Contrasting Criminologists Erving Goffman and Michel Foucault - Essay Example

? Comparing and Contrasting Criminologists Erving Goffman and Michel Foucault of Introduction As a branch of the bigger discipline of sociology, criminology uses knowledge from anthropology, economics, psychology, biology, and other fields to explore the origins and prevention of crime (McLaughlin, Muncie, & Hughes, 2003). A great deal of criminology is still covered by the field of criminal law. Criminology studies the foundations and consequences of criminal laws, specifically, how they develop, how they operate, how they are violated, and what is done to offenders (Sumner, 2008). However, laws differ temporally and spatially. Laws are historically influenced, relative, and not fixed (Hale et al., 2013). Even actions generally considered criminal, such as killing, have instances where they are allowed or considered necessary. And so, numerous criminologists argue that they must not be limited by the confines of law, otherwise, criminology would be a highly conservative or traditional field. Hence criminologists should be capable of taking into consideration a broader array of issues. This essay compares and contrasts two widely known criminologists—Erving Goffman and Michel Foucault—particularly their contributions to the discipline of criminology Erving Goffman and Michel Foucault: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis Generally considered by his contemporaries as an eccentric, Goffman was an introvert and sceptical observer of social interactions, whose incomparable model of sociology strongly reflected his own reluctance to follow social traditions and the conventional principles of human interaction and relationship. For instance, Thomas Scheff, a student of Goffman and a social scientist, describes in his works how Goffman would not just repeatedly emphasise behaviour or actions that, habitually, would be taken no notice of, but that he was also very interested in observing individuals in ordinary conversations or interactions in order to interpret their responses (Hayward, Maruna, & Mooney, 2013). This emphasis on the micro aspects of human behaviour was quite noticeable in his works. Goffman was widely known for his perceptive observational abilities and exceptional skill to underline generally ignored features of people’s daily existence—frequently placing emphasis on aspects people may wish not to pay attention to (Geis & Dodge, 2002). Like Erving Goffman, Michel Foucault presented an insightful and critical alternative to conventional ideas. In fact, and not like majority of French thinkers, Foucault was discontented with Marxist ideas. However, not like Goffman, Foucault explored a broader range of issues, not limiting himself to any specific academic field, topic, or are of study. Foucault has in fact been quite successful, and his work has changed the content and techniques of the many fields he was involved in. Criminology is one of these fields.  In 1953, he finished his dissertation and after three years his study was printed as a book, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. This interesting and very important work became the groundwork of the whole project of Goffman—the sociological analysis of human interaction, particularly face-to-face interaction. The core subject of Goffman’s ideas is how individuals try to keep a constant self-image in front of other people (Hale et al., 2013). In The Presentation of Self he makes use of the dramatic stage as a symbol to illustrate the process and setting of human identity formation. Goffman believes that social life is similar to a theatre wherein individuals are actors or performers and those surrounding them are the audience or spectators. Every time a person is in the present of others s/he is ‘on show’ and, with different levels of objective and motive, ‘put on a performance’ (Hayward et al., 2013, p. 129). He then introduced the concept of ‘dramaturgy’ to explain the rule-based preservation of a common agreement on how various social interactions and circumstances must be addressed. Both Goffman and Foucault believe that if things are devoid of meaning, it suggests that the object, such as the high-profile criminal, and the subject, such as the criminologist, and the area of non-discursive and discursive exercises, such as criminal justice dialogues are coexistent. Because practice, subject, and object are coexistent, both Goffman and Foucault advocate analysis of their connections so as to determine the reasoning at work in a particular area (Taylor, Walton, & Young, 2013). Moreover, since it is not possible to reflect objectively on something—for instance, it is not possible to envision a criminal justice system where jails are not the basic unit of punishment because people are coexistent with the ‘penality of detention’—Foucault suggests people reflect on it in a historical way: how did a corrective institution emerge? What made its emergence possible? What perspectives or beliefs were widespread at the time? Foucault’s study of the origin of the prison is based on the fact that humanity has only been employing incarceration as a punishment in itself since the beginning of the 18th century (Foucault, 1991). This realisation made Foucault interested in the circumstances the facilitated the emergence of the prison, and hence to draw a connection between modern-day power tactics and ‘penality of detention’ (Foucault, 2012).  Goffman eventually shifts his focus on the details of social interaction between strangers in public. He made use of the idea of ‘face work’ to explain how social actors often try to convey an image of themselves which has favourable social quality. This presentation of the self is called the ‘face’ s/he shows to other people (Goffman, 2005). Criminologists have discovered this idea useful in identifying the intricacies of interpersonal conflict. Issues like mindfulness of other people’s personal space, personal cleanliness, and eye contract are inherent to concepts of everyday ‘courtesy’. They become particularly essential in unfamiliar and overcrowded situations (Sumner, 2008). For instance, a recent London Transport advertisement programme demands that passengers avoid using loud devices and carrying foul-smelling things in their trip, as a way of respecting other passengers. Criminologist Martin Innes, influenced by the symbolic interactionist theory of Goffman, has introduced the concept of ‘signal disorder’ to explain how specific activities, like public drinking, are commonly viewed as risky or dangerous, being interpreted as a sign of possibly more severe troubles (Goffman, 2005). Goffman’s theory of ‘face work’ is substantiated by Foucault. Foucault argues that by individualising every individual, or through assessment of individual face work, unwanted or ‘abnormal’ behaviour becomes more identifiable, hence easier to examine and solve. Foucault claims that this is how surveillance works—it is a mechanism wherein several administrators can wield control and power over groups and individuals by organising them in a particular manner. The objective is to ‘normalise’ every individual, by diagnosing and addressing any unusual behaviour, regardless how small. When this has been accomplished, the person can effectively and securely be transferred to another, less rigorous section of the surveillance machinery (Taylor et al., 2013). However, it is a quite specific type of control, in that its objective is not forceful domination, but instead, the thorough examination of every person’s history, background, and behaviour, with the intention of rehabilitating and normalising them (Foucault, 2012). Goffman argues that individuals and groups have the chance to manipulate or mould the image they show to other people, by means of posture, gestures, mannerisms, style of speech, world choice, and so on. He calls this kind of self-conscious appearance ‘impression management’ (Goffman, 2005). As a result, his dramaturgical theory has been particularly useful in understanding the criminal justice system, through the concepts of ‘staging’ and presentation of court hearings and sentencing. Law is usually rule-based and structured, with trial partakers and courtrooms fulfilling fixed roles in a performance that is very ritualised and regulated. In ‘staging’ the court hearing, legal experts and court personnel attempt to build and sustain ‘formality’ by means of legal jargons, rigid time control, use of ritualistic clothing, and specific positioning of participants (Sumner, 2008). This argument has been expanded by Foucault by arguing that individuals are also, besides impression management, shaped by their efforts to give meaning to things that seemingly do not have one. Foucault argues (Hayward et al., 2013, p. 156): “there is neither a temporal object (e.g. the insane) to be known by a historicised subject (e.g. the subject of capitalism), as in Marxism; nor an a-temporal subject knowing a historicised object, as in phenomenology.” Both the subject and the object are not external to history. What individuals know, and how they conceive things, is an interpretation every time- things are devoid of meaning.  Goffman contributed greatly to the core principles of the Interactionist School of criminology. His ideas have been highly influential in criminology in spite of his opinion about the discipline. He argues that there was not much of a reason to separately examine deviant behaviour for there was no universal model of deviance (Goffman, 2005). For him, research on deviance was merely an addition to the wide-ranging focus of sociology. Goffman claims (Moyer, 2001, p. 177): It is remarkable that those of us who live around the social sciences have so quickly become comfortable in using the term ‘deviant,’ as if those to whom the term is applied have enough in common so that significant things can be said about them as a whole. Just as there are iatrogenic [illness brought about by medical treatment or analysis] disorders caused by the work that physicians do (which gives them more work to do), so there are categories of persons who are created by students of society and then studied by them. In spite of this view, Goffman’s ideas would have a lasting influence on the discipline of criminology, particularly as regards institutional or prison life and changes that take place in the patients’ or inmates’ personal identities.  On the other hand, the first contribution of Foucault to criminology is methodological. His scholarly work took place at a period when France was mainly divided into two major schools of thought—phenomenology and Marxism. In general, Foucault thought both perspectives are thorny. Moreover, Foucault gradually developed a threefold categorisation of the techniques of government implemented in Western societies throughout history (Foucault, 2012). This categorisation is extremely helpful to segregate paradigmatic transitions in criminology, particularly criminal law. These three power strategies are ‘sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical’ (Hayward et al., 2013, p. 157).  In the ‘sovereign’ strategy the law is the method of power, which concerns the subject. Offences are forbidden, and punishment or sentencing is of the structure of a ‘deduction’, which is defined by Foucault as “a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labour and blood, levied on the subjects” (Hayward et al., 2013, p. 157). In the ‘disciplinary’ strategy the method of power are the established rules or standards and power is used in individuals. Institutions aim to regulate, standardise, or normalise individuals by means of place and time structures like solitary confinement, thorough scheduling, and so on. In the ‘biopolitical’ strategy power is exercised by means of security procedures and rules intended to regulate the public by responding to statistically organised patterns (DeKeseredy & Perry, 2006). The primary goal of government is to assess risks and benefits. Modern-day techniques of managing risk suggest itself, with the criminal described in terms of the dangers he carries. Nowadays, according to Taylor and colleagues (2013), the ‘biopolitical’ strategy dominates. Foucault’s three categories are mirrored by Goffman’s portrayal of the criminal justice system as a ‘total institution’. As described by Goffman, these institutions were “where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (Moyer, 2001, p. 178). More particularly, he illustrates these places as those where the below circumstances are present (Moyer, 2001, p. 178): 1. All aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority. 2. Each phase of the member’s daily activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together. 3. All phases of the day’s activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a pre-arranged time into the next, the whole sequence of activities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials. 4. The various enforced activities are brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfil the official aims of the institution. Therefore, rehabilitation centres, penitentiaries, and any other institutions of detention usually related to the criminal justice system may be classified as ‘total institutions’. Both Goffman and Foucault provided a thorough investigation of the manner by which these ‘total institutions’, which may also consist of military, penal, and educational institutions, vigorously encouraged and aggravated ‘social deviance’ because of the administrative characteristic of their systems (Carrabine et al., 2013).  Numerous of Foucault’s arguments defy common sense. Whilst many view criminology as a scientific discipline that investigates and contributes to the understanding of criminal behaviour, Foucault views it as a field that broadens power relations and surveillance. Whilst many view penal systems or prisons as instruments for crime deterrence and reduction, he views them as tools for expanding crime (Hale et al., 2013). Obviously, Foucault’s arguments are controversial and highly debated. Goffman shares the same view. According to Goffman, when disconnected from a ‘normal’ life and transferred to a ‘people-processing’ institute, the patient would suffer ‘civil death’ (Moyer, 2001, p. 180). Their natural way of reinforcing and conveying personal identity by means of privacy, solitude, freedom of movement, personal hygiene, ownership, and so on would seriously weaken. Institutional life would expose them to a string of “abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations” (Hayward et al., 2013, p. 132) that embodied a kind of psychological violence. A progressive course would be activated, wherein the patient’s former identity was steadily debased and recreated based on a new mechanism of power relations and conditions. The only difference between their views of penal systems is the focus—Goffman focuses more on the individual, while Foucault on the larger system itself.  Even though Foucault was evidently focused on the issue of surveillance, and in fact dedicated an entire book to a specific, distinctive analysis of this concept, he was merely somewhat interested in informing his readers about the State’s ‘big brother’ qualities, and rather more interested in giving an explanation about surveillance’s individualising process—regarding the construction of the disciplined individual, instead of the suppression or domination of the individual (McLaughlin et al., 2003, p. 432). Still, Foucault’s ideas remain very influential in surveillance research nowadays, possibly due to his gloomy, threatening, and critical interpretation of the sinister, pervasive, social-restraining purposes of surveillance. A similar ‘gloomy’ image of the penal system is described by Goffman. He applied the idea of ‘moral career’ to examine the order of change in a patient’s concept of self and his/her structure of images for evaluating self and other people that this mechanism entailed (Moyer, 2001, p. 179). With their previous selves removed, patients would take on a ‘narrative’ or story to counteract the social stigma of their situation. Oddly, though, the coping mechanisms of these patients were viewed by personnel as ‘situational improprieties’ which verified the original verdict of mental disorder (Goffman, 2009).  Foucault defines monarchical power as the severe, inhumane, public kind of punishment. It is a manifestation of the unlimited power of the monarch, and a weak, unmanageable, kind of punishment; its exercise of brutal methods and strong emotions can go wrong, and the emotional crowd could even attack the government and the executioner. Juridical power, on the other hand, is the punishment from the latter part of the 18th century (Sumner, 2008). Punishment is to be impartial and balanced, with duration of imprisonment designed to reveal the severity of the crime perpetrated. It is not mainly interested in the criminal per se, who is merely re-assimilated as a whole citizen as soon as prison sentence has been completed. Foucault explains that disciplinary power emerged at the onset of the 19th century, after the concept of ‘discipline’ grew from the new penal system, and began governing prison knowledge and processes (Taylor et al., 2013). Discipline is rooted in control, re-education, correction of undesirable conduct, and continuous monitoring. Instead of trying to batter criminals, or simply imprison them for certain duration of time, disciplinary punishment tries to re-educate and normalise. Discipline uses units of space and time to organise and stabilise the social order (Hale et al., 2013). Goffman, on the other hand, explained how Foucault’s ‘discipline’ becomes necessary. Goffman’s work on Stigma makes a distinction between the racial, moral, and physical types of stigma, every one of which is derived from recognised differences that other people unfavourably assess and classify ‘spoiled identities’ (Lanier & Henry, 1998, p. 171). The individual with impairments or disorders or experiencing a mental illness would be a case of spoiled identities. And thus, people whose behaviour might suggest a personality defect, like criminals, are viewed and treated as morally wicked, corrupt, ruined, etc (Goffman, 2009). As a result, those who are stigmatised are ill at ease with their labellers, who they think have unfairly or abusively used their political and social authority to deprive them of their whole humanity (Lanier & Henry, 1998).  Foucault, who consistently decline to be linked to any academic movement or school of thought, raised an especially vital contribution to the formation of critical criminology. Foucault verges upon the theory of deviance’s analysis of governmental criminology (Van Swaaningen, 1997, p. 96): Have you ever read criminological texts? They are staggering. And I say this out of astonishment, not aggressiveness, because I fail to comprehend how the discourse of criminology has been able to go on at this level. One has the impression that it is of such utility, is needed so urgently and rendered so vital for the working of the system, that it does not even need to seek a theoretical justification for itself, or even simply a coherent framework. It is entirely utilitarian. Similarly, several of the most famous works of Goffman involved social deviance and psychiatric patients. His writings became associated with the labelling models of deviance and the anti-psychiatry campaign. A primary goal was to analyse the methods and impact of commonplace restrictions on individual freedom. Goffman believes that social controls could be used state agencies, but consistently with a ‘human face’ (Goffman, 2009). In studying Asylums, he worked as a ‘professional observer’ in Maryland’s National Institute of Mental Health. The patients of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, where he conducted ethnographic study, were regarded by psychiatrists to show strange and unpleasant behaviour specifically because they were not able to follow the ‘normal’ principles guiding face-to-face interaction (Hayward et al., 2013, p. 131). However, unlike Goffman, who focused on psychiatry, Foucault firmly focused on the history of the penitentiary, and paid minor attention to psychiatry. However, similar to Goffman, Foucault also explains how the objective of punishment per se has evolved. Both Goffman and Foucault believe that the prison is later changed from a simple representation of the power to penalise into a tool intended to create passive individuals, which functions to control and discipline individuals within and outside the penitentiary system. Epistemologically, he shows that the creation of reliable knowledge occurs within the rule of power relations (Van Swaaningen, 1997). Hence, he suggests amending the history of sexuality, of the penal institution, and the medical and psychiatric fields. With this in mind, he employs stigmatised knowledge—the knowledge of the corrupted and the criminal, and the patient and the psychopath. Foucault’s claim that humanitarianism is an inadequate justification for comprehensive penal restructuring had a considerable impact on all critical criminologists in Europe (Geis & Dodge, 2002). The subsequent work of Foucault on biopolitics resulted in the formation of ‘governmentality studies’, an academic program reorganising criminologists, political scientists, economists, and sociologists (McLaughlin, Muncie, & Hughes, 2003, p. 459). This program revolves around government actions in liberal societies, drawing on the argument of Foucault that liberalism functions through the conflict created by the contradictory yet typical need for security and liberty. Basically speaking, citizens have the freedom to govern themselves, and yet security apparatuses will be established to preclude the emergence of recognisable risks (Foucault, 1991). Foucault’s investigation of the various forms of governance contributes to the understanding of the risk-management techniques of the criminal justice system as the outcome of liberalism as a form of governance (Golder, 2013). In contrast to Foucault’s more general conception of the criminal justice system, Goffman argues that it is apparent that the process of stigmatisation is capable of reducing the capacity of those stigmatised to go back to a ‘normal’ life (Goffman, 2009). The outcome could be an attempt by those stigmatised to hide their socially and physically stereotyped impairments by creating a ‘front’ so as to look ‘normal’, specifically, as individuals with no abnormalities. Goffman’s concept of ‘total institutions’ has had major influence on labeling theory in general and particularly on knowledge about how prison or institutional life debases or brutalises the inmate (Carrabine et al., 2013). Hence, Goffman’s work contributes greatly to the understanding of the effects of institutional and social factors on the process of labelling. Especially significant, in view of the ideas mentioned, is that labelling reveals the risks intrinsic in efforts to change individuals. This is very obvious when penal or corrective interventions are misleadingly shown as rehabilitative systems that imply a ‘spoiled identity’ (Goffman, 2009).  Contributions to Criminology Foucault is interested in how criminology as an academic field develops while an entirely new mechanism of crime control is being actualised. The entire field of criminology, according to him, exists not to solve crime problems but to broaden and mobilise surveillance and power. Foucault believes that a technology of power’ is a historically particular method wherein individuals wield power over one another (DeKeseredy & Perry, 2006). Various technologies of power are widespread throughout various stages of history. He claims that technologies of power exist in all aspects of social life, as well as in factories, military, education, and heath. He is interested particularly in the function that three, historically consecutive, technologies of power fulfil in the areas of social control and punishment—monarchical, juridical, and disciplinary power (Golder, 2013). Foucault argues that the social scientific investigation of individuals, and particularly academic fields like criminology surfaced at this moment, together with the emergence of the contemporary penal system. However, the maximum security penitentiary is not the sole site in the criminal justice system wherein surveillance and discipline are situated. Foucault argues that disciplinary power supports not merely all less safe penitentiaries, but also community activities, diversion plans, and probation tasks (Golder, 2013). Furthermore, disciplinary surveillance infiltrates the social unit, with different professionals using hidden surveillance prerogatives through their expert surveillance types—the police officer-judge, the lawyer-judge, the teacher-judge (Hale et al., 2013, p. 438). Moreover, this normalisation and surveillance activity is used to a certain degree by all individuals. Through this, disciplinary ‘social control’ and disciplinary ‘punishment’ are ‘naturally’ linked to each other. On the contrary, even though some have criticised the extent to which Goffman might have exaggerated the restraining methods of institutional agencies, his works are still an important foundation for criminologists interested in examining the social realities of institutional life. Goffman’s compassionate explanation of prison life encouraged his readers to reflect on the limiting and stigmatising impact of supposedly sympathetic and rehabilitative institutions. His perceptive observational abilities showed how people’s reactions to ‘strange’ behaviour expose much about ordinary interaction and the social disadvantages of eccentricity or unconventionality. Cohen (1985), a prominent critic has summed up Foucault’s ideas as follows (as cited in Carrabine et al., 2013, p. 310): [T]he ‘Great Incarcerations’ of the nineteenth century- thieves into prisons, lunatics into asylums, conscripts into barracks, workers into factories, children into school—are to be seen as part of a grand design. Property had to be protected, production had to be standardised by regulations, the young segregated and inculcated with the ideology of thrift and success, the deviant subjected to discipline and surveillance. The newly developed disciplinary method of power which the penal system was to embody is part of an economy of power somewhat dissimilar from the sovereign’s harsh, subjective, and direct rule. However, even though Foucault’s writings are still influential, they have been rigorously criticised for not failure to differentiate between life outside and that in prison; its poor devaluing of subjectivity; and its historical incorrectness (Sumner, 2008). Therefore, it is not unexpected that scholarly view differs over the unorthodox sociological ideas of Goffman and Foucault. Supporters argue that their ideas offer perceptive, revolutionary, and ingenious ideas for understanding the criminal justice system. Detractors argue, on the other hand, that the nonconformist method of study of Foucault and Goffman is disappointingly ‘disorganised’ (Moyer, 2001). Nevertheless, regardless how Goffman and Foucault’s ideas are understood, it is certain that they provided a unique logical, systematic approach to criminology. Furthermore, whether openly recognised or not, their perceptive, profound, and thoughtful research on the self, conflict, civility, and societal institutions keeps on influencing present-day discourses in criminology. Unfortunately, it seems that Goffman’s writings have been more criticised than Foucault’s works for being ‘unsystematic’ because of the absence of organisation and their emphasis on social situations generally. However, despite these criticisms, Goffman’s works, even though highly sceptical of the study of deviance, fulfilled an important part in the effort to make sense of and broaden the scope of the Interactionist School of criminology.  Conclusions Erving Goffman and Michel Foucault are truly eccentric, revolutionary thinkers of criminology. Their eccentricity helped them see aspects of the social world that are not visible to the eyes of ordinary people. Their contributions to criminology are very influential and enduring. The similarities between these two thinkers are apparent: both are sceptical; both have a critical view of criminology; both are concerned with how the penal system has repressed and dehumanised inmates; and both are sympathetic to the common people, not to the crime control or criminal justice system. However, there are also differences between them: Goffman focused his work on the general aspects of the social world, while Foucault addressed a broad array of issues, not only in sociology and criminology but in other disciplines as well; Goffman paid much attention to psychiatric life, while Foucault talked much less about psychiatry; and Goffman provided a broad view of the interactionist perspective in criminology, while Foucault presented a specific analysis of prison, power relations, surveillance, and discipline. The contributions of Goffman and Foucault to criminology are unquestionable. Both explained the reasons for the existence of the penal system. Both believe that the penal system exists to punish ‘social deviance’, but they differ in their focus—Goffman focuses on micro aspects like individuals and interactions, while Foucault on macro factors like governance and surveillance. Both Goffman and Foucault believe that penal institutions, besides controlling deviance, can also encourage criminal behaviour through ‘labelling’, ‘stigmatisation’, and ‘harsh punishment’.  References Carrabine, E. et al. (2013) Criminology: A Sociological Introduction. London: Routledge. DeKeseredy, W. & Perry, B. (2006) Advancing Critical Criminology: Theory and Application. UK: Lexington Books. Geis, G. & Dodge, M. (2002) Lessons of Criminology. New York: Elsevier. Goffman, E (2005) Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face to Face Behaviour. New Jersey: Aldine Transaction. Goffman, E (2009) Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. UK: Simon & Schuster. Golder, B. (2013) Re-reading Foucault: On Law, Power and Rights. London: Routledge. 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