The Hyatt Regency Hotel: Analysis of Kansas City Disaster - Case Study Example

The Hyatt Regency Hotel, Kansas City Disaster Name Course title Date Table of Contents Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 Background Information 4 Hyatt Regency Hotel Disaster 4 Disaster Occurrence 5 Major Causes 6 Change of design 6 Use of Ineffective Materials 6 Excessive Weight load and Harmonic Movements 7 Lessons learnt 8 Sticking to the original plan 8 Defined Responsibility in Construction projects 8 Labelling and Offering Guidance 9 SCOSS Bodies 9 Conclusion 10 References 10 Introduction We are living in a world where growth and development are required in every sector of operation to sustain the growing demand that arises from the increased population. This growth and development requires every individual to engage in activities that guarantees productivity, progress, and sustainability with the highest standard of safety and security (Aggarwal, 2011, p.29). Moreover, infrastructure in all most economies needs to be upgraded if not to be redesigned so that future needs can be addressed as well as solving the current challenges facing various sectors of the economies. This calls for engineers to improve in their strategies, practices and designs so that they can help to make the world a better place with higher standards of living (Great Britain, 2010, p.23). Hence, their strategies, policies and practices should consider public safety among the major factors to be considered for any sustainable development to aim at reducing or eliminating probable disasters. Furthermore, it is important stating that most collapses are triggered by environmental hazards and natural calamities such as flooding, earthquakes, landslides and hurricanes among other natural factors but manmade factors also contribute to some disasters experienced on architectural infrastructure (Hayes, 2005, p.17). Besides, it is worth noting that when disasters happen, they result to loss of property, skilled individuals, family losses and increased economic burden that is irreversible and priceless to bear. Therefore, reducing probability of disasters occurring and improving working standards to ensure that all loopholes related to occurrence of disasters are sealed is a worth undertaking. Every engineer and individual has the responsibility to play in their pursuit of improved version of the current world (Laura, 2012, p.71). This paper looks into the Kansas City disaster that occurred outside Hyatt Regency Hotel in 1981 so that we can learn more about disasters and how to handle them effectively. Background Information Sometimes engineering projects go sour either during the project execution period or after the project completes. There have been cases where projects have been reported to collapsing and causing significant damages and killing people. Thus, occurrence of disasters is a global challenge that engineers and developers face in their bid to create creative, innovative and sustainable structures (Stoner & Wankel, 2010, p.15). The tragedy that was experienced in Kansas City outside Hyatt Regency Hotel in 1981 where two bridges collapsed is among such cases where disasters occur unexpectedly (Murphy, Alm, & Powers, 2011, p.127). This serious tragedy is remembered because it resulted to 114 death cases and 216 were seriously injured. It occurred on a Friday evening of July 17th when a Tea Dance was being held and was record as the most catastrophic collapse in United States at the time. However, in 2001 the World Trade Centre experienced a worse collapse in its southern tower after terrorists hijacked airliners and crashed them on the towers. The incident resulted to 2752 death cases and many scores of injuries (Parrish, 2004, p.11). Hyatt Regency Hotel Disaster It is worth stating that the construction project of the Hyatt Regency Hotel had cases of reported structural collapse cases during its implementation. Two years ago before the said major collapse the 40-storey building had experienced a roof collapse approximated at 250m2. This was caused by loose joint connection in one of the corners. The Hotel was opened officially in mid-1980s and comprised of a notable lobby atrium that had walkways connecting the two wings of the hotel that measured about 37 metres. The walkways that were on the second, third and fourth floors were made of glass, concrete and steel bars. Their cumulative weigh was estimated to be 29,000kg and were suspended from the building’s ceiling (Murphy, Alm, & Powers, 2011, p.45). On that day, July 17th, when the walkways collapsed there was a dancing event where 1600 people attended. To access the events of the celebrations, many people stood on the second floor walkway and some on the third while a few stood on the fourth level walkway. The walkways were arranged such that the second-level one was directly below the fourth and the one on third-level was designed separately aside. This made second and the fourth to share beams, more weight being subjected to the forth level walkway (Roe, 2013). Disaster Occurrence Suddenly, the fourth level walkway collapsed and landed on the second-level one and they both collapsed into the lobby atrium. This accident resulted to many people dying instantly, with significant number being injured critically. Many emergency agencies including volunteers, doctors, rescue teams, construction engineers and hospital staff came to offer help. Moreover, the collapse trapped people inside the debris and the hotel’s sprinkler system was disconnected and made the scene to flood. This inconvenienced the rescue teams but after 14 hours of heavy tasks the operation was completed although with major losses. The collapse had made heavy cloud of dust to form in the scene and this complicated the rescue operation due to poor visibility (Chiles, 2002, p.27). Investigations revealed that the engineers, architects, and owners had altered the original design after experiencing construction difficulties. The changed of the design had resulted to increased weight burden on the fourth floor walkway, affecting the supporting beams as well as tie rods. Adding to the increased weight of the large number of people standing on the walkways increased chances of collapsing of the structure. The steel company contracted to supply steel bars opposed the original Jack Gillum’s design stating that it was not effective. It proposed a design that instead of iron bars being connected to the ceiling the fourth floor walkway to be connected to the ceiling and the second floor walkway to hang from it. This eased the construction of the complicated design but did not effectively balance the weight in the walkways (New York Times, 1981). Major Causes Change of design Furthermore, investigations showed that the original design could accommodate the weight of up to 60% as per the Kansas City building regulations. However, the new proposed design could only accommodate half the load; this was identified after investigators scrutinized the walkway designs. Besides, original sketches were used before the final copies could be refined that could have identified the flawed proposal. The equilibrium weight to be carried by the fourth level walkway supporters was doubled and this created pressure on the equilibrium force of steel tiers and when weight increased beyond limit it collapsed. The resulting structure of the walkways after project completion was simple structures hanging from the ceiling with minimal sideways supports. Change of plan was cited as the main reason for the occurrence of the disaster (Petroski, 1992, p.27). Use of Ineffective Materials Furthermore, another cause was that the materials used by the builders and the engineers were too small to accommodate the design. Even after the design was changed the construction items were not changed and this created a loophole in the structure. The washers, beams, and ceiling rods created structural imbalance between the equilibrium force to be endured by the structure and the maximal weight they could hold normally. This was mistake that could have been prevented if considerations were made and regulations were followed (Walker, 2004, p.34). The investigations officer claimed that the newer design was cost-effective but it compromised its effectiveness and sustainability. It was also aimed at easing the construction time so as recover the delayed opening of the hotel. Showing that the contractors and owners were trying to beat deadlines without considering the effects of mistakes they made would be more fatal and costly. Hence, this made the disaster manmade as many investigators referred to it (Ramroth, 2007, p.49). Excessive Weight load and Harmonic Movements Finally, another cause to the disaster was the vibrations caused by the number of people who were dancing on the walkways. Given that the tea dancing party involved a lot of vibrations and movement, it weakened the joints of the walkways and this caused them to dismantle and crumble. Claiming that the movement were harmonic and created a wavelike motion that had the capacity to stress the equilibrium force holding the walkways together. Besides, inspectors said that the walkways could handle people traffic walking across but consistent weight upon them that was coupled with dancing movements created extreme pressure on their stability. The inspectors claimed that the original design which had weld plate had the capacity to bear the burden as opposed to the latter design (Baura, 2006, p.63). Lessons learnt Sticking to the original plan Some of the lessons learn from this Kansas City disaster is that there is dire need to stick to original design so that loopholes for disasters occurrence can be eliminated completely. The original design is authorized by the concerned bodies within a city after passing the requirements of building codes. These codes change from city to city and it is of paramount need for the certification of building documents to be verified by the council of the region the building will be constructed (Bartlett, 2004, p.35). This is due to varying environmental conditions, soil composition, landscape, and weather patterns among other factors. Moreover, the original design considers many factors and changes are done before arriving to the final design that is approved. However, a new design is done hasty and consists of many assumptions that introduce loopholes into the projects, resulting to collapses. Like evidenced in the Hyatt Regency Hotel, change of design contributed significantly to the collapsing of the walkways. This shows the importance of adhering to the original plan and if significant changes are done then authorities need to be notified. Defined Responsibility in Construction projects Furthermore, I have been able to learn that keenness is required during construction projects because a single mistake can result to collapsing of the whole infrastructure. It is the responsibility of all the involved parties to identify mistakes done, slight assumptions and missing information to the architectural documents. This eliminates the blame game that results when mistakes are made that result to accidents and disasters (Hurwitz, Heaslip, & Derek, 2012, p.72). In the case of the Hyatt Hotel, there lacked a group who took responsibility over the inspection of the whole projects and the issues hovered around engineers, builders, architects, owners, contractors and other involved parties. Besides, lack of proper documentation of the changes made was among the causes that surrounded the reasons for collapse. Therefore, all the involved parties should know their roles in the project to avoid conflict of interests in additional to ensuring keenness is observed during the execution of tasks (Collins & Kearins, 2010, p.68). Labelling and Offering Guidance In addition, another lesson learnt is that staff members should offer clear guidelines and instructions on the usage of different facilities within a building to reduce overburdening of critical areas within the building. Places like escalators, bridges, walkways, rooftops and halls need to have restricted capacity which they can hold at any given time. This can control occurrence of accidents and disasters with a significant extent. Therefore, labelling the capacity of facilities as well as offering directions can help clients. In the case of the Hyatt Hotel clear guidelines could have restricted people from crowding the walkways and dancing on them (Blewitt, 2008, p.54). SCOSS Bodies Standing Committees on Structural Safety (SCOSS) are aimed at providing advice to constructors, developers and other relevant groups on how to reduce disaster occurrence by erecting safe buildings. Moreover, they offer information on to satisfactory design, construct and inspect infrastructural projects so as to reduce any possible occurrence of disasters. If the concerned parties work effectively with such bodies they can be able to undertake safe and secure projects anywhere in the world. Therefore, these structural safety bodies need to be effective, informative and updated so that they can offer reliable services and advice accordingly (Manning et al., 2011). Conclusion It can be concluded that safety is critical and important to any owner, architect, customer, builder, engineer and any other relevant parties that use constructed infrastructures. Moreover, elimination of any loophole where disaster can be encountered is necessary to ensure that property loss, injuries and death are not experienced during construction or after project completion. Furthermore, the Hyatt Regency Hotel disaster in Kansas City was among the greatest disasters that have been recorded and that can offer significant lessons to infrastructural project implementers. Besides, safety and disaster management bodies should be effective in their operations. Therefore, it is of paramount concern to ensure that all the required regulations, laws and guidelines are enforced for achievement of safety and reduction of probable disasters occurrence. References Aggarwal, R. (2011) Developing a Global Mindset: Integrating Demographics, Sustainability, Technology, and Globalization, Journal Of Teaching In International Business, 22(1), Publisher Provided Full Text Searching File, EBSCOhost. Bartlett, A. (2004) Reflections on Sustainability, Population Growth, and the Environment. Renewable Resources Journal 15(4): 6-22. Baura, G. (2006) Engineering Ethics: An Industrial Perspective, Waltham, Massachusetts: Academic Press, ISBN 978-0120885312. Blewitt, J. (2008). Understanding Sustainable Development. London: Earthscan. ISBN 978-1-84407-454-9. Chiles, J.R., (2002), Inviting Disaster, Lessons from the Edge of Technology, New York: HarperCollins Publishers. Collins, E., & Kearins, K. (2010), Delivering on Sustainability's Global and Local Orientation, Academy of Management Learning & Education, 9, 3, p. 499, EBSCOhost. Great Britain (2010) Industrial Fatigue Research: The Incidence of Industrial Accidents Upon Individuals with Special Reference to Multiple Occurrence, London: Nabu Press, ISBN 978-1149908563 Hayes, B. (2005) Infrastructure: The Book of Everything For The Industrial Landscape (1st Edition) New York City: Norton, ISBN 978-0393329599. Hurwitz, D., Heaslip, K. & Derek M. (2012) Relating Transportation Systems Management and Operations Strategies to Policy Goals: A Framework for Quantitative Decision Making. Engineering Management Journal 24(3): 32-42. Laura, W. S., (2012), Research and Markets: Sustainability in the Global Construction Industry 2012-2013: A Global CEO Survey, Business Wire, NewsBank, EBSCOhost. Manning, S., Boons, F., Von Hagen, O., & Reinecke, J. (2011) National Contexts Matter: The Co-Evolution of Sustainability Standards in Global Value Chains: Ecological Economics Forthcoming. New York: Prentice Hall. Murphy, K. Alm, R. & Powers, C. (2011) The Last Dance: The Skywalks Disaster and a City Changed, in Memory 30 Years Later, Kansas City, Mo: Kansas City Star Books, ISBN 978-161169-1025. New York Times, (1981) Hyatt Tragedy Raises Questions of Responsibility. Accessed < www.nytimes.com/1981/07/28/us/hyatt-tragedy-raises-questions-of- responsibility.html > [30 March, 2015]. Parrish, W.E., (2004) A History of Missouri: 1953 to 2003. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press. Petroski, H. (1992) To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Structural Design, Visalia, CA: Vintage, ISBN 978-067973416-1. Ramroth, W. (2007) Planning for Disaster: How Natural and Man-made Disasters Shape the Built Environment, Kaplan Business, ISBN 978-14195-93734. Roe, J. (2013) Hotel Horror. Accessed < www.kclibrary.org/blog/week-kansas-city- histrory/hotel-horror > [30 March, 2015]. Stoner, J., & Wankel, C. (2010), Global Sustainability as a Business Imperative, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Walker, J.S. (2004) Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective, Berkeley: University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-23940-7. Read More

Thus, occurrence of disasters is a global challenge that engineers and developers face in their bid to create creative, innovative and sustainable structures (Stoner & Wankel, 2010, p.15). The tragedy that was experienced in Kansas City outside Hyatt Regency Hotel in 1981 where two bridges collapsed is among such cases where disasters occur unexpectedly (Murphy, Alm, & Powers, 2011, p.127). This serious tragedy is remembered because it resulted to 114 death cases and 216 were seriously injured.

It occurred on a Friday evening of July 17th when a Tea Dance was being held and was record as the most catastrophic collapse in United States at the time. However, in 2001 the World Trade Centre experienced a worse collapse in its southern tower after terrorists hijacked airliners and crashed them on the towers. The incident resulted to 2752 death cases and many scores of injuries (Parrish, 2004, p.11). Hyatt Regency Hotel Disaster It is worth stating that the construction project of the Hyatt Regency Hotel had cases of reported structural collapse cases during its implementation.

Two years ago before the said major collapse the 40-storey building had experienced a roof collapse approximated at 250m2. This was caused by loose joint connection in one of the corners. The Hotel was opened officially in mid-1980s and comprised of a notable lobby atrium that had walkways connecting the two wings of the hotel that measured about 37 metres. The walkways that were on the second, third and fourth floors were made of glass, concrete and steel bars. Their cumulative weigh was estimated to be 29,000kg and were suspended from the building’s ceiling (Murphy, Alm, & Powers, 2011, p.45). On that day, July 17th, when the walkways collapsed there was a dancing event where 1600 people attended.

To access the events of the celebrations, many people stood on the second floor walkway and some on the third while a few stood on the fourth level walkway. The walkways were arranged such that the second-level one was directly below the fourth and the one on third-level was designed separately aside. This made second and the fourth to share beams, more weight being subjected to the forth level walkway (Roe, 2013). Disaster Occurrence Suddenly, the fourth level walkway collapsed and landed on the second-level one and they both collapsed into the lobby atrium.

This accident resulted to many people dying instantly, with significant number being injured critically. Many emergency agencies including volunteers, doctors, rescue teams, construction engineers and hospital staff came to offer help. Moreover, the collapse trapped people inside the debris and the hotel’s sprinkler system was disconnected and made the scene to flood. This inconvenienced the rescue teams but after 14 hours of heavy tasks the operation was completed although with major losses.

The collapse had made heavy cloud of dust to form in the scene and this complicated the rescue operation due to poor visibility (Chiles, 2002, p.27). Investigations revealed that the engineers, architects, and owners had altered the original design after experiencing construction difficulties. The changed of the design had resulted to increased weight burden on the fourth floor walkway, affecting the supporting beams as well as tie rods. Adding to the increased weight of the large number of people standing on the walkways increased chances of collapsing of the structure.

The steel company contracted to supply steel bars opposed the original Jack Gillum’s design stating that it was not effective. It proposed a design that instead of iron bars being connected to the ceiling the fourth floor walkway to be connected to the ceiling and the second floor walkway to hang from it. This eased the construction of the complicated design but did not effectively balance the weight in the walkways (New York Times, 1981). Major Causes Change of design Furthermore, investigations showed that the original design could accommodate the weight of up to 60% as per the Kansas City building regulations.

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