Hyatt Regency Hotel Engineering Disaster of 1981 - Case Study Example

Sur 1 & Sur _of_the_Assignment XX May Hyatt Regency Hotel Walkway Collapse Being one of the oldest applied sciences, Civil Engineering has a vast variety of areas of application, by offering a compherensive range of services from the initial steps in design and procurement to construction, operation, maintenance, and project management. Like in all engineering disciplines, applying technical and mathematical knowledge to the problems in an attempt to help promote the well-being of the nature and its habitants, play a significant role in Civil Engineering. Owing to the fact that the scope of civil engineering has increased over the past several decades, this science of engineering was broken down into many branches of study such as structural engineering, transportation engineering, hydraulic engineering, environmental engineering, geotechnical engineering, and so forth. Nevertheless, the most important task of civil engineering is design and planning of various structures. For this reason, it is of great importance that the strenghts and weaknessess of the structures as well as the impact of the outside driving forces should be carefully examined and analysed in order to minimize the severity of the damage potential. It should also be never forgotten that even small details omitted or neglected might lead to extremely serious or even fatal accidents if a professional care is not taken. In this context, this paper reviews a case study to illustrate the facts and focuses on the failures as well as lessons learned in the aftermath of a tragic engineering disaster that occurred on July the 17th, 1981 in “Hyatt Regency Hotel” in Kansas City- Missouri, USA. Surname2 “This disaster killed 114 people and injured approximately 200 more, which at the time was the deadliest structural collapse in U.S. history.” (Wander, 1) Opening in July 1980, Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel was composed mainly of three sections; a 40 story tower, a function block and a grand lobby which featured a huge multi-storey atrium. “Inside the atrium, there were three walkways that connected the hotel to the conference facilities on the second, third, and fourth floors.” (Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel Walkway Collapse). The third and fourth floor walkways were each suspended from the roof trusses of the atrium, while the second floor walkway was suspended from the fourth floor walkway. Nearly one year after the completion, more than 2.000 people came together in the Hyatt Regency Hotel to participate in and watch a weekly dance competition. Shortly after the dance, a loud crack resulting from the the failure between the supporting steel rods and the beam of the fourth floor walkway was heard. This was indeed a sign of a severe disaster which would shortly result in a loss of more than 100 people inside the hotel. Thus, two of the walkways holding quite a bit of the guests on the second and fourth floors collapsed on the atrium floor. “In 1976, as the owner, Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation initiated a Project to design and build Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City” (Edward J. Brunet, Jr., P.E, 3) by signing a contract with two distinct firms. G.C. E International, Inc, a Professional Engineering Firm was the controller of the entire project, and Eldridge Construction Co, was in charge of all construction related affairs as a general contractor. Eldridge Construction Co, the general contractor on the Hyatt Regency Hotel Project entered into a subcontract with Havens Steel Company, the work-shop fabricator in charge of fabrication and erection of the steel construction of the atrium. Surname3 Indeed, the failure of the Hyatt Regency walkways was arising from a combination of things. However, the most important reason was an inefficient design of the walkways. Kansas City Hyatt atrium walkways initially designed and proposed by G.C. E intended for the second and fourth floor walkways to be suspended one under the other by way of single continuous hanger round steel rods anchored in the roof. “The rods were to run from the roof down to and through the fourth floor beams and were then to continue down to and through the second floor beams, where the rods would terminate with a nut and washer.” (Edward J. Brunet, Jr., P.E, 3) The ends of the rods were designed to be threaded in order that the walkways could be leveled by screwing the nuts on the threaded rods. A total of 60 structural design drawings were completed by G.C. E. and passed on to Havens Steel Company. G.C. E. prepared the sketches for the atrium walkways showing the technical information associated with the design criteria. But, these sketches were not handed over to the fabricator along with the structural drawings. In order to implement the primary structural drawings, Havens Steel Company would have had to thread the steel rods below the fourth floor to facilitate screwing on the nuts to keep the second floor walkway in place. To simplify the process, Havens changed the design to a two-rod system where the rods from the second floor would be attached separately to the fourth floor beams, and the fourth floor rods would be attached to the same beams and connected to the roof. This change was intended to avoid the threading and make the connection of the steel rods much easier and in a short time. Discussions between G.C. E. and Havens Steel Company resulted in a design change where a double hanger round steel rods would be assembled simply as Havens Steel did not want to thread the entire rod. The new work-shop drawings for the two-rod system were submitted to G.C. E. for the approval. The approval was granted and signed by G.C. E. Surname4 However, this change in the design increased the load on the fourth floor walkway beams, since they now had to reinforce the second walkway as well. In fact, the change in design, that is, the addition of one more rod, gave rise to a new load spreading a certain amount of shear stress over the fourth floor walkway beam. Moreover, the proposed level of load for each rod was calculated as 90kN, but the change in design increased the load to 181kN. Therefore, the beams could not stand a total weight of two walkways and caused this tragic disaster. In the aftermath of this fatal engineering error which caused a loss of 114 people, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) decided to make an investigation of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkway collapse to ascertain the cause(s) of the accident. The investigation determined that the disaster was as a result of a faulty design. These conclusion was made by implementing an extensive investigation on the walkways. The fourth floor fell down directly on the second floor. The investigation found out that both designs of the walkways did not satisfy the requirements of safety as required by the Kansas City Building Code. Because of the double rod design change carried out by Havens Steel, “the load at the nut on the fourth floor upper rod section was twice the load of the original single rod design. The investigation also discovered that the original design could only support 60% of the load required by the building code. That is, even as originally designed, the walkways were barely capable of holding up the expected load, and would have failed to meet Kansas City building requirements” (Edward J. Brunet, Jr.,P.E, 7) in any way. While in sworn testimony, the Havens Steel Company claimed that they informed G.C.E. and consulted about the design change, while G.C.E denied ever receiving such a demand from Havens Steel. The G.C.E , in fact not only received the revised drawings but also stamped them with the company seal. Surname5 On October 14, 1979, part of the atrium roof collapsed while the hotel was still under construction, “prompting G.C.E. to ask Crown Center Redevelopment for an on-site inspection of the entire site. Three different requests were denied due to the additional costs.” (Wander, 3). A lack of communication, negligence, misconduct, and unprofessional care in the practice of engineering were the decisive factors in the failure of the walkway collapse in the Hyatt Regency Hotel. As can be seen from the Kansas City example, an engineer is responsible for all the stages from design to construction. The revised design was obviously much less capable of keeping up the required forces, and was in conflict with the Kansas City building code. The collapse of the atrium roof during the earlier construction was an indication of problems with the design. However, all sides involved did not throughly examine the ensuing results and did not review the design currently accepted. Despite the injuries and loss of life, it has been possible to get much out of the terrible tragedy at the Kansas City Hyatt. Changes were made in the Kansas City Codes Administration Division and in other city code inspection departments across the country. “American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) announced a policy of holding structural engineers responsible for all aspects of structural safety in their building designs.” (Edward J. Brunet, Jr.,P.E, 11) Havens Steel changed to double rod connection detail because of cost and schedule considerations. “Constructability issues don’t normally cause a chain of events leading to the sort of death and destruction seen at the Kansas City Hyatt. But, a design that’s not practical to build will invariably result in cost and/or schedule impacts.” (Edward J. Brunet, Jr.,P.E, 12). During the design phase of the project, it should be throughly considered how difficult the construction will be to be fabricated and /or erected. Surname6 In addition, any alteration put forward by anyone should be documented, and the records should be retained in case of a necessity in the later stages of the project. ASCE guidelines issued as a result of the Kansas City Hyatt accident make it clear that the project structural engineer is responsible for all aspects of a building’s structural design. (Edward J. Brunet, Jr.,P.E, 12). Regardless of the type of project, it is logical to clearly indicate the responsibilities between parties at the beginning of the project. This can be achieved by employing a number of different tools or methods. Lastly, all construction related works should be throughly examined and designed by taking into account the modern quality procedures as well as legal binding guidelines. It is also of utmost importance that no concession should be made when it comes down to safety. Surname7 Works Cited “Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel Walkway Collapse” frostburg. edu. n.p. n.d. Web Wander, Steve. “Two Rods Don’t Make It Right” Nasa Safety Center, Volume 2, Issue 4, May 2008, Web. 19. May 2010 Edward J. Brunet, Jr., P.E. “Engineering Ethics Lessons Learned:Kansas City Hyatt Walkway Collapse” PDHengineer.com, PDHengineer Course № L-1010, 2007. Web. 19 May 2010 Read More