Why the Capture of Bin Laden Is Not Enough Justification - Essay Example

26 June Why the capture of Bin Laden is not enough justification When the United s successfully captured and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan on May 2, 2011, many people agreed that the means justified the end. Shah reported in The Guardian on July 11, 2011, however, that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) organized a “fake vaccination drive,” in order to acquire Bin Laden’s family DNA, because it can confirm his location. He divulged that the CIA conscripted Doctor Shakil Afridi, a high-level medical professional, to conduct a regional vaccination program, so that they could verify if Osama bin Laden was hiding in Abbottabad. In April, nurses gained access to the unusually-security-conscious compound, using the ploy of giving free hepatitis B vaccine (Shah). This news upset numerous healthcare and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), because it can create a major setback in their campaign against polio in Pakistan and other countries (Rauhala, 2011). Supporters of the program claim the CIA confirmed that the vaccination program was not fake at all. For them, it served a greater end of capturing a very influential terrorist group and it gave justice to all victims of the September 11 attacks. However, despite whatever good this program might have done, the CIAs vaccination strategy was not justified, because it produced hard-to-reverse effects on an already-ailing integrity of public health programs in Pakistan and other developing countries, on the security and credibility of NGO personnel operating in conflict-ridden areas, and on expanding conspiracy theories. The CIA cleared that the vaccination program was not fake at all, and this clarifies the underlying credibility of the vaccination program. This statement supports the justification of the program, because it stresses the responsibility of the Pakistan government in ensuring that the vaccination program continued, not the CIA. A senior U.S. official pointed out that the vaccinations were real: “Dr. Afridi was asked only to continue his program. The vaccinations were real, and he never harmed a soul in the course of this campaign” (Ignatius, 2011). Though it is claimed that the vaccination doses were not completed in some target areas of the program, this shows that the CIA did not derail or concoct any health public campaign. The CIA is not responsible for Pakistan’s success or failure in its healthcare programs. The CIA is only accountable for the success of its vaccination strategy, so that it can attain its primary objective of eliminating Osama bin Laden. Hence, the CIA did not malign all public vaccination efforts, since they only used an existing vaccination program. This argument lacks validity, however, when the role of the CIA in the erosion of the credibility of public health programs is not considered. It is not responsible for the general poor healthcare conditions of Pakistan, but it is accountable for the direct effects of its vaccination ruse on worldwide health public campaigns in high conflict areas. Moreover, the supporters also claim that the Pakistan health system and political conditions are to be directly blamed for its poor vaccination rates, and not the CIA. This claim is persuasive, because it highlights that Pakistan and the international community should not lay the entire blame on the CIA, because Pakistan has its own socio-economic and political problems that directly shape its healthcare conditions and programs. First, Pakistan is not investing on its people’s health, since it allots only “2.6% of gross domestic product” to it (Nature, 2011). Second, the political instability and poverty in Pakistan are the primary drivers of its poor healthcare system. Nature (2011) underlined: “Many cases are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a semi-autonomous region that is difficult to reach, in part because of ongoing military activity.” The same editorial stressed that Pakistani leadership is “weak” and its vaccination workers are underpaid (Nature, 2011). Moreover, people did not only reject the vaccines, just because of conspiracy thinking, but because these vaccines are not related to a more comprehensive healthcare program that responds to all their public health needs (Nature, 2011). This assertion lacks credibility, since it talks about the systemic issues of Pakistan, without considering the impact of American interventions on these issues. If overwhelming empirical studies support that this ruse did not have any adverse impact on Pakistan’s healthcare programs, especially vaccination ones, then the supporters of this ruse can claim that it has no significant negative effects at all on Pakistan. What supporters fail to acknowledge is the degree of harm of this vaccination strategy, wherein it particularly defaces the integrity of public health programs in Pakistan, as well as in other developing countries. In Pakistan, this claim is applicable, because it is a nation, where NGOs negotiate with tribal leaders, and if the former lose credibility, children will suffer the most. In the article, “Moral Fallout from a CIA Operation,” Ignatius (2012) criticized this CIA scheme, because it undermined “the integrity of public health programs in Pakistan and around the globe.” Millions of children in poor communities of developing countries are in dire need of vaccination and what the CIA did have roused suspicions against public healthcare programs, in general, and vaccination programs, in particular. This claim has a strong standing, because this vaccination ruse further dents the capacity of the national health department to address countrywide health issues and needs. When international, especially American-based, NGOs aim to provide vaccination programs, for instance, communities and governments may start questioning their motives. Thus, the CIA ploy serves to undercut the integrity of all succeeding public health programs, especially in developing countries, where it is widely needed. The human cost of this ruse cannot be undermined, as children will be prevented from getting vaccinations, because of fear for political and health consequences. This CIA vaccination tactic nurtures conspiracy theories, which is effective in eroding trust in public health programs. This argument is compelling, because it asserts the importance of credibility to a successful public health program. Extremist clerics and militant groups already use conspiracy theories to rouse people against America and the West and to recruit members. The use of vaccination as a Western plot may seem far-fetched, but now, it is real. Chambers (2011) narrated examples of conspiracy theories, where extremist believed that western powers aimed to curtail Islamic population growth through vaccinations. This theory sparked enough fear and paranoia in the North-West Frontier Province, and as a result, “in 2007 more than 24,000 children were prevented from being vaccinated” (Chambers, 2011). After the Taliban controlled the Swat valley in 2009, they closed all NGO offices and outlawed the polio vaccination, because it was an “infidel vaccine,” which “causes infertility” (Chambers, 2011). As a consequence, the polio virus was not eradicated and remained endemic in the country (Chambers, 2011). The World Health Organization (WHO) stressed that around $200m was required in 2005 alone to administer the much needed vaccinations (Chambers, 2011). This report indicates that conspiracy theories are also costly to NGOs and developing countries that finance these organizations (Chambers, 2011). This vaccination ruse also harms the integrity of NGOs, as well as endangers them. This assertion is sound, because the ploy presents more problems in Pakistan, where ministers in the North-West Frontier Province have formerly expressed “fatwas” (or legal opinion) that promoted assaults against aid organizations. These NGOs, by their very nature, are supposed to be non-politicized, but the CIA just gave them a highly-questionable political nature. This claim is convincing, because NGOs, in particular, will lose their credibility, if they are viewed as politicized instruments with hidden agenda. Moreover, militant and radical groups might escalate attacks against NGOs and their activities, because of fear that they are Western or American spies. On August 2010, Taliban men captured and killed ten humanitarian workers in Afghanistan, because of suspicions that they were undercover agents (Rauhala, 2011). Rauhala (2011) expressed alarm over this because: “Such incidents keep health workers out of high-need conflict zones, often the very areas that are in need of care.” Chambers (2011) provided further examples of violence against humanitarian workers. Oxfam stated that “225 aid workers were killed, injured or kidnapped in violent attacks” in 2010 (Chambers, 2011). These figures have grown 300 percent for the past ten years, because of greater work in conflict communities and mounting belief that NGO personnel are “agents of the west,” thereby becoming legitimate targets for militant groups (Chambers, 2011). The end does not justify the means, because the stakes are too high. The capture of bin Laden is not enough to rationalize its wider adverse effects on NGOs, public health programs, and children. Because of this ploy, the loss of trust might be greater than the need for life-saving vaccination. Truly, people cannot entirely blame the CIA for the plight of all children, who will not be able to get their vaccines in Pakistan and other conflict communities, because these governments are ultimately responsible for the success of their healthcare targets. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that because of this ploy, parents and militant groups, who believe that the CIA will repeat the same ruse, can justify rejecting these vaccines, while extremists can rationalize the widespread banning of vaccination programs and the killing of NGO personnel. References Chambers, A. (2011, July 13). Was Bin Laden vaccine plot worth all the risk? The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/13/bin-laden-vaccine-plot-cia Ignatius, D. (2012, May 30). Moral fallout from a CIA operation. The Washington Post, A15. Nature. (2011, July 21). Dont blame the CIA. Nature, 475 (7356). Retrieved from http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v475/n7356/full/475265a.html Rauhala, E. (2011, July 18). Why the CIA’s vaccine ruse is a setback for global health. Time. Retrieved from http://world.time.com/2011/07/18/why-the-cias-vaccine-ruse-is-a-setback-for-global-health/ Shah, S. (2011, July 11). CIA organised fake vaccination drive to get Osama bin Ladens family DNA. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/11/cia-fake-vaccinations-osama-bin-ladens-dna Read More