Personal identity. You are the same person now as you were ten years ago - Essay Example

Explain whether or not you agree with the following ment: ‘You are the same person now as you were ten years ago’. Word Count: 1489 In this essay I will examine the criteria necessary for the continuation of one's identity, answering the question as to whether I am the same person I was ten years ago. These criteria fall under two categories: bodily continuity or psychological continuity. I will also explore the further subcategories of the brain and psychological connectedness. I will conclude that, by defining personal identity as my brain, the main factors being my memories, personality traits, etc., psychological connectedness allows me to agree that I have maintained my identity. Firstly, I will show, through describing the limits of acceptable physical change, that bodily continuity alone is not enough to say I am the same person I was a decade ago. Some philosophers, such as Eric Olson, have claimed that the physical body is the basis of the identity (Olson 2003, pp. 337-338). This view claims that as long as one keeps the same body throughout their life, they remain the same person. For example, if someone commits a crime, as long as their body committed the crime, we can punish them for it. Therefore, as I am in the same body as I was ten years ago, I am the same person. However, there is opposition to the view that our identity refers only to our physical body as our bodies are constantly regenerating so how much of our body must stay the same in order for us to be classed as the same person? An example of this is the Ship of Theseus (Leibniz as cited by Gallois 2016). Many people believe that, at some point, the Ship of Theseus stops being the same ship. I could then also say I am not the same person I was ten years ago, as I have a completely different set of cells. But, with no detectable changes in appearance or attitude how could I prove I am a different person? Not everyone agrees that our regeneration makes us a different person, believing that the gradual change involved in the previous examples enables them to keep their identity, i.e. the gradual change of the Ship of Theseus. This means the gradual change of our body's cells, taking seven years to be totally replaced, ensures my identity is maintained. The need for gradual change is supported by Parfit's tele transporter thought experiment (Parfit 1986, pp. 199-201), describing a machine that should destroy one body of cells in one location in order to replicate them elsewhere, but that one day no longer destroys the original body, causing that body to expire within days. Parfit states that the original person that should have been destroyed would believe they are dying, because the individual elsewhere is just a copy of their real self (Parfit, pp. 199-201). This may be because a crucial part of the theory of bodily continuity, suggesting that we have to keep the same genetic structure. Because of this, genetic determinists realise that a clone would be qualitatively similar but importantly, never numerically identical (Chadwick 2012). We have therefore established that the regeneration of our cells falls within acceptable change, whilst being totally replaced with a non-human body does not. However, Bernard Williams describes a thought experiment where a person's body is replaced gradually with that of Napoleon's (Williams cited by Ninan, n.d. pp 1-2), showing it is in memories and character traits that show whether the subject is still the same person after the experiment. While being given Napoleon’s limbs has little effects on his identity, being given his brain is hugely significant. This suggests that the brain is the only part of the body necessary to have a continuous identity. This theory is supported by Shoemaker, who proposed a thought experiment regarding two men undergoing brain transplants. Each man adopts the others traits and memories, thus resulting in each man’s family deciding that each is in the other’s body. (Shoemaker 1997, pp. 43). This demonstrates that the body alone is not a necessary condition for the continuity of one's identity, and that the brain may be more significant in maintaining identity. If one’s brain is maintained as your own, no matter what body you reside, you can still identity as yourself. Here I have introduced a counter theory to bodily continuity, instead using psychological and brain continuity to explain what defines our personal identities and then how they can be maintained. In this paragraph, I will show that memories specifically are very important in determining our personal identities, but are unreliable and not alone sufficient for ensuring the continuation of that identity. More psychological components are further reliable in situations where memories are erroneous or have been forgotten. John Locke is regarded as the originator of the psychological theory. He argued that a person at an earlier time is the same as a person at a later time, if the later person remembers all the experiences of the earlier one (as cited by Weinberg 2011, pp. 1-2). Joseph Butler argues that this results in a circular position, as having first-person memories implies remembering that one performed them (Butler 1896, pp. 324). As this concerns identity, the fact I can no longer remember parts of my life would mean I am now a different person. Thomas Reid also objects to Locke's theory of identity with this example: ‘A young boy is flogged for stealing apples, grows up to become an officer and later becomes a general. The officer remembered being flogged, and the general remembers being an officer, but the general does not remember being flogged.’ (Reid cited by Copenhaver) According to Locke this means the general is not the same person as he was as a child. However, Reid argues although memory continuity is not transitive, numerical identity is (Reid cited by Copenhaver 2014). These issues can be addressed by determining between psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. Person A is psychologically connected with Person B if his psychological states are the same of those of Person A. Likewise, Person A is psychologically continuous with Person B if his mental states are related to those of Person B, by an overlapping connectedness. Therefore, while the general is no longer psychologically connected to himself as a young boy, he is still psychologically continuous with him. If I can remember certain points throughout my life that in turn connect with the aspects I cannot remember, I can still consider myself the same person. By appealing to psychology, rather than solely memories, we can avoid the issue of people suffering memory and, therefore, identity loss. People who have amnesia often demonstrate the same patterns of thought as they had shown before losing their memory, showing a continuity of self which goes beyond memories. More recently the importance of defining personal identity has been recognised. Thought experiments about hypothetical cases of fission have resulted in a theory in which we can survive without personal identity (Merricks 1996, pp 1-2). In these experiments a brain becomes divided into its two hemispheres and is transplanted into two bodies, the original person becoming two different persons. Neither of the resulting people would be identical with the original but the two new bodies would keep a relation of psychological continuity with the original self. A leading philosopher of this theory that asserts that we survive even without personal identity is Derek Parfit. Parfit asserts that psychological continuity can ensure identity as long as the body is in possession of ‘character and apparent memories’ (Parfit 1986, pp. 200). This would show that judgements on personal identity derive psychological continuity and not personal identity, suggesting that our decisions for the future are really a concern for whatever persons are psychologically continuous with us. According to Parfit it doesn't matter whether the future person is technically me or not. In conclusion, it is hard to determine whether I am the same person I was ten years ago as it is difficult in itself to actually define what our personal identities are. However, from my research the theory of psychological connectedness has greatly appealed to me. Surely I am the same person I was ten years ago if I have the sufficient psychological continuity to connect my present psychological self to my past psychological self. I can remember being me ten years ago, or in the very least can remember a time when I remembered being me ten years ago. With regards to my bodily continuity I don’t believe the specific body I am in defines me, but that my personality and character traits that are associated with my psychological continuity are more significant, as supported by Shoemaker (1997, pp. 43). However, Parfit does point out that by being able to survive without an identity, but not without a body, having a body is still a crucial part of being me. Therefore, as long as I have a body in which my psychological being, thus my personal identity, can reside I can continue being me. Read More