Risk Management in Preventing Disasters: The UK Intelligent Networks - Research Paper Example

A Major loss or disaster of your choice 1.0. Introduction: Before a research paper of this genre is posted, it is necessary to understand what the term disaster means in real terms. According to Frederick C. Cuny, disaster specialist, it is “A situation resulting from an environmental phenomenon or armed conflict that produced stress, personal injury, physical damage, and economic disruption of great magnitude.” (Disaster, 2010). Another major characteristic of a disaster is that most often outside support and disaster management becomes necessary to cope with the catastrophic situation and overcome the resultant crisis arising on account of the said disaster. For instance a bomb disaster would require the services of bomb specialists and forensic experts to provide vital clues about its perpetration. The major loss that is being discussed about in this paper is the stark naked terror that stalked the streets of London and unleashed gory terror in its most virulent form in several underground railway stations in London on that fateful day of July 07, 2005, killing 52 people, maiming 700 others, and leaving countless innocents, grievously injured. It was a tri-series of bomb blasts ripping through the carriages of London’s underground railway system by a suicide squad of four member, who also killed themselves in the blasts. There were also bombs planted on rear end of a double decker bus while it was traveling through Tavistock Square killing and injuring many more The London suicide bombings assume significance from the fact that it showed that no matter how strong and vigilant a security system may be, it is not infallible and safe in the face of determined and malicious anti-social elements that are quite capable of wrecking the lives or ordinary, innocent citizens of any country without the least provocation, or exacerbation. Perhaps one the major lessons learned from the London bombings 2005 is that no security system can ever lay claims to be safe and fool proof and it is the duty and responsibility of each individual to take care of his/her own life and property, and it would indeed be injudicious to expect the law and order machinery or the armed forced to protect and secure the lives and properties of common citizens against the machinations of criminals and terrorist gangs operating clandestinely and posing as law abiding citizens in a free world. More significantly, it is not known what this terrorist gang had achieved from this suicide bombing except lose their own lives and the precious lives of other 52 common citizens of this country and also injure 700 others. If it is a violent reminder of religious or political groups, intent upon exposing the limitations in the law and order machinery, it has served little purpose, since this has only reinforced and bulwarked the present law and order and surveillance systems in London city to circumvent and arrest any future occurrences of this genre and dimension. While there has been no let up in the security, there were no physical checking or X raying of belongings of persons in these stations, or their haversacks and thus these four suspected terrorists, their ringleader. Mohammed Siddique Khan (30), Shehzad Tanweer (22), Germaine Lindsay (19) and Hasib Hussain (18) escaped unnoticed to carry out their dastardly attacks on innocent civilians. While the Al Quada had claimed responsibility for the London bomb attack, the exact involvement of these dead suicide bombers in this terrorist outfit is not known, although it is believed that their leader, Mohammed Siddique Khan had visited Pakistan some time ago, and could have possibly received terrorist training in madrassas (Encyclopedia 7 July 2005 London bombing, 2005). Detailed description of three blasts on board enroute trains and blast on bus 1. 8.50am Train No 204 Traveling between Liverpool Street and Aldgate (death toll 7) Third carriage was approx.100 yards (90m) down to tunnel from Liverpool street. Damages occurred to parallel tracks Hammersmith 7 city line The parallel track of the Hammersmith and City Line from Liverpool Street to Aldgate East was also damaged. 2. 50 seconds later Train No.216 Edgware Road to Paddington (death toll 6) Train just left King’s Cross Station Eastbound circle line train in other line was also damaged 3 50 seconds later Train No. 311 King’s Cross street Pancras and Russell Square (death toll 26) Blast occurred just one minute after train left King Cross Station- at rear end of carriage causing extensive damages 4 09.47 am LXO3BUF Tavistock Square (death toll 13) The explosion ripped the roof off the top deck of the vehicle and ruined the back of the bus. 2.0. Background: Since year 2002, the UK Government has taken strong and active measures for effectively countering threats posed by Islamic terrorism in its soil and quite few intelligence reports activated on time have help thwart numerous terrorist designs on British soil. It is indeed interesting to note that “Al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda inspired terrorism remains the biggest threat to the UK’s national security. The Security Service estimates that over 2,000 people in the UK pose a terrorist threat and in March 2005 it was estimated that there were up to 200 al-Qaeda trained operatives in the UK. The British-based threat does not only affect the UK: a number of British Muslims have been convicted in foreign courts or have fought for (or trained with) terrorist or extreme Islamist groups abroad.”( Simcox et al n.d). It has been the principal motives and intentions of British Intelligence and the prevailing law enforcement machinery to “reduce the risk from international terrorism so that people can go about their business freely and with confidence.” (Great Britain: Intelligence and Security Committee 2006). Failure of British Intelligence Network: How and why the British Intelligence Office (BIO) could not predict and prevent this dastardly attacks on innocent civilians remains in the realms of dubiousness and doubts. This is not far to seek since most terrorist criminals carry out their nefarious tasks well under cover, and with strong upfront and alibi to avoid suspicion, detention and possible arrest proceedings. The fact that they received moral and material help from local terrorist sources also cannot be rule out, especially keeping in mind the fact that these attacks have all the markings and stamp of professionalism and meticulous planning and execution, which perhaps led to its successful ending. It is believed that while intelligence reports are received from all quarters day in and day out, most of them are of an inferential type and is not corroborated by facts and evidence. Actions by the various counter terrorism agencies base their programmes and action plans of verified facts and not hearsay or uncorroborated facts. Secondly, co-ordination between the various security agencies like Secret Services, (SS), Secret Intelligence Services,( SIS), Government Communication Head Quarters (GCHQ), Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) are absolutely necessary since counter- terrorism is a national phenomenon and needs to be tackled at several intergovernmental levels and hierarchies and power consolidation and decision making cannot just be conferred upon just one agency or intergovernmental agency or institution.” (Hiles 2007). In the case of the London Bombings in 2005, the main aspects that have got to be covered are with regard to the facts: 1. Whether any intelligence reporting, which may have assisted in preventing attacks, have been missed or oversighted 2. Is the sufficient cause to justify that perhaps a lowering of security at these sites were possible, prior to the attacks, and to consider what impact this had on the overall security landscape and risk assessment scenario, keeping in view the fact that people cannot carry powerful bombs in public places and allow these to kill and maim the general public, themselves included. 3. What lessons have been learnt from the London Blasts(2005) and what action plans are now being taken for ensuring passenger safety in United Kingdom’s public transport systems including railway networks and bus services. Besides the aspects of co-operation and co-ordination between various diverse security agencies and intergovernmental agencies that are responsible for the internal safety and security in the country, it is necessary to understand that it is also necessary to invoke and include the citizens in risk management measures. While how heavily armed operatives (with bombs) could escape security dragnet in public places, enter and blow up trains and buses through remotely controlled devices (or timed mobile phones used as detonators) is indeed a security lapse by any stretch of imagination, it is also the bounden duty of fellow travelers to notice and apprehend suspicious behaviour and bring these fugitives before the due process of law. Again, risk management also necessitates the enrollment of armed security personnel inside public vehicle and mobile means of transportation to circumvent and thwart terrorist designs to upset law and order. In the case of this attack, it could be mentioned that the primary objective of the London Bombing 2005 perpetrators was to waylay the pubic security & law and order network and create public hysteria, which perhaps, they were able to do for a day or two. 3.0. Risk Management Cycle: (Risk Analysis & Risk Management, n.d). There are several methods in which identification of all significant risks could be made: 1. Identify all significant risks 2. Evaluate the potential frequency and severity of losses. 3. Develop and select methods for managing risk. 4. Implement the risk management methods chosen. 5. Monitor the performance and suitability of the risk management methods and strategies on an ongoing basis.” (Page 3: 1st Lecture: The nature of Risk Management) 3.1. Risk Identification: “The first step in the risk management process is risk identification.” (2nd Lecture: Risk identification : Provided by customer) The risk identification in this particular case would be with regard to the dangers posed by armed suicide bombers capable of causing mortal injuries to themselves and ordinary citizens. There is no immediate motive or benefit for terrorist attacks, except perhaps an emotional or religious one, and this is an important consideration, since killing without motives is more dangerous to frustrate and even more difficult to establish – there are no witnesses left and no perpetrators to stand trial, except a few charred bones and a handful of ashes. However a great deal of tracing back evidences could be made, and the accomplices or sympathizers for such brutal acts of public murder could be arrested and made to stand before the due process of law. However direct and indirect links needs to be authentic and forceful and withstand the rigors of a courtroom, or a judicial inquiry. Risk identification needs to be based on solid evidences and proof of guilt, much less on inferences and accusations, however vociferous they may seem to be. Accusations without clinging evidences are pure rhetoric, music to the ears of the speaker and to nobody else, much less the jury. 3.2. Risk Measurement: The measurement of risk has to be in commensuration with the level and depth of the risks. In the case of national security it is believed that the maximum risk measurement has to be put into place for assessment. This could be in terms of internal security reports received from SIS, GCHQ, JIC and JTAC. These intelligence reports could be assessed for high risk presence considered the fact that there are evidences to prove entry and movement of members of foreign terrorist groups since year 2002 and yet nothing concrete has been done to monitor and observe conduct of such elements who could pose dangers to the country. However many terrorist groups have contacts which are essentially local are also home grown and could also escape the scanner due to local patronage. Thus, the intelligence agencies need to dig longer and deeper than feeders based on inferences and nee to measure and report on the real risks posed by global terrorism operating from British soil. “Individuals are included in this study if, in addition to being “homegrown,” they participated in, or provided illegal support for, jihadist terrorist plots. Thus, this study encompasses not just operatives, but also recruiters and those who illegally provided logistical or financial support.” (Gartenstein-Rose& Grossman 2009). Risk Analysis: It is necessary that risk analysis does not ignore or brush aside any lead, however slighted it may appear to be. In this bombing case, it is seen that “An earlier claim by British security officials that the four attackers were unknown to them was contradicted by an official admission on July 17 when officials revealed that at least one of the bombers – Khan -- was known to British intelligence before the attacks.” (The Attacks of London, n.d). Besides that damaging bit of evidence it is also believed “And FBI reports revealed that U.S. intelligence had warned that Lindsay, the fourth bomber who died in the worst of the attacks, was on a terror watch list, but Britain's MI5 had failed to monitor him,” (The Attacks of London, n.d). 3.4. Risk Decision: The risk decision would be consensus decisions he best way to tackle the risks and through tactical strategies minimize and even obviate the major risks. Thus it is necessary to consider before hand, the various protective and safeguarding strategies that could be put into place. While in the case of the London blasts, CC TV Footage was able to identify the perpetrators, this could not be of much use because they were all dead by the time the blast was over. 3.5. Risk Implementation: Once the policy decision has been decided upon as risk decision, it is now necessary to implement these risk decisions. If the need to employ commandos with automatic weapons is necessary to control and monitor crowded place which are soft targets for terrorist attacks, these need to be done. If haversacks needed to be checked by security before boarding and disembarking from public places, this needs to be done without much ado. 3.6. Risk Monitoring: Coming next to the aspect of risk monitoring, it may be mentioned that risk identification, assessment, decision making and implementation need to be smooth and even flowing and each should naturally emanate from the earlier. Risk monitoring is constant vigil all over the country not only by the security agencies, but also by common citizens for the sake of their own safety and security. “The United Kingdom remains a potential target for terrorist activity, with terrorist attacks occurring in 2005 and 2007.” http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/united_kingdom 3.7 Policy: Policies need to be changed, improved and upgraded to suit contemporary risk landscapes. In the context of the UK portfolio, it is evident that with major terrorist strikes in 2002 and 2005, it is necessary to overhaul the entire security system in the country and revamp the major policy decisions enforced to date, in the larger security interest of the community and citizens. “By executive decree, property could be destroyed or requisitioned, assemblies banned, freedom of movement limited, the Armed Forces mobilised and special courts set up to deal with suspects if it was felt another atrocity was planned.” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-354996/Cobra-committee-plans-terror-attack-response.html 4. Risk Management Strategy: A common strategy would be in terms of identifying and understanding the deficiencies of the current systems, remedying ills and creating a broad based and flexible system that could be remodeled at a minute’s notice. The psyche of terrorists is more in terms of creating psychological warfare such that denizens would remain in a constant state of anxiety and tenseness, which could indirectly boost their nefarious business with least interference and resistance. While terrorism itself is gaining control over the subject’s mind through mental subversions and radicalisation , similar mental tools and techniques could be used to correct the ills and bring the person back on normal paths. On a broader scale it could consist of safeguarding private and public property and lives of subjects through strong security enforcement and check systems. The economic factors of such high powered security systems is much lower than the value of human lives and therefore need to play only a secondary role. “A wider goal is to encourage trustees to adopt a risk –based approach to better identity and minimize potential threats, and to reduce the potential for harm in this sector from terrorist- related abuse.” http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/tkch1mod2.pdf 5.0. Conclusions: Terrorist attacks could occur at any time and to anyone without prior warnings. One the one hand it is necessary to step up security and safeguarding measures to avoid, or mitigate the losses due to terrorist operations, and on the other, it is also necessary that panic situations do not arise that could cause more harm than good. Law enforcement need to consider that the common good of the community is of greater importance than the comfort or convenience of an individual or a group of persons, however important they may be. Thus, anti terrorist measures should seek out common good of large majority of citizens. Since these attacks do not follow any fixed mode and suicide bombers do not live to provide statements, it is necessary that security systems are 100% fool proof and bespoke kind that could provide maximum security at least costs and 6.0 Recommendations: “Vigilance must therefore be maintained at all times in the future, not just immediately after an incident.” http://www.family-security-safety.com/terrorism.html Therefore the main aspects regarding non occurrence of future disaster wrought by terrorist designs need to consider heightened degree of security and safeguard in soft targets. Reference List Disaster, 2010. [Online] Business Dictonary.com. Available at: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/disaster.html [Accessed 8 December 2010]. Encyclopedia 7 July 2005 London bombing, 2005. [Online] Nation Master. Available at: http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/7-July-2005-London-bombings [Accessed 8 December 2010]. Gartenstein-Rose, D. & Grossman, L., 2009.An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process. [Online] FOD PRESS. Available at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/downloads/HomegrownTerrorists_USandUK.pdf [Accessed 8 December 2010]. Great Britain: Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006. Report into the London terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005. [Online]The Stationery office. Available at: http://books.google.com/books?id=rL9XbDNXw_cC&printsec=frontcover&dq=London+bombings+2005&hl=en#v=onepage&q=London%20bombings%202005&f=false[Accessed 8 December 2010]. Hiles, A., 2007.The Definitive Handbook of Business Continuity Management. [Online] John Wiley and Sons. Available at: http://books.google.com/books?id=8Gxm9i95lAIC&pg=PA498&dq=London+bombings+2005&hl=en#v=onepage&q=London%20bombings%202005&f=false[Accessed 8 December 2010]. Risk Analysis & Risk Management, n.d. [Online] rule works. Available at: http://www.ruleworks.co.uk/prince2/images/risk-cycle.gif[Accessed 8 December 2010]. Simcox, R. et al., n.d. Islamist Terrorism. [Online] Social cohesion. Available at: http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/uploads/1278089320islamist_terrorism_preview.pdf [Accessed 8 December 2010]. The Attacks of London, n.d. [Online] CTV.Ca. Available at: http://www.ctv.ca/generic/WebSpecials/london_attacks/index.html [Accessed 8 December 2010]. Read More