The Manezh Fire in Moscow - Case Study Example

Case Study: The Manezh Fire in Moscow, 14 March 2004 Table of Contents Introduction 2 Part One: Chain of Events and Possible Causes of the Fire 3 1.1 Description of the Event 3 1.2 Factors Contributing to the Severity of the Fire 3 1.3 Possible Causes of the Fire: Indications of Arson 4 Part Two: Lessons from the Manezh Fire 5 2.1 Flaws in Fire Safety Enforcement 5 2.2 Aging and Poorly-Built Structures 5 2.3 The Effectiveness of the Emergency Response 6 Part Three: Manezh in Preston – A Hypothetical Event 6 3.1 Buildings in Preston Comparable to the Manezh 6 3.2 A Comparison of British and Russian Fire Code Enforcement 6 3.3 The Response of Preston’s Emergency Services 7 Conclusion 7 References 8 Introduction On the night of Sunday, 14 March 2004 the Manezh, a large exhibition hall near the western wall of the Kremlin in central Moscow, was completely gutted by a fire, resulting in the deaths of two fire-fighters. The Manezh (which got its name from the French word manège, meaning “riding school”) was built between 1817 and 1825 to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the Russian victory over Napoleon. (Brooke, 2006) The most unique feature of the building was the immense open space it enclosed. Tsar Alexander I wanted a building large enough for cavalry exercises to be conducted indoors, and thus the Manezh was constructed with heavy, 45 metre-long larch beams bracing the roof which rested only on the low, colonnaded walls and provided an unobstructed floor area of 6,750 square metres. (Johnson, 2005) Used since Soviet times as an exhibition hall, its near-destruction was considered a tragic loss of one of Moscow’s landmarks. Location of Manezh Exhibition Hall in Moscow, Russia (Google Earth image) This case study will first summarise the incident, with particular attention to the possible causes of the fire, and structural and other factors that may have contributed to its severity. The flaws in fire safety regulation and enforcement, the poor condition of many buildings, and the obstacles faced by fire services in Russia that were revealed by the Manezh fire will be discussed. And finally, a hypothetical case of a similar fire occurring in the Indoor Market in Preston will be examined. The most serious limitation this case study faces is the absence of an official report by the Moscow authorities on the Manezh fire; consequently, research is drawn from other secondary sources, which are fortunately numerous enough to provide a fairly complete picture of the event and its consequences. Part One: Chain of Events and Possible Causes of the Fire 1.1 Description of the Event At approximately 9:14 p.m. on Sunday, 14 March 2004, a Moscow traffic warden reported a fire visible in the upper portion of the Manezh building. Fire-fighting units responded relatively quickly, but because of the vast size of the building and its wooden frame construction, the fire spread rapidly. Within an hour of the fire’s first report, about half of the building’s roof had collapsed, according to Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov. (Nerman, 2004) By 11:30 p.m., the fire had been declared a Level Five emergency – the most serious category – and up to 100 fire-fighting vehicles and 500 personnel were on the scene, with a 50-metre crane and water-dropping helicopters being deployed to prevent the fire from spreading to the nearby Kremlin grounds and the Moscow State University. (O’Flynn, 2004 and Holley, 2004) The Manezh Hall by that time was virtually destroyed, with the entire roof collapsing and the interior fully-engulfed in flames. The fire personnel were successful in keeping the blaze from spreading to other buildings, although the intense heat of the fire melted some window frames and shattered glass on the nearest building of the Moscow State University across the street. (O’Flynn, 2004) The Russian ITAR-TASS News Agency reported two fire-fighters who had been in the attic when the roof collapsed were killed, and that a third was hospitalised with burns and smoke inhalation. (Holley, 2004) Fortunately, there were no other reported deaths or serious injuries since the building had been empty when the fire started, with only a few security guards on duty who were able to quickly escape. The fire was finally brought under control after midnight on 15 March, with personnel remaining on the scene for much of the following day for mopping-up operations. (O’Flynn, 2004) The Manezh Hall was almost completely destroyed by the fire, with only the masonry outer walls left standing. In little more than a year, however, it was rebuilt and opened again in April 2005. (Johnson, 2005) 1.2 Factors Contributing to the Severity of the Fire From the various news reports of the Manezh Hall fire, it appears there were at least five significant factors that contributed to the fire’s severity: The fire was not detected early: As reported, the fire was first spotted by a traffic warden on the street outside the building at 9:14 p.m. The building’s security guards later stated that on their last walk-through of the building at 9:00 p.m. there was no sign of fire (The Russia Journal, 2004), but it is not clear one way or the other whether their inspection included the attic space of the building, where the fire started. In any event, the fire was already quite large by the time the alarm was sounded. The wooden construction of the building: The roof framework of the Manezh consisted of trusses constructed of long (45 metres) larch-wood beams, and was partially-covered by a 40mm-thick wood plank floor to create an attic space under the roof. Even though the floor and roof frame components had been treated with a fire retardant three years earlier, (The Russia Journal, 2004) these parts were completely burned. Because of the unique design of the Manezh, with the frame ends of the roof being supported only by the outer walls, once the roof and attic structure was compromised by the fire, there was nothing to prevent its complete collapse into the building’s interior. High winds: The news reports all note that a strong breeze helped to spread the fire and was of concern to the fire personnel, fearing the fire might spread to the nearby Kremlin and the Moscow State University. Possible fire code violations and lack of building insurance: The Moscow fire department had inspected the Manezh in April 2003 and cited the building for 17 code violations, in a statement given to the Russian Internet news agency Gazeta.ru and reported by The Moscow Times. (O’Flynn, 2004) Those violations were not detailed. The Manezh, however, was not insured. If it had been, it is probable that serious fire safety deficiencies, if any, would have been addressed, since the requirements of the agency that would be expected to pay for damage to the building might conceivably carry more authority than the city officers who could only threaten a small fine. Possible arson: This will be discussed in greater detail in the following section, but the rapid spread of the fire could have been the result of its being intentionally started. 1.3 Possible Causes of the Fire: Indications of Arson One of the first suspicions of the authorities was that the Manezh fire was the result of terrorism, or a politically-motivated act of arson; the fire occurred shortly after the closing of the polls in Russia’s national elections, where President Vladimir Putin had just won a second term in office. These causes were quickly ruled out by the authorities, even before the fire had been extinguished: Moscow Mayor Luzhkov blamed the fire on "a short circuit that might have been a result of the air-flushing of the air-conditioning system” and the Main Interior Directorate of Moscow said there was no evidence of terrorism in statements to ITAR-TASS reported at 21:04 GMT, or just after midnight Moscow time on 14 March, while the Manezh was still very much on fire. (Gateway to Russia, 15 March 2004) Other possible causes cited were a carelessly discarded cigarette or a firecracker thrown by one of the people celebrating Putin’s election victory in the streets around the Manezh. (The Russia Journal, 2004) The FSB (Federal Security Service) and the city’s chief architect ruled out an electrical fault, contradicting the Mayor’s assertion. (O’Flynn, 2004) Other investigators pointed out that while the wooden attic and roof framework could burn, they were extremely stout and would be difficult to ignite without the aid of a flammable substance. Employees of the Manezh stated that the attic space was very clean, and that dangerous insulating materials such as peat or tobacco that were sometimes used in old Russian buildings had been long removed from the Manezh; indeed, investigators found no evidence of any of these dangerous materials in the debris. The firecracker idea was similarly dismissed, since the windows in the building had been tightly shut. (The Russia Journal, 2004) And finally, even though it was certainly not proof of anything, public suspicion was that the building had been intentionally burned. Rapid development in Moscow for several years had been accompanied by a large number of fires in old buildings occupying valuable real estate. And plans that had been drawn up for an extensive remodeling of the Manezh, including the building of an underground car park, had been rejected by the City Council shortly before the fire. (Brooke, 2006) For many, the coincidence was too suspicious to ignore. The FSB on 18 March finally arrived at the conclusion that arson was the likely cause. (O’Flynn, 2004) The official investigation report was not made public, however, and the issue seemed to have quietly faded. Part Two: Lessons from the Manezh Fire 2.1 Flaws in Fire Safety Enforcement Since the fall of the Communist government in 1991, Russia has had an atrocious record in fire safety; in 2008, more than 15,000 people died in fires, and 2,000 more died in January 2009. Corruption among building owners and fire inspectors is anecdotally believed to be a widespread problem. In the case of the Manezh Hall, however, there were clear problems; 17 code violations were on record nearly a year before the fire, and the building was uninsured. (O’Flynn, 2004) Stronger enforcement of fire safety regulations and mandatory property insurance would have likely prevented or at least minimised the scale of the disaster. 2.2 Aging and Poorly-Built Structures The country’s aging infrastructure of crumbling, poorly-built structures and outdated electrical and water systems is blamed for much of the enormous loss of life and property due to fires. (Kuznetsov, 2009) The Manezh Hall, while by no means a derelict, is still a good example of the sorts of obstacles faced by Russia’s fire services, particularly in the country’s many old buildings. The Manezh was a risky building under the best conditions, with its unusually expansive, 187 year-old wooden internal structure; added to that the lax regard for fire safety, and it is probably fair to say it was an accident waiting to happen. 2.3 The Effectiveness of the Emergency Response While the news reports indicate that the Moscow fire services responded quickly with large numbers of men and equipment, the circumstances of the Manezh fire still raise some questions regarding the alert and response system. The Manezh Hall is located at the very heart of Russia, less than 200 metres’ distance from the walls of the Kremlin. That a serious fire in a huge building within this historically and politically important area would not be noticed until it was too late to save the building points to an appalling lack of security, as well as the absence of a basic fire detection and alarm system in the Manezh. Part Three: Manezh in Preston – A Hypothetical Event 3.1 Buildings in Preston Comparable to the Manezh There are no buildings in Preston that are very similar to the Manezh Hall in Moscow, due to its unique size, architecture, and age. For the purposes of this hypothetical case, however, there are two buildings that could be considered as having some comparable features: the Guild Hall theatre building and the Indoor Market building. Of the two, the Indoor Market building is closest in terms of overall size and use to the Manezh Hall, although its interior arrangement is considerably different. 3.2 A Comparison of British and Russian Fire Code Enforcement In the case of the Manezh Hall, there were three significant failures in the area of fire safety: unresolved fire code violations (although these were not detailed), lack of building insurance, and the apparent absence of a detection and alert system. It cannot be said with certainty that violations of the fire and building codes would not exist in the case of Preston’s Indoor Market building, but it seems unlikely that they would. Primary fires (those attended by five or more engines), accidental fires in dwellings, and deliberate fires have all declined in Preston for the past several years. (LFRS, 2008) It would be counter-intuitive to suggest that this reduction in fire activity could happen despite a disregard for fire safety and regulations. And while it is true that the Indoor Market, as a facility owned by the City of Preston, is self-insured, the backing of the government in the case of losses is dependent on a strict adherence to all applicable safety regulations. (Preston City Council, 2008) Those regulations include the provision of fire detection and automated alarm systems in buildings, as detailed in the Fire Safety – Approved Document B of the Building Regulations 2000. 3.3 The Response of Preston’s Emergency Services The response time of the fire and rescue services in Preston averages below six minutes from the time the alarm is raised until the arrival of the first truck on the scene. (LFRS, 2008) The main fire station in Preston is approximately three kilometres from the Indoor Market by way of the main roads, with nearby stations at Penwortham and Bamber Bridge being approximately 3.5 and 6.4 kilometres away, respectively. Since the entire fire and rescue service of Lancashire is organised on a county-wide basis, in a serious emergency a large number of assets could be deployed very quickly, in much the same manner as the city-wide alarm in Moscow for the Manezh fire. (LFRS, 2008) Conclusion This study has briefly summarised the chain of events, possible causes, and consequences of the Manezh Hall Fire in Moscow on 14 March 2004, and considered, however improbably, the possibility of a similar scenario occurring in Preston. The conclusion that can be drawn is that, even despite the obvious danger of arson fires, lax attention to fire safety and code enforcement along with a large number of old and unsafe buildings increase fire hazards and risks dramatically in Russia. These hazards and risks are absent or at least greatly reduced in the United Kingdom, thanks to better enforcement and inspection procedures, and an altogether more attentive public and government. Works Cited Approved Document B, Volume 2 – Buildings other than dwellinghouses. (PDF document) London: Department for Communities and Local Government, April 2007. Available from: . Brooke, Caroline. (2006) Moscow: A Cultural History. New York: Oxford University Press. 14 March 2004 22:13 - Moscow mayor confirms short circuit as cause of Manezh fire, rules out arson (2004) ITAR-TASS wire service report. [Internet] Gateway to Russia, 15 March 2004. Available from: [Accessed 3 March 2009]. Holley, David. (2004) Fire Engulfs Russian Landmark. The Los Angeles Times, 15 March 2004, p. A-8. Johnson, David (Ed.). (2005) Ninth bulletin from the Moscow Architecture Preservation Society (MAPS) [Internet], 29 April 2005. Johnson’s Russia List. Available from: [Accessed 2 March 2009]. Kuznetsov, Alexsei. (2009) Russia's Burning Problem. World Watch, 4 February 2009. CBS News. [Internet] Available from: [Accessed 3 March 2009]. Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS). (2008) Performance Report and Action Plan 2008. [Internet/PDF document] Available from: [Accessed 3 March 2009]. Nerman, Anneli. (2004) Fire Guts Historic Hall Off Red Square. Associated Press wire report, 15 March 2004. [Internet] Firehouse.com. Available from: [Accessed 2 March 2009]. O’Flynn, Kevin. (2004) Fire Destroys Historic Manezh Hall. The Moscow Times, 15 March 2004. [Internet] Reprint at Rusnet. Available from: [Accessed 2 March 2009]. O’Flynn, Kevin. (2004) Blaze Guts the Manezh. The Moscow Times, 16 March 2004. [Internet] Reprint at Rusnet. Available from: [Accessed 2 March 2009]. O’Flynn, Kevin. (2004) Manezh Fire Was No Accident. The Moscow Times, 19 March 2004. [Internet] From the Highbeam Research database. Available from: [Accessed 3 March 2009]. Preston City Council. (2008) Welcome to Preston. (homepage with indexed links) [Internet], 2008. Available from: [Accessed 2 March 2009]. The Russia Journal. (2004) Moscow hall fire: arson possible. Report from RosBusiness Consulting, 18 March 2004. [Internet] The Russia Journal. Available from: [Accessed 2 March 2009]. Read More