Safery Development and Management - Case Study Example

Sаfеty Саsе Dеvеlорmеnt аnd Маnаgеmеnt Your name: Institution name: 1.0 Introduction Over the years serious incidents such as the Clapham Rail Disaster, Off-shore Oil and Gas Platform Disaster, and Piper alpha have been instrumental in prompting a reconsideration of how safety is managed in critical sectors (ACDS, 2004). In every case, there had not been total ignorance of safety concerns. Instead, the main problem was that the operators and designers of safety practices had failed to demonstrate a through and systematic consideration of safety measures. Safety standards that have been introduced after these accidents indicated a step change in the approach being adapted to safety regulation (Ambion, 2006). Previous approaches have primarily being focused on the prescriptive safety requirements. With the introduction of safety cases, the responsibility has been shifted back to the operators (Boisson, 2006). It is up to the operators to demonstrate that they have an adequate argument of safety in their operations. Nowadays, helicopters have become an essential aid for dealing with rescue and disasters (Beaumont, 2007). They particularly come into their own when they are used in operation during the rescue operations. Individuals who have been rescued from catastrophe or are endangered by disaster cannot afford to wait until damage has occurred (Aven, 2006). In fact rescue helicopters can contribute toward establishing this picture, and as a result should be promptly called out as soon as “a major incident has occurred. It is advisable that procedure for air rescue operation should be prepared in advance by an authorised body (CCPS, 2008). The final decision making power should be passed as far as possible to those men at the scene of the disaster. 2.0 Context and Scope The key function of CGH crew is to co-ordinate: Aeronautical search and rescue over sea and land Maritime search and rescue in inshore, offshore and shoreline areas Inland search and rescue. Provide first responder medical facility on ground and onboard CGH (Boisson, 2006), and Recover casualties and transport to hospital. These functions and responsibilities will be undertaken through the ability of the various organisation and authorities to: Communicate between search and rescue units and the coordinating authority. Receive details of vessels, aircraft and persons in distress. Communicate between co-ordinating authorities. 3.0 Legal Requirements Helicopter SAR operations 3.1 SAR is an individual country activity and is not regulated under European Union law; it is consequently regulated by NAAs (Boisson, 2006). In the UK, operation of a CGH is considered to be for the purpose of public transport and therefore it will be subjected to Article 12 of the Air Navigation Order of 2009 requiring a national AOC. National SAR approval 3.2 CGH may only conduct Search and Rescue flights if the operator has been approved by CAA. 3.3 In order to obtain a national Search and Rescue approval the operator is supposed to: Demonstrate to the CAA compliance with the guidance detailed in this CAP (Boisson, 2006); Hold a EASA AOC or PT AOC; and Hold a Helicopter Hoist Operations Approval in accordance with Part-SPA Subpart 1. Night Vision Imaging Systems approval 3.4 CGH will only be operated at night with the aid of Night Vision Imaging Systems if operators has been authorised by the CAA. Low Visibility Operations (LVO) approvals 3.5 CGH may only conduct LVO if the operator has already been approved by the CAA (CCPS, 2008). 3.5.1 In order for a person to obtain low visibility operations approvals he/she must complied with Part-SPA Subpart E (CCPS, 2008). Flight Time Limitations The operator is to establish and maintain a Flight Time Limitation (FTL) scheme adapted for SAR as approved by the CAA 4.0 HAZOP Hazard have been identified as a dormant potential for harm which can be presented in one or another within the Helicopter search and rescue. The potential for harm may be in the form of a natural hazard such as technical hazard or terrain. Analysis of the past incidents has shown that there are many lessons that could be learned with respect to the helicopter air and rescue planning. Therefore some of the measures that have been put in place to prevent air rescue accidents include: 1. The procedure that will be used to summon emergency services promptly has been incorporated into emergency plans. 2. Off-site emergency plans will state how environmental contamination has been managed, with methods of informing the crew members. 3. Sites where firewater run off could create a major environmental accident should consider with relevant bodies the best methods of managing the associated risks. 4. Emergency training and planning for major rescue operations and hazard sites have encompass all major accident incidents, and with necessary attention that have been given to smaller but significant air and rescue risks. 5. Effective communication of missing aircrew to the authority has been undertaken and associated procedures have been practised routinely to ensure effectiveness at any time of the day. 6. The associated guidance that ensure that past lessons have been learned have been incorporated in the search and rescue guidance. 7. The authority should consider providing information to the general public before and during the accidents to allay concerns. 4.1 How risk will be managed Where possible the air crew will be kept intact and work as a team on the incident ground, and for variety of reasons, the air crew may be tempted to self-deploy. This will be avoided because it is important to account for all the available resources. The crew members will be properly briefed prior to their deployment so that safety critical information can be shared. Once the crew members have been briefed they must follow those requirements and work safely. This will include wearing the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and ensuring that access and egress is properly secured at all times. Care must be taken to give crews sufficient rest, relief and refreshment. Under these circumstances the level of fatigue must be measured against the continued desire to work. A balance must be found between safe operations and crew morale. The potential for post incident stress will be recognised and person in charge of the air crew will be trained to identify sign of stress among the air crew. New crew members will be trained first before being deployed in search and rescue mission. This is important to reduce accidents. Increased maintenance and inspection to deal with cracks in the tail rotor-blade to reduce to reduce the number of cormorants available to carry out SAR missions. Aging fleets will be replaced to increased efficiency and reduce accidents. 5.0 Safety Requirement When the helicopter is to land or used to winch there are few safety requirements that are supposed to be remembered by the safety crew persons: Down-draughting can be severe from the helicopter and can be as a result of blade technology which can produce concentrated cylindrical blade rotation (Boisson, 2006). Therefore it is important for the crew members to protect the affected persons ( casualty) in addition should secure loose equipments that include that of rescue team. Non essential personnel should be cleared away from the landing/winching site and movement should be restricted at a minimum (HSE, 2009b). Leaving/Entering the helicopter The following rules will apply when a person leaving, entering, and flying in the CGH: The CGH should not be approached during shut down or start up. The CGH should be approached or leaved when it has been cleared by the crew members such as giving a ‘thumbs up’ signal during the day o at night a flash of the lights ACDS (2004). The CGH should be approached or leaved only in the direction that has been by the rescue crew. The CGH should not be approached or leaved near the helicopter tail, or the affected persons or other crew members should be out of sight for other crew members (Bolsover and Wheeler, 2005). Once people are inside the CGH, they should strap themselves in their assigned seat and they should not make any movement until they have been given instructions by the rescue team. (Beaumont, 2007). When the CGH crew are working on ground that is sloppy, the ground clearance/rotor blades can be reduced on the upslope side (Ambion, 2006). In this situation it is important, when crew being picked up, to adopt a kneeling position and stay still until the signal is given to approach the helicopter. Winching Deployment For reason of speed or fuel economy, the helicopter pilot may drop or land to pick up or drop of the crew team. However, the terrain may not be conducive the crew members may decide to use the CGH winch for this purpose (HSE, 2009b). When winching the following measures should be considered: Obey the crew member’s instructions/signals at all times. Crew should wear their helmets at all times when working with helicopter and if possible ear protection to protect from noise or head injuries. Boarding and existing If the crew members are using NVGs, normal torch should not be used inside the helicopter, as this will adversely affect the NVGs. A torch that is fitted with green/blue filter will be compatible with NVG operations and these may be available on the CGH. If light is needed at the back of the CGH, a NVG torch should be asked. 6.0 Hazard Identification The hazards or danger that present when working with CGH may involve one or more of the following: Suspended loads/static electricity Moving rotor blades Incorrect approach/disembarking/boarding Downwash Noise Aerials Use of radios. Manual handling Search/spot lights Engine exhaust Navigation malfunctions. 7.0 Hazard Analysis 6.1 ALARP Statement Associated Hazard: There is an eCassandra Hazard linked to this risk: H27- Minimum Safe Separation Distance Breached with other Aircraft. This may be contributed to helicopter failure of avionics system (HSE, 2009b). Includes formation and non-formation flying. Worst Credible It can be assessed that the worst scenario for CGH with regard to the MAC0-GA risk is collision and this may result in loss of rescue crew. Mitigation 1. Training: there is a comprehensive flying training system (FTS) that is consistently under review as well as being subjected to frequent internal and external quality audits. In addition to teaching the ‘see and avoid’ principle and assessing crew members visual lookout scan on every sorties (Ambion, 2006). The crew members will be trained on accident reduction through a combination of rigorous training, high standards and graduating only those crew members who are seen to be fit and safe (Boisson, 2006). 2. Information: there is a robust and well established system for the promulgation of CANps, NOTAMs, PINs and Late Warnings to CGH, both during flight via formation radio frequencies and take-off (Aven, 2006). Additionally, Aerodrome Manual provide a source of information on stn based ATC and radar services that are available. CAD is in use by CGH (Beaumont, 2007). Efforts continue to use CADS to provide information of civil emergency air assets and other GA airspace users. Mitigation CGH crew will be taught to make discipline radio transmissions on relevant frequencies e.g. Stornoway, Inverness, when entering areas. Loca civilian engagement programs will be used to enhance the mutual understanding of aviation activities. 7.2 Hazmat Awareness During a Search and Rescue response, caution will be required due to potential hazardous materials being present: Fumes from stored chemicals in both residential and industrial buildings may create an explosion/fire or toxic hazard; During a flood raw sewage may be spilled, contaminating large areas and houses. Fuel storage tanks may float or spill during a flood, creating an explosion or fire; Clandestine drug materials can be encountered in any rural or urban environment. Mitigation Areas where hazards known to be present, such as areas with oil and gas exploration or production there are hazard such as H2S that require specific precautions (Bolsover and Wheeler, 2005). Hazmat response and expertise can be accessed through the Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC), who will contact the appropriate response agency and notify the proper authorities. 8.0 Safety Functional Requirement When emphasis is made on four factors that are common to helicopter accidents-loss of control, weather, night operations and controlled flight into obstacles/terrain- the established rules will encourage safety requirement for CGH (Beaumont, 2007). These safety requirements establish flight rules and enhance communication among the CGH crews. Although air rescue helicopter fly “under unique conditions,” these helicopters are not the only ones that face challenges and land at unfriendly terrains with hazards such as towers, trees and wires, so the safety requirements should be of interest to all rotary-wing operators. New weather minimum for CGH between the surface and 1200 feet above the ground will affect all the rescue helicopter operations (Boisson, 2006). In order to reduce the chances of inadvertent rescue flights into instrument meteorological conditions, visibility requirements is added in order to operate clear of clouds. In their training, CGH pilots are required to demonstrate they are able to manoeuvre and exit IMC when they inadvertently encounter it. This will include flight-light conditions and the helicopter-induced IMC of rotor-washed snow (whiteout) or dust (brownout), and rotorcraft pilots must be able to recognize and avoid these situations. CGH operations will be required to be installed with more survival equipments when operating over water mass. For example, helicopters should be equipped with approved radar device or altimeter that incorporates one. 9.0 Safety Management Arrangements The hazard management process is not well understood or defined within the reference guidance by a number of operators, but forms an important element in managing risk to as low as reasonably practicable. Regardless of the size of the operator, the operator is required to include risk or hazard management process (Boyle and Smith, 2000). Although the procedures and systems may vary by the operator and need to be in tandem with other elements of the SMS, the risk or hazard management process should contain the elements and links that are shown below (HSE, 2009b). The CGH has a hazard registering system that covers the whole operations or mission or a number of location. In this case, controls that are identified for specific location are assigned local responsibility (Aven, 2006). The risk or hazard management system is linked to safety reporting and investigation process its Management of Change process, and to the QA function (Boyle and Smith, 2000). This will ensure that the risk or hazard management process is being triggered by reported occurrences and incidents, while, those parts of the process that are indicated are subjected to periodic management review. The management will develop document and implement a quality assurance process or system that is modeled to provide confidence that the risk controls that are specified through the regulation and risk management system or process are effective within all ground operation (Boyle and Smith, 2000), flight operation and maintenance activities (HSE, 2009b). This will include: Auditing of processes, procedures, documentation, training and records. An internal evaluation/audit programme encompassing all safety and quality critical activities within flight operations, ground operations and maintenance. The programme should be managed at the local operational level and be subject to periodic review by the air operator’s management. References ACDS (2004), “Major Hazard Aspects of the Transport of Dangerous Substances”, Health and Safety Commission, Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances, HMSO. Ambion (2006), “Approaches to Hazard Identification”, Ambion Consultants, Offshore Technology Report OTO 97 068, Health & Safety Executive, HSE Books. Aven (2006), “Reliability and Risk Analysis”, Elsevier Applied Science, London. Beaumont, J. (2007), “Clyde & Seillean”, presentation to Safety Case Preparation, The Industry Responds, Fire and Blast Information Group Technical Review Meeting, The Steel Construction Institute, Ascot, UK Boisson, P (2006), “Safety at Sea: Policies, Regulations and International Law”, Bureau Veritas, Paris Bolsover, A.J. & Wheeler, M. (2005), “Decision-Making to Treat an Explosion Hazard”, Conference on Safety on Offshore Installations. Boyle, P. & Smith, E.J. (2000), “Emergency Planning using the HSE’s Evacuation, Escape and Rescue (EER) HAZOP Technique”, Hazards XV, Symposium Series No.147, Institution of Chemical Engineers, Rugby. CCPS (2008), “Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedure”, 2nd edition, Center for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York. HSE (2009b), “Reducing Error and Influencing Behaviour”, HSG 48, Health and Safety Executive, HSE Books, Sudbury, UK. Read More