Deepwater Horizon: Evaluating the ethical failures of adherence to recommended testing and inspection procedures of well control equipment - Essay Example

Section/# Macando Blowout and Prevention One of the driving forces that has encouraged so many companies to continue the search for oil and expend untold millions of dollars in exploration for new oil reserves has to do with the near continual growth in oil prices that has been exhibited over the past several decades. As with any commodity, supply and demand factors impact upon the overall price level that is exhibited at any point in time. Nonetheless, as the figure below illustrates, the upward trajectory of the cost of a barrel of brent crude is for the most part a price structure that has continued to increase.

As illustrated below, the economic downturn of 2007/2008 provided the necessary pressure on the overall demand for oil and the overall profitability that oil-producing nations and companies could hope to achieve. Nevertheless, as the economy began to dig its way out from this downturn, the overall price of oil rose alongside economic growth that was indicated. It is for this very reason that companies are continually encouraged to seek out new sources of oil and to extend hundreds of millions of dollars but exploration that may or may not reveal new sources. Figure 1.0 Such was essentially the case with respect to the way in which BP, and many other firms for that matter, sought to leverage well resources that were exhibited within the Gulf of Mexico.

As it became clear that leasing rights would be provided to multinationals that sought to utilize these sources of oil as a means of generating profitability, more and more firms began to crowd this particular geographic space and leverage the hydrocarbon resources that were exhibited under the ocean floor (Myers, 2013). Naturally, one of the most notorious of these oil wells that was seeking to leverage the natural resources extent within this region was that of BPs oil rig that was working on the now infamous Macondo prospect.

This region was one in which a particularly high concentration of oil resources was exhibited within the Gulf of Mexico; not even 50 miles from the Louisiana shore. BP’s oil wells located in this region were expected to bring a very high return on investment; as BP had already surveyed the region and attained the requisite leasing rights for these sites (Bishop, 2014). Beginning operation in 2007 within the Gulf of Mexico, one of these BP oil wells, Deepwater Horizon, was part of BPs strategy to leverage the extant resources within the region and draw a high level of profitability and oil from the engagement.

In service just under three years, within the Gulf of Mexico, the fateful explosion that occurred in April of 2010 brought international attentio to the way in which BP and other oil wells were considering the importance of safety protocols within the industry (McNamara et al., 2014). Essentially, subsequent research has definitively proven that failure to train employees properly and a general dismissive attitude towards safety on the oil well, and up the chain of command within BP, were the main factors in the destruction and hardship to the environment that the explosion that doomed Deepwater Horizon was responsible for.

One of the first and most pivotal changes to the way in which oil drilling takes place was effected by the National Energy Board of Canada only a few weeks after the spill began. Accordingly, the dossier and updated rules and regulations that the NEB provided stipulated that the safety rules surrounding same season relief wells would be fundamentally redrawn to discourage such an occurrence from happening again. Similar and analogous US regulations, encompassed in part within API RP 53, 125 stipulated that “Opperational components of the BOP equipment systems should be function checked at least once per week to verify working componentry and intended operations” (API, 2014).

This is of vital importance as it was failures in oversight and testing that proved to be detrimental to Deepwater Horizon. Not only did the equipment on Deepwater Horizon fail, but the workers did not engage in effective safety checks to ensure that working equipment was represnted on board prior to continuing work. In this way, more rigid safety regulations enhance the overall level of overview and oversight that the industry currently undertakes. References API Recommended Practice 53, 3rd ed.

Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells, March 1997, p. 41. Bishop, B. (2014). Focusing Events and Public Opinion: Evidence from the Deepwater Horizon Disaster. Political Behavior, 36(1), 1-22. doi:10.1007/s11109-013-9223-7 McNamara, M. W., Morris, J. C., & Mayer, M. (2014). Expanding the Universe of Multi-Organizational Arrangements: Contingent Coordination and the Deepwater Horizon Transportation Challenges. Politics & Policy, 42(3), 346-368. doi:10.1111/polp.12073 Myers, E. (2013). WORSE THAN SPILLED MILK: A CRY FOR CASUALTY LOSS REFORM IN THE WAKE OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER.

 Case Western Reserve Law Review, 63(4), 1363-1392.