Prevention of Air Attacks - Essay Example

Events such as 9/11 have impacted many aspects of American life but nothing has been more impacted than air travel. Air travel involves security measures that need to be in place both at the airports and on-board. Numerous efforts have been made to close the security gaps at the airport resulting in a safer commercial aviation system, but a system that is far more intrusive and time consuming (Levine, 2005). Enough is being spent on research and new technology to ease the flying experience of the passengers. However, so far these techniques and technologies have not been able to make the air travel safer or reduce the incidences of hijacking. Despite new technology and equipments, it has not been possible at airports across the world to provider safer travel environment to the passengers. On the contrary, the security measures end up scaring the passengers. Hijacking is something that the commercial sector has been trying to prevent but the security lapses are tremendous. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is a part of the Department of Homeland Security and has been extensively spending on research and new technology. To prevent hijacking the passengers are subject to rigorous screening process. Passengers have been resisting the frisking process and the passengers have expressed irritation (The New Zealand Herald, 2010). Moreover, Europe and European air officials have been resisting the US imposed useless and intrusive air travel security measures, to which the US carriers and security officials do not adhere to for their internal flights (Judd, 2010). Imposing measures such as removing shoes and taking laptop out of bags have done little to enhance the security of the passengers or the crew. Despite all the security measures in place, at the British airports suspicious packages were found on an American-bound aircraft (The Express, 2010). This signals that air freight consignments would also need to be screened which means added security measures without any positive outcome. Low-paid workers working in the cargo section have free access to the entire airport, ramps and runways without undergoing any personal inspection or their belongings being checked (Fonda, Donnelly & Thomas, 2003). Cargo on freight planes is seldom checked. At the Pearson International Airport, in the aftermath the security measures were such that the passengers felt insecure and frustrated (Gulli et al). The security personnel ran their fingers through the passengers’ hair, ran their hands over the passengers’ body, lifted up the pant leg and even slid down the socks. Even babies were woken up for inspection. Such security measures cause not just frustration but they make the people even more fearful apart from causing delays in departure. False alarm goes off from the baggage scanners. After the false alarm the passenger’s name is announced over the public address system and then the baggage is opened in his presence. These only add to the panic and woes of the passengers without any positive outcome. Canada has introduced secret-weapon air sky marshals who have been trained to detect and eliminate threat to passengers, flight crew and aircraft (Gulli, Henheffer, Mendleson, & Macdonald, 2010). The sky marshals’ role becomes important only when other security measures at the airport fail, or is missing. Multi-layered approach including traditional tools such as metal detectors and bomb sniffing dogs has been found to be ineffective in fighting terrorists. They can be very expensive and their scope of detection is limited. New security measures including 44 body scanners at a cost of $250,000 have been ineffective as terrorists can safely pass through the scanners if the explosives are stuffed in their body cavities. This cutting-edge technology cannot pick up explosives and is limited to detecting metal, plastic, rubber, wire, ceramic and liquids tucked inside pockets. Hence bombers and hijackers can still board the aircraft with explosives on them. The process of body-screening is time-consuming as it takes one minute per passenger and moreover, gaps in security still remain. The focus is on objects rather than on people and their intentions. If people’s intentions could be detected, perhaps to some extent hijacking could be avoided. Based on the new theory of detecting intentions, it is believed that one may have the most lethal weapons but may not have the intentions to use them and hence such people are harmless. Behavior screening could possibly be an effective process. This starts the moment the passenger enters the airport arena (Gulli et al). The officials that have been trained in the process look for signs such as changes in vocal intonation, physical sings and other clues. As they enter the terminal building assessments start and the suspects are directed in a different direction. They then look for reactions of the passengers as they approach the metal detector and this gives signals of malicious intentions. Tests and screening like these are subject to racial issues which could hinder right direction and create confusion. However, no security measure is fool-proof and the best method to safeguard aviation interest in to stop the terrorists from entering the country through better intelligence and technology that can identify the evildoers (Doyle, 2005). It is faster, cheaper and better to keep the bad people from boarding the plane than screening all people for bad things. There have been instances when watch-list glitches have occurred and intelligence and information-sharing failures have taken place. This is perhaps the reason that American Civil Liberties Union are against developing computerized passenger screening system based on data linked to a person’s name. A name can be flagged wrongly leading to 5 million people being wrongly identified as treat to security (Doyle, 2005). The idea of detecting intentions is definitely laudable because the person should be detected before, and not after he walks through because this suggests that the efforts towards securitization are rendered useless. Canada is hence trying to move away from airport security to access control and surveillance outside of and throughout the airport. Futuristic technologies such as “smart seat belts” have been introduced that enables the passengers to be locked down in their seats (Gulli et al). “Brain finger-printing” sense travelers’ intentions but the benefits do not commensurate with the costs. Moreover, security measures may be adopted for the departing passengers and the flights that are scheduled for departure. Attention had so far not been given to the passengers that arrive but after one of the deadliest attacks in Moscow, the safety and security of the passengers that land at airports also become essential. As the passengers left the baggage area they were met by an army of taxi touts. A suicide bomber killed 35 people and injured another hundred (Economist, 2011). This attack was designed in such a way that it killed Russians and foreigners alike. The male suicide bomber entered the terminal building through the car park avoiding metal detectors. The CCTV had picked up the bomber entering the building about an hour before the explosion took place. According to the footage the bomber did not look north Caucasian. Blames for security breaches are passed on from one department to another but this does not really solve the problem. The entrance restrictions have to be beefed up and people cannot be allowed to walk in from anywhere. Despite all these efforts it has not been possible to stop the thugs from entering the aircrafts. This is because the passengers that are registered under TSA’s Registered Travelers’ Program get a “fast-pass” through cumbersome airport security checkpoints. These passengers are allowed to skip most secondary screening (Levine, 2005). Moreover, if all passengers entering from all directions have to pass through the metal detector, crowd piles up which poses security threat in itself (Economist, 2011). It is not practical to check everyone walking in to the airport. The air marshals need to be better trained. The quality of training should not be compromised with because some marshals have been found to be confused with their roles (Fonda, Donnelly & Thomas, 2003). Such marshals cannot be expected to deliver quality service. The screeners and supervisors need to be trained and recertified annually. Background check for the screeners too needs to be completed. Their fingerprints should also be on the file with FBI. Electronic self-checking is one of the ways that could reduce the time taken in checking in as passengers cannot afford to spend the amount of time currently being taken up (The New Zealand Herald, 2010). The security measures have to stretch beyond the point of departure. Moreover, the equipments used for security measures should be regularly tested and set right (Bentham, 2010). People and organizations with malicious intentions come to the airport with the intention of committing the crime. This is not decided after arrival and hence intelligence capabilities need to be harnessed in advance instead of subjecting the passengers with new ordeals after each new crime that takes place. The current security system is inconsistent and has too many layers (Judd, 2010). Better profiling is needed. Passengers’ risk level should be based on a variety of personal data including criminal records. Based on the records the passengers should be granted green, yellow or red light to fly (Fonda, Donnelly & Thomas, 2003). Those with green light can breeze through while those with red might be subjected to extensive screening and perhaps even barred from traveling. Those with yellow light would be subject to close inspection. A few days after flying the data should be deleted and the computer should also record details of those who resist the system. Thus, since 9/11 several new measures have been adopted by the commercial air sector. However, none of the measures have been fool-proof and all of the measures are time-consuming and harassing to the passengers and the staff. Besides, the security measures, the metal detectors and the scanners are not imposed on all that enter the airport building, the low-paid workers are not subject to any security while they are freely allowed to roam around the entire airport arena. Installation of the CCTV also does not serve any purpose because the suicide bomber’s entry went undetected. The air marshals and the screeners are ill-trained and confused about their roles. The security section often has the longest queue and people are left unnerved and frustrated. Technology has not been able to make the system fool-proof and this is not possible with the number of people that enter the airport arena every day. The terrorists and the hijackers are growing smarter as technology advances. They can now hide bombs in their body cavity which goes undetected. Travel is no safer than it was before 9/11 despite huge amount of dollars spent on research and new equipments. References Bentham, M November 1, 2010, RYANAIR BOSS: BRINGING IN MORE AIRPORT BOMB CHECKS IS POINTLESS, The Evening Standard (London) Doyle, JM 2005, SECURITY DILEMMA , Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol. 163, no. 8, pp. 47-48 Economist, 2011, Terror at the airport, vol. 398, no. 8718, pp. 47-48 Fonda, D Donnelly, SB & Thomas CB 2003, BUMPS IN THE SKY, vol. 162, no. 18, pp. 32-34 Gulli, C Henheffer, T Mendleson, R & Macdonald, N 2010, THE SCARY TRUTH ABOUT AIRPORT SECURITY, 00249262, 1/25/2010, Vol. 123, Issue 2, pp. 16-21 Judd, T October 28, 2010, Government backs calls to review redundant airport security checks, The Independent (London) Levone, S 2005, SOFTWARE AND SMART CARD, U.S. News & World Report, vol. 138, no. 9, pp. 36-37 The Express, October 30, 2010, Longer delays as security gets stepped up, The New Zealand Herald, October 30, 2010, Time consuming airport security checks cant last, says pilot, Read More