Airbus A320 Control Problem Case Study - Essay Example

The side sticks reacted oppositely such that when the side stick on the right was controlled, the plane moved in the opposite direction and vice versa. After the plane moved to a height of FL120 the crewmembers noticed the abnormality and sought to land the plane safely for further checking. The maintenance organization group took over the plane and repaired the plane but did not realize the fatal error they did while trying to repair the plane. No damage occurred to the plane and no injuries occurred to the people on board.

This paper discusses and analyzes the findings of the aviation investigation team and makes the distinguishing mistakes done on the plane by the teams handling the repair. Research Findings and Analysis The team investigating the fatal error first recognized that the plane was on maintenance two days even before the flight and the plane had indicated the problem. The problem affected both ELAC number one and ELAC number two. The errors were both visible through the computer transmission. The elevator aileron computer controls the back angle of the plane.

The researchers found out that despite repairing the elevator aileron computer, a bent pin on elevator aileron computer number one was not replaced and not repaired. The investigation also reveals that during the repair of ALAC number one, the entire rewiring process was incorrect. The command and the monitor channels faced alteration when the technicians inverted the whole wiring system after getting confused on which diagram to use on the manufacturers manual. The wire connects the plug of ELAC to the plane for ease of monitoring the back angle of the plane and other conditions of the plane.

Due to lack of enough experience by both the engineers and the crewmembers, the errors remained undetected and almost led to massive losses and death. Flight controlled check group are to be blamed for failing to realize the error. The report argues that the error occurred due to the following reasons. There was an unclear information about the planes diagrams that resulted to abnormal wiring of the control and monitor channels. The researchers believe that a wrong diagram caused the problem.

The research findings also indicate serious differences between the manufacturers and the engineers on the maintenance. The report argues based on the data difference used by manufacturers and the maintenance team in correcting the errors of the plane. The findings also indicate that the unambiguous instructions from the manufacturer could have led to the fatal error. According to the report, the analysts argue that the insufficient functionality of the quality assurance services undermined the quality of the work done by the maintenance and the flight control checkers.

This is mainly due to the two separate groups working distinctively separate failing to identify and notice the problem. The high authority members of the organization is also to blame as they did not pass their tests in ensuring that sufficient supervision and maintenance was done to the plane before declared fit for transport. The following defenses were broken while trying to correct the error on the plane. On 18th March 2001 when the pane signaled an error message on ELAC number two, the maintenance group ought to have corrected the mistake instead of doing a RESET.

Another defense broken is that the crew passed the plane fit for travel while they had not fully corrected the mis