Hitlers Decision to Attack the Soviet Union - Essay Example

? Was Hitler’s Decision to Attack the Soviet Union His Greatest Military Failure? Introduction Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941was a part of a plan facilitated by Operation Barbarossa.1 Operation Barbarossa was described as an “ideological and racial contest” designed to annihilate the USSR and to reduce “its population to servitude”.2 Certainly, it has been argued that much of Hitler’s foreign policy was based on biological, geopolitical and racial factors.3 These factors would characterize Hitler’s larger National Socialist programme which was aimed at annexing east territories and was further motivated by the perception that the Bolshevik regime was a threat to Germany.4 Regardless of Hitler’s larger objective, Operation Barbarossa was perceived to be Hitler’s largest military risk. In its aftermath, it was described as a colossal failure.5 Operation Barbarossa put Germany in the unenviable position of having to fight on a number fronts and therefore altered the entire strategic design of World War II. Thus Operation Barbarossa would be the catalyst that resulted in the collapse of the Third Reich.6 Based on these assessments it is therefore argued that Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union was its greatest military failure. This paper intends to illustrate this hypothesis by first evaluating Hitler’s foreign policy and secondly Operation Barbarossa. Hitler’s foreign policy will be evaluated first as a means of tying it to the strategies, planning and execution of Operation Barbarossa. Thirdly, this paper will conduct an analysis of Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union with the objective of determining how Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union ties in with his strategies toward the Allied powers during the Second World War. The third part of this paper will analyse what aspects of Operation Barbarossa contributed to its greatest failure. Having conducted this analysis, it will be possible to not only substantiate the hypothesis that Hitler’s attack in the Soviet Union was its greatest failure, but also why it was Hitler’s greatest failure. I. Hitler’s Foreign Policy Adolf Hitler took office as Germany’s Chancellor in 1933 at 43 years of age and with not prior experience “of authority in government”.7 Moreover, Hitler was not well-read and had scarce travel experience. Even so, Weinberg informs that Hitler: Had a clearly formulated set of ideas on major issues of foreign policy, and these ideas were intimately interwoven with his concepts of domestic affairs.8 These clear ideas were founded on the doctrine of race and were predicated on the concept that man’s history is more specifically understood by reference to race. More specifically, man’s history is tied to the “racial components of different societies”.9 Prior to taking office, Hitler’s doctrine of race underpinnings and its characterization of his foreign policies were obvious in his speeches and writings. For Hitler, Germany had not lost the First World War. Instead, Germany had been backstabbed by Jews those who supported Jews. Jews and their supporters not only had tremendous influence in Germany but also garnered strength from foreign powers whose victory during the First World War had facilitated the backstabbing.10 It therefore followed that any effective foreign policy was required to facilitate domestic reconfiguration. To this end, according to Weinberg, “a nationally conscious group must assume power” and must “ruthlessly displace whatever steps toward democratic government” that had already occurred in Germany and “rearm to provide the tools of an aggressive foreign policy”.11 What this meant for Hitler was the formulation of a policy that would require a direct confrontation with France, Germany’s perpetual enemy. This policy might also require a coalition with Italy who equally objected to France acquiring European hegemony. Other strategies included annexing Austria and other yet to be identified territories under a “Greater Germany”.12 The annexation of Austria was part of Hitler’s vision for a German-Austria restoration to “the great German Motherland”. 13Ultimately, war was not only necessary, but inevitable. This time Germany would triumph, having learned valuable lessons from the First World War.14 Thus far it can be discerned that Hitler’s foreign policy had dual purposes: German expansion and the annihilation of Jews. Back in 1919, Hitler who was serving in Munich’s army was convinced that it was on account of the Jew that the US joined the First World War which ultimately ended the war for Germany.15 In fact Hitler told journalist, Josef Hell in 1922, “once I really am in power, my first and foremost task will be the annihilation of the Jews”.16 In his autobiography, Hitler expressed the view that the First World War the millions of deaths suffered on the battlefield would have stood for something.17 Lighbody informs that during Hitler’s political career, he was driven by an unfailing ambition to completely annihilate the Jews. In addition to blaming the Jews for Germany’s defeat during the First World War, Hitler was convinced that the Jews incited or otherwise were responsible for the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and were influencing the spread of communism throughout Europe so as to achieve domination across the globe.18 Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on January 30, 1939 which marked his 6th year in office, his theme was exactly the same: If international finance Jewry inside and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, the result will not be the bolshevization of the earth and thereby the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe!19 Hitler’s foreign policy which was characterized by the race doctrine was also closely aligned to an equally exaggerated version of the space doctrine. The underlying ideology of both doctrines is referred to as Lebensraum. Essentially, Hitler’s vision was to Germanize much of Europe, if not all of Europe since Germans were the superior race. Those territories occupied by races that were too inferior to be Germanized would simply be dominated by and subservient to Germany.20 In other words, Hitler’s foreign policy as it unfolded just prior to and during the Second World War was predicated on Lebensraum. Thus war was inevitable. Hitler would set out to conquer, annihilate and reform both German and Europe’s society.21 It is against this background, the Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa was formulated and executed. II. Operation Barbarossa Hitler’s Lebensraum policy as revealed in the previous passage indicates that Hitler aligned Jewry with Bolshevism or Communism and Marxism. For him being Jewish, Bolshevist, Communist or Marxist was indistinguishable. To this end each of these traits were perceived as “enemies of German culture, economics and government”.22 These perceptions as explored in the previous section helped to rationalize and radicalize Hitler’s foreign policy and would inevitably lead to Operation Barbarossa or more specifically, Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union.23 Operation Barbarossa did not seem like a possibility in 1939. It was during this time that France and Britain commenced talks with the Soviet Union with a view to establishing a mutual anti-Germany stance. These negotiations collapsed as a result of British and French mistrust in the Soviet Union. Eager to avoid a union between Britain, France and the Soviet Union, Germany convinced the Soviets to execute a non-aggression treaty with Germany.24 Given Hitler’s anti-Communist/Bolshevist stance, the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 is a most curious event in the years leading up Operation Barbarossa. Although signed by Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev attempted to provide an answer for the Soviet’s curious amalgamation with Germany. Stalin had indicated to Khrushchev immediately after signing the treaty that once work of the friendship between Germany and the Soviet Union reached the French and the British, they would immediately withdraw from the imminent and pending war. Stalin also indicated that he had no confidence in British and French efforts to align themselves with the Soviets and that their main objective was to “incite Hitler” against the Soviets.25 Khrushchev went on to state that Stalin and Soviet officials knew that Hitler could not be trusted. They also knew, that Hitler would eventually attack the Soviets. Therefore the non-aggression Pact was no more than a delaying tactic. It gave the Soviets some room to breathe. According to Khrushchev, Hitler also had a similar motive for signing the non-aggression Pact. The Pact would buy time for Hitler and thus avoid the military errors of the First World War where Germany found herself fighting a battle on several fronts.26 It therefore followed that from the Soviet’s perspective, Germany would turn its assault on the Soviet Union only after it had successfully completed its battles against the allies. This way, Germany could avoid fighting on more than one front. However, as fate would have it, Operation Barbarossa would function to prove the Soviets wrong. Be that as it may, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was Hitler’s final diplomatic move before the start of the Second World War. The Pact included a secret design for distributing Soviet and Nazi control of Eastern Europe and facilitated the start of the Second World War.27 With assurances that the Soviet Union would remain neutral in the event Germany was involved in a war and with the expectation that Britain and France would remain neutral, Germany would invade Poland, thereby initiating the Second World War.28 By June 1940 while the Germans were intensifying their campaign in France, the Soviet Union was fortifying its interest in Eastern Europe under the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of the previous year. The Soviets had dispatched military troops to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and the Baltic states were officially under Soviet control by August 1940. Although Hitler had not expected the Soviet Union to have moved so quickly, he still considered forging a closer relationship with the Soviet Union and the possibility that the Soviets would join Germany in a campaign against Britain.29 Yet, on December 5, 1940, Hitler made a decision to attack the Soviet Union and issued a directive to that effect on December 5, 1940.30 Although Stalin knew that the attack would eventually come, he had not anticipated that it would come so soon. From Stalin’s perspective, he could continue to appease Hitler until such time as his military was efficient enough to ward off a German attack.31 Hitler no doubt had an uneasy co-existence with the Nazi-Soviet Pact. In fact, in a letter to Mussolini once he made the decision to attack the Soviet Union, Hitler wrote: Since I struggled through to this decision, I again feel spiritually free. The partnership with the Soviet Union, in spite of the complete sincerity of the efforts to bring about a final conciliation, was nevertheless often very irksome to me, for in some way or other it seemed to me to be a break with my whole origin, my concepts, and my former obligations. I am happy now to be relieved of these mental agonies.32 This missive by Hitler is self-explanatory. He had grown weary of the charade and was more than happy to withdraw from the Pact and expedite his larger and more important plan: German expansion and the annihilation of Jewry and Communism. Barnett in an attempt to understand Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union questions the utility of this decision. To start with, Stalin had been entirely cooperative and there was nothing to indicate that his cooperation would come to a stop anytime soon. Moreover, Hitler himself had indicated that the Red Army was hardly a threat, therefore he could not have been fearful that the Soviets were about to launch an attack on Germany. 33 Reportedly, this is exactly how Hitler rationalized his decision to attack the Soviet Union. Hitler is said to have rationalized that the Soviets were colluding with Britain to launch an attack on Germany.34 Despite the fact that Hitler implied in his letter to Mussolini that the attack on the Soviet Union was part of a greater and more important ideology, the attack was more likely driven by practical considerations. It is highly likely, that Hitler was of the opinion that the attack would permit Germany to move its forces more effectively against Britain.35 According to Barnett, Hitler had claimed that “Russia constituted Britain’s last hope,” and “once Russia was smashed Britain would make peace”.36 Barnett doubts the veracity of this claim by Hitler and argues that this claim is fraught by the fact that: Russia was then not even a belligerent, was in no way supporting Britain’s fight, while Britain was very evidently looking to America for rescue rather than to Russia.37 It must therefore be assumed that Hitler had formed the view that Britain was no longer a formidable opponent and it was time for him to realize his lifelong dream of defeating Communism and establishing “a Germanic empire on Russian soil”.38 Not only is this conclusion consistent with Hitler’s exaggerated space and race doctrine, it is also consistent with this missive to Mussolini. Hitler’s conduct after commencing Operation Barbarossa is very instructive. For Hitler, the Baltic states were destined to become annexed to Germany. This annexation would reflect the Nazi perception that Slavics were “subhuman” and were only fit for servitude to the “German master race”.39 Ukraine’s schools were closed because it was assumed by Hitler, that education was not necessary for “people whose main function ws to provide physical labor”.40 As a result, several hundred thousand were forced into servitude in Hitler’s Germany. Over the ensuing two years, as much as 2.5 million Soviet citizens had been sent to Germany to labour in agriculture and industry.41 Hitler’s plan was to exploit the Soviet’s land for agricultural and economic gains for Germany. However, informal uprisings and sabotage made those efforts increasingly futile. Essentially, the German troops faced “passive resistance and the destruction of war” and as a result were incapable of reaping “as much grain from the occupied areas as they had” benefited from via the Pact.42 In any event, from all appearances it appeared as though Germany was on the verge of claiming victory over the Soviet Union. By fall 1941, Smolensk which was just outside of Moscow had been seized and Leningrad was surrounded within a month. Kiev, the capital of Ukraine fell to Germany in the same month and Kharkov the following month. By October, Germany’s troops were just 60 miles outside of Moscow. Both the British and the Americans feared that it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union fell.43 Meanwhile, the situation was not so clearly in favour of Germany. In Muller and Ueberschar’s examination of German war diaries, a bleak picture emerged. For instance Chief of General Staff, Franz Halder warned that Germany’s casuals and loss of material could not be replaced. Not only were the German troops facing the possibility of further erosion should the offensive continue, other German troops were deterred by having to fight off passive resistance and civilian attacks. In addition to constraints on supplies, the Germans were further disadvantaged by the Russian terrain and bitter winter. Making matters worse, the Red Army launched a devastating defensive from the 5 to 6 December 1941 with a “resulting crisis for the entire German front”.44 The failure of Operation Barbarossa was easily dismissed by German generals and Hitler himself. The common complaint was the winter weather was brutal and ultimately sapped the Germans of their will to fight. However, as Muller and Ueberschar explain, there was nothing unusual about the winter weather at that time. Moreover, the Red Army was subjected to the same weather conditions.45 The truth however, is more subtle. The failure of Operation Barbarossa is primarily attributed to Hitler’s arrogance and race ideology. As a result of his race ideology, Hitler underestimated the resilience and resources of the Red Army. Hitler’s belief in his own military’s superiority and the inferiority of the Russians prompted him to go into the Soviet Union with a bare supply of troops and material. It was his belief that the superior Germans would quickly and efficiently dispose of the Communist Red Army with a minimum of resources. As the war diaries of Heinrich Uhlig and Andreas Hillgruber indicate, the failure of Operation Barbarossa was borne out of a “blindness to reality” which came from “anti-Communist delusions”.46 Essentially, as a military failure, the defeat of the German military in the Battle for Moscow reverberated throughout the Second World War. It is characterised as a “severe setback” for Hitler’s war efforts.47 As Muller and Ueberschar explain, Germany’s high command came to the conclusion that “it could not provide enough soldiers and war material to restore” the German military’s “strength to what it had been” prior to Operation Barbarossa.48 In the meantime, Hitler’s Western opponents were dispatching military supplies to the Soviet Union.49 The Soviets’ successful resistance to Operation Barbarossa elevated its status globally. Stalin renewed talks with the Western allies and Germany had a crisis in the East and a growing national economic crisis to deal with. Complicating matters, in adjusting its economic policies, Germany was forced to abandon its highly successful and relatively cheap blitzkrieg war strategies.50 Therefore in many ways, Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union was the catalyst that led to Germany’s eventual collapse and defeat in the Second World War. A detailed analysis follows. This analysis will provide some insight into why and how Operation Barbarossa was perhaps Hitler’s greatest military failure. III. Analysis: Operation Barbarossa’s Failure ` Khrushchev’s memoirs (as cited in the previous section) inform that the Soviet Union was not only anticipating an attack from Germany, but that quite possibly they used the Soviet-Nazi Pact as an opportunity to prepare for that attack. It is therefore hardly surprising that when Germany did attack the Soviet Union it had underestimated the extent of the Soviet Union’s resources.51 Therefore, while the Soviet Union was prepared for Germany’s attack, Germany was ill-prepared for the consequences of its attack on the Soviet Union. Lee argues that the declaring war on the Soviet Union and thereby creating yet another enemy, Hitler committed what can only be described as a “monumental blunder, one which eventually cost Hitler the war”. 52 It would have certainly made sense for Germany to have waited until after the war with Britain had come to an end. Even Hitler had previously stated just two years earlier, “we can oppose Russia only when we are free of the West”.53 However, it can be argued that it was because of Hitler’s failure thus far to defeat Britain that he turned his attention to the Soviet Union. The idea was to demonstrate to Britain that: By means of another swift and decisive campaign Hitler was certain that he could deprive Britain of any lingering hope that she might in future be able to use a ‘continental sword.’54 Hitler had also hoped for a more profound benefit. In his own words, Hitler informed his army’s lead officers in July 1940: If Britain’s hope in Russia is destroyed, her hope in America will disappear also, because the elimination of Russia will enormously increase Japan’s power in the Far East.55 In other words, Hitler did not plan for the consequences of losing Operation Barbarossa. His entire strategy and policy placed all of his military success on Operation Barbarossa. From his perspective, losing was not an option and the outcome was so appealing, he dared not think beyond the rewards of his success. By taking this approach, Hitler recklessly gambled away his military and economic resources with the expectation that his pay off would be victory. Certainly, in the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, it certainly appeared that he was going to succeed. This accounts for his commitment to the war effort in the Soviet Union, despite the losses that he was amassing at the gates of Moscow and its surrounding areas. The loss of men and supplies that could not be replaced would ultimately predetermine Hitler’s military failure in Operation Barbarossa and ultimately, his failure in the Second World War. This military failure was further manifested by the manner in which it changed Hitler’s own war strategies. This war strategy was blitzkrieg or lightening war.56 The lightening war provided Hitler with quick, cheap and decisive defeats throughout Europe. By year end 1941, Hitler had used lightening war to establish Germany as a formidable power through Europe. Not only had Poland fallen to blitzkrieg, so had western Europe. However, the attempt to use Blitzkrieg in Britain had not been successful. However, as Lee reports: There was however, one major shortcoming, which would ultimately prove fatal to the Third Reich. Operation Barbarossa had not fulfilled the objective of finishing off the Soviet Union by the end of 1941, a serious failure since Blitzkrieg depended on instant victory.57 It was the success of Blitzkrieg that fortified Germany’s position in Europe. It was the failure of Blitzkrieg in the Soviet Union that changed Hitler’s fate. As of 1942, Hitler discontinued his blitzkrieg attacks and instead adopted a more “prolonged and destructive war of attrition”.58 As a result, the remainder of Hitler’s war efforts would come at a greater cost in terms of manpower, supplies, casualties, fatalities and ultimately greater injection of funds. Complicating matters for Hitler, Operation Barbarossa transformed the war from a European War to a global war. It was no longer a war for control of Eastern Europe. Each of the world’s powers were forced to reorganize and set new aims for the war. Meanwhile, Germany was forced to plan and prepare for a much longer and more involved war effort.59 Perhaps the greatest outcome was the renewed efforts on the part of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States to form a coalition against the triple alliance: Italy, Germany and Japan. While the coalition between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States was solidifying in December 1941, the triple alliance was failing.60 No doubt Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union despite a non-aggression pact would have occupied the minds of its allies. In other words it must have been clear to Japan and Italy that Germany could not be trusted. Moreover, Germany’s failure in Operation Barbarossa much have also indicated to Japan and Italy, that Germany was not as formidable as previously believed. Ultimately, Operation Barbarossa was not clearly defined, nor was it clearly planned. The operation itself was as bereft of structure as it was of a clear political ideology. The most that can be gleaned is that Hitler had planned to simply annihilate the Russians as a part of his race and space doctrine. Even so, this political ideology does not explain why Hitler launched an attack on the Soviet Union while it was struggling to defeat Britain. Not only did Hitler expose Germany to more fronts, it exposed Germany to a global war at a time when Germany could ill afford to fight the war against Britain. Conclusion Hitler’s race and space doctrine was as misguided as his decision to attack the Soviet Union. More specifically, Hitler’s plan to annihilate the Soviet Union was based on an exaggerated race and space ideology that was impossible to force on the world at large. It was this race and space ideology that convinced Hitler that Germany was superior and was not only entitled to, but could achieve world dominance. However, Hitler failed to take into account that his failed attempt at destruction of the Soviet Union would only amass the Western powers together in support of the Soviet Union. This would be facilitated by Germany’s creation of an enemy that would share the objectives of its most formidable enemies: the US and Britain. Hitler therefore came into Operation Barbarossa with tunnel vision. He only planned and prepared for victory. In doing so, Hitler sealed Germany’s fate and instead of annihilating the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa strengthened the Soviet Union, ensuring that it would occupy a place alongside the world’s super powers. In the final analysis, Operation Barbarossa was Hitler’s greatest military failure because it ultimately cost him the war for Europe. He acquired for himself a world war against virtually indestructible enemies and ensured that Hitler could not win a war that had to be fought on several fronts. 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