Human Evil is the Inevitable Result of Human Disobedience, Not of God's Malice or Neglect - Essay Example

Human Evil is the Inevitable Result of Human Disobedience, Not of God's Malice or Neglect Introduction What is the nature of human action What distinguishes actions from, for example, behaviors, movements, or events What is the difference between intending and deliberating When we think up some behavior, do we always ponder it, weigh it against other possible ways of behaving If so, then intentional action would be the same as deliberate action. It does seem that the following can be said, truly, about action: Actions-cutting, burning, weaving-have an independent nature of their own. If we wish to succeed, they cannot be performed in just any way the whims and desires of particular actors may dictate. The objective character of the world determines the operations that must be performed, though only if the goals that are to be accomplished are also posited. The goal-what is to be accomplished, in general or in detail-also serves as the measure of adequacy of the operation. Moreover, all these and many other actions are performed with a proper instrument, one that is suitable for the proper performance of the operation in question (Weingartner, p 30) Some social philosophers are noted for having concluded that since the bulk of our behavior is not deliberate, it is, instead, unintended, spontaneous. They reach this assessment by observing that many of the consequences of human action have not been thought of and anticipated when the action was taken. Thus, they think, the action must not have been intentional. These philosophers invoke this point to stress that since we reach most of our ends-especially those that amount to various institutional arrangements, such as language, a system of money, and the marketplace-without deliberation, these ends must not have been intended in any sense at all. Philosophers see human action more as human behavior, as driven rather than intended. The conflation of deliberation and intention leads to the claim that much of what we do is in some sense not up to us, not a result of human initiative. It just happens. To put it another way, such an understanding of human action suggests that what we do without deliberation comes about spontaneously, with no one being responsible for it. It may, indeed, amount to something totally arational, even instinctual. The order in much of human social life appears to have come about spontaneously, without anyone having planned it. But, of course, there is planning and there is planning. Intentional action is planned, even if the planning is not elaborate, involved, and self-conscious. As Austin sees it, even though the person acts on impulse, this may mean simply that he gave little thought to what he set out to do, not that he did not set out to do it, did not plan to push him and for him to fall. Premeditated planning isn't the only kind (Austin, pp 150). Deliberative action, involving self-conscious planning and monitoring of what we set out to do, is somehow unnatural; that it is not really part of the normal proceedings people embarks upon in life or that the deliberative behavior of human beings may be artificial. It seems that this attempt to deal with different types of human action without recourse to the normative sphere is misguided. It leaves us at sea when we face evil, when we consider such matters as the Holocaust, rape, serial murder and child molestation, leading many to turn to social and natural science, such as evolutionary psychology and biology, and avoid the waxing problems of morality. Yet those problems nevertheless reappear if only because even to say that one ought to look at human affairs in one light rather than another carries with it a moral tinge. Such a claim is usually followed by charges of stubbornness or intransigence, both of which are clearly morally pregnant. It is, thus, crucial that we address here one of the most troublesome areas of moral philosophy, the problem of human evil. But this will take a bit of preparation. Human evil is the evil that is either committed by humans or committed to (that is, suffered by) humans. It entails breach of moral identity in either (or both) of 2 means. The evil of extraordinary destruction will breach the constitutive uprightness of the moral identity of the sufferers in that it symbolizes an unnecessary unbearable diminishment or obliteration of the aptitude for moral identity. The evil of indistinct will breach the recognized integrity of the moral identity of evil agents in that it symbolizes a clash within and so a contradiction of moral identity. If human evil is the willful neglect of full mental focus, and if the results of full mental focus are always as good as they could possibly be as far as the quality of human actions is concerned, then full mental focus cannot have as its target evil ends. Evil ends would be just those that would result from lack of such full focus! Indeed, when one is tempted to link rationality to evil ends, one usually omits from consideration that rationality requires full, not partial or selective, focus on the facts that are available for consideration. When a criminal gang focuses very sharply and intently on how the bank vault is to be opened, they only appear rational if one forgets that the wealth in the vault belongs to others and they failed to take that into account to its full measure of importance. Given that human nature involves being a rationally conscious biological entity, it is the volitional focus of one's attention on the circumstances of one's life that makes one good at the kind of being one is. Human Action & Human Evil When someone is said to be morally evil or when some act is said to be morally wrong, just what is being said about the person or the act, respectively What is it that constitutes evil Without a clear enough idea of what evil is, we are left perplexed about numerous problems in society. Let us just consider some random cases where human evil is said to be found: a jury in a trial subverts justice, so its members are blamed for something they should not have done; gang members are blamed for their violent deeds; politicians are accused of abusing their power or not doing their duty. In each case, we are blaming people, holding them morally responsible, for evildoing or negligence. Whenever we charge parents with child abuse, men with sexism, women with self-deprecation, teachers with indoctrination, drug traffickers with poisoning children, industry with polluting, or terrorists with senseless violence, we are claiming that something morally wrong was done and that someone may have been morally evil in doing it. Skepticism & Moral Judgments Nevertheless, throughout history, as in our own time, there has been much skepticism about morality. Many people, erudite or plain, claim that evil is in the eye of the beholder and either that we cannot know what is right and wrong conduct or that no one is morally responsible for anything because no one can help doing what he or she does. Indeed, much of social science rests on such skepticism. Many social scientists wish to engineer us to behave well because they do not believe that we are responsible for what we do. They take it that the way we behave is produced by factors outside our control and that if these factors could only be manipulated intelligently, our behavior would also change for the better, but not on our own account. Skepticism Belied Still, even social scientists blame people-for example, those in Congress who will not vote enough money for them to do their important work, those who find their outlook mistaken, and those who would subvert the work they believe is the only salvation of society. Paradoxically, also, social scientists often chide their own children or friends for wrongdoing, all the while doubting, officially, that such wrongdoing is anyone's fault or could be known as such. Despite the complexity of this issue of whether human evil exists and what it amounts to, it is worthwhile at times to take a stab at the subject outside academic circles. The matter is not so difficult to comprehend as some may believe. And an understanding of moral goodness and evil cannot require a very special way of thinking, since it would then be unavailable to the people whom we praise or blame. In short, we ask that everyone understand morality enough to practice it. So how could it be so complex that only philosophers could comprehend it Human Nature, Action, & Moral Responsibility Ultimately, the explanation of all blameworthy human actions, even attitudes, is most sensibly understood in view of human nature. This is because whatever is good or bad about anything is assessed in terms of the nature of that thing. Whether we are judging a tomato or an orange, a tennis match or a football game, a home or an office, a movie or a play-whatever it is that we are evaluating, we begin the process by first grasping what kind of thing is involved. Once we grasp what something is-not necessarily in some timeless fashion, but usually in a transhistorically stable fashion-we can begin to consider what would make it good or bad. A good apple is something that fulfills the requirements of being an apple, while a perfect apple is this to the utmost, exceptionally. Accordingly, what makes adults good is to be as fully, or maturely, human as they can be. The analogy is, of course, incomplete, since apples do not take part in making themselves good. But as living entities, what makes them good as apples is akin to what makes other living things good as the species of living things they are, namely, completeness and consistency in their nature. In the case of children, adjustments are made to account for their necessarily incomplete potential for full human development at the time when they are acting and being judged as doing well or badly at what they do. To put it differently, while adult human beings have the capacity to be fully, or maturely, human on their own initiative, a person may choose not to be such and thus will have chosen to amount to a less than good human being, one who does not choose to actualize his or her full potential for being a whole, complete, fully developed individual human being (Mises, pp 19). What, then, is it to be a human being Our nature is just what we must be to be human, and that is to be thinking animals (Machan, pp 23-29). This means that we are the kind of biological organism that depends on thinking for its survival and flourishing. It is by virtue of our thinking faculty that we are different from other animals. But it is by virtue of our biological attributes that we also are part of the animal world. Both of these are vital to our humanity. Thinking is an activity of forming ideas, theories-a way of grasping or understanding what the world is conceptually, by means of abstractions based on primitive awareness, as it were, achieved by our sensory and perceptual faculties and organs. To have a biological nature is to be a living organism that survives by means of nutrition and self-development. This self-development, however, can occur at reflexive, instinctual, and conceptual levels. A thinking being must flourish by means of conceptual self-development. Choice, Thought, & Human Action But perhaps the most unusual aspect of being a thinking animal is that we live largely by choice, not by reflex and instinct, since forming ideas is not automatic. Thinking is a mental process that one must initiate-it does not just happen. The idea that human beings have free will means that their thinking and, thus, their actions are self-produced. It is also the foundation of their moral nature-their individual responsibility to do the right thing and avoid doing the wrong thing, to be good (Skinner, 1971). To be good at being human, we must excel at being thinking animals. It is when they choose to get by with only half their minds tuned into reality that we see human beings doing badly at living their lives. Aristotle called the basic goodness of human beings the exercise of right reason. Plato believed that the choice to be guided by reason made the difference. Many other philosophers suggested something similar; prior to the time when they became enamored with "science," which they thought eliminated free will. As noted before, the idea that humans have free will means that their thinking is self-produced; they have the capacity to ignite the process of thinking, to start up the formation of ideas. Now, instead of putting our thinking into motion or, in other words, initiating thinking, we often just coast, without "engaging our gears," without even firing up the engines of our human lives, namely, our minds. That, more than anything else, would explain human malpractice, including thinking silly or half-baked stuff and acting on it. The main difference between people and the rest of the living world is that we must initiate the thinking that is essential to our lives. We lack instincts to steer us on the right course. Other animals live largely automatically, instinctually, with their genetic makeup equipping them to react to circumstances successfully enough; they use ideas only minimally, and they do not reflect on this fact-they are not aware that they need to focus their minds, think carefully, attend to problems. We learn of this need very early in life. We can make mistakes because we fail, by our own volition, to pay heed to the world around us. Other animals tend to be victimized by new circumstances-especially by ones human beings introduce in the world, such as highways, dams, forest fires, and onrushing trucks, but also by natural disasters such as floods and tornadoes-whereas our task is to constantly reassess the world we face so as not to be found unawares. This requires the effort to think, to be aware, to be and to keep in focus. The fact of human evil is too evident to be argued away by any theorist, so the only alternative is to try to understand what it comes to. So, then, what is the nature of evil, given our commonsense awareness of its existence Since thinking is the activity that is most directly under our own volition-we must activate it; no one can make us think-what we must ultimately be blamed for has to be our failure to think. This is also the best way to understand the fact that morality is neither something wired into us nor something arbitrary. The debate, as old as the one about free will, concerning whether morality is objective or merely subjective may well be managed best along these lines, because although there is no morality without human beings electing to come under some set of principles, they do make this choice when they embark upon their own living experiences. They, as human beings, cannot avoid choosing either to be or not to be living a fully human life. "To be or not to be," as Shakespeare's Hamlet so poignantly put it, is the fundamental choice, and for humans it comes to the same as "To think or not to think"1. Once we make the choice in favor of being, it immediately ushers in a set of principles, namely, whatever reason requires-most directly, the requirement of being in mental focus. The principles, or virtues, that are the heart of Aristotelian practical reason, or prudence, are what we all ought to put into effect. Final Observations on Human Evil It seems, then, that the problem of evil is not insoluble. Indeed, ordinary mortals do not seem to think so, insofar as they engage in blaming and praising-as well as in outright character assassination-throughout the globe and all of human history. Given what human action amounts to, namely, behavior guided by purposive ideas (that is, intentions); we may have a handle on action as both explainable and open to moral evaluation. But this comes at something of a price, at least to those who harbor utopian hopes of a world engineered to be morally good. It is that each of us cannot do much to improve other people if those others do not make that choice entirely on their own. All the social engineering in the world, starting with the gentlest type evident in welfare states, all the way to massive regimentation, will not create morally good persons. What, then, can we do We can encourage the development of a community where the "evil that men do will come back to haunt them." That way, at least, people's failure to think will result in untoward consequences for themselves and those directly associated with them. Protecting people from their own evil will perpetuate the evil, because their failures will not come back to teach them lessons. The best device for achieving such a feedback mechanism within communities is the institution of the principle of the right to private property. People's actions can, at least legally, be tied to them reasonably firmly, and any attempt to dump on others can have some penalties attached to it. Without this approach, we will-indeed, we often do-suffer from a phenomenon, the moral tragedy of the commons, in which we have no way to differentiate between the good and evil deeds of different individuals; they all get mixed up with one another and thus lead to the perpetuation of the process of wrongdoing. Neither blame nor credit can be taken in the case of such dumping. The good that people do will not be a source of self-esteem, nor the evil a source of guilt. Beyond the rather minimal help of instituting a system of private property, nothing much more can be done politically to produce good in the world. Making people good is not possible by anyone outside the individual people, and trying to make them good usually has the opposite effect. Now to just summarize the thesis on evil advanced in this discussion. All forms of immorality are varieties of irrationality in the sense that they involve perverse understanding of the way things are. This perversity, however, is self-induced, not "irrational" in the mentally incapacitated sense of that term. Both morally evil people and criminal (Machan, pp 213-222) -those who actually violate just laws, not those who rebel against unjust or silly laws-are irrational in the sense of subverting their own reason as they view the world. Since our sphere of freedom in our lives is in our thinking, this is where our fundamental moral responsibility lies in life: to think clearly. "Ought" implies "can," so where else would morality fit in with human existence if not in the sphere where we are genuinely free, where it is we who initiate conduct The mind is free-it initiates thought and awareness, particularly conceptually (Skinner, 1971). So what follows (conduct, action) is free derivatively, because it is guided by thought. So the moral philosophy sketched here is very close to a view of epistemology that sees thinking as a form of action that one can embark upon or not. The reason we can criticize others' ways of thinking is that we are free to do it well or badly. And it is in this sphere that action that goes wrong originates and thus gets its quality, ultimately. Because this is free action, it is also the source of moral success or failure. Reference: Rudolph H. Weingartner, the Unity of the Platonic Dialogue (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), p. 30. J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 150. Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 19. B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Bantam Books, 1971). Tibor R. Machan, "Epistemology and Moral Knowledge," Review of Metaphysics, 36 (September 1982):23-29. Tibor R. Machan, "A Revision of the Doctrine of Disability of Mind," Persona y Derecho, vol. 33 (May 1995):213-22. Read More