Philosophy of Language: the Rule-Following Problem - Essay Example

?Philosophy of language Thesis: The rule-following problem is a deep philosophical problem. It raises questions about what meaning is and what language is. The rule-following problem may be referred to the problem of meaning underdetermination of an intentional phenomenon. Thus, rule-following is a problem to internalists interlocutor of Wittgenstein (from his early years). The later Wittgenstein influences on Kripke’s ideas though his ideas were not taken by Kripke to the largest extent. Still, both Kripke and Wittgenstein refer to the paradox of rule following from different perspectives thus evoking numerous philosophical questions. Though Kripke’s ideas are often criticized for his skeptical approach to the rule-following paradox, there are followers of Kripke who consider him to be dominant over Wittgenstein for his attempt to solve this problem in such a way and not only theorizing, as it did Wittgenstein. Introduction to the philosophy of Wittgenstein Early Philosophy of Wittgenstein Wittgenstein is a great philosopher. He discusses the issues of self and meaning. He tries to draw parallels between the role meaning plays in the communication. He tries to see what language is and considers its structure. The studies of Wittgenstein present a perfect background for development of numerous philosophical ideas. Our discussion concerns his vision of language. In order to understand his paradox of rule following, it is relevant to trace tendencies of his development as a philosopher. Wittgenstein in his early philosophy developed ideas of Russell borrowed from Principia Mathematica and was focused on discussion of false or true propositions. Wittgenstein was focused on application of logic for semantics. He was inspired by Frege and Russell and their considerations about axiomization (Kaplan, 2006). In the course of his creative activity, Wittgenstein referred to symbolic depiction and mathematic language in order to show a factual basis of the language. An integration of different approaches to solving the problem of what logic is, what language is and how these issues are reflected in an individual, make Wittgenstein a great philosopher. In his early theory of language, Wittgenstein reflects his ideas about interrelatedness of things and words. Thus, “if the words in a factual proposition were not correlated with things, no sentence constructed out of them would say anything” (Stern, 2006). A correlation between things and words is the basis of communication. Therefore, Wittgenstein uses philosophy as a ‘tool’ in identification of the language function. From this claim it is seen that the philosopher considers correlation between separate things, thus he refers to the ideas of ‘atomism’ developed by Russell, i.e. in his early years Wittgenstein considered different phenomena separately, like ‘atoms’, and in his later years he considered different phenomena in relation to each other. Further on, Wittgenstein developed his ideas and made remarks to his Tractatus. Gradually, Wittgenstein started to step back from his version of ‘logical atomism’. Firstly, in Tractatus he claimed that “A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given with it” (Wittingstein1922, 3.42 cited by Stern, 2006). Consequently, Wittgenstein moved to holism (Crary and Read, 2000). Thus, he rejected the ideas of atomism taken from Russell. Wittgenstein widened his philosophical views and started to appeal for consideration of things in integration and interaction. Wittgenstein started to claim about a set of logical elementary proposition and considered the structure of the language, which “might be visible on its surface and might actually be gathered from the ordinary uses that we make of words in ordinary situations” (Wittgenstein, 1968). Consequently, Wittgenstein descended to his later philosophy. The later Wittgenstein is of great importance in the modern philosophical paradigm. In a modern context of world’s development with overall processes of globalization it is important to trace the background of these tendencies, because Wittgenstein’s development from a philosopher who considered things separately to a philosopher who considered things in relation to each other symbolizes modern trends of globalization. Thus, Wittgenstein’s ideas present a fertile ground for philosophers and researchers discussing the nature of language. Later philosophy of Wittgenstein The lectures he gave to students in Cambridge (1933) were comprised in the Blue Book (1958). He didn’t find answer to philosophical questions in the myriads of definitions, he rejected a tendency to generalization, and he wanted to see a family of senses resulted from the consideration of numerous cases and not mere definitions. The main attention of later philosophy of Wittgenstein concerned studies of meaning and self (5.6.Tractatus). The problem of meaning is crucial for further research. It is evident that Wittgenstein in his early theory considered meaning as “rigid, based on a single, self-contained connection which, once made, remains authoritative, without any need for interpretation or any possibility of revision” (Wittingstein, 1922). In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein concludes that the meaning should be referred to flexibility and perceived in a different manner dependent on the context of usage or usage in different situations practiced by a certain linguistic society. Thus, Wittgenstein transcended from considering language as a static phenomenon to the language as a dynamic phenomenon. In Philosophical Investigations (1953) Wittgenstein considers meaning and language in dynamics. Moreover, in the modern anthropocentric philosophical paradigm these views of Wittgenstein maybe interpreted in the following way: language is a living creature and not a static essence. Nowadays, this statement is a well-known fact, but Wittgenstein belongs to the scientists, who initiated to consider a living nature of the language. Wittgenstein’s rule following paradox in Kripke’s interpretation Attitude of Wittgenstein to rules is the following: "any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning" (Wittingstein, 1968, p. 198). Kripke argues that in mathematic language rules work because ‘+’ has been used in numerous cases. There is a metha-linguistic usage of ‘+’, i.e. the one used in the linguistic society, as it is claimed by Wittgenstein. Kripke introduces a matter of quaddition a specially constructed function which is deviant in relation to addition. When skeptics start arguing why 68 and 57 will result in 125 and not 5 for example, there is a need to give answer to two questions: 1) "an account of what fact it is (about my mental state) that constitutes my meaning plus, not quus" and 2) to "show how I am justified in giving the answer '125' to '68 + 57'" (Kripke 1982, p. 65). Kripke claims that no exact answer is possible. In such a way, Kripke gives up his positions thus making skeptics to be right. Kripke intends to solve the problem of ‘meaning’ from a skeptical perspective. A well-known example of Kripke, which will be discussed throughout the paper, is determined in the following way: “But…how can I be sure that, given what I meant by ‘+’ in the past, that ‘125’ and not ‘5’ is the correct answer to ’68 + 57?’ as I now use ‘+’?” (Kripke 1982, p. 198). Kripke argues that it is possible to mean plus by ‘+’ and to get the answer ‘125’; it is possible to answer ‘125’ on the basis of previous facts; there is no exact answer to this question; it is not the case when one has to say ‘125’; it is not the case when plus means ‘+’. Here are five types of Kripke’s argumentation about Wittgenstein’s rule following paradox. Still, Kripke argues with Wittgenstein and says that it is impossible to mean plus by ‘+’ all the time, because one can lie; or it is possible to deduce with no appeal to previous facts or experiences. Kripke gives numerous arguments, but his main premise is framed by expression ‘there is no exact answer’. Thus, he reveals a skeptical nature of his problem solving: “I have no justification for thinking that I meant something or nothing by ‘+’” (Kripke, 1982). Therefore, Kripke introduces a problem of absence of justification about what individuals really mean, or, in other words, what the meaning of an intentional phenomenon is. Kripke considers the problem of meaning as a paradox. Both, Wittgenstein and Kripke apply paradox for the rule following problem’s solution. Wittgenstein agrees upon the fact that “there couldn’t be determinate facts about meaning, if meaning were construed in the way the skeptic assumes”. From the skeptical perspective, the premise must be rejected; the usage of ‘+’ can’t be based on personal experience only; the linguistic community determines the meaning of ‘+’. From skeptical consideration, the “truth-conditions of sentences” will fail in this problem solving. It would be more relevant to involve “use-conditions’ and claim that ‘125’ is the only right answer, because linguistic community acclaims this legitimate usage of the expressions. The latter explanation is closer to Wittgenstein and is developed on the basis of the principles of the meaning usage by the community developed by him. Consequently, it is impossible to talk about a private language, because any meaning used separately from community’s criteria and every meaning is used in a ‘rule-governed way’. In accordance with McDowell (Arulanantham, 1998), the rules of using one or other words are forced on humans by the society. All humans follow generally accepted rules, and there is no way “to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it” (Kripke, 1982). This is the way Kripke discusses a rule-following paradox. Moreover, he claims that “this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule” (Kripke 1982, p. 198). Kripke considers the rule-following principle in terms of skepticism. In such a way, the philosopher underlines avoidance of rule following approved by the society or linguistic community. At this point Kripke’s views diverge from Wittgenstein’s ideas. A ‘private’ nature of rule following is defined by Kripke as well. Wittgenstein’s idea about a rule following is expressed in terms of holistic views. The philosopher correlates the idea of rule following in terms of interaction between an individual and the society; in case a linguistic society follows the rule, then an individual follows the rule also. Therefore, the rule-following paradox is interpreted by Wittgenstein’s idea of integration and cooperation of an individual and the society. Thus, there is no private rule and not private language, because only the language community or environment may define them. This is the position of Wittgenstein. The paradox of rule following is discussed by Wittgenstein by means of philosophy. From philosophic perspective, as it is stated by Wittgenstein, everything is before humans; philosophy neither explains nor deduces anything; in other words, philosophy enables individuals to tkink over a certain meaning or any phenomenon. (Crary and Read, 2000). For Kripke, skeptical argument is the essence to get into the depth of truth of everything and philosophy is a ‘tool’ to penetrate into the depth of true and false statements of the world. This statement can be proven by Kripke’s choice of the third solution to the rule-following paradox ‘there is no exact answer’. He claims that whether he meant something or nothing by ‘+’ doesn’t matter, because no exact solution exists. The essence of finding solution to the paradox by Kripke is in skeptical discard of the community approved decisions, unlike Wittgenstein, who managed to solve this problem in terms of an individual and society relation. Criticism on Kripke’s rule of following The reaction of critics to the Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein resulted in a detailed discussion of the rule-following problem. In accordance with Simon Blackburn, “Kripke’s view that whatever dispositions we succeed in identifying they could at most give standards for the selection of a function which we mean. They couldn’t provide us with an account of what it is to be faithful to a previous rule” is worth attention (Miller, 1997). Blackburn belongs to normativists (or positivists), who perceive law or any phenomenon separately from the society; or ‘as is’. Thus, semantic normativism can be considered a view implying that “a theory of meaning may in principle fail to satisfy even given the assumption that it satisfies the extensionality constraint” (Blackburn 1984, p. 37).Blackburn joins Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. In order to grasp the meaning and reflect it, it is necessary to get the “essential normativity” of semantic judgment, as it is suggested by Blackburn (1984: 33). Next to other semantic normativists, such as Wright (2001), Brandom (1994) and McDowell (1984), Kripke’s function of standardization assigned to the meaning by him, is supported by Blackburn. As it is stated in the article by Arulanantham (1998), McDowell supports Kripke’s attempt to solve the problem of rule following and claims that Wittgenstein doesn’t support enough his claims, he just theorizes them. From another perspective, it may be argued that Kripke gives a more skeptical consideration to the problem of rule-following and doesn’t look for solutions to this problem in the linguistic society. On the contrary to Wittgenstein’s idea, there is a need for “a diagnostic deconstruction of the peculiar way of thinking that makes such a thing seems necessary (Arulanantham, 1998)”. Basically, followers of Kripke do not support his skeptical considerations to the fullest extent, but they underline his dominance over Wittgenstein in his attempt to solve the paradox of rule-following even in such a skeptical way. Opponents of Kripke’s vision are semantic anti-normativists. This group of scientists and researchers are focused on the anti-normativist vision of the meaning. In other words, they underline the necessity to solve the problem of rule-following paradox in terms of an individual-society relation, like Wittgenstein does. Jerry Fodor (semantic anti-normativist) doubts that “the Kripkensteinian (he means Wittingstein and Kripke) worry about the normative force of meaning is either a non-issue or just the reduction issue over again; anyhow, that it’s not a new issue” (Miller, 1997). Fodor’s supporters are Gluer and Pagin (1999), (Bilgrami, 1993) and others. An opponent of Kripke, Cora Diamond has criticized the way Kripke interpreted Wittingstein’s vision of words "agreement," "correctness," and "mistake". Kripke considers the meaning of the words separately from the words’ functioning context. Of course, this approach sounds weird in the modern philosophical and linguistic paradigm. Contextual background is primary in linguistic studies of word’s usage or in the field of translation. Therefore, the best way not to fall for Kripke’s constructivist interpretation of Wittgenstein and “to give an account of meaning in terms of assertion-conditions is to remain with our eyes fixed in the wrong direction” (Arulanantham, 1998). The same claim can be considered with regard to legal rules. Realists claim that “if language exhibits this baseline indeterminacy, and legal rules are built on language (and share all of its instability), legal propositions can have no determinative force either. Therefore, the realists conclude, judges are never compelled by rules” (Arulanantham, 1998). As far as it can be seen, rule-following principle of Wittgenstein applied for language, scientists and researchers may refer to different spheres of human activities. Thus, a vivid reaction to Kripke’s attempt to interpret Wittgenstein evokes considerations about normativity and rule following applied in a wider context. The discussion about meaning is an integrative part of philosophical theorizing (Arulanantham, 1998). Moreover, a wider application of Kripke’s argument and Wittgenstein’s ideas are related not only to the philosophy of language, but to other spheres of human actitivity. Summarizing ideas of Wittgenstein and Kripke Wittgenstein is a great philosopher whose ideas bind together philosophy and language. Logic of language suggested by Wittgenstein is a perfect background for the discussion about the relation between philosophy and language. Philosophy clarifies to people meaning of words in the context of daily activities. Furthermore, word’s meaning triggers further activities of humans. Wittgenstein interprets a real meaning of logic in a specific manner, the same happens with his consideration about the word’s meaning. What meaning of objects or ‘absolutely simple sense data’ actually is, – this claim is often referred to Wittgenstein attempt to interpret a word’s meaning. In reality, philosophical considerations about what meaning is has been a crucial issue for Wittgenstein: “I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the significant explanation, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence; for all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond language, but it is impossible” (Wittingstein 1968, p. 11-12). On the one hand, Wittgenstein underlines that an individual’s imagination can’t exceed his logic or ascribed by linguistic community rule-following. In order to consider the way Wittgenstein refers to philosophy in his works, his ideas were considered from different perspectives. Kripke interprets the work Rules and Private Language and reflects his ideas on the matter discussed by Wittgenstein. Still, ideas by the latter interpreted by Kripke are often represented in a strange manner and it is relevant to consider Kripke’s view only to get better acquainted with Wittgenstein’s ideas. Skeptic views of Kripke can be seen in his claim that “there is no fact about what you then meant by ‘+’” (Kripke, 1982). In such a way, Kripke claims that there is no evidence about what a word really means. From the perspective of Kripke, Wittgenstein rejects the “truth-conditional reading of meaning ascriptions in favor of assertibility-conditions analysis (Kripke 1982, p. 73). Thus, Kripke argues that no one really knows what one wants to say. Thus, there is no certain rule to define the real meaning of the words. Both, Wittgenstein and Kripke use mathematic or symbolic example to illustrate their ideas. Nevertheless, Kripke behaves like skeptic when he says that following a rule is on community behalf and an individual can’t behave following by rule by himself. Thus, the meaning of words is defined by one’s linguistic community and one can do nothing about that. Obeying a rule is on individual’s behalf but the rule is set in the community. Kripke’s ideas about Wittgenstein’s work have some advantages. He is focused on the issue of rule following, but on the other hand Kripke fails to clarify the ideas of Wittgenstein’s interlocutor which are thought to be mistaken because grasping a rule is a primary concern for interlocutor and not his interpreting skills (Deuten). Kripke tends to solve the problem from the skeptical perspective, but Wittgenstein relates the problem to an individual and to the linguistic community. Interpretation (Deuten) is defined by Wittgenstein as "There is an inclination to say: every action according to a rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another" (Wittingstein 1968 §201). Even in this definition of Deuten Wittgenstein uses a term ‘rule’. Wittgenstein protects his idea of the important rule of interpretation, because it is a way to perception of the rightness of following the rule and not a blind following. Therefore, interpretation is the solution to a problem. Wittgenstein shows a practical approach to the solution of a problem of word meaning. Conclusion Philosophy of language is a plane of evidence; true and false can be seen on this plane. No matter, whether an individual needs to relate an intentional phenomenon and the meaning, or he looks for the best approaches to determination of the meaning. In spite of the fact that Wittgenstein’s explanation of the word’s meaning can be found in the interaction of an individual and the society, makes a philosophy of language a special bound between the society and an individual. Therefore, approach of Wittgenstein to philosophy in language is not atomized, as it was in his early years, but generalized. Unlike the latter, Kripke appeals to philosophy as to a certain helpful tool used for restoration of the meaning in individuals’ minds. Therefore, the paradox of rule following is not a problem to be solved to them; it is a challenge evolving other philosophical problems. Works cited 1. Arulanantham, A. T., 1998. Breaking the Rules? Wittgenstein and Legal Realism. Yale Law Journal 107 (6), pp. 1853-1883. 2. Crary, Alice and Rupert Read, eds., 2000. The New Wittgenstein. London: Routledge. 3. Fitch, G. W., 2004. Saul Kripke. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 4. Kaplan, Morton A., 2006. Human Reason and a Common World: Why Wittgenstein and Rawls Are Both Wrong. The Review of Metaphysics 60, p. 359+. 5. Kripke, S.A., 1982. Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language. Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press. 6. Stern, David G., 2006. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. 7. Wittgenstein, L., 1968. Philosophical Investigations. 3rd. ed. and transl. by G.E.M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan. Read More