Critical Infrastructures- Railroad Transportation (Heavy Rail) - Assignment Example

Critical Infrastructures- Railroad Transportation (Heavy Rail) One of the worst terrorist attack son railway systems was witnessed in 2005 when Islamic extremists launched attacks on three underground rail stations and a bus causing deaths of thirty seven and scores o others injured. This just but one among many other examples of terrorist attacks specifically calculated to target public transportation systems. The US may not have suffered such an attack but this is not supposed to mean it is not targeted. There were plans by Islamists to attack bridges and tunnels in New York City in 1993. There were also plans in 1997 by terrorists to carry out suicide bombings on the subway system of New York. Just in the city of New York alone, there have been six attempts at making attacks that have been thwarted since the famous 9/11 attack on WTO. In some of these attempted attacks the target was rail and mass transit systems. The question therefore when will terrorists succeed in attacking? A major security issue in America is no doubt safeguarding our railroad transportations and railroad transportation hubs as well as rail-borne hazardous material shipments from terrorist attacks. As such the United States through coordinated efforts led particularly by the department of homeland security has and continues to implement a raft of measures aimed at protecting our subways and other public transit systems. Any failure to detect and deter terrorist attacks on our subways could be a catastrophic in terms of loss of human lives, economically as well as psychological harm to our sense of security. Public transportation can a very ideal target of those terrorists intended at killing in quantity and indiscriminately since they are used by millions every day. There are also les secured as compared to airports and have no designated check points. Almost every passenger is a stranger and as such anonymity, ease of escape for attackers is guaranteed. Current strategies in the U.S Rail Transit Security. Mass transit agencies have since the year 2001 employed similar strategies of ensuring security with minimal reduction on operational efficiency. The strategies fall into three categories i.e. improvements on processes, improving technology and improving the entire facilities. Since not any of them assures complete security, agencies employ a combination of both so as to achieve a multi-layer security strategy. The most widely used strategy since the year 2001 has involved process-based improvements as their impact on the system’s operational efficiency is minimal. An example is the Visible Intermodal Protection Response. VIPR teams deploy Marshalls, inspection panels, canines, etc to detect, deter and disrupt any terrorist plans. Many cities have also increased trainings aimed improving attack detection, response time and usage of modern technology (Armstrong et al, 2008). Another process-based improvement strategy involves background checks as well as access controls. Many subways systems are currently implementing at least some form of access control in the U.S. most of them have systems in place that require employees and visitors to swipe access cards while entering controlled areas such repair facilities, control rooms and other crucial locations. Integration of access controls and background checks is very easy. The Transportations Security Agency-TSA’s Transportation Worker Identification Credential strategy for instance is able to investigate current and future rail-operations and security personnel. In the end those found not to meet the threshold requirements are either turned down or permitted access with restrictions. There is an increase in the use of technology based improvements to secure heavy rail systems in the U.S. Chemical Biological & Radioactive (CBR) and Closed Circuit Television (CCTIV) detection strategies have received most of the attention on this end. Nearly all domestic transportation agencies today have at least a CCTV system in place and this has an added advantage of tackling general crime at the same time. Unfortunately this has continuously encouraged continued usage of outdated technologies that are not able to keep up with the post-2001strategies. Modern CCTV technologies are therefore coming up that can enhance security while reducing staffing requirements. New Jersey Transit for instance has smart cameras in place that are capable of detecting objects as well as abnormal movements and sending warnings (Wilson and Jackson, 2007). CBR detectors have been under exploration domestically since the attack on Tokyo subway system but their implementation is significantly limited by the cost requirements. Under the protect program, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit (WAMATA) became the first to deploy chemical detectors in the year 1999 and now installed in over 12 of its subway stations to date. Boston is also implementing both chemical and biological detection technologies in subway stations. CBR detectors have the advantage of being usable during post-blast investigations to put evidence together. In the PROTECT program of WAMATA, any trigger signals video cameras to authenticate an attack, while alarms are produced in the command points hence directing operators to action through optimised feeds on computers. This is a clear demonstration of efficiency in multi-layered security approaches. A limitation with CBR is that they can’t precisely identify the source of detected CBR substances. Facility-based improvements involve the physical designs and inventories in the particular subway stations. The strategy is widely referred to as Crime Prevention through Environmental Design or CPTED. Many agencies are now integrating security designs at least in their new or already there buildings and other structures. The strategies include ensuring more visibility for staff on board, cameras, minimising possible areas where explosives can be hidden and increasing exit points for emergency times. PTA in the year 2004 gave a directive for all domestic transit agencies to have clear and also bob-resistant bins. Visibility could also be increase through minimisation of columns in the stations and enhancing lighting systems. Installation of vending machines that have not holes and that have sloped tops is another innovation that could help in eliminating hide points for explosive devices. Given the open and often crowded nature of public transit stations such as subways, implementing these innovations in facilities can be very helpful in detecting and responding to scenes of active shooting and or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as easing emergency exits and evacuation. Recommendations for the Future. The current strategies have the advantages of not placing significant delays on the entire transits system’s operations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is however looking into ways of passenger screening in the settings of mass transit as is the practice in airports. This is almost infeasible with the current technologies owing to the openness and dynamic nature inherent with urban mass transit systems. Success of implementation in screening must therefore balance between ensuring security and the system’s efficiency. One way of striking this balance is conducting random bag screens as was done by Boston in 2004 during the Democratic National Convention. New York also started the same permanently just after the July bombings on the London Subway. The screens do increase security with little delays on the operations of the system but delays could set in with an increase in number of required screens. Resorting to technology could help narrow down to screening specific passengers; smart cameras for instance can single out the passengers that are potential threats after which they could be pulled aside for screening. There also appears to be no single national clearing house despite existence of a number of National clearing houses and thus centralization is needed. This setback has led to information over loads yet many agencies lack the resources necessary for digesting this information for decision purposes. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) an online network known as the Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) that facilitates exchange of lessons learned as well as best response practices. The same DHS also runs a Homeland Security Digital Library that has documents on strategies and policies for academia and practitioners in homeland security. One limitation to the implementation of best practices is the every local controls its own practices when it comes to security. As such federal government cannot direct agencies on which practices to implement despite the controlling purse strings. This has been taken advantage of by the federal government in the past to push certain preferred practices through but to mandate. Such an approach can be taken when it comes to protecting critical infrastructure. DHS being responsible for the development of guides in terms of best practices runs a number of databases for sharing of information on the arena. It is now a requirement by DHS for all agencies and authority in transit to have in place current and validated plans for responding to emergencies so as to qualify for any transit security grant. The need for sticking a balance between standardisation and variation in terms of security practices by different agencies is overt. Variation is good as it encourages creativity and adoption of best practices; agencies also vary on the grounds of security levels and sophistication hence diminishing the possibilities of standardization. Nonetheless, operations of data bases with current information, lessons learned and best industry security practices will make it easier for cross-agency sharing and performance of independent security functions (Sammon and Keil, 2002). Screening Technologies. Our heavy railway transportation network is used my millions on a daily basis and as such security should be at its best but with minimal interference on travel schedules. The solution lies in increased reliance on technology. One very innovative technology for screening present on the international market at the moment is known as Passive Millimetre Wave Screening. This is technology is capable of detecting weapons, explosive material and other threats that could be hidden under clothes with no physical contact with security teams. The system produces a 3D image of one’s body with blurred facial features for reasons of primacy and the image is analysed on remote screens. Another innovation involves Portable Explosive Detection Devices which have been found to be highly reliable despite being very transportable, cost effective and less time intensive (Edwards and Goodrich, 2013). Biometric technology could also boost security efforts in our heavy railway transit systems by offering capabilities to compare persons entering against lists of known terrorists. Its disadvantages are that biological information of the terrorists is required and as such may not increase security against terrorists who are not known. FAST or Future Attribute Screening Technology is another innovation that could be employed to boost security in our heavy railway systems. FAST systems use a combination of technologies to increase security by screening even unknown threats further to the known ones. The innovation includes Current/Future Observation Techniques, Hostile Intent Detection Technology, Psychological Sensors and Interviewing Techniques. Its implementation therefore can avail resources that will ease security concerns of the industry as there will be no need for relying on known information such as terrorist lists. It can also bridge the gaps present in the usage of biometrics. Intelligent Video Technologies could also enhance security with minimal hindrance on the usage of heavy rail systems. With advanced software for instance, Automated Video Surveillance can allow computers to help monitor thousands of cameras existing in the heavy rail transportation systems. Challenges for Future Transit. As a result of high oil prices, continued population growth and general trends in the environment, public transit is increasingly becoming a necessity especially in major cities. Traditional barriers include overreliance on funding by the federal government, jurisdictional conflicts and political impediments spanning decades. Mass transit is also justified and linked to increased population densities. Implementation of mass transit today faces a significant arising from the security aspect as well as its costs. Securing issues come with increased expectations from the general public, as well as challenges of implementation especially in areas that are densely populated. Cost is therefore a major issue of concern in the securing of our heavy rail networks particularly because of the huge expectations from the public as well as the constant threat from terrorists. What should be Done Going Forward? Securing our railroad transit systems today and for the future requires implementation of multilayered strategies that are flexible enough to guarantee preparedness to different situations. Anticipating innovatively new and untraditional attacks should guide our future security strategies. As much it may not be practically impossible to bring down the risk of attacks to zero, having multilayered systems in place could offer the flexibility needed in adapting to new challenge and protecting against untraditional threats. For example, proactively and eliminating any kind of crime in a subway stations could go along away in reducing opportunities for suspicious persons entering. Implementing reliable learning systems will also help in identifying current weakness while at the same time establishing professional networks for exchange of experiences. Lack of inter-agency information sharing accounted for most problems that arose post 9/11. Even though it is not the responsibility of TSA to centralize intelligence, they have the moral responsibility of offering expertise, research, leadership in best practices, capacity building as well as fund regional & local agency’s security operations. Preparedness must be linked to response and frequently practised. For instance training through taking units to respond to emergencies outside their jurisdictional boarders, identifying best practices and sharing of information has been very helpful. Another innovative strategy involves having inter-municipality mutual agreements for aid. This was the case with Arlington and Alexandria following the Pentagon attack. Congress and DHS should also increase its funding for security aspects of the railway transit systems considering their important role to the economy and the fact that cost is a major stumbling block for the implementation of modern technologies for combating terrorism. References. 1. Frances L. Edwards and Daniel C. Goodrich. (2013). Introduction to Transportation Security. CRC Press. 2. Giusepe Anteniese et al. (2014). Critical Infrastructure Protection: Threats, Attacks and Countermeasures. Available at: www.dis.uniroma1.it/~tenace/download/deliverable/Report_tenace.pdf 3. Jeremy M. Wilson, Brian A. Jackson et al. (2007). Securing America’s Passenger-Rail Systems. Rand Corporation. 4. James J.F. Forest. (2006). Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets, Vol 3. Green Wood Publishing Gorup. 5. John P. Sammon and Todd M. Keil. (2002). Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2010. Department of Homeland Security. https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/.../nipp-ssp-transportation-systems-2010.pdf 6. Nicholas J. Armstrong et al. (2008). Securing America’s Passenger Rails: Analyzing Current Challenges and Future Solutions. Syracuse University. 7. Philip Auerswald,. Lwirs M Branscomb,. Toddm. LA Porte and Erwan Michel-Jerhan. (2005). The challenge of Protecting Critical Infrastructure. Available at: opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/downloads/05-11-EMK.pdf Read More