Maintenance and Collapse and the Mississippi River Bridge - Case Study Example

Name: Tutor: Title: Maintenance and Collapse: The I-35W Mississippi River Bridge Course: Date Maintenance and Collapse: The I-35W Mississippi River Bridge Introduction The bridge was designed by Sverdrup & Parcel to 1961 American Association of State Highway Officials standard specifications. The construction contract cost was worth more than $5.2 million during that time. Construction started within 1964 and the bridge started being used within 1967. The bridge has 14 spans that extended 1,907 feet and three key spans were of deck truss construction whereas the 11 spans were made from steel multi-girder construction and the other two were concrete slab construction. The piers were not constructed within the navigation channel but rather the bridge center span contained a single 140 meter steel arched over 119 meter channel (Patrick 2011). When the bridge collapsed, it was still the most recent river crossing constructed on a new site within Minneapolis. Following the ebb of the building boom in 1970s, infrastructure management shifted into inspection and maintenance. Basically, the bridge had been rated as structurally deficient from 1990and yearly inspections started in 1993. In 2005, the bridge sufficiency rating was 50% and just 4% comparable scored lower than 50%. The main reason for the bridge being structurally deficient was due t corrosion within bearings. Signs of cracking and fatigue were identified and just patch-up repairs were carried out (Patrick 2011). A week before the collapsing occurred, minor constructions and 4 out of 8 lanes had been closed for resurfacing. 575,000 lbs. of construction supplies and equipment were on the bridge and around 100 vehicles were on the bridge during the rush hour when the bridge collapsed. During the collapsing, the bridge was under so high pressure with the construction work that was being carried out. A design flaw steel plates linked to girders were under so high stress with the construction equipment which caused the separation of plates and ensuing collapsing. During inspections, the bridge was categorized as a non redundant structure which implied that if one part failed, the entire bridge would collapse. In addition, there was corrosion where the paint systems had declined (Patrick 2011). The bridge was an eight-lane steel that transmitted interstate 35W across Mississippi River, within Minnesota. In 2007, the bridge collapsed. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the cause of the bridge’s collapse was an error of the design. An Allowable Stress Methodology was utilized in designing the bridge, where the stresses resulting from specific design loads were supposed to be less than material-specific allowable stresses. The methodology incorporated safety within the design load requirement as well as within the allowable stress level. The design loads consisted of the dead load of the bridge weight along with a worst-case live load equivalent to numerous lanes of heavy trucks and an additional 50% of the live load to counter dynamic impact. Under the design loads that were used, the stress within every component was supposed not to exceed 55% of the yield stress and this was dependant on the form of load applied (tension, compression, or shear). The acceptable stressed for truss members within compression were reduced more to protect any collapsing (Ringle 2012). The bridge started being constructed within 1964 and completed within 1967. After its completion, infrastructural management moved towards inspection and maintenance (Charlotte 2002). This report will analyze the dramatic collapse of the bridge during the maintenance period and the contractual issues involved. Mode of failure Black ice prevention system The temperature of the bridge hit −30 °F (−34 °C) on 19th December 1985. Vehicles passing through the bridge experienced black ice and the black ice piled up massively on the bridge on the northbound part. Within 1996, it was established that the bridge was the most unreliable weather mark within the Twin Cities freeway system, due to the thin layer of black ice that formed often when temperatures reduced to 30s Fahrenheit (4 °C to -1 °C) and below. The bridge was near Saint Anthony Falls and this greatly alleviated the icing problem and the spot was noted fro regular delays and collisions. In 1999, efforts towards reducing the black ice on the bridge began and towards the end of the year, temperature-activated nozzles were entrenched on the bridge deck to spray using potassium, acetate solution to ensure that the area was freed the black ice. The system started operating in 2000 and it has been envisaged that the potassium acetate might have played a role in the 35W Bridge collapsing (Ringle 2012). Maintenance From 1993, the inspection of the bridge was carried out every year by Mn/DOT, even though there was no inspection report within 2007, because of the construction work that was on-going on the bridge. Some years before the bridge collapsed, numerous inspection reports indicated some problems with the structure of the bridge. Within 1990, the government rated the 1-35W bridge as a “structurally deficient” because of considerable corrosions that were identified during inspection (Charlotte 2002). A study conducted by the civil engineering department of University of Minnesota identified some cracks within the cross girders at the end of the approach spans. The key trusses that were connecting to the cross girders as well as resistance to movement at the link end bearings was causing unexpected out-of-plane buckle of the cross girders as well as ensuing stress cracking. The condition was dealt with before the study through drilling the cracks in order to stop more dissemination and addition of support struts to the cross girder with the aim of preventing more distortion. In addition, the report indicated that there was redundancy lack within the major truss system, and this implied that the bridge was at a higher risk of collapsing in case of any structural malfunction. Even though the conclusion of the report was that the bridge was not to have any problems with exhaustion cracking within the foreseeable future, a proposal had been made that the bridge required instrumentation using strain gauges and constant structural health monitoring (Ringle 2012). Once again, within 2005 the rating of the bridge was “structurally deficient” and that replacement was necessary. These problems were also identified within other two ensuing inspection reports where an assessment conducted in 2006 established cracking and fatigue problems while the 2007 inspection report indicated that the bridge required replacement. Basically, in federal assessment ratings, the bridge was rated at the bottom in a 100 rating score and within 2005 the bridge was rated at 50 which indicated that replacement was required. On another measure, the rating of the bridge was “structurally deficient” but according to the inspection, the bridge met the acceptable limits to stay as it was (Hao 2010). Towards the end of 2006, a steel fortification project was considered for the bridge. Nonetheless, the bridge strengthening project was nullified within January 2007 and periodic safety inspections were instead recommended after it was discovered that drilling to retrofit the bridge would actually result to bridge weakening. According to the internal Mn/DOT documents, the bridge officers discussed regarding the likelihood of bridge collapse and were concerned that it may have to be predestined. The construction that was being done within the weeks before the bridge collapsed consisted of joint work as well as replacement of lighting, concrete, along with guard rails replacement. During the time when the bridge collapsed, four of the eight lanes had been closed for rematerializing and there were 575, 000 pounds of construction materials and tools on the bridge (Norbert 2008). On 1st August 2007, with jam and thus the traffic on the bridge was slow using the restricted lanes, the central span of the bridge abruptly relented and adjoining of spans then took place. The structure and deck buckled into the river and underground river banks. About 100 cars were caught up and the passengers together with construction workers were sent up to 115 feet down to the river and into the river banks as well. Northern sections of segments of the bridge fell into a rail yard and landed on three stationery freight train vehicles that did not have occupants. When the bridge collapsed, URS was still conducting its inspection and the contracted repair firm was resurfacing the concrete bridge deck (Gray, Plant & Mooty 2008). Reasons why the failure occurred According to the NTSB, the likely cause of the bridge collapse was insufficient ability of the U10 gusset plates. This was caused by an error resulting from the primary bridge company, who did not carry out all the required calculations to appropriately design the key truss gusset plates. The failure of U10 gusset plates resulted from combined loads from the primary weight of the bridge, the weight increase resulting from bridge modifications, as well as traffic and the construction motor vehicles and materials on the bridge within a region was more than the U10 nodes (Patrick 2011). When the design was reviewed, it indicated that the U10 along with L11 gusset plates were just half as thick as required to fulfill the design requirements. The finite element analysis verified that the insufficiency of the U10 and L11 gusset plates, in that they were yielding under just the dead weight of the primary 1967 bridge. If the gusset plates had met the design requirement, they would have maintained a considerable periphery of safe tinder the loads on the bridge when the collapse took place (Norbert 2008). The finite element analysis showed that the bridge collapse was prompted by a local bending unsteadiness within the U10W gusset plates, which took place prior to any material malfunction or fracture. In addition, computations indicated that the cause of unsteadiness might have been elicited at U10W before U10E or one of the L11 nodes, even when counting rust on the L11 gusset plates within the models. Including the bend deformation within the U10 gusset plates that was seen within the photos lowered the load required to prompt the unsteadiness, and also caused the lateral movement of the upper end of the L9/U10W diagonal to the exterior side of the bridge. This matched the debris observations. Lastly, the finite element analysis showed that the changes in temperatures during the day that the bridge collapsed had minimal impact on the load required to prompt the unsteadiness within the U10W gusset plates (Norbert 2008). Lessons learned Guidelines are supposed to be availed to the contractors to ensure they are doing what is safe and carrying out all their duties as per the guidelines Specific instructions have been provided regarding how gusset plates should be inspected. Research is being carried out about how various forms of gusset plates respond to stresses Constructions should be inspected often and thoroughly and recommendations made should not be ignored. Engineers are supposed to be aware of how construction materials function when they are new and not after a long period when changes on the materials are already taking place (Murdoch 2007). Engineers should take a more careful approach to the cracks and corrosion they identify in buildings/constructions. Following the bridge collapse, this was the first key installation of the compound within the country and thus it is expected that this principally aesthetic aspect will result to greater detection of what could be an innovative standard within building materials. Training courses should be updated to address inspection techniques and conditions specific to different construction materials Reference materials should be revised and any newly developed rating of the construction should be addressed (Hao 2010). The Type and Conditions of Contract The contract was that URS was required to assess loads of structural members and other functions, in addition to developing “tension and compression collapse criterion for truss members and connections based on eventual failure state according to the original design.” As a result, URS had the contractual responsibility of reviewing the first design, which is a lot of work that both Mn/DOT and URS did not understand, was the obligation of URS (Norbert 2008). As per the contract agreement, the contractor URS had the duty of providing all required equipment, labor, part, supplies, as well as materials (apart from chemicals that were to be supplied by the Minnesota Department of Transportation) for an automatic bridge de-icer on the two roadways of Interstate 35W Bridge No. 9340 over the Mississippi River within Minneapolis, Minnesota. The contractor also had the duty of providing the required site training of Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT) operation along with technical workforce for operation, trouble shooting, maintenance, and repair of the complete automatic de-icer system. Installation and inspection of all elements of the project features was required to complete by October 15, 1999 (Norbert 2008). The effect the contract had on liability for the failure After the collapse of the bridge, which injured 145 people, killed 13 individuals and resulted to considerable property damage, Minnesota was tasked to establishing if a legislative response to the tragic incident was suitable. Within May 2008, Minnesota’s legislature appropriated $37 million for paying the collapse victims and survivors. Many claimants filed individual injury and wrongful death cases were consolidated for the purposes of pretrial and Jacobs Engineers was sued on two different law suits (Ralph et al. 2008). The ten year condition statute of repose protected the original designers of the bridge, Jacob Engineers from liability for the collapse of the I-35 Bridge; the URS, who were the ensuing bridge inspection engineers, could not sue Jacob engineers for the liability because there was a lack of a common liability for damages that the claimants who died and experienced injuries during the bridge collapse owned. As a result, Jacobs Engineers were at liberty of a dismissal of the third party claim by the URS for contribution. Additionally, because URS never pleaded facts illustrating URS would have vicarious liability and this made the URs to be responsible for damages that originally were caused by Jacobs Engineer, because Jacobs were in addition entitled to discharge of the URS indemnity claim (Gray, Plant & Mooty 2008). Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates, which afterwards was bought by Jacobs Engineering Group, had designed the bridge within 1962. Within 2003, there was a contract between the state department of transportation and URS Corporation, for URS Corporation to carry out inspections of the bridge and recommend the required repairs. This led to the state department of transportation awarding the contract to a construction company to carry out repairs on the bridge. The bridge repairing started within June 2007 and it was intended to be completed within September 2007. While the bridge was in process of being repaired, it collapsed and 13 individuals died while more than hundred people got severe injuries (Gray, Plant & Mooty 2008). Following the bridge collapse, more than hundred lawsuits were filed against the URS Corporation and the company that had been contracted to do the repairs; the lawsuits were about negligence as well as breach of contract. Consequently, URS along with the contractor firm brought third party actions against, the original company, Jacobs and the claims were that Sverdrup was liable to negligence because of faultily designing the bridge (Ralph et al. 2008). Jacobs Engineers went to court to discharge the third-party action for failing to state a claim on which the reprieve could be awarded; Jacob’s argument was that the ten year statute of repose had elapsed and this made it immune from the lawsuit by the claimants, and hence the lawsuit by URS and the contracted firm on the contribution and indemnity theories (Murdoch & Hughes 2008). The court refused the motion, and Jacobs appealed and the Court of appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling and held that the dismissal was entitled to be awarded as to contribution and indemnity due to the following reasons: The first reason was that Jacobs claimed that a fundamental aspect of any contribution claim is that the defendants are supposed to share within a common liability to the claimants, or else there is no legal base of evaluating contribution damages against a body that had no direct liability to the claimants. Court of appeal was in an agreement that such a common liability is the fundamental aspect of contribution act. The court’s reasoning was based on the fact that “the principle of contribution is applicable only when numerous individuals are under a common liability to another individual, and equity dispenses the burden among numerous obligors according to their specific shares. If one of the numerous obligors is found to have satisfied the requirement that would if not fall on all of them, the other obligors are obligated to make contributions to pay back the one to the level that he/she has fulfilled the responsibility in excess of what could be claimed from him/her reasonably (Ralph et al. 2008). Accordingly, in this case, a state statute made it not possible for an engineer to be litigated by the claimants if more than ten years have elapsed after a substantial completion of the construction project. The statute governing activities for damages that result from faulty and hazardous condition of an improvement to real property states that: 1. Except when there is a defraud, no action can be taken by any individual in contract, tort, or otherwise to get back damages for any harm to property, real or individual, or for physical harm or erroneous death, resulting from the faulty and harmful state of an improvement to real property, will be brought against any individual carrying out the design, planning, supervising, materials or inspection of the construction/improvement to real property more than 2 years following the identification of the harm, neither within any incident shall the cause of build up more than 10 years following considerable conclusion of the construction. The time when the project was completed shall be established basing on the time when construction or improvement is satisfactorily completed and is ready for use (Gray, Plant & Mooty 2008). 2. A contribution action or indemnity resulting from the faulty or hazardous state of an improvement to real property might be brought not later than 2 years following the cause of action for contribution or indemnity has ensued, irrespective of if it occurred prior or following the 10-year duration referenced within paragraph (1). 3. A cause of an action can accrue after the injury is discovered, as long as, nonetheless, that in the case of a contribution action or indemnity under paragraph (1), a cause of action ensues upon the earlier of initiation of the action against the party filing for contribution or indemnity, or imbursement of an ultimate verdict, arbitration award, or settlement resulting from the faulty and hazardous condition (Brennan 2008). The purpose of a statute of repose is to stop the likelihood of liability following a defined duration of time, irrespective of the probability of the claimants not being aware of their cause of action. Such statutes indicate the legislation termination that there is a time that elapses and a potential defendant gets immunity from liability of a previous action (Ringle 2012). URS and the firm that had been contracted to carry out the repairs agreed that the 10-year repose duration banned direct action by the claimants against Jacobs Engineers, but they claimed that URS and the contracted firm’s claim for contribution could be allowed under sub-paragraph (3) of the above statute. However, the court of appeal did not agree to this argument and ruled that being in a position to take a contribution action pursuant to the restrictions explained within the statute does not imply that a contribution action has in reality ensued that would prompt the new time duration for filing a contribution action. Because the claimants themselves were not entitled to bringing an action against Jacobs’ engineers; the ruling of the court was that there was no common liability that Jacobs and URS/contracted firm owned together; as a result, since there was no common liability, there was no accretion of a contribution action. Even though contribution is a flexible equitable remedy, equity did not allow a court to change the substantive right of Jacobs to be freed from a liability following an elapse of 10 year repose duration (Hao 2010). For the indemnity count of the URS third party claim, Jacobs Engineers argument was that it had a right to indemnity since its liability to the claimants was vicarious liability for harm that was caused by Jacobs Engineers. The indemnity in this case included a common law indemnity instead of indemnity resulting from a contractual liability clause. According to the court, an indemnity here was: a one joint tortfeasor can acquire indemnity from another joint tortfeasor if the tortfeasor seeking indemnity has (a) has a vicarious liability for harm resulting from the one seeking to be charged, (b) has sustained liability through an action at the direction, within the interest of and depending on the one seeking to be charged, (c) has sustained liability due to the breach of duty that the one seeking to be charged owns him, or (d) there is an existence of a contract between the parties and the expression of contract has a precise responsibility of repaying for liability of the element involved (Ralph et al. 2008). The concept of vicarious liability is determined by the relationship between the involved parties, regardless of participating through action or exclusion, of the party vicariously liable, where it has been established as a policy issue that one individual is supposed to be responsible for the action of another individual. The authentic basis of vicarious liability is for the most part one of the public policy where it has been established that, regardless of liability, a contractual party should be responsible of responding to another party’s actions (Jones 2004). Accordingly, in the case of the collapse of the bridge, even if URS and the contracted repair firm argued that Jacobs was liable for negligence when designing the bridge and that URS was not in any way liable for an mistake or negligence act that may have contributed to the claimants’ injuries, URS missed a crucial aspect during its pleading in that it did not plead any facts concerning a relationship between Jacobs and URS that would render URS vicariously legally responsible or oblige liability for the claimants’ harm on URS, although it was in the end established that URS was free from liability. Since URS could not show how it could have just a vicarious liability for harm to the claimants resulting from Jacobs fault in design of the bridge, there was no indemnity action (Ralph et al. 2008). How the NEC contract could be applied to the situation should be made This case indicates the massive risk that a consulting engineer can presume if he/she inspects and analyses an aged construction. In case of an occurrence of a disaster, such as the collapse of a building/construction, a consulting engineer is not permitted by most repose statue from seeking contribution from the primary designers and builders (Murdoch 2007). This case illustrates one of the many jurisdictions that prohibit contribution as well as indemnity claims later than the repose duration. The risk of incurring all latent losses without remedy against others can daunt from agreeing to carry out an inspection and assessing aged constructions, especially if they are governmental projects, something that is supposed to be encouraged so that any suitable corrective work can be carried out before the occurrence of a disaster. This approach can reduce the number of engineering inspections of old construction, or can raise the cost of engineering inspections (Burr 2012). To control such risk, inspecting engineers are supposed to be very careful in their contractual agreements to ensure that the written scope is comparable to the scope of inspection actually carried out (Jones 2004). Inspecting engineers are supposed to cautiously structure and identify their extent of work within their contracts. Normally, the employing a design expert is a contract matter and basically the design expert only has a responsibility on the obligations indicated within the contract. Moreover, an omission can be the base of a design professional’s liability just when the design expert has a confirmatory obligation to act. Unless the engineer volunteers to carry out obligations further than the scope of their contracts, the inspecting engineer will be in a position of limiting its responsibilities through the contract terms. In case the scope of engineer is to be visual inspection, for instance the contract of the engineer is supposed to specifically exempt the responsibility of reviewing the sufficiency of the original calculations as well as any other duty not consistent with the contracted scope (Ralph et al. 2008). Irrespective of how cautiously the engineer crafts the scope of its responsibility, his/her professional status can enforce an additional-contractual obligation to the public in case the engineer identifies a risky condition during his/her inspection. Possibly, the statutory prerequisite that design experts be certified to protect life, health and property and to promote the public wellbeing endows the design professional an obligation, including the responsibility acknowledged by the common law (Uff 2009). Therefore, a contract should stimulate good management of the work in the contract, and should be clear and easy to be understood where the language and structure of the contract should be simple and easily understood for all contractual parties to be aware of all their responsibilities. Finally, the contract should be supported by allied guidance notes and flow charts showing the exact procedures that are supposed to be followed and who should follow them throughout the lifecycle of the project. If NEC contract was applied in this case, URS would have been aware of all its duties and massive liabilities and the long law-suit on its part would have been avoided (Murdoch 2007). Relation of English Law to the Project Under English Law, the individual interpreting the contract should offer effect to the literal meaning of words. The rule is that words should be given their usual and natural meanings that the law doesn’t easily accept that individuals have made linguistic errors, yet on the contrary, if the conclusion from the background that something wrong happens, the law won’t attribute to the intention of the parties which plainly could have not had. The basic approach of the common law is that literal and not purposive. In this project, Mn/DOT was not significant in URS’ work; however the contract owner (state) claimed that URS did not perform the scope of work stipulated within the contract (David 2008). The contract was that URS was required to assess loads of structural members and other functions, in addition to developing “tension and compression collapse criterion for truss members and connections based on eventual failure state according to the original design.” As a result, URS had the contractual responsibility of reviewing the first design, which is a lot of work that both Mn/DOT and URS did not understand, was the obligation of URS. Accordingly, in English law it is always possible for contractual relationships for duties to arise and the greatest importance in construction area is design liability. In this project, the duty of design liability was on Jacobs Engineers. In Hedley Byrne v. Heller 1964AC 465, it was held that a professional person can be held responsible for negligence for statements made negligently in circumstances where the person knows those statements are going to be acted on, and they were acted on. However, in this case, the employer did not take all steps reasonably essential to enable the contractor to discharge its duties according to the contractual terms to execute the Works within a regular and systematic manner according to the program (Adams 1988). In the project the contract named Mn/DOT as suppliers and the URS was supposed to offer the contractor with appropriate information regarding the works. The government had an obligation to the engineers to make sure that they were not partial. In this contract the implied terms were that the government was dependant on the skill of the contractor that the bridge repairs and inspections were suitable for its purpose (David 2008). Intriguingly, when plans and specifications are prepared for tenders, the individual asking for the tenders does not normally impliedly warrant that the work can be effectively executed according to such plans and specifications. Therefore, in this project, the implied contractual terms went beyond the obligations imposed by the obligation to act in good faith and thus URS as well as Mn/DOT had the contractual responsibility of reviewing the first design and thus bore the liability that resulted from the bridge collapse (David 2008). Bibliography Adams, B., 1988, The Unfair Contract Terms Act: A Decade of Discretion, 104 LQR 94 Burr, A., 2012, Construction Law, Construction Law Journal, Vol, 1/8. Brennan, D., 2008, The Construction Contracts Book: How to Find Common Ground in Negotiating the 2007 Industry Form Contract Documents, American Bar Association, New York. Charlotte, M., 2002, Climbing the Mississippi River Bridge by Bridge, Volume Two: Minnesota, Adventure Publications, Cambridge. David K., 2008, The English Legal System, Routledge-Cavendish, London. Gray, Plant, Mooty, 2008, Investigative Report to Joint Committee to Investigate the I-35W Bridge Collapse. Hao, S., 2010, I-35W Bridge Collapse, J. Bridge Eng., Vol, 15/5. Jones, G., 2004, Alternative Clauses to Standard Construction Contracts: 2004 Cumulative Supplement, Aspen Publishers Online, New Jersey Murdoch, J. R., & Hughes, W. P. D, 2008, Construction Contracts: Law and Management, Taylor & Francis, London. Murdoch, J., 2007, Construction Contracts, Taylor & Francis, London. Norbert, B., 2008, Beyond Failure: Forensic Case Studies for Civil Engineers. Reston: American Society of Civil Engineers, 211-215. Ralph, D., et al, 2008, Interpreting Construction Contracts: Fundamental Principles for Contractors, Project Managers, and Contract Administrators, American Society of Civil Engineers, New York. Ringle, T., 2012, Minnesota Determines That Victim Compensation Fund legislation May be Used to Revive Claims Barred by the Statute of Repose, The Newsletter of the ABA Forum on the construction Industry, Vol, 14/3. Uff, J., 2009, Construction law: law and practice relating to the construction industry, Sweet & Maxwell, London. Hedley Byrne v. Heller 1964AC 465 Read More