The Space Shuttle Challenger Accident - Case Study Example

The Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Cause(s) of Accident The Space Shuttle Challenger Accident happened on 28 January 1986. It occurred 73 seconds later after it had started to fly; it was because of an explosive burn of oxygen and hydrogen propellants that destroyed the External Tank thereby exposing the Orbiter to severe aerodynamics loads that resulted in total structural breakup (NASA, 1987). Mainly, the accident was attributed to the misalignment of a booster rocket o-ring seal, a situation that was stressed further by unusually cold temperatures and strong wind shears (Fuqua, 1986). Structural and Mechanical Factors The coldest temperature recorded in Florida and strong winds aggravated the problem of o-ring. Cold temperatures and strong winds caused the misalignment of a booster rocket o-ring seal. As a result, an explosive burn of oxygen and hydrogen propellants destroyed the External Tank thereby exposing the Orbiter to severe aerodynamics loads, resulting in total structural breakup (Fuqua, 1986). Contributing Factors There was basic flaw regarding the manner in which potential risks were addressed. NASA established that a day before launching of the Challenger, Thiokol engineers had argued that what was projected to be the coldest temperature recorded in Florida would aggravate the problem of o-ring (Feyman, 1986). However, the Marshall and Thiokol managers did not accept engineers’ arguments that the projected temperatures were hazardous and went ahead to make the decision of the Space Shuttle Challenger launch (NASA, 1987). Investigation Board Findings Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident indicates that the Commission made the following findings: the accident was largely because of complacency in safety; and there was lack of independence in assurance reviews and this contributed to the accident. Thirdly, lines of responsibility and authority and interfaces between SR&QA, centre support offices, contractors and programs were sometimes improperly and poorly defined; and fourthly, NASA and its contractor organizations did not have sufficient resources to perform properly their SRM&QA assurance functions (Federal Register, 2012). Recommendations The following recommendations were made: there is need for safety motivation programs, which should emphasize the relationship and importance of following procedures, self-discipline, and the essence of technical excellence to achievement of safety programs’ objectives (Feyman, 1986). Secondly, critical problems must be assessed independently. Thirdly, there should be firm commitment to be maintained in the emphasis of safety during adversity and success periods (NASA, 1987). Outcomes The outcomes of the findings and recommendations have been desirable. Space safety has been enhanced significantly and, as a result, accident of the Space Challenger nature has not been experienced since then. Also, the recommendations led to remarkable success in Space Shuttle in subsequent years. What lessons did you learn from the Challenger Accident? The major lesson learnt from the Challenger accident is the basic flaw regarding the manner in which potential risks were addressed. NASA established that a day before launching of the Challenger, Thiokol engineers had argued that what was projected to be the coldest temperature recorded in Florida would aggravate the problem of o-ring (Feyman, 1986). However, the Marshall and Thiokol managers did not accept engineers’ arguments that the projected temperatures was hazardous and went ahead to make the decision of the Space Shuttle Challenger launch. In this respect, it was learnt that engineers should be in a position to prove their concerns so that they can convince managers to make certain decisions or against making particular decisions (Fuqua, 1986). Nonetheless, an important lesson learnt in this respect is that even in the absence of absolute proof of failure condition, any considerable possibility of failure should be a cause for delay in the launch. This should be the case until the issue is resolved fully, or until the ambient temperatures are confirmed to be within proven safety zone for the launch (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1988). Since the accident was largely because of complacency in safety, important lesson on the need for commitment for safety emphasis was learnt. There is need for a firm commitment to be maintained in the emphasis of safety during adversity and success periods (NASA, 1987). There should be tangible evidence of commitment on the part of all those concerned particularly the managers and engineers in order to prevent commitment deficiencies that were witnessed in the pre-Challenger accident environment (Federal Register, 2012). In addition, Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) capabilities should be acquired and maintained. SRM&QA functions require new personnel’s infusions to ensure its technical competence is maintained (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1988). These functions should also maintain a minimum core of skilled professionals who are capable of guiding the operations and management of the functions. There is also need for adequate resources including personnel to perform both the assurance and program in-line functions (NASA, 1987). Report by the U.S. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident found out that there was lack of independence in assurance reviews and this contributed to the accident (Federal Register, 2012). The problem of SRM joint-seal was not reviewed independently by SRM&QA and NASA organizations and no action was taken in the identification of the inherent safety risks. There were two main lessons that were learnt from this problem. The first one was that critical problems must be assessed independently. Proposed corrective actions and safety-critical problems should be evaluated by safety assessment organizations that are independent and recommendations that are consistent with overall risk criteria made (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1988). The second lesson learnt from this problem was that critical problems need to be made visible to guarantee independent assessment. To achieve this, a comprehensive safety problem reporting system needs to be maintained (Feyman, 1986). What other lessons are there? There are other lessons from the Challenger accident. The investigation into the accident revealed that lines of responsibility and authority and interfaces between SR&QA, centre support offices, contractors and programs were sometimes improperly and poorly defined (Feyman, 1986). Therefore, it was learnt that agency and program SRM&QA relationships must be defined well and properly. There is need to define Agency and program SRM&QA functional and organizational relationships accurately and to review them periodically to provide the most effective and efficient methods of operating within the context of making balanced schedule, risk decisions and performance, providing assurance oversight and identifying safety risks (NASA, 1987). Along with this, it was learnt that organizations must accommodate any revised responsibilities and roles in order to provide consistency in record keeping and review (Federal Register, 2012). The final lesson learnt from the accident relates to the fact that NASA and its contractor organizations did not have sufficient resources to perform properly their SRM&QA assurance functions. It was learnt that decree should not diminish safety risk (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1988). Decisions associated with SRM&QA resource allocations at any program phase, be it systems, staffing, and skills must be based on factual and objective assessment of safety risk and should not be skewed by operational or schedule expediency. Additionally, SRM&QA workforce must be involved and must be very competent to ensure that effectiveness of SRM&QA functions are well maintained. More importantly, there is need for baseline sustaining of core skills resources (Federal Register, 2012). References Federal Register. (2012). Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Retrieved September 6, 2012, from https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/presidential-commission-on-the-space-shuttle-challenger-accident Feyman, R. (1986). Personal observations on the reliability of the Shuttle. Retrieved September 6, 2012, from http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51l/docs/rogers-commission/Appendix-F.txt Fuqua, M. (1986). Investigation of the Challenger Accident. Retrieved September 6, 2012, from http://klabs.org/richcontent/Reports/Failure_Reports/challenger/congress/64_420a.pdf NASA. (1987). Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Retrieved September 6, 2012, from http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/genindex.htm National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (1988). Lessons Learned From Challenger. Retrieved September 6, 2012, from http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/aeronautics-and-astronautics/16-891j-space-policy-seminar-spring-2003/readings/challengerlessons.pdf Read More