Argumentative Business Dispute: Google and Censorship in China - Case Study Example

Censorship, properly defined, refers to the conscious containment of communication or speech that might be construed as either sensitive or hurtful by the agent performing the act of censoring. The concept of censorship frequently applies to that of a government or other political entity that ignores the right to free speech either as a means of accomplishing its own ends or that of the public as a whole. The People’s Republic of China, and its leading political party, the Communist Party of China, still practices the act of censorship as a means of accomplishing its own ends: limiting the dissemination and viewing of particular items on the internet, television, print, or through other media. Content not driven at the ideology of this political group or the government as a whole (for example either Tibetan or Taiwanese independence) is suppressed in the interests of the state (Hughes). Search engine giant Google has recently come under fire for complying with China’s standards of censorship. Opponents, like Frida Ghitis, accuse Google of selling out on its lofty and righteous corporate responsibility to the oppressed people of China. They claim that as Google puts profits above the people of China, they are compounding the problem by promoting a low standard of corporate ethics. Nevertheless, this view of Google and its ethical responsibilities is itself destructive and contradictory. Claiming that any corporation has a moral duty to serve the interests of anyone besides stockholders is patently absurd. Additionally, to think a corporation does have a moral duty threatens to subordinate businesses to the whims of societies (and, by proxy, their governments): the outcome Google’s opponents argue against. The question of Google allowing the Chinese government to censor its content drives a deeper issue: that of corporate social responsibility. This term refers to the moral kinds of obligations, if any, that businesses and corporations are committed to by virtue of being such entities. Obviously, many are favorable to the idea of corporations contributing in some way to social change, other than what some have called “economic imperialism”, where corporations “exploit” workers in third-world countries. Nevertheless, the ethics of corporate responsibility have not been well-justified, and are typically found only in the businesses’ models for making profit. Thus, on its face, it seems that “being responsible” for a corporation is good for business. It can benefit, first of all, brand differentiation. Namely, an advantage for a business comes when the public comes to identify a certain ethical value with a certain business, and customer loyalty results. Also, businesses can persuade governments by enhancing their corporate responsibility policies, either by convincing them that their place in their country will help with health, the environment, and so on. Critics of corporate responsibility frequently point to examples like British American Tobacco and British Petroleum, which seemingly engage in corporate responsibility with the interest of making profits. Nevertheless, this should not be at all surprising. Those critical of these programs point to the fact that such moves into corporate responsibility are designed to distract attention away from the ethical problems in their core operations. Rather than driven at the interests of society, corporations make these moves in an effort to boost their image with the public. In her article “Google’s China Web”, Frida Ghitis points to Google’s “Don’t be evil” motto as a contradiction: why help China’s government remain tyrannical and oppressive and yet hold such a righteous guiding motto? Of course, there is no contradiction here: Google has no intention of living up to that motto. Corporations do not launch programs driven at “moral responsibility” for the sake of the public: they do so for profits. Recognizing this, opponents like Ghitis move to attack Google in another way: by assigning a normative value to the fact that firms do not exist for the greater good, but for the good of those who participate in them (Ghitis). The purpose of a business in general is to produce profits for shareholders. Shareholders hire executives, along with an entire hierarchy of laborers that serve their interests collectively. Given this, and that only individual people can have moral or social responsibilities, it is a deductive fact that corporations are only responsible to those who make them financially possible. Corporations, then, have no other moral or social responsibility to a society other than following its laws (Friedman). Thus, the responsibility of protecting rights (including that to free speech) is entirely within the realm of the government’s. In other words, if China’s government does not wish to respect the right to free speech, then it is the responsibility of China’s people (who choose their government) to change it. We cannot expect a corporation, like Google, to service a political or ideological end when, as a corporation, it has no political or ideological ends. Its ends, or goals, are strictly contained within its “bottom line”. Opponents like Ghitis also fail to understand the price and reward for Google’s decision to “capitulate” to China’s demands (Ghitis). While there is indeed an inconsistency with Google’s mission statement (which I have previously disregarded) by removing search results that the Chinese government does not find favorable, there would be an even greater inconsistency by not complying and being held out of China altogether. By avoiding the latter option, Google is providing the Chinese people with a great service. Censorship of internet resources by the Chinese would continue regardless if Google had denied self-censoring themselves (Hughes). The utility of Google’s resistance would have been minimal. In addition, the utility of Google’s ability to participate in the Chinese market should be apparent. The benefits of capitalism for individual citizens in terms of economic growth, standards of living, infant mortality rates, and so on, are too great to pass up (Friedman). As China moves toward capitalism on the whole, we will see demand for a less oppressive government go down, perhaps one day leading to less censorship and a moderation of the Community Party. Google, a Western corporation, by participating in China’s growing marketplace, represents another step in the direction of this goal. Thus, it seems the premise that Google is “inconsistent” with its motto “Don’t be evil” is based on the assumption that capitalism is perhaps more evil that censorship. This last thought raises another important point. While opponents like Ghitis criticize Google for not complying with the demands of an oppressive government, they do so on the basis that Google is not serving the masses of Chinese citizens. The contradiction in their position ought to be apparent: instead of their actions being dictated by a government, their actions ought to be dictated by the people of China—the people who put that government and ensure its existence. Are we then to say that the government does not represent the people of China? Obviously this would not be Google’s problem, and should not be the subject of such criticism. The arguments of individuals like Ghitis, to be the most productive, should not be aimed at attacking Google for pursuing the goal of making profits, which is inherently its one and only mission (Ghitis). Instead, they should criticize the Chinese government that does not guarantee a Western standard of individual freedoms. Google does not have the power to change the Chinese regime or to convince people that Communism is an intrinsically flawed economic/political philosophy. It may have the power to bring capitalism to a country hampered, but this a praiseworthy goal and not one to be condemned as “selfish”. Google’s agreement to self-censor its content in a compromise with China’s government is not a moral evil. In fact, Google should be praised for injecting one more instance of Western capitalist values into a society that continues to be hampered by government control and oppression. The fault does not lie with Google in this matter and it is a wasted effort trying to levy blame on a corporation for “not living up to a righteous motto” (Ghitis). We should expect a business to actually mean what is says about “serving the public”. We must recognize that the fundamental purpose of a corporation is in serving its investors. Google’s opponents, however, say that instead of serving China’s government, they should serve the Chinese public. The error in this naïve belief is that Google has no obligation to serve anyone except its stockholders: ignoring this demonstrates ignorance and a contradiction too deeply rooted to disentangle. Works Cited Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits." The New York Times Magazine 13 September 1970. Ghitis, Frida. "Google’s China Web." Gaetz, Lynne and Suneeti Phadke. The Writers World: Essays. London: Allyn & Bacon, 2009. Hughes, C. China and the Internet: Politics of the Digital Leap Forward. New York: Routledge, 2003. Read More