Development of Cognitive Semantics, the Approaches of Truth-conditional and Relevance Theory Schools - Essay Example

 Semantics is the study of meaning or sense of the word; it is primarily associated with the meaning of words used in a systematic pattern within the grammatical structure of natural languages. One needs to keep in mind that the meaning of the word can change with context or differ from the traditional vocabulary, which is why linguistic semantics is important as it deals with words and their meaning as encoded in the particular context. This paper will deal with the topic of ‘Principled Polysemy’ as proposed by Andrea Tyler and Vyvyan Evans. It will discuss the circumstances that led to its proposal, what the model itself proposes, and some of the critical reception it has faced. Principled Polysemy is a form of lexical representation of cognitive semantics in order to avoid the ‘polysemy fallacy’. The primary objective of this model is to distinguish between sense stored in semantic memory and the central sense associated with radial category. This model has been found useful when applied to a range of lexical categories like prepositions, verbs and nouns. It has also been used successfully in several languages other than English. In the scope of this paper, Cognitive Semantics as a field will be discussed, recapitulated and defined. Cognitive linguistics and polysemy may be themselves analysed and commented on from time to time. Terms like ‘polysemy fallacy’ will also be defined and discussed in the process. The paper attempts to critically review the salient features of this model and discuss its significance in the study of semantics in general. Works by Vyvyan Evans are cited most frequently in this essay. Andrea Tyler and Stephen Levinson are two other theorists whose works were also greatly significant in the writing of this paper. There will be a practical application of a cognitive semantic analysis of the much commented upon English word ‘over’, including applied ‘Principled Polysemy’ as demonstrated by Tyler and Evans in 2001.  This paper will first discuss and trace the field the development of the field of cognitive semantics, critically review the approaches of truth-conditional and relevance theory schools and come to a conclusion regarding the present significance of the cognitive semantics field. Words: 361 Words Critical Review: 1. Background: What is Cognitive Semantics? The study of cognitive semantics took off in the 1970s, largely as a protest against the objectivist trend of American and English traditions of philosophy (Evans & Green, 2006). The predominant stance taken by theorists of the time belonged to the school of the ‘truth-conditional semantics’. Eve Sweetser describes this school as: ‘By viewing meaning as the relationship between words and the world, truth-conditional semantics eliminates cognitive organization from the linguistic system’(Sweetser, 1990). In almost direct opposition to this, cognitive semantics sees meaning as the manifestation of conceptual structure. In other words, mental representation, in all its diverse and multi-faceted form, is highlighted. A leading practitioner of cognitive semantics in the 1970s, Leonard Talmy, has described it thus: ‘[R]esearch on cognitive semantics is research on conceptual content and its organization in language’ (Talmy, 2000). i) Principles of Cognitive Semantics: Cognitive Semantics accepts a few principles as its central concerns: That conceptual structure is ‘embodied’, i.e., abstractions are turned into concrete conceptions by the embodiment of experience. That semantic structure is itself such a conceptual structure. Representation of meaning is ‘encyclopaedic’, i.e., words do not represent neat bundles of meaning but are points of access (Evans & Green, 2006). Construction of meaning is also conceptualisation. To expand on this, serially, the embodiment of conceptual structure refers to the abstract conceptions that with the help of the backdrop of context, whether social or otherwise, get condensed into concrete ‘senses’ which in turn change over time and contextual shifts. This happens through the process of ‘structural mapping.’ The second principle is that the deep structure of language, i.e. of semantics itself is a ‘conceptual structure’ possessing a set of properties that define it thus. Meaning formation and inference is done in an ‘encyclopaedic’ sense. This essentially means that meaning is not considered as a neat package but instead as a point of entry to other possibilities of meaning it may contain. The formation of meaning is also considered a conceptual action. The generation of meaning happens in much the same way that abstraction gets reduced to concrete sense in linguistics. In other words, through the process of structural mapping, meaning is generated in the discourse of cognitive semantics. 2. Contextualising Cognitive Semantics: The two contending theories of meaning and its role in linguistics, other than cognitive linguistics, are: Truth-Conditional and Relevance Theory. It is primarily against these predominant schools of thought and study that the cognitive school of semantics functions. i) Truth-Conditional Semantics: The preoccupation with the nature of truth, words and meaning is an ancient one and can be traced back to Aristotle and Plato and their conceptions of mimesis. Plato and Aristotle were both concerned with, though in very distinct ways, with the idea of reality and art corresponding to it. There was a certain value attached to art that mimicked reality and it was an accepted fact that reality and art mirrored each other. This philosophy has influenced the truth-conditional school which accepts as truths any statements that describe a reality. Truth and reality corresponding is assumed to be an arbiter of truth. This approach is called the ‘correspondence theory’ also. Alfred Tarski, a philosopher of the twentieth century had argued that the meaning of a word or form could be understood as the truth if it corresponded with the reality of the world. Tarski has also claimed that a language that is self-describing cannot be attributed a semantic structure (Evans & Green, 2006). Tarski’s claim was that since in a self-describing language a word is defined by the use of more words from the same language, the objectivity of the definition is suspect. He suggests therefore, the creation of a ‘metalanguage’ above and beyond the ambit of the ‘object language’ to successfully define it. ii) Relevance Theory: This theory was first proposed and developed by the psychologist Dan Sperber and the linguist Deirdre Wilson, advancing the theories laid down initially by Paul Grice in 1975. This theoretical stand sees all verbal communication as following the pattern of ‘ostensive-inferential communication.’ In other words, the communicator explains himself through an act of ostensible behaviour with is then inferred and understood by the recipient of that piece of communication. For instance, when we gesticulate to represent things or actions. A mutual cognitive environment is necessary for such communication to take place because without the inferring recipient the ostensible communication is null and void. Of these two theories, the Relevance Theory has more in common with the Cognitive Linguistics School than the Truth-Conditional theories. This is because the truth-conditional approach relies on a strict, objective view of meaning in correspondence with outside ‘reality.’ It is therefore concerned with the use of structured metalanguage. Relevance Theory is more preoccupied with communication. Sperber and Wilson admit the role of encyclopaedic knowledge as well as contextual knowledge which leads to the creation of meaning. This is most consonant with the claims of cognitive linguistics. 3. Background: The Traditional Opinion on Lexical Structures: The lexicon has been traditionally viewed as a ‘repository of the arbitrary and idiosyncratic’ (Evans, 2003). The lexicon is viewed traditionally as a repository of random and particular or selective glossary of words that take place in a language within its grammatical structure and rules. According to Bloomfield (1933) "lexicon is like a prison [also]". In this particular context lexicon means the use of language within set patterns and well-defined rules. According to Chomsky (1995) the use of lexicon is rather like a "list of exceptions that does not follow general principles". The strict adherence to lexical norms and organization makes the use of words rather static which can be inserted into syntactic frames as and when required. It has, however, been realised in recent times that the traditional approach to lexical semantics is not compatible with linguistic facts. The main reason for this being so is that the lexicon is made up of static words which is not compatible with the dynamic meaning or word sense. 4. Introduction to Principled Polysemy: The Principled Polysemy is a model of lexical representation within the study of cognitive lexical semantics. It was proposed by Vyvyan Evans and Andrea Tyler. This model was envisaged a critique of and an answer to the ‘Full Specification’ model of polysemy (Evans, 2007). Its express purpose was to avoid the ‘polysemy fallacy.’ Principled Polysemy is also concerned with creating decision principles which make semantic network analysis more objective and verifiable. These decision principles have two major goals: (1) to help define what constitutes distinct sense and therefore, help in distinguishing between senses of the stored semantic memory (polysemy) and the senses dependent on the context (on-line) (Evans & Green, 2006); (2) they help establish the prototype for a given radial category (Evans, 2007). This model has been applied to different lexical classes with positive results, like the prepositions, nouns and verbs and with languages other than English also. i) Polysemy Fallacy: This fallacy in the methodology of polysemy has been discussed most comprehensively by Sandra and Rice in 1995. Sandra’s contention is that to see all contextual uses of a lexical unit is making the ‘polysemy fallacy.’ Some units may show polysemy without actually being representational instances of polysemy. Sandra and Rice attribute this fallacy to the absence of ‘scientifically valid principles’ (Evans & Green, 2006). This has been considered and countered by the principled polysemy model. In fact, to attempt to introduce more empiricism was one of the keynote features of proposing this model. 5. The Significance of the Principled Polysemy Model: Meaning, in this model, is treated as being fluid and temporal – i.e. meaning as changeable over time. Word-meanings are therefore derived in a way that leads to the creation of new lexical concepts called ‘Senses’ which become associated with the new form of meaning-extension (Evans, 2003). As a result of this, new senses can become conventionalised by this approach. Over time, the new sense of words can overcome their preceding sense and be reanalysed as no longer a direct relation to the original sense. This method recognises that the language user is not fully aware of all the senses of a word when using it at a synchronic level. Finding and developing such a system of deriving word meanings and the relations between different word-senses is crucial (Heine, 1997). How the semantic structure interacts with the concepts of linguistics is an important and controversial subject. The chosen system determines not just the semantics of individual items and architecture of semantic memory but the entire model of language (Evans, 2003). This is explained by Tyler and Evans (2003) as: The lexicon represents the pivotal interface between syntax, semantics and pragmatics; the representation of the semantic component of lexical items has crucial implications not only for a theory of word-meaning but also for a theory of sentence-level meaning construction. At stake are issues concerning the source of the information that is necessary in the interpretation of an utterance and the appropriate location of the productive (rule-governed) elements of the linguistic system. Such issues bear on the interaction between words and the human conceptual system. In addition, establishing the semantic content of the lexical representations directly impinges on the distinction between our conventionalised linguistic knowledge and encyclopaedic, general world knowledge in the process of meaning-construction, which is to say, the traditional distinction between pragmatics and semantics. 6. The Basic Tenets of Principled Polysemy: Evans (2003) describes the basic tenets of the Principled Polysemy model as the following: i) A large, vague form like ‘Time’ can be expressed, at the synchronic level, in several lexical concepts. Or in other words, Time exists in many ‘senses’ which are stored in the semantic memory. ii) These senses are derived from an earlier sense in a principled way. iii) At the synchronic level, these senses are can be said to be related by a semantic network. iv) These are organised in a Sanctioning sense, which may parallel the sense that is the earliest diachronically. This sanctioning sense is taken as ‘prototypical’ because it contains the citation of senses. v) The distinct senses are formed as a direct result of the dynamic process of meaning-extension. vi) Users of language do not always recognise that the various senses of a form are associated in a synchronic manner. 7. Criteria for Distinguishing Sense in the Principled Polysemy Model: Andrea Tyler and Vyvyan Evans mention two criteria for deciding what counts as distinct sense and consequently, what can be studied under polysemy: i) For a sense to count as distinct, it must involve a meaning that is not purely spatial in nature, and/or a spatial configuration holding between the TR and LM that is distinct from the other senses conventionally associated with that preposition; and ii) There must also be instances of the sense that are context-independent: instances in which the distinct sense could not be inferred from another sense and the context in which it occurs (Evans & Green, 2006). 8. Polysemy Exhibited in the Preposition ‘Over’: Tyler and Evans (2001) discuss the English preposition ‘over’ under the aegis of the ‘Principled Polysemy’ model: At base, we argue that the many senses of ‘over’ constitute a motivated semantic network organized around an abstract, primary meaning component, termed a PROTOSCENE. The many distinct senses associated with over are accounted for by interaction of the protoscene with a constrained set of cognitive principles. Accordingly, our more general claim is that the lexicon is not an arbitrary repository of unrelated lexemes. Rather, the lexicon constitutes an elaborate network of form-meaning associations in which each form is paired with a semantic network or continuum (Tyler & Evans, 2001). The two assumptions made in this argument are that: i) That semantic structure is derived from and reflects conceptual structure ii) That our bodies determine the ‘how’ of our experience while the physical world we inhabit determine the ‘what’ of our experience Previous approaches to describe the polysemy of ‘over’ have included attempts with the ‘full-specification approach’. Examples: i) The helicopter hovered over the ocean. ii) The hummingbird hovered over the flower. The relationship between the figure and the ground were described with the use of ‘Trajector’ (TR) and ‘Landmark’ (LM). The first sentence was therefore described as a TR – LM relationship with an extended LM, i.e. the ocean while the second was also a TR – LM relationship where the LM was not extended. This was termed the ‘full-specification’ approach. In the ‘partial-specification’ approach, Kreitzer claims that there are 3 levels of schematisation: (i) the component level; (ii) the relational level and (iii) the integrative level. Tyler and Evans go on to cite: Consequently, Kreitzer argues that the plethora of separate image-schemas posited by Lakoff can be represented by three image-schemas at the relational level. The primary sense, which he terms over1, is static, over2 is dynamic, and over3 is what Kreitzer terms the occluding sense. Examples of these are: (5) The picture is over the sofa. (over1, static sense) (6) Sam walked over the hill. (over2, dynamic sense) (7) The clouds are over the sun. (over3, occluding sense) (Tyler & Evans, 2001). 9. Conclusion: Critical Review and Assessment of the Cognitive Linguistics School: Cognitive semantics was criticised for its lack of strict empiricism. But thanks to the work of theorists like Vyvyan Evans and models like the ‘Principled Polysemy’ model, this criticism has been refuted to a great extent. Tyler and Evans were among the first to break away from the less empiricist tradition of Brugman and Lackoff, for instance. Seana Coulson is another theorist who has contributed to the empiricist influence in the assessment of conceptual integration networks. Cognitive semantics is yet to bridge the gap with the previous models of formal linguistics that it raised its protest against. It has not yet reconciled the difference in points of view that it has against formal linguistics as a result of which its treatment of the former practice is often dismissive and distorted. Cognitive semantics also needs to further expand its empirical base and explore regions beyond just grammar and semantics. It can apply its comprehensive structuralist models on studying subjects that lie in the humanities as well as outside of it. Trends in recent biochemical research, for instance, can merge Biochemistry and Sociology in interesting ways with the help of the cognitive semantic models. Anthropology, Psychonalysis and so on can all benefit from the empirical and yet humanist approach of the cognitive linguistics field. Words: 2555 References: Bloomsfield, L., 1933, Language. New York: Henry Holt. Chomsky, N., 1995, The Minimalist Program. Cambridge: MIT Press. Evans, V., 2003, The Structure of Time: Language, Meaning and Temporal Cognition. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Evans, V., and Green, M., 2006, Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Evans, V., 2007, A Glossary of Cognitive Linguistics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Heine, B., 1997, Cognitive Foundations of Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Levinson, S., 2003, Space in Language and Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lyons, J., 2002, Linguistic Semantics: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sweetser, E., 1990, From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Talmy, L., 2000, Toward a Cognitive Semantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Tyler, A., and Evans, V., 2001. Reconsidering Prepositional Polysemy Networks. Language, 77 (4), pp. 724-765. Read More