How EU Shale Gas Companies Engage in Transparent Lobbying - Research Paper Example

School: Topic: Transparency in EU lobbying and how EU shale gas companies engage in transparent lobbying Lecturer: Submission: Contents Introduction 3 Shale gas business within the European Union (EU) and in the greater global context 3 The role of EU institutions in promoting transparency in lobbying for EU level shale gas businesses 4 Current lobbies in favour and against shale gas exploration 6 Lobby strategies within the EU 8 Impact of transparency in lobbying on external relations of the EU 10 Conclusion 11 References 12 Introduction The impact of fossil fuel on the environment, particularly with its role in global warming has led to talks on finding alternative replacement for the heavy dependence on the resource. It is against this background that many see shale gas as a useful, reliable and sustainable source as energy (Burnham et al., 2012). This is because shale gas is considered an unconventional form of fossil fuel with proof of having cleaner energy source than coal (Baker, 2014). The debate on the real environmental impact of shale gas exploration however continues to go on at the EU level, resulting in a current situation where there is no clear-cut EU level position about shale gas exploration. Meanwhile, based on the success of the resource in other parts of the world, particularly the United States, some EU member countries such as Polan has already started commercial exploration of shale gas. The official EU level position however is that lobbying is still ongoing for a position to be taken as part of Energy 2020 strategy by the union. This paper therefore examines the issue of transparency with the lobbying processes and how different stakeholders both for and against the exploration of shale gas have gone about their lobbying. Shale gas business within the European Union (EU) and in the greater global context Shale gas which is natural gas found in shale formations is considered an unconventional fossil fuel that addresses most environmental issues posed by conventional fossil fuel. With the success of shale gas in the United States, the EU is strongly considering creating a shale gas revolution for the region (Morton, 2013). Talks for such revolution started in 2009 and today, the result is a chain of businesses whose line of trade is focused on the exploration, drilling and transportation of shale gas for selected member states. Shale gas exploration has however become a central issue of academic and professional discourse given the fact that there is no EU level consensus for the exploration of the natural resource (Naumann & Philippi, 2014). Consequently, most EU countries are not certain about its impact and have therefore banned it temporarily in their history. Such countries include France, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and North Rhein-Westphalia (Burnham et al., 2012). In the remaining sections of the paper, how shale gas companies have used transparent lobbying to ensure that they get the necessary approval to engage in exploration is critically examined. The role of EU institutions in promoting transparency in lobbying for EU level shale gas businesses As indicated earlier, shale gas exploration comes with doubts among some member states on the safety of this unconventional natural gas for domestic and industrial usage (Klemens, 2011). The businesses involved in the shale gas exploration have however continued to insist that this unconventional natural gas is safe and efficient. Because the issue has a two sided position, lobbying has been resorted to by most companies involved in shale gas exploration as the best means by which they can get their arguments through to policy makers and the necessary EU institutions. As explained by Geiger (2006), lobbying is the practice of influencing decisions that officials and policy makers make so that the decisions are directed towards areas that can be considered advantageous for the lobbyist. Because lobbying involves the interest of some stakeholders, mostly private people and organisations, the issue of transparency in lobbying has long become a subject of discussion in EU business transactions, particularly with shale gas exploration. To ensure that transparency in lobbying is promoted, there are several recognised EU institutions designated with the responsibility of ensuring that the right procedures are followed with lobbying and that outcomes from lobbies are those that benefit the interest of the larger EU community and the world at large (Klemens, 2011). These EU institutions set to hear cases of lobbies on shale gas exploration come on different forms and are many so that transparency can really be ensured as a lobbyist must exhaust all ranks within the EU institution to get decision made. The EU Commission one such institution, which has in times past been responsible for lobbying cases such as DG environment versus DG energy where the Commissioner Oettinger ruled in favour of shale gas exploration for the interest of EU (Kerr, 2011). The European Parliament is another institution which continues to sit on a number of cases which are yet to be resolved. Examples of such lobbying cases that the European Parliament is considering are those being championed by the European Parliament Industry Committee (ITRE) and another by the Environment Committee (ENVI) (Warner, Cidney & Jackson, 2013). As the Commission and Parliament go about their duties, the use of lobby register has been a major tool that guides them in ensuring and promoting transparency. This is because the lobby registry for the EU serves as a public database where information about lobbying actors and their actions can be accessed and assessed (Kierkegaard, S. 2005). The EU lobby register has been considered by many as a step in the right direction because it helps in subjecting the actions of EU institutions and interest groups to public scrutiny as a way of gaining transparency (Geiger, 2006). The lobby register is therefore a form of checking tool that makes all stakeholders involved in lobbying accountable to the ordinary citizen within the EU and any other person with some form of interest in the outcome of lobbying, particularly those that involve sensitive issues of shale gas exploration in Europe. There are studies that have confirmed that through the use of lobby register, transparency has been achieved and thus corruption reduced (Kierkegaard, 2005). Current lobbies in favour and against shale gas exploration Interestingly, there are agencies and bodies which lobby both in favour and against the exploration of shale gas in EU. These interest groups have stated different reasons and factors for which the EU institutions must hear them out. On the whole, it can be said that the gas exploration companies which have been involved in shale gas exploration in other parts of the world such as the United States are those in favour of shale gas exploration at the EU level (Stevens, 2010). The industry has had three major arguments that it has used in lobbying in favour of shale gas exploration at the EU level. The first argument is that shale gas has a very huge potential, given the number of proven reserves of gas containing shale in the EU region (Buisset & Selleslaghs, 2012). The second argument is that there is minimal environmental risk with the exploration and use of shale gas when compared to coal (Morton, 2013). Finally, the industry holds the position that as a natural gas, shale gas will only produce 50% of emission when compared to what comes from the burning of coal (Naumann & Philippi, 2014). There is however those who fail to promote the exploration of shale gas at the EU level and are thus lobbying against the exploration. Nuclear, oil, coal, and gas suppliers, and environmentalists are the two camps against the exploration of shale gas at the EU level. As far as the suppliers are concerned, particularly the nuclear suppliers, their major stand for lobbying has been that shale gas will come as a potential threat to their industry (Kerr, 2011). Using evidence from the Fukushima catastrophe however, there are those who have regarded the argument of this camp as very soft stand (Warner, Cidney & Jackson, 2013). Environmentalists including groups such as Friends of the Earth Europe, Food & Water Europe, Greenpeace and Health & Environment Alliance have all argued that there are impacts on the environment and human health with the usage of shale gas (Buisset & Selleslaghs, 2012). The varying views among the groups lobbying for and against have made the issue of lobbying strategy very important in getting one’s position taken. Lobby strategies within the EU Lux, Crook and Woehr (2011) noted that successful lobbying at the EU is a systematic process which ensures that a person or an interest group gets a workable strategy that can be used. This is because if for nothing at all, there are an estimated 15,000 lobbyists who compete for attention at the EU level (Beyers and Kerremans, 2007). The strategy used therefore goes a very long way to determine the level of success. Writing on how successful transparent lobbying can be done at the EU level, Lux, Crook and Woehr (2011) admonished the need for interest groups or lobbyists to engage early. This is because doing so gives the EU institutions sufficient time to draft their legislative proposals and come up with the best proposition that can be considered by all referring to the lobby register as transparent, accurate and free from all forms of corruption. What is more, when lobbying is done early enough, there is always the opportunity of making changes as and when they are necessary (Coen, 2008). Another strategy that has informed how lobbying is done at the EU level and especially among interest groups lobbying either in favour or against the exploration of shale gas is the creation of alliances. Beyers and Kerremans (2007) stressed that in lobbying, who you know who can influence decision making is very important. Indeed, the principle of who you know can be used in a very positive and healthy manner in ensuring that one’s arguments gets to the right people who must hear the arguments and take decisions on them. Using the Brussels business as an example, one would note that in Brussels decisions are taken on a consensus basis (Coen, 2008). This means that almost all people who sit in to take decisions must be convinced well enough through the lobbying process. To do this effectively, the form of alliances that an interest group or a lobbyist builds can go a long way to influencing voting positively. One other way that has defined how lobbying is done at the EU level is the use of give-and-take strategy. This is a strategy that concerns the creation of a win-win situation among the EU legislators who sit to take decisions on policies or issues. In the current circumstance, such a win-win situation will be expected to be created among the interested parties either lobbying in favour of shale gas exploration or against the exploration, and the EU institutions namely the EU Commission and the European Parliament. For this form of win-win situation to be created, one must avoid any means of corrupt practices or acts that influence decision making. Any forms of conflict of interest must also be avoided. In the place of these, sufficient, valid and updated information that makes it possible for the legislators to understand and appreciate the benefits of the position taken by the lobbyist must be clearly presented (Greenwood, 2014). Once the legislators are convinced that a decision for a particular lobbyist will bring an outcome that benefits not only the outfit that the lobbyist represent but the larger society, a win-win situation is said to be created and decision will be taken in favour of such lobbyist (Greenwood, 2014). Impact of transparency in lobbying on external relations of the EU Once the issue of transparency is taken very seriously and the outcome of any decision making at the EU level is trusted to be founded on the basis of truth, accountability and fairness, there are several implications that it can draw for the EU in terms of external relations. Putting the issue of shale gas exploration in context, it would be noted that other countries, particularly the United States is keenly interested with the outcome of the EU’s decision. This is because already, the use of shale gas is widely accepted in the United States (Baker, 2014). This means that like any other natural resource and trade commodity, the United States will be interested in having trade partners for the resource. The partnership could either be for importation or the exportation of the resource. It is therefore very important that transparency will be promoted in the lobbying process so that the outcome with it can be fairly accepted by such an important player as the United States should the decision go against the exploration of shale gas at the EU level. On the other hand, it is expected that should the decision on shale gas exploration go for those who are in favour of its exploration, all international environmentalists and groups who currently opine that the exploration should not be allowed will accept the outcome amicably. But for such amicable acceptance to be achieved, it is important that there will not be any course for suspecting that acts of injustice and bias has gone on with the decision (Stevens, 2010). It is for this reason that transparency in lobbying can be said to be an issue that has an external impact on the EU. Conclusion The paper sought to look at the issue of transparency in lobbying at the EU level and the impact of this on shale gas business in the EU. Based on the numerous differing positions and points that have been raised by the different interest groups both in favour and against shale gas exploration, it will be concluded that transparency is indeed the only true means by which the best outcome can be taken by EU institutions put in charge of this delicate issue. As it has been stressed in the paper, whatever decision that comes out will not only affect the EU region but the world at large. The whole world is therefore watching the EU institutions and looking up to them to uphold the statutes and provisions of transparency in lobbying. Should transparency be upheld and all forms of corruption avoided, it can be expected that the eventual outcome of the lobbying would be one that favours EU business in particular and global business in general. References Baker B. (2014). Report exposes European lobby groups who ensure expansion of shale gas. [Online] http://ecowatch.com/2014/07/24/european-lobby-shale-gas/ [2 January 2015] Beyers, J. and Kerremans B. (2007). “Critical Resource Dependencies and the Europeanization of Domestic Interest Groups” Journal of European Public Policy, 14, pp. 3-12. Buisset S. O & Selleslaghs J. (2012). Lobbying shale gas in Europe. [Online] Available at http://www.pacteurope.eu/pact/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Lobbying-shale-gas-in-Europe.pdf [2 January 2015] Burnham G. et al. (2012). “Life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions of shale gas, natural gas, coal, and petroleum" Environmental Science and Technology, Vol. 46 No. 2, pp.619-627. Coen, D. (2008). Business Lobbying in the EU. London: Oxford University Press. Geiger, A. (2006). EU Lobbying handbook, A guide to modern participation in Brussels. Paris: Helios Media Greenwood J. (2014). 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