Individuals Error Protection During Flying - Literature review Example

LITERATURE REVIEW Name: Institute: Leadership and human factors impact on aviation safety and their significance on safety culture Leadership Overview in Aviation Industry All aviation communities have missions, which relies on effective leadership to succeed or fail. Considering that every company’s aim is to achieve its mission, aviation companies’ success depends heavily on selecting leaders as well as managers who can effectively accomplish the company’s mission (Ferguson & Nelson, 2013). However, in aviation, safety is the main priority given that companies have to protect the lives, property, as well as consider the benefits. Undoubtedly, any organisation approaching safety as a main priority build in coping as well as adaptability mechanisms in spite of difficulty. Basically, safety assists in ameliorating economic loss attributable to incidents and accident. To ensure safety, aviation companies require leadership from the right persons, but finding the right leaders to counter the safety challenge as well as achieve the needed organisational success is hard (Martinussen & Hunter, 2009). Actually, score of airliners reflect first on profit instead of safety, and this is because they lack the right leaders to run the management. Majority of investigated aviation accidents have been blamed on poor training of workers and poor leadership. Essentially, decision making at management level is the most influential position in all organisations, since the applications as well as process of excellent decisions do good to both the performers and the organisation, writes Martinussen and Hunter (2009). Therefore, Martinussen and Hunter (2009) think that aviation industry requires leaders who are empowered and who through the decisions as well as chain of command may empower others workers to achieve the organisational mission. Goglia, Halford, and Stolzer (2012) suggest that for excellent leaders, the involvement of workers during the process of decision making should matter to them. Considering that in aviation culture there are risk decisions, but they must be comprehended by every person involved. In most aviation companies, especially airliners, risk management is part of their organisational culture. Furthermore, all aviation communities have performance conditions for least expertise; but, at what threshold or point is the safety flag raised and operations stopped, asks Goglia, Halford, and Stolzer (2012). Leaders in aviation industry understand that rational dedication is the truthful, intellectual way of thinking that makes workers to stay put in a certain job or an organisation (such as health benefits, salary, and additional facilities).however, as mentioned by Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson (2006), these leaders have failed to understand that emotional commitment depicts the reasoning that workers have concerning their workplaces, like if their effort is valuable to the organisation. Southwest Airline as indicated in Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson (2006) study has shown a typical leadership in the history of aviation industry; its leaders consider its workers as the first assets of the company. Other aviation companies should emulate this form of leadership considering that when workers are less motivated, the expectation of performance is normally unsafe and poor. Moreover, workers never follow leaders who are uncommitted. In this case, commitment may be exhibited in a full array of matters to comprise the working hours the leader decide to maintain, how the leader work so as to improve workers individual abilities and reduce human error. Human Error Human error in aviation industry has repeatedly been the key cause of accidents; thus, highlighting two natures of accidents: individual as well as organizational accidents. Individual accidents, in this case, occur when an error free from organisational influences is placed by a person (Dhillon, 2012). For example, this form of accident can take place when an employee following the organisation’s set rules, accidentally slips from the ladder and get injured. So, the wound or damage experienced by the victim will be limited to simply on the victim, and even supposing the implications may well be severe for the victim together with his/her family, most likely there are no pervasive implications on the organisation and environment. Organizational accidents, on the other hand, have multiple causes and its effect can be experienced across the organisation, and also has a shocking effect on the environment, people, as well as assets not related to the organisation. As mentioned by Dhillon (2012), organisational accidents arise from the string of many contributory factors stemming from a number of system levels. Human error as for many years has been acknowledged as the main causative factor to more than 70 per cent of accidents in aviation industry (Latorella & Prabhu, 2000). Whilst typically associated with operations of aircraft, human error has not long grown to be the major priority in management of air traffic in addition to maintenance practices. Human factors in aviation industry, work together with pilots, mechanics as well as engineers to utilize the latest knowledge the interface between airplanes as well as human performance so as to help regarding operators improve safety and efficiency in their continuous operations (Gramopadhye & Drury, 2000). For that reason, the word human factors have developed to become trendier while the aviation industry have finally realised that human error, as opposed to mechanical failure, causes most of aviation accidents. In aviation industry, human factors are used to advance knowledge of how workers can most competently and safely adapt to with advancing technology. This knowledge as mentioned by Gramopadhye and Drury (2000) is subsequently transformed into organisational procedures, design, or policies in order to help workers perform productively. This may well lead to organisational changes, and as in any organisation changes are at all times received with fierce resistance especially if the workers were never consulted during the process of change. Significance to Safety Culture Basically, safety culture as mentioned by Flannery (2001) is inextricably associated with, but may possibly be made different from organisational culture. In this case, safety culture depends on leadership and human factors, particularly how the leadership is handling the often contradictory purposes of success and safety, and the exhibited level of devotion to organisation’s safety. Safety culture also depends on perceptivity of the organisation’s communication styles, and according to Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson (2006) lack of communication may result into unsafe organisation environment. For example, in case a worker in the control centre is not sure about the safety of the set procedures, communications channels must be open to communicate about the issue. A safety culture that is ideal is the organisational engine that guides the system towards the goal of resisting its operations hazards. This goal as indicated by Gill and Shergill (2004) has to be realised irrespective of the existing commercial agitation, and must be supported by the organisation’s leadership. Therefore, safety culture is steered by a steady appreciation level for anything that may support safety within the organisation. When the safety performance is improved, the best way of remaining secure is to amass the correct forms of data, specifically to produce an erudite culture (Gill & Shergill, 2004). An erudite culture requires leaders to be mindful of the scores of factors that have an effect on the safety systems, in particular human factors. According to Christenson (2007), the organisational safety culture is made known in a way through which safety in aviation industry is managed. Most leaders fail to understand that system for safety management in the organisation cannot be created by a set of procedures as well as policies. Instead, the system is anchored on how leaders manage safety in the workplace and how procedures as well as policies are implemented. Additionally, the nature through which wellbeing of the workers and users is dealt with in the workplace (exclusively, supervising) is influenced by the safety culture of the aviation company. In view of that, safety management have to be incorporated in the leadership management practice within the company as well as in organisational system. Absolutely in high-risk industries like aviation industry, safety ought to come first ahead of anything else. So an better safety culture may both reflect and be reinforced by factors like commitment to safety by organisational leadership, watching over hazards, worrying about the public, as well as ceaseless commitment to safety through organizational learning. Importantly, some styles of leadership especially the transformational leadership can heavily impact a safety culture, because safety culture as mentioned by Wiegmann, Thaden, and Gibbons (2007) needs an aggressive leader who puts safety first and profitability last. Bearing in mind that a safe organisational environment leads to improved employee motivation and morale, and because of improved productivity, the profitability levels also increases. The Future In the future, (anel on Human Factors in Air Traffic Control Automation, National Research Council, and Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (1998) claimed that automation technology for Air traffic control will advance with regard to complexity as well as intricacy. Means used for control as well as measurement, diagnosis and detection of failure, prediction of weather patterns, voice and data communication, display technology, and expert systems will all in the coming days improve. These technological advances will allow for innovative changes in the quality of data in addition to the support reachable to the air traffic controller. Importantly, the novel making of automated tools will help leaders in making decisions and possibly will replace the management and planning activities of the controller. As mentioned by (Panel on Human Factors in Air Traffic Control Automation et al. (1998), although these advances in technology are certain, there exists some doubt that automation will in the future replace human factors in controlling air traffic control, mainly for detecting failure in the system as well as giving solution to prevail over that failure. Still, leadership will be much needed since the technologies will be to a certain extent narrowed in their capabilities; thus, oversimplifying the central paradigms of the leadership processes. Summary In summary, the literature has indicated that inability to follow the set procedures is not uncommon in incidents as well as accidents related to procedures of maintenance and flight operations. Still, insight into the contributory factors of human errors in aviation industry is inadequate considering that so far the industry has not succeeded in espousing reliable and systematic tool for examining such incidents. Bearing in mind that absolute safety is not practically feasible in aviation industry, leaders and human factors as the change agent are needed to present the link between different groups within the organisation and the operating environment in order to lessen hazards as well as provide safety. Ensuring high performance in the present era of complexity is principally very important in aviation industry where the possibility of error and disaster is certain. Therefore, to prevent future accidents as well as incidents, as much as safety is concerned, the board for aviation safety must comprehend and get involved on how systems and traditions of organisational leadership and management function in all aviation communities. References Christenson, D. (2007). Build a Healthy Safety Culture Using Organizational Learning and High Reliability Organizing. U.S. Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center. Dhillon, B. (2012). Safety and Human Error in Engineering Systems. Florida: CRC Press. Ferguson, M., & Nelson, S. (2013). Aviation Safety: A Balanced Industry Approach. New York: Cengage Learning. Flannery, J. A. (2001). Safety Culture and its measurement in aviation. University of Newcastle. John A. Flannery. Gill, G. K., & Shergill, G. S. (2004). Perceptions of safety management and safety culture in the aviation industry in New Zealand. Journal of Air Transport Management, 10(4), 231-237. Goglia, M. J., Halford, M. C., & Stolzer, P. A. (2012). Implementing Safety Management Systems in Aviation. London: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Gramopadhye, A. K., & Drury, C. G. (2000). Human factors in aviation maintenance: how we got to where we are. International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 26(2). Hitt, M., Ireland, R. D., & Hoskisson, R. (2006). Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases. New York: Cengage Learning. Latorella, K. A., & Prabhu, P. V. (2000). A review of human error in aviation maintenance and inspection. International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 26(2), 133-161. Martinussen, M., & Hunter, D. R. (2009). Aviation Psychology and Human Factors. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press. Panel on Human Factors in Air Traffic Control Automation, National Research Council, B. o.-S., & Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. (1998). The Future of Air Traffic Control:: Human Operators and Automation. New York: National Academies Press. Wiegmann, D. A., Thaden, T. L., & Gibbons, A. M. (2007). A review of safety culture theory and its potential application to traffic safety. AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety. Illinois: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Read More

Human Error Human error in aviation industry has repeatedly been the key cause of accidents; thus, highlighting two natures of accidents: individual as well as organizational accidents. Individual accidents, in this case, occur when an error free from organisational influences is placed by a person (Dhillon, 2012). For example, this form of accident can take place when an employee following the organisation’s set rules, accidentally slips from the ladder and get injured. So, the wound or damage experienced by the victim will be limited to simply on the victim, and even supposing the implications may well be severe for the victim together with his/her family, most likely there are no pervasive implications on the organisation and environment.

Organizational accidents, on the other hand, have multiple causes and its effect can be experienced across the organisation, and also has a shocking effect on the environment, people, as well as assets not related to the organisation. As mentioned by Dhillon (2012), organisational accidents arise from the string of many contributory factors stemming from a number of system levels. Human error as for many years has been acknowledged as the main causative factor to more than 70 per cent of accidents in aviation industry (Latorella & Prabhu, 2000).

Whilst typically associated with operations of aircraft, human error has not long grown to be the major priority in management of air traffic in addition to maintenance practices. Human factors in aviation industry, work together with pilots, mechanics as well as engineers to utilize the latest knowledge the interface between airplanes as well as human performance so as to help regarding operators improve safety and efficiency in their continuous operations (Gramopadhye & Drury, 2000). For that reason, the word human factors have developed to become trendier while the aviation industry have finally realised that human error, as opposed to mechanical failure, causes most of aviation accidents.

In aviation industry, human factors are used to advance knowledge of how workers can most competently and safely adapt to with advancing technology. This knowledge as mentioned by Gramopadhye and Drury (2000) is subsequently transformed into organisational procedures, design, or policies in order to help workers perform productively. This may well lead to organisational changes, and as in any organisation changes are at all times received with fierce resistance especially if the workers were never consulted during the process of change.

Significance to Safety Culture Basically, safety culture as mentioned by Flannery (2001) is inextricably associated with, but may possibly be made different from organisational culture. In this case, safety culture depends on leadership and human factors, particularly how the leadership is handling the often contradictory purposes of success and safety, and the exhibited level of devotion to organisation’s safety. Safety culture also depends on perceptivity of the organisation’s communication styles, and according to Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson (2006) lack of communication may result into unsafe organisation environment.

For example, in case a worker in the control centre is not sure about the safety of the set procedures, communications channels must be open to communicate about the issue. A safety culture that is ideal is the organisational engine that guides the system towards the goal of resisting its operations hazards. This goal as indicated by Gill and Shergill (2004) has to be realised irrespective of the existing commercial agitation, and must be supported by the organisation’s leadership. Therefore, safety culture is steered by a steady appreciation level for anything that may support safety within the organisation.

When the safety performance is improved, the best way of remaining secure is to amass the correct forms of data, specifically to produce an erudite culture (Gill & Shergill, 2004). An erudite culture requires leaders to be mindful of the scores of factors that have an effect on the safety systems, in particular human factors.

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