Right Direction for Americas Long Haul National Security - Research Paper Example

 Right Direction for America’s Long Haul National Security President Eisenhower’s New Look Program juxtaposed two seemingly contrasting but necessary objectives. The New Look Program was designed to reduce the cost and size of the United States military machine while sustaining and maintaining the country’s military might and superiority respectively during the Cold War (Dockrill, 2000). This Program, which was adopted in 1953 after President Eisenhower’s ascension to power, was based on the premise that the American military could be restructured to reduce military spending while maintaining its global superiority through the increased adoption of nuclear weaponry to boost its reduced manpower (Gaddis, 1982). The Program advocated major reductions in the army and naval personnel in favor of a heightened nuclear-powered air force. The necessity for military might and superiority was dictated by the Cold War and communism aggression which demanded a fortified United States. This is a critical analysis of the presumption that Eisenhower’s New Look Program presented the right direction for America’s long haul national security. Background President Eisenhower assumed presidency after the Korean War; which was a costly affair for the United States. After taking office, Eisenhower introduced the doctrine of global peace and also embarked on a mission to revive the American economy (Gaddis, 1982; Dockrill, 1996). The high cost of the Korean War and the just concluded World War II was vivid to the American taxpayers and this necessitated a reduction in the military budget (Bowie & Immerman, 2000). These issues together with President Eisenhower’s pledge for global peace after the recently concluded global armed conflicts contributed to the creation of the New Look Program. This Program addressed both present and future American military demands because it emphasized on the increased integration of technological warfare with traditional conventional military resources to achieve an invincible military might at a reduced cost (Dockrill, 1996). The United States which had already witnessed the effectiveness of nuclear weapons during the Japanese retaliation had a practical option that demanded fewer funds as compared to conventional military strategies (Gaddis, 1982). The other benefit of the nuclear approach was that due to its inherent destructiveness it would act as a deterrent between nuclear powers and also to other communist aggressors inhibiting the occurrence of war both in the present and also in the future (Bowie & Immerman, 2000). Armed with these strengths, the New Look Program presented the right direction for America’s long haul national security. The global peace doctrine was appealing after the messy wars that had left many nations economically paralyzed. Although peace was a welcome relief to many, the Soviet Union and its communist allies posed a threat to America and its allies (Dockrill, 2000). This called for a two-pronged approach for the American statesman; to enhance the American security apparatus and also to reduce military spending (Lemmer, 1967). The president’s objectives would be realized by the increased adoption of nuclear war materials. The New Look Program recommended the development of strategic nuclear weaponry that would be used by the air force to launch both general and limited warfare. The nation that posed as the biggest threat to the United States during this time was the Soviet Union (Dockrill, 2000). This is because the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons and also because it was entrenched in communism (Dockrill, 2000). The New Look Program was based on the notion of deterrence which assumed that due to the inherent knowledge about the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, nuclear powers would avoid nuclear confrontation thereby maintaining world peace (Lemmer, 1967). This Program led to the reduction of conventional forces and the increment strategic nuclear weaponry. Arguments The New Look Program was critiqued by many and received both support and criticism from various analysts. The main arguments for this policy include: The weapons advocated by the New Look Program were highly capable and effective in enhancing American security. The United States was faced by the growing threat and hostility of the Soviet Union which had taken an aggressive stance towards all noncommunist countries (Watson, 1986). The extent of this hostility became vivid when Germany was split into two. After the division of Germany, the Western nations recognized the threat that communist regimes in the East posed (Watson, 1986). China was also under communist rule and it seemed that it wanted to expand its control to neighboring countries in the Far East (Lemmer, 1967). President Eisenhower had described the expansion of communism in the Domino Theory whereby he feared that communist countries could end up spreading the ideology to regions where the United States had influence or interest (Watson, 1986). Furthermore, American intelligence speculated that the Soviet Union was developing continental nuclear weapons that would be capable of inflicting massive damage to the United States in the near future. Although the United States could not control the Soviet Union’s weapons’ endeavors, it decided to arm itself securely to enhance a state of mutual deterrence between the two nations (Dockrill, 1996). Considering these events, the New Look Program seemed to be the best option because it served to prevent military confrontation at the present and also in the future. At the time of creating the New Look Program, the United States had superior nuclear strength and hence the communist aggressors could not dare to engage it in a war. The Program also ensured that the countries would avoid war even in future because of the mutual deterrence state (Gaddis, 1982). This argument shows that the New Look Program offered a solution for both the short-term and long-term national security concerns in the United States. The next argument for this Program was its cost effectiveness. The Korean War which occurred before President Eisenhower took office utilized a lot of government resources in order to finance the massive military machine that was used in the war by President Truman (Dockrill, 2000). After these two wars, the United States was looking to revitalize its economy; this necessitated reduced federal spending (Bowie & Immerman, 2000). The New Look Program offered a solution where the military would reduce its army and naval personnel without compromising the country’s security. Although the Program’s recommended numbers were changed after many discussions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the end result was a reduced budget for the conventional forces (Gaddis, 1982). This proposition has generated a lot of debate with many critics and analysts arguing that the net result of these reductions was nil. This is attributed to the increased spending on nuclear research and development and also on the acquisition of bombers to enhance the country’s air force (Jervis, 2001). The main argument in this case is the Program’s long-term cost viability. After the initial research projects which were significantly expensive, subsequent developments in nuclear war materials proved to be relatively inexpensive as compared to an expansive military workforce (Bowie & Immerman, 2000). This again supports the argument that the New Look Program offered a solution for the United States long-term security concerns. Counter-arguments The New Look Program has also been criticized because of various issues associated with its implementation. One such issue is that this Program undermined the American military strength and hence its superiority (Dockrill, 1996). This counter-argument was based on two policies contained in the Program. The first is the reduction of the conventional military units in the military. The second issue is the overreliance on one weapon in warfare; referring to nuclear airstrikes. According to military analysts, these two policies would impact the American military negatively in terms of strength which would in turn expose the nation to security threats (Tonnell, 2002). After the Program was adopted by President Eisenhower’s administration, the army and navy suffered massive budget cuts and this resulted in manpower and units’ reductions in the military. Although the might of nuclear weaponry is highly acknowledged, it still needs to be complemented with conventional military resources to achieve optimal results in war (Bowie & Immerman, 2000). The United States seems to have erred in assuming that the air force could win any war independently as long as it has nuclear weapons. This counter-argument is reflected in the events of the Korean War. The United States needed to use the army even after bombing the strategic facilities in Korea (Tonnell, 2002). Another limiting factor in this counter-argument is that due to the sensitivity associated with nuclear weapons, nations are reluctant to deploy them in war. This was witnessed in the Indochina War in 1954 where France suffered a humiliating defeat because allies like the United States could not help due to overdependence on nuclear weaponry (Tonnell, 2002). According to military strategists, a country needs three elements in warfare; “the sword”, “the shield” and “support”. Nuclear weapons act as the sword while other military resources provide the other two necessities. This begs the question whether this Program is really sufficient for American national security concerns in the long run. The other counter-argument concerns the cost of nuclear weaponry production. The New Look Program aimed to reduce military spending in its implementation. However Program seemed to escalate military spending in the long run (Bowie & Immerman, 2000). Developing nuclear weapons is very expensive this being the reason small countries cannot afford this endeavor. It is alleged that despite President Eisenhower’s promises to reduce military spending, the Program did not achieve this benefit. The United States engaged in massive weapons research including biological and chemical experiments in a bid to boost its military strength (Hallion, 1987). The military budget soared as these tests and developments continued and eventually it appeared as though the New Look Program was only shifting money from one military department to the next (Hallion, 1987). This uneconomical prospect of the Program may undermine its credibility as a solution for America’s long haul security concerns considering the harsh economic realities that have plagued the country since the Program’s implementation. Another issue is that this Program undermined world peace and posed the United States as a threat to global peace. President Eisenhower pledged peace since his ascension to the presidency (Dockrill, 1996). The president even introduced a peace policy based on nuclear energy where he alluded that nuclear weapons could be used to maintain global peace (Ellison, 2013). The continued increment of American nuclear weapons intimidated the free world causing objections even from American allies. The New Look Program advocated for the creation of nuclear weapons capable of unimaginable destruction as witnessed in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings (Gaddis, 1982). The Program stated that the United States had to maintain a military readiness to engage in massive retaliation against military aggressors like the Soviet Union (Ellison, 2013). The Program was adopted after World War II when there were a lot of antiwar sentiments, but the Program seemed to agitate for war ()Dockrill, 1996). This caused the world to reflect on American war ideologies and to ask whether America’s long-term security concerns are entrenched in the ideology of continued warfare. The destructive nature of nuclear warfare also undermines the basis of this Program. Nuclear weapons have adverse effects both during and after a war. Nuclear warfare as anticipated in the Program would result in massive destruction for both the aggressors and also for proximal nations (Ellison, 2013). Considering the fact that the Program allowed for massive retaliatory attacks if deterrence failed, this Program loses credibility concerning American security sustenance. Conclusion Despite its criticisms, the New Look Program managed to sustain American security during President Eisenhower’s tenure. The Program has been altered in various ways since then but some of its fundamental statutes are still the main sustainers of American peace such as nuclear might (Jervis, 2001). The counter-arguments raised against the Program are mainly ethical because they concern the effects of nuclear retaliation (Dockrill, 1996). It is important to note that in view of the many enemies that America faces, intimidation must be used in order to deter attacks. Without nuclear retaliation it is possible that most American aggressors would opt to act like Japan did in 1941 (Ellison, 2013). It is therefore necessary for the country to project a threatening image in order to discourage such reckless attacks against its citizens. The counter-argument concerning global peace does not hold water because during President Eisenhower’s tenure there were no major wars despite his implementing this Program (Watson, 1986). Finally, this Program seems to be worth its cost because it managed to sustain peace during President Eisenhower’s tenure despite the Cold War tensions (Jervis, 2001). Although there are arguments that the Program did not achieve a reduction in military spending, its effectiveness in sustaining national security compensates for its financial requisites. Recommendations The New Look Program seems to offer a solution to America’s long haul national security concerns. The Program remained effective throughout President Eisenhower’s regime. However, his predecessor President Kennedy expressed his resentment for the Program before he was even elected president. He criticized the notion that American security had to be based on nuclear intimidation (Tonnell, 2002). President Kennedy implemented a flexible military strategy that balanced all the elements in the American military (Dockrill, 2000). Similarly, this Program requires to be tailored to fit within the global security policies and guidelines. The New Look Program should be revised to incorporate several recommendations in order to optimize its effectiveness and also to increase its global appeal. The first recommendation is that the United States should strive to reduce nuclear armament domestically and also in other countries instead of competing to be the top nuclear power. After witnessing the devastating effects that accrue from nuclear attacks, it is in the best interests if the United States as a superpower to use its influence in mobilizing other nuclear powered countries to reduce their nuclear weapons stock pile. This will eliminate the threat of a nuclear war outbreak thereby boosting world peace. The Program should also be revised to balance the three arms of the military that is; the army, navy and air force. Although it is not mandatory for the three units to have equal resources, there is need to maintain reasonable congruence between them and their budgetary allocations in order to consolidate the American military apparatus. Finally, the New Look Program should condemn chemical and biological weapon research. This is the most dehumanizing scientific research whose products result in global epidemics and other catastrophes. The United States should lead the war against chemical and biological warfare in order to eliminate these destructive inventions from the world. With these recommendations the New Look Program is bound to be the best solution for America’s long haul national security concerns. Bibliography Bowie, R. R., & Immerman, R. H. (2000). Waging peace: How Eisenhower shaped an enduring cold war strategy. Oxford University Press. Dockrill, S. (1996). Eisenhower's new-look national security policy, 1953-61. Macmillan Press. Dockrill, S. (2000). Dealing with Soviet Power and Influence: Eisenhower's Management of US National Security. Diplomatic History, 24(2), 345-352. Ellison, K. E. (2013). Building A House of Peace: The Origins of the Imperial Presidency and the Framework for Executive Power, 1933-1960. Retrieved from http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=dissertations Gaddis, J. L. (1982). Strategies of containment: A critical appraisal of postwar American national security policy (Vol. 690). Oxford University Press. Hallion, R. P. (1987). Doctrine, technology, and air warfare. Airpower Journal, 1(2), 16-27. Retrieved from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj87/fal87/hallion.html Jervis, R. (2001). Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?. Journal of Cold War Studies, 3(1), 36-60. Retrieved from http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/ps154/JervisSectyDilem.pdf Lemmer, G. F. (1967). The Air Force and Strategic Deterrence 1951–1960. United States Air Force Historical Liaison Office, December, 48. Retrieved from http://www.foia.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090818-045.pdf Tonnell, B. W. (2002). Will the Bomber Always Get Through? The Air Force and Its Reliance on Technology. AIR UNIV MAXWELL AFB AL SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ada420747 Watson, R. J. (1986). History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Volume 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON DC. Read More