Negotiation and Bargaining Skills of the Participants of Camp David II - Case Study Example

Running Head: NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING SKILLS Negotiation and Bargaining Skills [Writer’s Name] [Institution’s Name] Negotiation and Bargaining Skills Introduction Negotiation and bargaining skills are something extremely important in every field of life. Politicians and businessmen use these skills all the time. In fact the most historical summits became successful due to the good negotiation and bargaining kills of their members. However some even failed because their member had poor negotiation and bargaining skills. One such summit is Camp David II. In this essay the negotiation& bargaining skills of the participants of Camp David II. Will be analyzed in detail. .Clinton Arafat and Barak’s negotiation styles will help in evaluating their skills. Apart from this the Collaborative negotiation style and Competitive negotiation style of negotiation will be forced on as these two styles helped in polishing or spoiling their negotiation& bargaining skills. Analysis Camp David II was the most important meeting between the Israelis and Palestinians since the 1993 Oslo accords (Clayton 2004). The crucial questions of refugees and Jerusalem, as well as settlements and land, were negotiated. The negotiating styles of the mediator (Clinton ) changed dramatically the used a Collaborative negotiation style while Arafat and Barak came to the table with a lot Competitive negotiation style of negotiation . Yasser Arafat was a very rigid person he had a Competitive style of negotiation he said that, not long prior to the Camp David invitation were passed out , he said that he had predicted before that and had told Madeleine Albright an essential meeting like this one was destined to fail if no appropriate preparation was done. He assumed that he had persuaded the United States secretary of state into believing that they required a little more time before the meeting so that they could do some research of their own (Shazly 1986). although Albright permitted herself to be influenced via the Israeli Prime Minister, as Ehud Barak had a Competitive negotiation he wanted to get the best out of the meeting so he told Clinton that the meeting should be held as soon as possible Barak also successful in convincing united states a private meeting amongst himself, Arafat, and Clinton. He insisted that a face-to-face meeting which might convince Arafat to agree an agreement that may satisfy Israel and put a stop to the conflict between Jews and Palestinians (Deutsch 2000). However since he was using an Competitive negotiation style he thought this might a end all the conflicts with the Palestinians by announcing that they would put an stop to all their claim, just by negotiating with them for one two days. The conflicts between the two were too intense and Barak’s competitive negotiation style would not be useful here. Many conspiracy theories were made about Barak setting conditions regarding Jerusalem, people in exile, borders, Jewish settlement, and so on. Nevertheless, Arafat also had a competitive negotiation style and thus wanted only to win against Barak. Barak too had the same style and thus wanted Arafat to give in to the pressure which both Clinton and Barak were putting, and if things would not go as planned he would place the hold Palestinian responsible. It was unlikely that Arafat would not accept Clinton's invitation. As he had improved US relations among the Palestinian Authority in the year 1993 as well 1998 he had visited the Gaza so that he could give a speech .Moreover, he had invited Arafat more then any other Arab leader. Clinton wanted this extraordinary affiliation to be successful so that he could lend a hand to Barak. Arafat explained the reasons numerous times as to why he was refusing the conditions given to him. As Clinton had a collaborative style of negotiation he continuously persisted, Arafat just said one thing that Clinton would be attending a funeral if he accepted these conditions (Clayton 2004). Clinton along with Barak worked to influence, the late President Hafez al-Assad of Syria. However they completely failed to do so the reason behind this could be that Barak and Clinton had different negotiation styles and thus they had a different a purpose in mind while influencing this leader. However president Mubark told Arafat about what was going on and how the other two ware trying to get Muslim leaders on their side. Arafat had no choice but to attend it. Nevertheless he had predicted the consequences this summit which was held among Stockholm and Shlomo Ben Ami, even Ahmad Qurai was apart of it. Even after twenty sessions, there had been a complete deadlock. The Palestinians included the UN at the very beginning of the negotiations. The fact that both leaders had competitive negotiation style they both were very inflexible. They believed after Israelis accepted resolutions mainly the two hundred and forty two calling for removal from area which had been occupied the 1967 war, and one hundred and ninety four refugees could cross the border, they could consider the Palestinians to be flexible. However the response they got was very inflexible and thus reflected the competitive negotiation style. They said that they required conditions which were more moderate then the ones given to them. The Israeli negotiator had a very competitive negotiation style and said that the Palestinian would take what they are getting as their demands were not realistic (Safty 1996). After this degrading suggestion, Ben Ami stated the summit had come to an end and believed it was time to gather all the leaders collectively to make the suitable decisions. As soon as Abu Ala stated that they had not still made any development whatsoever, Ben Ami said that they did not have much time. This whole mess was because both Arafat and Barak had competitive negotiation style so conflict was inevitable. Since Clinton had a collaborative style of negotiation he was the main person in the entire Camp David talks. He spoke of a lot of money for aid in an attempt to convince Arafat - whereas, Barak, who had initiated the meeting, carefully dodged any personal conversation with Arafat all through the summit. While four committees were resolving the refugee and border issue. They even addressed the security issue. They mostly tackled the query of control of the eastern border with Jordan; this was the only issue which was resolved Clinton having a collaborative style of negotiation needed some neutral information thus he tried to show-off his comprehensive information of the streets of Jerusalem. however not even one of advisors told him that opening a speech with the topic of the al-Aqsa mosque which is the third most holy Islamic mosque might not be a good idea as this was a proposal of a straight partition among Muslims and Jews right on the rock which it is situated. By asking the Security Council Resolution to help them as they were asking for control on the Arab area of the Eastern part of Jerusalem thus Israel would be left with the Jewish district inside the Old City as well as the Western part. Nevertheless, the Israeli offer was to offer the Palestinians control just over remote villages and districts, with some sort of independence over the Muslim and Christian parts as well as Palestinian areas which were situated out of the boundary. Israel in addition planned to give eight percent of the West Bank and taking possession of the rest taken up mostly via the Jewish agreement. Even here both side of the committees seemed to have a competitive style of negotiation. From all the committees the most unsuccessful one was the one which was dealing with refugees. Those who survived the nakba and its effects. The Palestinians anticipated a few real signs from the Israelis - mainly because their accountability for the removal of the refugees in 1948 was confirmed (Berridge 2005). In spite of this, leaders were giving the worn out speeches thus highlighting their competitive style of negotiation. Israel right away with drew all responsibility and did not agree to apology to the disaster. They said that they can only send their condolence to the refugees. Israel believed that the people who were accountable for this disaster, which had an effect on all these, people the Arab nations who advised the Palestinians to run off and abandon their homes whereas they were waiting for the Arab army to come and give their country independence. Thus the committee listened to a worn out propaganda which was quite famous in 1950 (Dershowitz 2003). Israel seemed to have very strong competitive style of negotiation thus they were only concerned, with confirming the fact that they were right and the right of return of the refugees was wrong. And that meant that the demolition of the state of Israel. Israel gave an idea to the committee for the solution of the issue taking in a few thousand refuges within a period of 5 years. At one session of the committee, the following exchange of views took place: Yasser Abed Rabbo who too seemed to have a competitive style of negotiation as he insisted that the refuges be paid back for all the properties they left behind said they have to repay the refuges for their properties, controlled via the Israeli official accountable for deserted Palestinian property. Then estimated price of the property is about several billion and the refuges should be paid back that amount. Elyakim Rubinstein, for the Israelis: These funds no longer exist. We have used them up. It is up to the international community to create funds for this. Return of the refugees' property was also categorically refused. Moreover just a fraction of the international funds was going to go to the refugees. While the left over funds would go to the Jewish refugees who left the Arab country of Palestine. This notion was given a lot of disagreement as well as resentment from the Palestinian negotiators Not just did these new refugees shift into the homes of those whose landlord had been exiled or had run away the mass destruction, however they wanted to take over this property on their expense. It would not be an easy thing, for the Jews who left there homes and left Arab countries with strong support and immense aid from Israel. Shlomo Hillel, stated that he was not a refugee abut was only a homeless Zionist immigrant. In the year 1999, the distributed, in collaboration with the office of the Israeli prime minister, tens of thousands of forms to register the property of Jews left in Arab countries (Winslade 2000). It was stated the most likely conditions that the plan of this implementation was not to cover the immigrants, however it was a way by the government could have a meeting with the Palestines. . As soon as the summit came to an end, a propaganda movement started this had more then only one objective: to put the blame Arafat for not letting the summit being successful, invoke international judgment for a new summit among the three leaders, this time it would be a productive one; as well as present a fake image of the Palestinian situation to place Arafat in trouble. For example, Barak claimed that quite different to the information, which the Palestinians had approved to relate the query of the refugees to the aid intended to help the Palestinian refugees. Here Clinton changed his negotiation style to competitive style of negotiation from collaborative style of negotiation and he became apart campaign. He criticized Arafat at length in a long interview on Israeli television despite solemn promises on the eve of the summit not to put the responsibility for an eventual failure on him. He gave warnings to Arafat of retaliation if he approved the need for an independent Palestinian state, claiming that if this cat took place then, he may have to re-evaluate the entire status of their relations, and go even further. And threatened to shift the American embassy to Jerusalem. Due to the method which was employed to make the summit successful , Israel along with the US are forcing Arafat more intensely to be more flexible. Amongst their urging is the danger Barak was organizing on account of the breakdown of his alliance (Quandt 2005). These opinions were refused by Arafat's office as well as the refugees camps and the inhabitants of the West Bank along with Gaza. The Palestinians were now publicly claming that they had to compromise a lot in Oslo by supporting the desire to reconstruct their state on only a 1/5 of their own home land. They are also highlighted the fact that the intense flexibility exhibited in the Palestinian despite the fact that they are presently insisting that international legitimacy be appreciated. They were claiming the fact that UN resolutions have to be established, and then every the unsettled issues can be discussed in a sensible manner. Accepting the fact that Barak has internal issues, they thought that peace might have been accomplished if Barak had had the nerve on his election, whereas the Israeli right was in shock over its electoral defeat. The Palestinians seemed to now be using a collaborative style of style of negotiation however they hoe ever they were losing their tolerance. The barefaced breach and organized postponement in executing the Oslo accords within 7 years infuriated them and once again they turned to a competitive style of negotiation (Dale 1995). Their representatives started saying that any new contract will have to be signed by complete reassurance as well as agreement from all the international authorities. Any breach must be taken seriously investigated and considered by them. Why it failed The failure of Camp David II cannot be put solely on President Clinton. Arafat and Barak had a lot of baggage with them before even stepping foot on US soil. Arafat never really had the full support and backing of the Palestinians, and therefore, he was never truly in a position to agree or disagree about a particular topic, unless the offer was too good to refuse. However, Barak was never going to make such an offer. As noted earlier, Barak laid down the conditions on Jerusalem, refugees, borders, Jewish settlements, etc. that the Palestinians might no give their consent to. If, nonetheless, Arafat surrendered and had to join hands with Clinton as well as Barak due to the pressure and accepted the intolerable conditions he had to change his style and had to adopt a collaborative style of negotiation, it would be great success for Barak. He could hold the Palestinians accountable the failure. Also, in this point in time, Barak was facing strong elections in the forthcoming months, and his voters were not satisfied with the latest progress of the summit (Degregorio 1993). The Israelis were not ready to negotiate after being bombed by suicide bombers, rather, they wanted to see their prime minister fight off Arafat and not offer anything over the bare minimum. Knowing this, Camp David II was doomed to failure. Conclusion One could argue that there was no bargaining range in Camp David II due to the lack of political authority Arafat had and the mindset that Barak had before entering the negotiations. Therefore, by analyzing Camp David II, it can be said that two negotiation styles were uses competitive style of negotiation and collaborative style of negotiation. If the Clinton altered its negotiating style, or if the opposite side had decided to use another negotiating strategy, then maybe the outcome would have been different. Even though the both sides negotiations were completely for their own selfish desires, the attitude and approach of the two were different from each other. There for it can be concluded that for any negotiation to be successful it is very important that the leaders adopt a flexible negotiation style, so that a valid and good decision can be made. In the above motioned situation there was a lack in a strong negotiation style. ReferenceFind all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author Are you an author? Learn about Author Central Berridge, G. R.l (2005); Diplomacy: Theory and Practice 2nd ed; Palgrave, Basingstoke. Clayton E. Swisher (2004); The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process, Nation Books.Clayton E. Swisher (Author) Degregorio A. William (1993); The Complete Book of U.S. Presidents Barricade Books; 4th edition Dershowitz Alan (2003); The Case for Israel, Wiley Deutsch, Morton and Peter Coleman (2000); The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice. Marcus: Books › Visit Amazon's Clayton E. Swisher PaQuandt B. William (2005); Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, Brookings Institution Press and the University of California Press; 3 edition. Safty Adel (1996); From Camp David to the Gulf: Negotiations Language and Propaganda and War Black Rose Books; First Edition Shazly Saad (1986); The Arab Military Option American Mideast Research; 1st edition W. Dale Nelson (1995); The President Is at Camp David, Syracuse University Press; 1st edition Winslade, John and Gerald Monk (2000); Narrative Mediation: A New Approach to Conflict Resolution, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Read More