The CIA Created Osama bin Laden - Research Paper Example

Section/# Osama Bin Laden: A Creation of the CIA The horrific nature of the events of September 11 have discouragedmany would-be journalists or investigative reporters to analyze the connection that existed between the Central Intelligence Agency and Osama bin Laden. However, as with any form of investigative reporting, it is oftentimes necessary to consider those “less comfortable” aspects of the story and determine whether or not the Central Intelligence Agency continue to play a powerful role with respect to the formation and development of Osama bin Laden, and by extension this Al Qaeda organization, right up until the terrorist attacks of September 11. Accordingly, the following analysis will seek to engage with this very topic. As such, it would be necessary to delve deeply into storable roots of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden and determine whether or not a clear and determinant level of group exists with respect to the way in which this potential “asset” was handled. In accordance with the basic premise of investigative reporting, the discussion will be concentric upon those alleged and proven aspects of cooperation that exist between the Central Intelligence Agency and Osama bin Laden. Is the hope of this particular author that such a level of discussion will be beneficial in shedding further level of light on what can only be described as an increasingly murky and seemingly undecipherable relationship. As with many of the assets and informants that the Central Intelligence Agency seeks to develop around the globe, Osama bin Laden was of little importance to the agency prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Recognizing that fellow Muslims were being oppressed by an atheist regime, Osama bin Laden, and indeed many others throughout the Islamic world, set out to provide moral, material, and direct support to the forces that were fighting against the Soviet occupation. As such, Osama bin Laden left what many individuals would describe as a comfortable life and began to utilize this fortune, time, and energy as a means of funneling money and material to the mujahedin. Although it is true that Osama bin Laden began to play a more active role as the 1980s progressed, it was this initial activity that placed him on the radar for Pakistani ISI, Saudi intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Further, as it was the United States’ direct and implicit goal to see the Soviet Union fail in its attempted invasion of Afghanistan, coordinating with anti-Soviet actions and supplying these individuals with the required material and financial needs that they may have is a primary goal and elements of the CIA’s role in the struggle. Not surprisingly, the juxtaposition of shared interests quickly led the Central Intelligence Agency to Osama bin Laden. It is at this particular juncture that the relationship becomes quite murky (Inkster 7). Firstly, what can be agreed upon is that the Central Intelligence Agency, along with the Pakistani ISI, and Saudi intelligence, facilitated monetary transfers and material aid to mujahedin elements within Afghanistan; up to and including Osama bin Laden’s group. However, what is not agreed upon by many scholars, as well as governmental apologists, is that the Central Intelligence Agency ever had direct integration with Osama bin Laden. Instead, agency argues, up until this very day, that it merely cooperated with elements within the mujahedin that could have included bin Laden; however, never directly. This story begins to unravel as one analyzes the alleged link between “Tim Osmond” and Osama bin Laden. Investigative reporters point to the fact that Tim Osmond was merely a code name for the now notorious terrorist; used by the spy agency as a poorly constructed cover to provide direct support to him and his related co-conspirators. Yet, regardless of the information that has thus far been presented, a far more worrisome aspect has to do with the fact is that once the conflict in Afghanistan had concluded, the United States and did not distance itself from this character and instead sought to continue the relationship and fostered over the years. Leaving Afghanistan for Sudan, Osama bin Laden actively engaged in developing a more radical terrorist organization that would seek to redefine the way in which Muslim interests throughout the Middle East were reflected. Realizing that this would come in direct conflict to the goals of US foreign policy throughout the Middle East, the United States began to cooperate with the government of Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia as a means of ensuring that Osama bin Laden was forced to leave the nation. During his years in Sudan, Osama bin Laden is not actively known to have a direct level of integration will support by the Central Intelligence Agency; instead, he was most likely viewed as a liability that could potentially wreak havoc upon US interests throughout the region. Yet, once again, instead of directly dealing with the issue in seeking to either apprehend or kill Osama bin Laden, the United States instead leveraged international support as a means of forcing to relocate. This of course had an unintended level of consequence as Osama bin Laden determined to return to Afghanistan. Once in Afghanistan, the rhetoric and approach that the espoused turned decidedly anti-American. This was no doubt the result of the fact that the CIA, in tandem with many other agencies and entities representing the will of the United States government, and actively harassed and persecuted Osama bin Laden since his time fighting against the Soviets. Turning his anger and aggression towards the United States, many individuals with analyze the character and slow evolution of Osama bin Laden have pointed to the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency is ultimately responsible for turning one of its prior assets fully against the United States (Javaid and Noureen 210). Within the 1990s, Osama bin Laden utilized as financial resources and level of respect within the radical Islamic community to sponsor, planned, and bond a litany of terrorist attacks throughout the Middle East on American interests. Contrary to popular belief, the attacks on the African embassies for the attack on the USS Cole were not the first engagements that Osama bin Laden has been definitively linked to supporting and planning. Interestingly, many scholars that analyze Osama bin Laden have come to understand the period of the mid-1990s as a pivotal moment with respect to his development and ideology. Ultimately, these scholars and researchers point of fact that the initial bombing attacks and assassination plans that Osama bin Laden had directed were expected to receive an immediate and crushing response; at least in the mind of Osama bin Laden and his advisers. However, due to the fact that the United States apparently made only farcical attempts to deal with this threat, Osama bin Laden was further emboldened to realize and determine that his old handlers did not have the will or the desire to ensure that radical Islamic terrorism, as understood and foisted upon the Middle East by Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, would be dealt with definitively (Hitz 245). As a direct function of the fact that Osama bin Laden was able to carry out terrorist attack after terrorist attack without direct consequences, historians and biographers alike agree that the lack of desire to the Central Intelligence Agency directed towards apprehending this individual served as an ample encouragement for Al Qaeda and militant Islam to continue to plan further attacks and engagements in the very near future (Hirsch 4). Yet, perhaps the most damning of all the information that has thus far been presented is concentric upon the fact that even after the bombings of the USS Cole, even after the bombings of the African embassies, and even after it was proven that Osama bin Laden had a will and desire to carry out violent jihadist attacks on American interests throughout the globe, the Central Intelligence Agency continue to foster what seems to be relatively close, if not cordial, relations with this professed Islamic jihadists. As late as July 2001, merely six weeks prior to the attacks of September 11, a CIA station chief visited Osama bin Laden in the hospital; as he underwent something of a routine procedure related to urology (Altizer and Jilani 4). In the eventuality that such a meeting has been proven to have taken place, it is obvious that the Central Intelligence Agency could have easily apprehended or liquidated Osama bin Laden. The government excuse that had been given up until this point in time was the fact that it was difficult to locate him and/or the was extraordinarily well hidden within the tribal areas of Afghanistan and protected by an unknown cadre of radical Islamic forces (Preston 5). However, in the eventuality that the CIA station chief had direct knowledge of the fact that he had been admitted to the hospital and was able to go and visit them, the reader has no alternative but to come to the realization that a close relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and Osama bin Laden had existed since at least the mid-1980s (Brasrick 69). The final troublesome aspects of the relationship between Osama bin Laden and the Central Intelligence Agency is with respect to the fact that a litany of different investigative reports, both external and internal to the United States government, and failed to turn up relevant evidence concerning this linkage. In many cases, the FBI has stated that it has been stymied from analyzing many of the existing files for linkages between the Central Intelligence Agency and Osama bin Laden (Heilbrunn 7). As such, this is encourage many individuals to view the situation through something of a conspiratorial lengths. Although it is not the intended for approach of this particular author to engage the reader in an understanding that Osama bin Laden and the Central Intelligence Agency have cooperated in tandem with one another throughout the entire period in question, the evidence that has been presented and corroborated by evidence illustrates the fact that a very close relationship did indeed exist. As long as elements within the government will go to such great lengths to conceal the true nature of the relationship that existed between the United States intelligence community and the former head of the most notorious terrorist organization in modern history, it is doubtful if any overall inference can be made with respect to this question. However, by seeking to broach this issue within this particular paper, this student hopes that the reader will come to question the official narrative and determine further revelations in the light of existing knowledge. Whereas patriotism and a desire to protect one’s country wise of the very core of each citizens conscience, the desire to understand the true nature of this unique relationship should come a very close second. Works Cited Altizer, Andy, and Erum Rubina Jilani. "Ghost Wars: The Secret History Of The CIA, Afghanistan, And Bin Laden, From The Soviet Invasion To September 10, 2001." Journal Of Homeland Security & Emergency Management 2.4 (2005): 1-7. Criminal Justice Abstracts with Full Text. Web. 29 Apr. 2014. Brasrick, Geoff. "So Wheres Bin Laden? Ask The CIA." Foreign Policy 179 (2010): 69. Business Insights: Essentials. Web. 29 Apr. 2014. Heilbrunn, Jacob. "Bin Ladens Demise." World Affairs 174.2 (2011): 7-12. Political Science Complete. Web. 29 Apr. 2014. Hirsh, Michael. "Secret Love: Obamas Budding Romance With The CIA." National Journal (2011): Business Insights: Essentials. Web. 29 Apr. 2014. Hitz, Frederick P. "U.S. Intelligence In The Wake Of September 11: The Rise Of The Spy Commando And Reorganized Operational Capabilities." Harvard Journal Of Law & Public Policy 35.1 (2012): 245. MasterFILE Premier. Web. 29 Apr. 2014. Inkster, Nigel. "The Death Of Osama Bin Laden." Survival (00396338) 53.3 (2011): 5-10. Academic Search Complete. Web. 29 Apr. 2014. Javaid, Umbreen, and Nighat Noureen. "An Insight Into The Philosophical Dynamics Of Al-Qaeda." Journal Of Political Studies 20.2 (2013): 201-218. Political Science Complete. Web. 29 Apr. 2014. Preston, Stephen W. "CIA And The Rule Of Law." Journal Of National Security Law & Policy 6.1 (2012): 1-9. Criminal Justice Abstracts with Full Text. Web. 29 Apr. 2014. Read More