Risk Compensation and Road Safety Intervention - Essay Example

Risk Compensation and Road Safety Intervention Introduction Risk Compensation Theory explains that people will generally adjust their behaviour in relation to their perception of the level of risk (Hedlund, 2009). They will be more cautious when they perceive the danger to be greater and become less cautious when they perceive the danger to be less great. Alternatively, people become less careful when they feel that they are more protected and more careful when they feel that they are less protected. This theory forms the basis of fundamental benefits associated with safety interventions. However, it can sometimes produce lower net benefits than were originally anticipated. For instance, on the roads, it has been observed than motorists who wear safety belts drive faster than motorists who do not (Hedlund, 2009). Motorists drive faster when the vehicles in front of them have anti-lock brakes installed in them than when they do not have them. Again, this theory can explain why sometimes there is failure of condom distribution programs. This is because people will feel more protected and engage in reckless sexual intercourse whether or not they use the condoms. The HIV prevalence will have risen without the condoms. When the sky diving gear becomes safer, skydivers are likely to take more chances. The more chances they take the more they are likely to get into accidents. Overview Risk compensation borrows so much from behavioral adaptation, which includes all aspects of behaviour changes people make while responding to safety measures regardless of whether they are compensatory or not. Researchers use the two terms interchangeably since they are only interested in the negative adaptive or compensatory behavior. This theory was developed following road safety research after it emerged that many safety interventions on the roads did not achieve the desired result-reduce accidents on the roads. The theory has been applied in many fields to assess why the expected benefit levels from intervention measures are usually not met. Peltzman Effect This refers to decrease of predicted benefits from regulations intended to increase safety. The term was coined in recognition of renowned professor of economics, Sam Peltzman, from the School of Business, University of Chicago. He published "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation" in the Journal of Political Economy in 1975 (Surhone et. al., 2010). In this controversial journal, he argued that road safety measures had failed to reduce accidents on the roads; that highway deaths had not decreased (Surhone et. al., 2010). He argued that regulation was useless and counterproductive. Although he maintained that risk level compensation in responding to road safety regulations was complete, Peltzman was non-committal on whether this applied in all situations. Another setback of the theory is the fact that it fails to predict risk compensation magnitude in general. The Peltzman Effect can lead to a redistributing effect, a phenomenon where innocent people feel repercussions of risky behaviours. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the “moral hazard”. For instance, when risk-tolerant drivers respond to safe-driving interventions on the roads such as crumble zones, compulsory seat belts and ABC brakes, among other measures, they drive faster and pay less attention. This will likely result in more injuries and deaths to innocent people- the pedestrians. Risk Homeostasis A controversial hypothesis, risk homeostasis was initially proposed by Queen’s University’s economics professor, Gerald J.S. Wild (1982). His hypothesis suggested that people tend to maximize their benefits through comparison of the anticipated cost and the benefits of the less and more risky behaviors; introducing the idea of target level of risk (Evans, 1985). He proposed following four factors that influence an individual’s calculation of risk: Expected Risky Behavior Benefits Motorists who speed on the roads do to gain time and reach their destinations faster. They are preoccupied more with the benefits of fast driving than with the likely consequences such as accidents on the roads. It also helps them fight boredom and monotony as well as increase their mobility on the roads. Expected Risky Behavior Costs Motorists and vehicle owners may prefer to buy speeding tickets so that they have the justification to drive faster on the roads. Some drivers may fail to repair their cars as they view doing so to be expensive. Yet, others may have insurance that covers them in case of accidents. This makes them careless on the roads, as they know that they are covered. Yet others may fail to insure their vehicles due to insurance surcharges. Expected Safe Behavior Benefits Drivers will be more cautious on the roads if they get insurance discounts during no-accident periods; they will most likely take safety measure seriously so as to enhance their reputation and sense of responsibility (Rudin-Brown, G., & Jamson, 2013). Expected Safe Behavior Costs Some drivers may shy away from buying comfortable seat belts as they deem them expensive, and instead buy cheaper but uncomfortable seatbelts. Expected costs include peers calling you a coward and loss of time. Wilde noted that when the driving rule was changed in Sweden- driving on the right instead of driving on the left-rate of traffic fatality was reduced for about 18 months. Afterwards, the pervious trends returned to normal levels. He argued that drivers had been more cautious at first due to perceived danger (Evans et al, 1985). However, after getting them accustomed to the new side of the road, they became bolder and took more risks; they became less careful, explaining why the values resumed to their previous states before the switch on the roads. They got used to the new regime-new ways of doing things. Munich Study In this study, a fleet of taxicabs was used. Half of the fleet was fitted with anti-lock brakes (ABS). The other half acted as control (they were fitted with the traditional brake systems). The fleet remained identical in all other aspects. They were studied over a period of three years. The ABS- break system cars had higher crash rates than the conventional break-system cars. Wilde reached a conclusion that the ABS-equipped car drivers felt they were safer and took higher risks while the non-ABS drivers thought they were not as safe, so they were more careful and took lower risks (Evans et. al., 1985). Disputes Risk homeostasis has been disputed from many quarters. One author asserted that the hypothesis lacks sufficient support to make it viable. Another proposed that it is “a flat earth hypothesis”. Yet a third observed that the proposal commanded little media attention. What led to the disputes was the fact that drivers adapted not due to the perceptions of varying risks through compensatory behaviors. Rather, it was a homeostatic process, one that produces equilibrium towards safety-related outcomes. Road fatality statistics have fallen significantly since inception of safety measures, facts that do not support the theory. Road Transport Safety Anti-lock Brakes They increase safety of the vehicle as they are designed to reduce skidding during braking. Numerous studies attest to the fact that ABS-fitted vehicle drivers develop a tendency to drive faster; they follow the vehicles in front of them closer and take longer to brake. This tendency accounts for failure of the ABS brakes to achieve their original intended purpose-to reduce accidents on the roads (Hedlund, 2009). The researches were conducted in Denmark, Germany and Canada. A civil engineering professor from Purdue University, Fred Mannering, led a study that favored risk compensation. He termed it the “offset hypothesis.” A Munich study concluded that crash rates for both ABS-fitted cars and non-ABS-fitted cars was constant; ABS-fitted car drivers took more risks. However, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety conducted a study and released its findings in 2010: motorcycles installed with ABS braking systems significantly reduced fatal crash by 33% (a third) as compared to models that were not fitted with the ABS. Bicycle Helmets A Spanish Research was conducted from 1990 to 1999; the results were that motorcyclists wearing helmets and involved in accidents had a less likelihood of having violated traffic laws compared to motorcyclists with no helmets; motorcyclists with helmets were more likely to have over speeded and been involved in accidents as compared to motorcyclists who wore no helmets. The researchers concluded that “whereas the results do not have a significant risk compensation mechanism regarding the motorcyclists with helmets, such a possibility cannot be ruled out.” In yet another experimental study, adults who were used to wearing helmets were observed to cycle more cautiously (slowly) without a helmet (Hedlund, 2009). There was no notable difference in speed between those who are accustomed to helmets and those who do not always wear the helmets. Motorists can also change their behavior as regards helmeted cyclists. An England-based study by walker found that 3000 vehicles overtook a helmeted cyclist less cautiously- by a clearance of 8.5 cm, than the clearance they gave to cyclists without helmets (20 cm). These differences are significant and were re-analyzed by Olivier (the analysis is beyond the scope of this paper). Rodgers re-analyzed the data from the above study, showing that helmets were effective; he found errors in data and weaknesses in the methodologies. He reached a conclusion that because “bicycle-related fatalities are positively and considerably associated with increased helmet use,” risk compensation explains this tendency. Seat Belts A research conducted in 1994 on people who wore and never wore seatbelts reached a conclusion that drivers drove faster and less cautiously when belted. When the British government contemplated the passage of the seat belt legislation in 1981, John Adams, a professor from University College London, faulted the proposition, citing no substantial evidence and correlation between the legislation and accident reductions. He compared states with seat-belt laws and those without and argued that there was no significant reduction in fatalities and injuries. He proposed that some injuries occurred among road users and other road users; and between road users and pedestrians (Hedlund, 2009). The “Isles Report” reiterated the concerns. Adams argued that there were other factors such as drunk driving that contributed to road accidents. He proposed the introduction of breath tasting for drivers who drove under the influence of alcohol. However, a 2007 research based on National Highway Traffic Safety Administration data, showed that from 1985-2002, there were “considerable reductions in death rates for passengers and motorcyclists following implementations of belt-safety laws” and that “use of seat belts lower fatality rates for pedestrians, passengers and motorists and other road users, even in the presence of other traffic safety measures and various demographic factors.” Driving on the Right in Sweden When the drive-on-the-right change was made in Sweden, there was a considerable drop in crashes and injuries. This was linked to an increase in perceived risk. Number of motor insurance claims dropped by 40%, but returned to normal in the next six week. The rates of fatality returned to normal after two years. This can be explained thus: initially, the drivers took more caution, but later dropped guard and became careless on the roads (Jackson, 1994). Shared Space In this approach, road designers consciously use risk compensation to increase uncertainty levels for drivers and road users by removing conventional demarcations such as curbs, traffic signs and road surface markings between vehicle traffics. This approach has been proven to result in lower speeds and low road casualties. Speed Limits Controlling traffic speed through speed limits, road bumps and other speed-calming methods have played a significant role in reducing road casualties. However, not all these measures can achieve desirable measures without accompanying them with the relevant traffic law enforcements. In a 1994 research aimed at testing the Risk Homeostasis Theory, by use of driving simulator, showed that increase in posted speed limits and reducing speeding fines led to significant increase in driving speed without significant change in frequency of accidents. The study also found that increased cost of accident significantly reduced accident frequency without change in choice of speed. These findings suggest that regulating specific risky behaviors, including choice of speed, have little influence on the rate of accidents (Hedlund, 2009). Conclusion Road safety intervention measures may have achieved the purposes for which they were intended, but risk compensation takes center stage in explaining why there are still rising cases of road accidents despite various road safety intervention measures. This paper has looked at the available literature; listed various researches conducted and conclusion reached. The paper has also looked at the Risk Homeostasis Theory and how it explains accident phenomena witnessed on the roads. At the end, a conclusion is made that many factors combine to explain why some road safety-intervention measures have succeeded while others have not, including perceived risks, behavioural adaptation and uncertainties. References Evans, L., & General Motors Corporation. (1985). Risk homeostasis theory and traffic accident data. Warren, Mich: General Motors Research Laboratories. Hedlund, A. (2009). "Risky business: safety regulations, risk compensation, and individua- behavior". Accident Prevention 6 (2): 6:82–89. Jackson, J. S. H. (1994). A simulated driving test of Wildes risk homeostasis theory. Ottawa: National Library of Canada. Rudin-Brown, G., & Jamson, T. (2013). Behavioural Adaptation and Road Safety: Theory, Evidence and Action. CRC Press. p. 67. Surhone, L. M., Tennoe, M. T., & Henssonow, S. F. (2010). Unsafe at any speed. United States: Betascript Publishing. Read More