim for a similar state of being. As such, the individual would have to coexist in a power struggle in order to assert one’s authority in achieving such a state (Benson, 2005). Thus, such dynamics ultimately result in a hierarchical structure, which feminist theorists aim to get rid of in the first place. In most cases, such structure is even oppressive in the sense that those succeed in wielding their authority are able to grab the top position while those who fail to do so end up in subordinate positions and are ultimately denied their autonomy (Gilligan, 1982). It is this sense of hierarchical notion, the very root of the rise of the feminist movement, which some feminist theorists try to dispense of with the idea of autonomy. To these feminist theorists, autonomy simply sets the table for bias and subjectivity that may entail the relegation of women to the subordinate position of society. As such, the very notion of feminist theory may be trumped. Therefore, they emphasize that in order to accommodate the notion of autonomy within the feminist context, autonomy must be taken via its relational nature, highlighting the feminist concept of self (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). There must be no room for competition in the achievement of autonomy. Instead, autonomy must be realized through an interconnection with other individuals. That is, it is through this intricate link with others that individuals develop a sense of self and, ultimately, autonomy (Wallace, 2009). 4.0 Liberalism and Personal Autonomy “He who lets the world, or his own position in it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties.” Mill, 1985, p. 123 . It may be quite impossible to discuss autonomy independent of liberalist context. In fact, the literature indicates that it autonomy is one of the basic tenets of liberal theories ( Levinson, 1999; Pring & Halstead, 2008; Suissa, 2010 ). None is more liberal than an autonomous individual who is capable of reflecting upon numerous sets of values and is able to choose freely from among such sets of values so that the establishment of liberal freedoms and rights is justified and, along with it, the institutions that guarantee these freedoms and rights are cultivated within the framework of the liberal state (Suissa, 2010). Thus, it comes as no surprise that liberalist education puts much emphasis on autonomy as one of its main goals. Van den Brink emphasizes that autonomy is not necessarily enhanced by every social form ( 2000 ). While the liberal concept of respect for autonomy is crucial in liberalism’s dealings with such social forms, it is pointed out that “liberal societies cannot simply force dissident groups to affirm liberal notions of autonomy and reasonableness” (van den Brink, 2000, p. 80) because doing such defies the concept of personal autonomy in the liberalist context. This may be considered as the bridging tool that will remove the apprehensions of feminist theories with the concept of autonomy. 5.0 Personal Autonomy as a Goal of Education “A person is autonomous to the degree, and it is very much a matter of degree, that what he thinks and does, at least in important areas of his life, are determined by himself.” Dearden, Autonomy and education, 1975, p. 343 . Indeed, personal autonomy must be considered as one of the central aims of education. Althought feminist theorists do not exactly welcome certain notions of autonomy, it cannot be denied that the postmodernist concept of achieving the concept of self and, consequently, of autonomy has become one of the pillars of modern liberal feminist views. The fear that the concept of autonomy poses a threat of a hierarchical society, should be foregone as postmodernist feminist theories will actually show that the notion of autonomy conforms with existing feminist view. Reindal (1999) actually supports the feminist idea of interdependence as being a necessary ingredient in achieving personal autonomy. In his paper, Reindal (1999) aargues that personal autonomy should not only be viewed dichotomously in terms of independence and dependence but, mor importantly, individuals must come to realize the need for interdependence. He suggests that the concept of personal autonomy should be viewed as something that is both embedded within, and embodied by, the individual (Reindal, 1999). Taking off from such a notion, it should be added that education ( or educational programs ) must be designed from the constructivist perspective in such a way that learners are not simply embedded with a sense of personal autonomy but instead, fully are allowed to embody the idea. Amidst the promise of the benefits of educating learners on personal autonomy, Laborde (2006) issues a fair caveat. Autonomy must be taught and made to be understood as non-subordination to the wants and will of others. As such, this can only be accomplished if learners are first provided with autonomy-related skills for them to appropriately distinguish between personal autonomy and subordination (Laborde, 2006). In her study of the practice of hijab ( wearing of headscarves ) among Muslim women, Laborde ( 2006 ) emphasizes that “autonomy-facilitating education is not primarily about securing a right for individuals to exercise autonomy by leaving their communities” ( p. 373 ). Rather, autonomy-facilitating education aims to assist individuals in being subjected to subordination within their own cultural and normative frameworks. As such, autonomy-facilitating education emphasizes the need for individuals to practice their right to voice, so that ( in the case of Muslim women ) they will be able to express their questions and challenge the interpretation of their religion, providing them with an opportunity to a proper discourse, rather than being encouraged to leave the religion (Laborde, 2006). Arnot (1997) provides an appropriate feminist analysis of the role of education in creating ‘inclusive’ democratic citizenship, which is a close approximation of personal autonomy through the concept of self. Using four discrete feminist perspectives on citizenship, she claims that these perspectives provide a venue to critically take into consideration the history and continuing efforts of women to achieve equality in society (Arnot, 1997). These perspectives are outlined by Arnot (1997) as: “a) a theoretical critique of citizenship as a modern male narrative; b) a socio-historical perspective on women's struggle for equal citizenship through education; c) deconstruction of the discourses of citizenship used by contemporary teachers and their gendered dimensions; and, d) an emerging educational perspective on the gender principles which should affect education for citizenship in democratic societies” (p. 276). These perspectives clearly indicate just how complex are the concerns being faced by the education sector especially in terms of putting forward personal autonomy. Moreover, Arnot (1997) concludes that the educational system requires the transformation of more than one masculinist liberal discourse if it is to be expected for women to realize full personal autonomy. Clegg (1999) goes one step further and looks into the effects of reflective practice and feminism on professional education. Based on the results of her study which uses the UK experience, she suggests the adoption of a revitalized research agenda which critically applies the reflective practice within the professional contexts (Clegg, 1999). She notes that critiques on the universalizing claims to knowledge established by a number of professionals have been made by feminist groups. In place of such claims, these groups placed more focus on how power-knowledges may be constructed by different professions (Clegg, 1999). As such, Clegg (1999) strongly recommends the establishment of a theoretically informed research agenda which takes into consideration the issues brought up by feminist groups, especially when it comes to reflective practice, so that professional training may understand and hopefully resist a political agenda. 6.0 Conclusion There should be no doubt as to the importance of personal autonomy taking a central position among the aims of education. The decision to live one’s life and the choices that one must take, should reside fully on the individual. The adherance to personal autonomy should be encouraged by academic institutions and must be incorporated in the curriculum. Despite initial apprehensions of feminist theorists on the necessity of advancing personal autonomy due to the conceptual notion of autonomy being laced by the threats of masculinist implications, appropriately revised concepts of personal autonomy is steadily being accepted within the feminist context. Indeed, the feminist concept of autonomy, that is, one that is rooted in the concepts of the self and of interdependence among individuals, may actually best highlight personal autonomy in education. This idea should be introduced to learners as early as possible so that they will be able to manifest it in the way they live their life. 7.0 References Arnot, M. (1997). 'Gendered Citizenry": New feminist perspectives on education and citizenship. 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