Hyatt Regency Hotel Walkaway Collapse - Assignment Example

Hyatt Regency Hotel Walkaway Collapse Table of Contents Table of Contents 1 1.Abstract 1 2.Introduction 2 3.Reasons for selecting this disaster 3 4.Events leading to the collapse 3 5.Analysis of cause 4 6.Impacts on engineering practice 6 7.Recommendations for future practice 6 8.The Lessons that were not learned 10 9.Conclusion 11 Works Cited 12 1. Abstract The night of July 17th, 1981 is a memorable occasion for engineering enthusiasts who are concerned with the impact of engineering failures on the society (Banset & Parsons 273). Hundreds of people attended a video-taped party in the Hotel. The party involved a traditional tea dance. Many people assembled on the dance floor. Others were on the three walkaways suspended on the floors above the dance floor. The disaster occurred at 7:05 pm (Banset & Parsons 273). The disaster began with the crumpling of the fourth floor. Then it brought down the second walkaway as it fell. When the walkaways reached the floor, they killed 114 people (Lewis, James, Ralston, Norb& Wheatly 2). The accident left 200 people injured (Banset & Parsons 273). The disaster is related to engineering disasters because a flaw in the connection of the walkaways and the support rods. The disaster led to a number of significant changes in engineering practice. For instance, the engineer who authorized its design lost his license. After restoration, the hotel is currently functioning normally. 2. Introduction The Hyatt Regency collapse occurred on July 17, 1981 in Missouri (Banset & Parsons 273). The hotel is located in Kansas City. The accident led to the death of 114 people and caused the injuries of 200 others (Banset & Parsons 273). The disaster has been selected for this paper because it was the most tragic structural collapse in American history at that time. During that fateful night, many people had gathered in the atrium to attend the highly publicized tea party. A significant number of people stood on the walkaways. When the accident occurred, all the walkaways were packed with many patrons. The design of the walkaways contributed to the extent of the disaster. The fourth floor bridge was suspended over all the subsequent bridges. In addition, the third walkaway was set off a few meters from the other two. Investigations established a flawed design alteration that increased the load on the connection between the support beams of the fourth walkaway and the tie rods that were used to carry the weight of the next walkaway. The engineers had clearly failed to observe due diligence. For example, the new design could not handle the weight of the structure. In addition, it could not support the weight of the hundreds of spectators that were standing on it. Consequently, the bridge failed and both walkaways ended up crashing into the lobby. The accident led to the death and injury of many people. 3. Reasons for selecting this disaster The paper has focused on the Hyatt Regency Hotel disaster because it is the most devastating structural failure in the history of the United States of America. The 114 dead people and the 200 injured victims represent the largest human casualty as a result of structural failures (Banset & Parsons 273). Furthermore, the disaster led to the destruction of millions of dollars of property. The disaster also affected thousands of people in the city. 4. Events leading to the collapse The construction started in 1978 (Banset & Parsons 274). The design objective involved connecting the two bedrooms that were located on one side of the hotel to the conference room. The engineers hoped to use different levels in order to enhance the interior space. The design of the hanger rod connections was altered a year later. The alteration involved changing it from a one rod to a two rod system. Havens Steel Company received the drawings that had been approved by G.C.E and proceeded to construct the walkaways as per the instructions. Later that year, about 2700 square feet of the roof collapsed (Lawson & Brady 7). The collapse was triggered by the failure of one of the connections on the roof at the north side of the building. During the investigations, G.C.E stated that they requested on-site representation but received no feedback. They believed this was because it would result in increased costs because of onsite inspection. On the fateful day, the Hyatt Regency Hotel was the venue of a tea party. The large number of attendants meant that the structure of the building was strained. In particular, the walkaways had such a large number of people that it was bound to collapse. 5. Analysis of cause An analysis of the tragedy shows that the engineers had missed several opportunities. G.C.E engineers submitted a number of drawings that revealed the connection points suspending the walkaways to the fabricator. The drawings were submitted about a year into the construction of the hotel. The fabricator that was involved in the process was Havens Steel Company. Although the engineers had proposed the use of a single hanger rod to support the walkaways, they approved the redesign proposed by the fabricator. The redesign involved the use of two smaller rods. However, miscommunication occurred between the fabricator and the G.C.E team. Neither the engineers nor the fabricators had made calculations on the strength of the beam. Neither of the parties was willing to take responsibility. The second opportunity to test the connection points was also missed during the construction phase when the atrium ceiling collapsed. At this point, they carried out calculations on the crucial points but failed to include the skywalks in the process. G.C.E was held responsible because it had approved the design even if it was clearly below Kansas City building codes. If the points had been tested, G.C.E would have discovered that the critical connection points at these box beams would only support a third of the required load capacity. The disaster occurred because of the numerous management errors that characterized the construction process. Poor management resulted in the construction of a flawed support system (Banset & Parsons 288). Inefficient communication processes between G.C.E engineers and Havens Steel Company resulted in the numerous design changes. The rods were changed from a single to a double hanger rod box beam connection on the fourth floor walkaways. The fabricator found that the original design that involved continuous threading of the nut through two stories to be impractical. As a result, it replaced the original single rod design drawings with a two rod system. In the new system, one rod would go from the lower to the upper bridge while the other would go from the upper bridge to the roof. The change affected the load capacity of the bridge. As a result, the walkaways ended up weighing more than they were expected to. An examination of the original rod design shows that it would have managed to prevent the collapse. The box beams that were resting on the supporting nuts got deformed within a year. Consequently, they could not support the load for much longer. In effect, the collapse of the building was inevitable. Furthermore, the construction of the building fell short of the Kansas building codes. The organizations that were involved violated many rules that guide the construction of such buildings. The construction firm and the engineering firm were responsible for the deaths that occurred that night because they failed to observe due diligence. The hotel also failed to ensure that it was receiving a strong and well-designed building. A further examination of the case revealed more bad practices. The quality of workmanship was poor for a building that was expected to host a significant proportion of people. In addition, the welding and connections were improperly done. The building material that was used was also inadequate. The hotel also failed to hire building inspectors. The authorities who allowed the hotel to be occupied before its hazards had been mitigated against were also at fault. 6. Impacts on engineering practice Following the failed skywalk disaster at the hotel, the engineering community was forced to create a new design objective. The suspended skywalks were discontinued after they caused the death of 114 people. Although the Hyatt Regency Hotel had enjoyed its status as a major attraction in the city, it was now forced to compensate the victims and their families. The compensation costs were about $ 3 billion (Banset & Parsons 274). The engineering industry was now expected to make the walkaways to appear as solid as they needed to be. The Hyatt Regency hotel now has a single span walkaway that is supported by pillars that are anchored into the rock beneath the hotel. Moreover, fabricators have stopped offering professional services due to the lack of engineers who are willing to work for them. 7. Recommendations for future practice The proprietors of a building have the responsibility to exercise due diligence. They must ensure that they use firms that have been certified. In addition, they should ensure that they have a strong record of fulfilling their professional obligations in an appropriate manner. The engineering firms should also ensure that they carry out on-site inspections (Banset & Parsons 288). Engineers should ensure that they do not carry out arbitrary changes in the plan of a building. Any change should be well thought and implemented in a careful manner. The Hyatt Regency Hotel collapse was largely due to the design change from the original single rod to the double rod system. The changes were not even prompted by the engineers. Instead, they were prompted by the fabricators who believed that the single rod system was not practical. Consequently, the role of fabricators should be limited in the construction process. The engineering firms should have complete control over the entire construction process. An efficient communication process between all the parties that are involved in the construction process is crucial. In this event, the collapse was caused by the inability of G.C.E and Havens Steel to communicate effectively. Investigators established that the two organizations had failed to communicate effectively. The drawings that were prepared by the engineers were just preliminary sketches while Havens interpreted them to be finalized drawings. Moreover, the engineers had failed to review the original designs thoroughly. They accepted the plan presented by Havens without performing the rudimentary calculations that would have enabled them to identify its inherent flaws. For example, they would have noted that doubling the load on the fourth-floor beams would undermine the structural integrity of the building. Engineering firms should have complete control of the construction process. The structural integrity of the building was significantly undermined when the fabricator decided to include a particular change in the design. The changes were guided by the practicality of the situation. The fabricator failed to consider the structural implications of its actions. Instead, it just wanted an easy solution. In the original design, the engineers stated that the beams of the fourth floor would only provide support for that walkaway. The weight of the second floor was supposed to be supported by all the rods. In contrast, the revised design shifted that responsibility to the fourth floor beams. They were now expected to support all the floors. Since the load of the fourth-floor beam had been doubled, Havens proposed a design that could only support about 30 percent of the load. The original load would have supported 60 percent. The serious flaws in the new design were increased by the fact that both designs envisioned that the bolts would be placed directly through the welded joint. As a result, they would not have met the minimum requirements of the city (Texas A & M University department of Philosophy and the department of Mechanical Engineering 14). The joint connected the two C-channels. That was the weakest structural point in the building. An evaluation of photographs of the wreckage reveals that the cross-section experienced significant deformation. When the structural failure occurred, the box beams split along the weld and nut supporting them causing them to slip through the subsequent gap. Another key lesson is that the engineers bear the sole responsibility for the structural integrity in the building (Lawson & Brady 4). The engineers would have prevented the collapse by implementing a number of changes throughout the process. First, their original design should have reflected a sense of responsibility towards observing the code of conduct. Second, the engineers should have taken the collapse that occurred during the construction process seriously. Third, they should have taken the lead on the construction process. The disaster highlighted the important role that engineers play in the society. Many people realized that their safety depended on the ability of engineers to perform their jobs well (Lewis, James, Ralston, Patricia, Norb & Wheatly 8). Consequently, the engineering community adopted a higher standard of behavior that was meant to ensure that such a disaster does not occur in the future. In addition, it led to the emphasis on clear lines of communication and responsibilities. Under the new structure, the construction projects would be run efficiently and each party would be held responsible for any professional issue that involves their work. The event highlighted the need for all stakeholders to work together in order to make engineering projects a success. The move would ensure that the integrity of the project is ensured. For example, the relevant city authorities should have identified failures in both the original and the subsequent design. The engineers would have also communicated properly with the fabricators. During the investigations, the latter claimed that they tried to reach the former in order to discuss the new design without any success. The building inspectors should have also identified the structural deficiencies of the building. The fact that these people failed to appreciate the importance of their roles was a cause of significant concern. The engineering community has appreciated the need for it to demonstrate a willingness to adhere to the highest professional standards (Lewis, James, Ralston, Patricia, Norb & Wheatly 8) Technological advancements and new information in the construction industry is making it easier for stakeholders to avoid a repeat of such a disaster. However, avoiding repeat of such a disaster involves willingness to observe high levels of professionalism and an appreciation of the things that are at stake in the process. The stakeholders in this case would have carried out their duties with significant professionalism if they would appreciate that many people would use the hotel and they are responsible for guaranteeing their safety. A lesson that should be learned from this disaster is the need for a party that is responsible for the finalized drawings. The problem in this case was in part because the fabricators believed that they had room for their judgment to be considered. The practice undermines the safety of the building because they have no qualifications that allows them to do the same. The drawings had failed to accurately convey the intentions of the engineer (Lawson & Brady). Besides establishing responsibility, formal oversight should be involved in the construction process. In this case, the unapproved design changes were made because of an ineffective design review process. Consequently, a formal design review process should be involved in all construction projects. The disaster was also caused due to the overreliance on a longitudinal weld. The weld was not strong enough to protect the building from experiencing a significant structural failure. The solution involves a deliberate attempt to make the weld as strong as possible. The materials that are used in the construction process have a significant bearing on its structural integrity. Consequently, engineers should always ensure that the materials are used in a way that enhances rather than undermines the structural integrity of the building. The Hyatt Regency Hotel collapse has offered an opportunity for the engineering profession to increase their effectiveness. The American society of civil engineers established a precedent that stated that the responsibility for the building lies with the engineer’s seal. Consequently, the person who approved a set of plans would be held responsible if it had issues that they should have noticed. Moreover, city engineers are now expected to perform formal checks on the load-bearing calculations. The process will enable them to identify potential failures at the design stage. As a result, the lives of many people would be saved. The reconstruction of the hotel involved a focused attempt to avoid the challenges that had faced it before. The lobby was rebuilt using a single crossing line on the second floor. The line was supported by large pillars. The construction resulted in the construction of a structurally sound building. 8. The Lessons that were not learned The tragedy revealed the importance of communication in the engineering community (Lawson & Brady 4). The tragedy cost the reputation of Jack Gillum who served as head of G.C.E at the time. The engineering disaster could have been avoided by checking the calculations at the critical points. A subsequent reconstruction of the hotel revealed that the engineers had made an effort to create a structurally sound solution. However, the observation did not underscore the effectiveness of their ability to learn from the disaster. The changes may have succeeded in creating a more structurally sound hotel. The hotel or other buildings in the country could be affected by the fact that engineers have to deal with endless variables that could destroy them because of slight miscalculation. Furthermore, the checkpoints highlight a significant procedural error that may still occur in the future. For example, a sustained gradual deformation of the box beam joint at the Hyatt skywalk proves that a fatal disaster can occur in the area again. A similar disaster has happened in Germany in the recent past. Following heavy snowfall in the area, a roof of an ice rink in Bad Rechenhall collapsed. Before the disaster, the locals had lodged formal complaints about the structural integrity of the building. Instead of conducting a thorough investigation, a few spot checks were conducted. If the investigations had been conducted in a diligent manner, then they would have revealed structural weaknesses in the roof. The case showed that engineers had failed to learn from the negligence that had affected the Hyatt Regency hotel. Engineers have to learn that simple checks during and after the construction process can prevent structural collapses. 9. Conclusion The collapse of the Hyatt Regency Hotel provided many lessons for the engineering community. The disaster highlighted the need for all parties involved in the construction process to exercise due diligence. In addition, it reinforced the need for engineers to have complete control over the construction process. Moreover, it reveals the need to ensure that the structural integrity of the building is the leading factor that should be considered when designing a building. The role of fabricators and construction firms should be limited to carrying out the instructions of the engineer. However, the engineers had clearly failed to observe due diligence in this situation. For instance, the original design failed to meet the structural requirements in the city. Even if the fabricator had not initiated the change, the structural integrity of the building would have been severely compromised. Works Cited Banset, Elizabeth A & Parsons, Gerald M. Communication’s failure in Hyatt Regency Disaster. Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering. 115.3 (1989): 273-288. Lawson, J. Wilson & Brady, A. Pamela. Using the Hyatt Regency Skywalk collapse case study in Engineering Education. Print. Lewis, James E &Ralston, Patricia A, Delatte, Norb & Wheatly, David. Implementation and Assessment of Case studies in a Freshman Engineering Program. 2011. Print Texas A & M University department of Philosophy and the department of Mechanical Engineering. Negligence and the Professional Debate over ‘Responsibility’ for the design. 2009. Print Read More