The Paddington Rail Disaster - Essay Example

 The Paddington Rail Disaster Introduction The Paddington railway accident is regarded as the most serious accident on the British Railway system which took place at 8.11 am on October 5, 1999. The accident involved two trains which crashed two miles outside the Paddington train station at the Ladbroke grove Junction in London, England. One of the trains was the Great Western, which was a high speed train running from Cheltenham to Paddington and the Thames train, which was a three car diesel unit which was on its way to Bedwyn in Wiltshire from Paddington. The accident resulted to the deaths of 31 persons and with 520 persons injured in the process. This was reported as the second major accident in the Great Western area line in a span of two years. Background The Health and Safety Commission asked the HSE to conduct an inquiry that would be able to give a full account of the crash. The inquiry was supposed to be able to provide information on the immediate technical issues surrounding the crash, and immediate actions that were taken subsequent to the collision (Ingram, 1999). The investigation Following the collision, the HSE railway Inspectorate conducted a full investigation as per the directive of the Health and safety Commission, which sought to answer three major questions in relation to the collision: why the accident happened-this was aimed at reviewing the root cause of the accident and providing information and a complete analysis of the technical causes of the collision. The investigation also sought to answer the question of the critical action that was to be taken by the Railway Inspectorate as a remedy to the problem. On this note, the investigation aimed at providing measures and putting mechanisms in action, to make it easy for a similar problem to be prevented in future. The railway inspectorate therefore focused on a long term remedy. The third objective of the investigation sought to establish whether the action that resulted to the accident could result to an action in terms of enforcement. This was aimed at screening any likelihood of negligence which would propagate prosecution. The investigation involved a public inquiry into the collision in the year 2000 by Lord Cullen. The Cullen inquiry involved two sittings, where one was divided into the accident while the second one looked at the management and regulation of the UK system (Ingram, 1999). Main points The real accident cause was appropriately identified to have been caused by driver Hodder, the one in charge of the Thames train, who passed a SN109 signal when it was indicating a red signal that is normally associated with danger, some 563 meters away from the point of collision. The public inquiry however identified several contributory causes of the accident which included Thames train driver’s driving capabilities, as he had qualified for his role only some two months earlier and the Rail track of the Great Western which was responsible for its servicing. The major contributory factors of the Paddington rail disaster can therefore be classified into three major categories: Human error-the driver of the Thames Train failed to follow the rules of the SN109 as a restrictive policy, which saw him pass the signal without making a stop. The investigation however left the reason for the violation as undetermined as the driver may not have had enough visibility to detect it. Organizational factors were also attributed to causing the collision. The report by the public inquiry identified a slack and ignorant culture in the Thames Company in regard to training and a string of miscommunication in the company. On the basis of their driver, there was incompetence on the originations part as the assigned driver had received his competency letter 13 days prior to the disaster. The organization also lacked documented evidence to show whether their driver had been taught on the complexities of the specific route he was assigned to. His examination paper also lacked signatures that had been marked to show whether he had sufficiently passed the required subjects (Ingram, 1999). Organization error was also put forward on the part of the HM Railway inspectorate as it was characterized by inspection errors and malfunctions. The Rail track signaling center at Slough contributed to the collision as they failed to pass the signal on time after the Thames Train had indicated a danger signal. The staff was wrong on this as they based their thoughts on the assumption that the train would stop as it had previously happened on the same course. On organizational errors, the Rail Tracks Great Western Zone was also blamed as a major contributing factor to the collision. This was especially after the company had failed to take appropriate action over the span of 6 years when there had been eight Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs). There was a history of 8 reported SPADs between 1993 to 1998 with SN109 being among the 22 highest signals that had been passed. Based on this history, the public inquiry established that there was an 86% likelihood of a SPAD at SN109 every year, with a 7% likelihood of collision (Ingram, 1999). Design errors were also responsible for the Paddington rail accident. In the Turbo Train for example, the investigation revealed that there was lack of a train protection system which is useful for the purpose of warning the driver of any red signal in existence and instantly brings the driver on a stop even without the driver inputting a stop with the brakes. The Paddington route also created a complex task for the drivers especially because of the automatic system that had been placed for the purpose of improving performance in the area, by having trains in and out of the area especially at peak hours. As the investigation revealed, there lacked documented evidence of drivers being sufficiently taught on the complexities of the route which was characterized by about 6 bi directional routes and several multitudinal routes. The drivers had also previously complained on the difficulty in clearly seeing the signals in the area and specifically the SN109 (Ingram, 1999). Design errors were also present as a result of the difference in the materials that were used in building the Thames train, which resulted to more passenger deaths than in the larger Western train. This was attributed to the fact that the Thames train was built in the 1990s using aluminum, which resulted to less resistance to the impact of the collision. The high survival rate in the first cabin of the Great western train on the other hand was attributed to the high standards in engineering at the Derby Works in Britain where it was built (Ingram, 1999). The investigation also sought to establish the cause of the raging inferno that composed the first carriage of the Great Western Train. One factor that was found relevant was the use of the highly flammable winter diesel with the investigation revealing a likelihood of a faulty full tank. The fault is seen to have resulted to a fuel leakage and an eventual explosion which the company disregarded on the fact that the problem occurred during filling without a recurrence. Basic ground errors were also responsible for the high number of casualties where the survivors of the crash efforts were dismissed by lack of emergency equipments and first aid rescue materials on the Great Western high speed train. The hammers for example that were used for crashing windows in case of emergency also proved to be ineffective. Site and victims management The Paddington railway accident resulted to the loss of 31 lives with about 500 casualties, which itself resulted to unending pain of loss and suffering to the injured persons and the bereaved families. During the period following the collision, all those involved in rescue operation worked closely with emergency services taking a lead with the help of other parties as the site became more accessible following the preservation of needed evidence. At the site however, the inquires revealed a lack of coordination between contractors in lifting damaged vehicles and wreckage. Rail track also failed in its task of incident management by appointing rescue and incident officers who lacked sufficient knowledge and experience and it’s only after the accident that this was affected. Although major accidents are rare, such a crucial appointment should have been made at the very beginning as a way of ensuring proper procedures had been put into action (Ingram, 1999). Effects of the collision on families Following the death of 31 personas and the injury of scores, counseling efforts followed the affected parties to come to terms with the result of the disastrous collision. In spite of the counseling efforts, most victims were regular commuters who found it difficult to get over their horrible experience and go back to commute by train. Some of them had to leave their previous jobs while others preferred to work elsewhere where it was possible to avoid boarding a train because of their post traumatic depression and anxiety over use of a train (Ingram, 1999). Claims that arose from the accident were traded as personal injury claims which made it difficult for some people to be fairly compensated. The claims for physical injuries for example had considerable disparities especially ranging from persons with over 50% burns, head injuries and those who had suffered psychological trauma as they witnessed their counterparts burning alive in the carriages (Ingram, 1999). Public response to the Paddington crash The Paddington crash elicited social outrage on the part of the public who felt that every angle of the disaster could have been prevented. Privatization has resulted to the transport industry becoming corrupted with a fragmented structure and contractors whose aim is making money at the expense of the public, as they normally have little regard to rules and regulations. The public has also been highly distraught on ignorance by both companies where the two trains impacted on a combined speed of 145 mph, with the two thousand gallons of diesel resulting to a fire ball. Some survivors have had to deal with the physical effects of the crash for almost their whole lives with one survivor having almost 40 corrective operations after graft failed due to infection. Another female survivor has had about 22 operations and has to wear a protective mask on her face as a way of concealing the scars. Train chiefs were highly criticized by the members of the public especially because they were seen to have put their shareholders before the safety of the Britons, especially by refusing to pay for a train protection unit of about 5.5 million pounds and agreeing to pay their shareholders’ dividends worth 7 million pounds. Following the Paddington train disaster, various projections of sociology can be designed and reviewed. Discourse /communication of horror-the horror of the present are contrasted with the everyday happiness that proved the disaster. In the Paddington station, people looked at the restructuring of the rail paths to accommodate more trains during the rush hour as a means of arriving at their destination faster and with much convenience. Following the crash however, people critised this measure as being unsafe especially because of the pain it brought forth to the victims and their families. The discourse of horror is mainly associated with witnesses bearing an account of the happenings, survivors giving an account of the suffering and the brutal reality that face the rescue workers who have an account with scattered bodies and debris (Ingram, 1999). An empathy discourse is also a sociological projection associated with a major disaster like the Paddington train collision. The Paddington collision exhibits two types of empathy: civic empathy that was expressed by the survivors, bereaved families, volunteers and rescue workers, and the political empathy that was expressed by the government through formulation of inquiry teams and the management of the two train companies as they sought to defend their position following the collision (Ingram, 1999). Grief has also been seen as a sociological projection of disaster in different regions where for example, the Paddington collision led to an expression of grief by the families and general public who took into intensive campaigns to have the disaster ruled as manslaughter. Acts of grief were also symbolized by rituals at various religious centers and in the site of the accident, which involved building of shrines, lying of flowers along the railway station and litting of candles at various religious centers as a way of identifying with the disaster (Ingram, 1999). Safety measures and recommendations following the accident One of the recommendations that was put across involved the need to have a rail track put and appropriate mechanisms enhanced, where signals are aligned and sighting confirmed at the time of installation and commissioning. To ensure that there is a regulation on sped and its effect in case of an accident, there was a directive to have records of casualties in accidents which speed was established as a contributing factor to accidents. It was also important for train crews to acquire improved training and briefing on emergency evaluations and practical evacuations from accident scenes. There was also a need to develop an ATP that was to be managed and funded in future through a technology system that had representation and support from major sectors in the economy. There was also a great need to ensure that the Rail Incident officer was an individual with dual competencies and experience in the area. The Paddington disaster in general resulted to an overall desire to minimize distress and improve procedures at times of disaster (Ingram, 1999). Reference Ingram, M., 1999. Second rail collision follows London. Available from http://intsse.com/wswspdf/en/articles/1999/10/rail-o20.pdf (Accessed April 26, 2013). Read More