Risk Assessment Methods - Assignment Example

1. Performing risk assessments on critical infrastructure must, like all such assessments, take into account the cost of recovery. It is universally accepted that much of the infrastructure in this country is in terrible shape. How should that affect the risk assessment, if at all? Risk assessment and control at the local level is founded on four basic elements: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. Risk assessment aims to estimate the likelihood and impact of the occurrence of hazards and threats, and determine to what extent the risk associated with that hazard or threat is acceptable or tolerable. Granted that all risks are tolerable due to the resiliency of the populace (i.e., recall 9/11), some risks however will take more from them than others, and therefore will be more difficult to tolerate or recover from. The premise presented is that much of the infrastructure in this country is in terrible shape. This shall be taken to assume that they are in terrible shape in so far as surviving intact those natural calamities that may be expected to occur in their localities. Against these, models of previous occurrence in the locality may provide some basis for the vulnerability factor in risk assessment. This requires the use of intelligence analysis, as mentioned in the materials for this study. However, there are also man-made disasters, which are more difficult to estimate. Vulnerabilities of terrorist attack, for instance, may be linked with the use of the structure or its cultural or political importance rather than their state of disrepair or wear. Haimes lists at least five other factors of risk that have more to do with the use or disposition of the structure, rather than with their physical state. All other factors being equal, the general state of disrepair of a structure may work to either lower or increase risks, depending on the significance (whether functional, historical or cultural, etc.) of the infrastructure, and how difficult will this particular functional, historical or cultural value may be recovered to the extent that its original value (that is, prior to the occurrence of the emergency or crisis event) is restored. If the structure is relatively recent and its function recoverable after restoration, then the risk assessment should be rather close to the amount of funds that a reconstruction (i.e. the cost of design, materials & labour) will entail. For historically or culturally important structures, however, recovery may not be as easy; given a scenario of major damage, whether from a natural or man-made cause, the cost of recovery of its original value may be unrecoverable. It is thus important that during the assessment of structures, the recovery factor may be reduced by increasing mitigation, preparedness, and response. This would entail the employment of special measures to strengthen the structure’s integrity and security against foreseeable and likely damages. Over and above this would be too costly, and too far beyond the normal reckoning of risk assessment methods. Aside from the structure itself, there is a need to assess the direct and collateral effects on the environment and community in the wake of the disaster. This was apparent in the damage to Japan’s nuclear power plants during the recent massive earthquake and tsunami. The response and recovery effort in the community, both in the immediate and broad geographical sense, is immeasurable, from the very loss of lives, long-term contamination to the environment, and likely repercussions on the health and welfare of generations yet to come. Such types of structures will be eternally vulnerable to risks, in such a way that defies effective assessment. Every effort must therefore be made to safeguard them to the extent that is possible, or shut them down and seek other alternatives. 2. Each of the three articles making up part of this weeks reading assignment (found in Reserved Readings) rejects the traditional approach to risk assessment and offers an alternative. Should the tried and true approach be rejected so easily? Why or why not? If so, which of the alternatives do you recommend? The three articles listed for reading assignment each described a new model of risk assessment grounded on quantitative methods of analysis. McGill, Ayyub & Kaminskiy (2007) described a quantitative risk assessment technique that employed a precise flowchart to delineate the stages, used statistical probabilities to quantify the risks, and a benefit-cost analysis as the governing decision criterion at the end. Aven and Renn (2009) focused specifically on quantitative modeling of risk situations with “large potential consequences, large uncertainties, and/or ambiguities”, most importantly that of terrorism risk. Finally, Haimes (2009) espouses a philosophical and methodological systems-based approach in defining risk. The model recognizes the complexity and multidimensional nature of risk, expressing risk as a function of time, the initiating event and the specific input, the likelihood of the consequences, system’s states, and the results. Looking at each of them and comparing, while the utilize similar basic statistical concepts of probability and forecasting, they nevertheless specify different equations because of different perspectives and identified variables. What is readily apparent in these new methods is their level of complexity, and the difficulty in defining, visualizing and conceptualizing the various variables, results, and the processes that link them. This makes the use of such models highly theoretical and, one might say, clinical. There are some advantages to this, of course. The objective approach provides a degree of independence from personal subjective perceptions which may introduce judgement error into the estimations. Quantitative risk assessments also have the advantage of being more goal oriented, thus providing “high levels of performance both in terms of productivity and risk reduction (Aven & Renn, 2009, p. 587). The problem here is that the models, detailed as they are, are still at best only approximations of what may truly occur in actual situations, because as Haimes mentioned, there are too many unknowns to be captures in a confined assessment. What is more, during the development of an actual crisis or disaster, the models become too wieldy to use in order to fine tune and arrive at a closer, more realistic estimate within the shortest possible time. At times, readings for variables will not be possible in real time, and at best would compound the error by providing transient values. The complex mathematical operations needed would also require electronic hardware and software which may not always be available when needed particularly during an unfolding scenario. On the other hand, more traditional methods of risk assessment are based on both qualitative and quantitative methods, derived from a familiarity with the impact of elements in the environment. The advantage of traditional methods is that they are usually grounded in context-specific scenarios, and quantitative methods tend to generalize from among the various crisis situations in the course of categorizing elements or indicators into common classes in order to fit into the general equation. In the course of this aggregation, something is lost that pertains to the distinct risks attendant to particular types of hazards. The traditional method therefore may not provide a specific measure of risk in quantitative terms, but it may capture those aspects of a crisis which have an equally, if not more important, bearing on risk assessment. The quantitative methods are very helpful, enlightening, and would most likely provide new insights into risk assessment, but they must be supported by traditional methods in order to obtain a balanced and comprehensive evaluation. References Aven, T. & Renn, O. (2008) “The Role of Quantitative Risk Assessments for Characterizing Risk and Uncertainty and Delineating Appropriate Risk and Management Options, with Special Emphasis on Terrorism Risk.” Risk Analysis. 29(4):587-600 Haimes, Y.Y. (2009) “On the Complex Definition of Risk: A Systems-Based Approach.” Risk Analysis. 29(12):1647-1654 McGill, W.L.; Ayyub, B.M.; & Kaminskiy, M. (2007) “Risk Analysis for Critical Asset Protection.” Risk Analysis. 27(5):1265-1281 Read More